

MIAOQING JIA

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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2022

Dissertation Title: *The Demand Uncertainty of Inappropriate Use of Medicine with Policy Implication*

Main advisor: Ching-To Albert Ma

M.A., Political Economy, Boston University, Boston MA, 2019

B.A., Economics and Mathematics (*Summa Cum Laude*), Union College, Schenectady NY, 2016

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Health Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Applied Theory

PUBLICATIONS

“[Online Work Habits and Academic Performance](#),” (with Tomas Dvorak) *Journal of Learning Analytics* 3.3 (2016): 318-330.

WORKING PAPERS

“[The Demand Uncertainty of Inappropriate Use of Medicine with Policy Implication](#),”
October 2020. Job Market paper.

“[Informal Gift Exchange in the Public Health Sector](#),” March 2020.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“The Effect of China’s Healthcare System Reform on Self-Medication”

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dean’s Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2016 – Spring 2021

Summer Stipend, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2017 – 2021

President’s Commission on the Status of Women Senior Scholarly Activity Award,
Union College, 2016

Martin Terry Resch Prize, Department of Mathematics, Union College, 2016

Seward Fellows, Union College, Spring 2014 – Spring 2016

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Data Analysis for Managerial Decision-Making (graduate), Questrom School of Business, Fall 2021

Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Health Economics (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2019 – Spring 2021

Teaching Assistant, Health Economics (graduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2019 – Spring 2020

Teaching Assistant, Energy and Environmental Economics (graduate), Department of

Economics, Boston University, Fall 2018
Teaching Fellow, Introduction to Macroeconomics (undergraduate), Department of
Economics, Boston University, Fall 2017 – Spring 2021

QUALIFICATIONS

Passed Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Level III, Passed Financial Risk Management
(FRM) Level II

LANGUAGES

Chinese(native), English(fluent), Cantonese(fluent)

COMPUTER SKILLS

STATA, SAS, Mathematica, R, Python, LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS

China/F1

REFERENCES

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The Demand Uncertainty of Inappropriate Use of Medicine with Policy Implication (Job Market Paper)

The inappropriate use of medicine leads to higher medical costs for patients in subsequent periods. I analyze patients' decisions on medicine use in a two-period model. The patients' utility from taking medicine in the second period depends on their consumption of medicine in the first period, which is internalized only by forward-looking patients but not by myopic ones. This externality leads to market failure under both perfect competition and monopoly. However, the price of medicine is higher in equilibrium under monopoly than under perfect competition, which mitigates the inappropriate use of medicine in the first period and leads to higher social welfare.

Informal Gift Exchange in the Public Health Sector

I study informal gift exchange in the public health sector in China. In the public system, a physician receives a fixed salary and additional payments from patients. A guilt effect from violating professional norms limits the size of informal payments. In the private system, the guilt effect vanishes because of the legalization of informal payment. Without receiving the fixed salary, the physician in the private system abandons patients with low payments. The distribution of patients' wealth levels and the physician's outside option affect the relative welfare in both systems. If too many patients are left behind, the regulator will support the public system.