Back in Action: The Ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sees Renewed Relations and Development Prospects

By Tianyi Wu
For those suggesting China has disengaged from its cooperation with Africa, Chinese leader Xi Jinping sent a clear message at the recent ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC): China is back and reaffirming its commitment to support “modernization” in African countries, offering its own development model as an example.
How will this “joint pursuit of modernization path” unfold? Analyzing key documents from the Ninth FOCAC, including Xi’s speech, the Beijing Declaration and the 2025-2027 Action Plan, in both English and Chinese, reveals China seeks to adjust its approach with Africa by forging strategic partnerships, compartmentalizing financial tools for various development projects and aligning its engagement with regional multilateral initiatives.
At the Summit, Xi announced pledges of $51.32 billion, including “RMB 210 billion ($29.6 billion) in credit lines, RMB 80 billion ($11.8 billion) in assistance in various forms and RMB 70 billion ($9.87 billion) in investments from Chinese firms,” plus a $50 million contribution to the China-World Bank fund. The speech did not detail the specifics, but based on historical credit instruments used by Chinese development finance institutions (DFIs) and commercial banks, credit lines are expected to include preferential export buyers’ credits and commercial loans that are supported by insurance from Sinosure.
The phrase “assistance in various forms” seems to be a translation of “援助” in the Chinese version of the speech, which actually means “aid.” Based on this, the $11.8 billion in assistance will likely come from China’s aid budget, which includes grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans with interest rates between 1 percent and 2 percent, as specified in China’s foreign development assistance regulations.
Notably, this year’s FOCAC marks the first rise in summit pledges since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with dollar amounts rising to 2019 levels, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: FOCAC pledges in 2019, 2021 and 2024

Strategic partnerships
Xi Jinping announced the elevation of China-Africa relations to an “all-weather community with a shared future,” the first continental-level upgrade since 2015. “All-weather” signals the close and lasting relationships Beijing aims to build with African countries. The concept of a “community with a shared future” is tied to the emphasis on “modernization,” positioning China’s development pathway as a model for Africa.
Strategic partnerships were established or elevated to higher levels with 30 African nations (see Table 1 for the hierarchy and interpretations of China’s bilateral diplomatic relations), marking a significant diplomatic push, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Notably, South Africa’s relationship was upgraded to an all-round strategic cooperative partnership. China also strengthened its relationships with Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Senegal and Zimbabwe by upgrading them to comprehensive strategic cooperative partnerships and fostering a “community with a shared future” with these nations. Djibouti, Togo, Cameroon, Rwanda and Burundi also entered into comprehensive strategic cooperative partnerships with China.
Table 1: Hierarchy and interpretations of China’s bilateral diplomatic relations
外交关系层级 | Level of Diplomatic Relations | Interpretation |
---|---|---|
战略协作伙伴关系 | 1. Strategic Partnership of Coordination | Highest level of foreign partnership with Beijing, cooperation on all front |
战略合作伙伴关系 | 2. Strategic Cooperative Partnership | Coordination and corporation of wide-ranging issues, including strategic interests at geopolitical, political and economic levels |
战略伙伴关系 | 3. Strategic Partnership | Countries with strategic importance at political, economic, and geopolitical levels, Beijing aims to increase their level of engagement to navigate through existing frictions |
合作伙伴关系 | 4. Cooperative Partnership | Economic cooperation as the main issue area |
合作/伙伴/友好关系 | 5. Cooperation/
Partnership/Friendship Relations |
Partnership is limited to specific issue and has room for further improvement |
Source: Legarda (2021), BBC China (2024), China Institute of International Relations (2023).
Figure 2: Diplomatic relations of African countries with China, post-FOCAC 2024

Figure 3: Countries with upgraded bilateral relations with China, post-FOCAC 2024

Compartmentalized financial approach
The FOCAC 2024 Beijing Action Plan suggests a compartmentalized approach in channelling various financial flows from China. A broad differentiation is drawn between projects funded through “development assistance (援助)”, which contain an aid-like flow by definition of Chinese foreign aid) and those funded through “development finance 融资),” which are leveraged non-aid like instruments by definition of Chinese foreign aid. According to the Action Plan, projects that improve “people’s livelihoods” will be in the budget line for development assistance, following the “small and beautiful” principle. Meanwhile, development finance that mixed “(preferential) buyer’s credit, commercial lending, equity investment and trade finance” will support larger projects through “market-oriented” approaches, particularly in infrastructure, trade and industrial sectors.
Livelihood projects: Development assistance and “small and beautiful”
Over the past three years, China’s overseas development finance has shifted from large infrastructure projects to smaller, more focused initiatives due to domestic economic pressures and sovereign debt concerns. While this was evident during the post-COVID-19 period, the FOCAC 2024 Beijing Action Plan has clarified that this shift applies specifically to development assistance projects as well, following the “small and beautiful” principle.
This principle denotes that the focus of aid-like development assistance will be channelled to small-scale livelihood projects such as urban and rural development, gender equality, health, education and water management. Specifically, China will “use development assistance to deliver 1,000 ‘small and beautiful’ projects to improve people’s livelihoods (援助实施1000个小而美民生项目).” This principle reflects a more cautious approach to allocating grants and concessional resources. Table 2 provides examples of recent livelihood pledges and projects.
Table 2: Development assistance pledges on livelihood projects ($11.8 billion budget line)
Pledges | Description | Value |
Agriculture | Emergency in-kind, agriculture centers and technical assistance and capacity building programs. | $141.793 million |
Climate Change | 17 climate mitigation and adaptation projects. | Amount not specified |
Digital Economy | 18 E-digital economy projects. | Amount not specified |
Gender Equality | In-kind support and capacity building for women. | Amount not specified |
Green Energy | PV installation and power storage. | Amount not specified |
Military | Capacity-building and training. | $1.4 billion |
Source: FOCAC Beijing Action plan (2025-2027), 中非合作论坛北京行动计划(2025-2027).
Infrastructure, trade and investment: Development finance and a “market-oriented approach”
Similar to development assistance, the Action Plan also outlines how development finance will be channelled under the financing cooperation segment. Specifically, China aims “to support infrastructure development, energy resources development, agricultural and manufacturing development, and the integrated development of the entire industrial chain in Africa through a combination of concessional loans, other types of loans, equity investment and trade financing.” In essence, China is moving away from traditional DFI lending as the sole form of project-based finance and to a more blended-finance approach.
The deals signed during FOCAC 2024, as shown in Table 3, also signal that China is not moving away from large-scale infrastructure and renewable energy projects in Africa but is using a new finance model that involves public-private partnerships (PPPs) and commercial creditors. These initiatives include Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway extension and Tanzania-Zambia Railway rehabilitation. In the energy sector, Chinese companies are advancing solar and hydroelectric projects in Zambia, Nigeria, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with renewable energy gaining prominence over traditional hydropower. China is also investing heavily in digital and ICT infrastructure, particularly in Cabo Verde and Egypt, enhancing tech capabilities and promoting innovation. Additionally, China has expanded market access for African goods through tariff reductions and signed multiple trade deals. Investment focus also includes critical minerals and industrial development in countries like Nigeria and Zambia.
Table 3: Development finance deals on infrastructure, trade and investment at FOCAC 2024
Source: Author’s elaboration.
Anchoring engagement to multilateral initiatives
The 2024 FOCAC Beijing declaration is anchored to multilateral initiatives including China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and other regional initiatives. The focus is on forging strong synergies between China-led multilateral initiatives and Africa’s regional development agendas. Infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are now integrated with Africa’s Programme for Infrastructure Development (PIDA), focusing on regional connectivity. In the energy sector, China’s backing of renewable projects aligns with Africa’s Agenda 2063, shifting from hydropower to solar and wind to meet sustainability targets. Through the GSI, China supports Africa’s security cooperation for stability. China also aims to strengthen nuclear energy cooperation through multilateral initiatives including African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE). Additionally, China’s involvement in health cooperation, particularly its support for the Africa Center for Disease Control (CDC), is also highlighted.
This shift is seen as a step towards greater African agency in addressing the imbalance in China-Africa relations, with China aligning itself to support Africa’s agenda. However, these plans remain tied to Chinese initiatives, reflecting China’s goal to engage Africa more comprehensively and position itself as a counterbalance to Western-led multilateralism. The extent to which this alignment truly reflects African agency remains uncertain. Still, it presents new opportunities for African policymakers to create more strategic and proactive roadmaps for their relations with China, leveraging China’s recognition of the need to evolve its engagement. This could lead to deeper development synergies amid changing domestic and global dynamics.
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