{"id":2461,"date":"2014-05-13T16:23:30","date_gmt":"2014-05-13T21:23:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/?p=2461"},"modified":"2023-05-09T12:02:15","modified_gmt":"2023-05-09T16:02:15","slug":"crossing-the-ocean-by-feeling-for-the-bits-investor-state-arbitration-in-chinas-bilateral-investment-treaties","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/2014\/05\/13\/crossing-the-ocean-by-feeling-for-the-bits-investor-state-arbitration-in-chinas-bilateral-investment-treaties\/","title":{"rendered":"Crossing the Ocean By Feeling For the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China\u2019s Bilateral Investment Treaties"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Lima, Peru. Photo by Matias Ilizarbe via Unsplash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In the 1970s, China began to sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but refused to grant foreign investors the right to sue their host government in international arbitration tribunals.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Few realize that China\u2019s treaty negotiations have in fact abandoned this restriction in almost every Chinese BIT signed since 1998, including those with Latin America. Scholars have suggested that China reversed its policy in order to support Chinese overseas investors or to fit its general economic liberalization strategy.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However, China\u2019s BITs with Mexico, Peru and Colombia and its arbitration case with Peru contradict these theories.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In a <\/span>2014 working paper<\/i><\/b><\/a>, Amos Irwin argues China began signing BITs to test the risks of granting open access to European countries and the United States for whom open access is a key condition.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Main findings:\u00a0<\/b><\/b><\/h5>\n