Selective Engagement and Strategic Retooling: Chinese Loans to Africa Database, 2000–2024

Luanda, Angola. Photo by Shawn Clark via Unsplash.

A new update to the Chinese Loans to Africa (CLA) Database, managed by the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, estimates that from 2000-2024, Chinese lenders signed 1,319 loan commitments amounting to $180.87 billion with 49 African governments and seven regional institutions.

In 2024, Chinese loans commitments to Africa remained concentrated among a small group of borrowers, falling again to just under $2.1 billion. The current level reflects China’s ongoing strategic recalibration of its economic engagement with African countries.

The CLA Database is an interactive data project tracking loan commitments from Chinese development finance institutions (DFIs), commercial banks, government entities and companies to African governments, state-owned enterprises and regional multilateral institutions.

A new policy brief by Mengdi Yue, Diego Morro, Nicolò Capirone and Yiyuan Qi analyzes the state of Chinese lending to Africa reflected in this database update.

Main findings:
  • Total loans: Between 2000-2024, 42 Chinese lenders signed 1,319 loan commitments amounting to $180.87 billion with 49 African governments and seven regional institutions.
  • New loans: In 2024, China’s loan commitments to Africa totaled just under $2.1 billion. With only six projects financed across the entire continent, this pattern reflects a shift toward selective engagement with strategic partners.

Figure 2: Chinese Loan Commitments Compared with World Bank and African Development Bank, 2000–2024

Source: Authors’ illustration based on African Development Bank (2024, 84); World Bank (2025); Chinese Loans to Africa Database, Boston University Global Development Policy Center, 2025.
  • “Back to basics” for sectoral lending: Lending remained concentrated in transportation, energy transmission, water and sanitation and financial services—sectors with challenges in attracting private investment. Fossil fuel projects, energy generation and information and communication technology (ICT) stopped receiving additional loans in 2024, with ICT now largely market driven.

Figure 3: Chinese Loan Commitments to Africa by Sector, 2000–2024

Source: Chinese Loans to Africa Database, Boston University Global Development Policy Center, 2025.
  • Shift toward new financing modalities: China increasingly employs RMB-denominated loans, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) on-lending via domestic banks in African countries and FDI.
    • In Kenya, all 2024 infrastructure loans were RMB-denominated, contrasting with the USD-denominated borrowing that dominated the 2010s.
  • Energy lending evolves: Only one energy loan commitment was confirmed in 2024. It illustrates a pivot from generation and fossil fuels to grid infrastructure. Renewable energy projects are increasingly implemented through FDI or trade rather than sovereign loans.

Figure 7: Chinese Loan Commitments to Africa in Energy, by Energy Source, 2000–2024

Source: Chinese Loans to Africa Database, Boston University Global Development Policy Center, 2025.
  • Geographic and risk prioritization: Lending in 2024 is mostly concentrated in countries with established relationships, deeper markets and clearer profit potential, reflecting a more selective and risk-averse approach by Chinese financial institutions. Angola received the largest share, at $1.45 billion for energy transmission and road projects, followed by smaller commitments to Kenya, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Senegal.

As the era of billion-dollar projects winds down, China’s evolving financial instruments may define a new, more selective phase of engagement. With 2026 unfolding under the banner of the China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges, it remains to be seen whether China’s partnership with Africa will retain its depth.

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