

## MIAOQING JIA

270 Bay State Road

Boston MA 02215 USA

Phone: (518) 366-2899

Email: [jiam@bu.edu](mailto:jiam@bu.edu)

Website: <https://sites.google.com/view/miaoqingjia>

---

### EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2022

Dissertation Title: *The Inappropriate Use of Medicine with Policy Implication*

Dissertation Committee: Ching-To Albert Ma, Randall P. Ellis, Marc Rysman

B.A., Economics and Mathematics (*Summa Cum Laude*), Union College, Schenectady NY, 2016

### FIELDS OF INTEREST

Health Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization

### PUBLICATIONS

“[Online Work Habits and Academic Performance](#),” (with Tomas Dvorak) *Journal of Learning Analytics* 3.3 (2016): 318-330.

### WORKING PAPERS

“[The Inappropriate Use of Medicine with Policy Implication](#),” October 2021. Job Market paper.

“[Informal Gift Exchange in the Public Health Sector](#),” March 2021.

### WORK IN PROGRESS

“The Effect of China’s Health Care System Reform on Self-Medication”

### PRESENTATIONS

Boston University Applied Microeconomics Dissertation Workshop, Boston, MA 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021

### FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dean’s Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2016 – Spring 2021

Summer Stipend, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2017 – 2021

President’s Commission on the Status of Women Senior Scholarly Activity Award, Union College, 2016

Martin Terry Resch Prize, Department of Mathematics, Union College, 2016

Seward Fellows, Union College, Spring 2014 – Spring 2016

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Data Analysis for Managerial Decision-Making (graduate), Questrom School of Business, Fall 2021

Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Health Economics (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2019 – Spring 2021

Teaching Assistant, Health Economics (graduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2019 – Spring 2020

Teaching Assistant, Energy and Environmental Economics (graduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2018  
Teaching Fellow, Introduction to Macroeconomics (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2017 – Spring 2021

**QUALIFICATIONS**

Passed Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Level III, Passed Financial Risk Management (FRM) Level II

**LANGUAGES**

Chinese (native), English (fluent), Cantonese (fluent)

**COMPUTER SKILLS**

STATA, SAS, Mathematica, R, Python, LaTeX

**CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS**

China/F1

**REFERENCES**

**Professor Ching-To Albert Ma**

Department of Economics  
Boston University  
Phone: (617) 353-4010  
Email: [ma@bu.edu](mailto:ma@bu.edu)

**Professor Randall P. Ellis**

Department of Economics  
Boston University  
Phone: (617) 353-2741  
Email: [ellisrp@bu.edu](mailto:ellisrp@bu.edu)

**Professor Marc Rysman**

Department of Economics  
Boston University  
Phone: (617) 353-3086  
Email: [mrysman@bu.edu](mailto:mrysman@bu.edu)

## **The Inappropriate Use of Medicine with Policy Implication (Job Market Paper)**

Excessive use of medicine may raise pharmaceutical costs due to microbe becoming drug resistant. Not all patients recognize this. Forward-looking patients recognize the negative externality; myopic patients ignore it. I study how decisions of forward-looking and myopic patients interact in a multi-period model. I assume that future pharmaceutical costs will increase in the current average consumption quantity. A perfectly competitive market with marginal cost pricing is inefficient due to myopic patients' over-consumption. A monopolist sets prices above marginal costs, so all patients consume less. I show that a monopolist's higher prices reduce consumption and mitigate the excessive use of medicine. Monopoly may result in higher social welfare than perfect competition.

## **Informal Gift Exchange in the Public Health Sector**

I study informal gift exchange in the public health sector in China. In the public system, a physician receives a fixed salary and additional payments from patients. A guilt effect from violating professional norms limits the size of informal payments. In the private system, the guilt effect vanishes because of the legalization of informal payment. Without receiving the fixed salary, the physician in the private system abandons patients who offer low payments. The distribution of patients' wealth levels and the physician's outside option affect the relative welfare in both systems. If too many patients are left behind, the regulator will support the public system.