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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2022 (expected)
> Dissertation Title: *Essays on Unemployment Insurance*
> Dissertation Committee: Johannes F. Schmieder, Kevin Lang, M. Daniele Paserman

M.A., Political Economy, Boston University, Boston MA, 2018

M.Sc., Economics, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile, 2015

B.A., Economics, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile, 2011

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Labor Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics

WORKING PAPERS

"Unemployment Insurance with Individual Savings Accounts," September 2021. Job Market paper.

"The Labor Supply Effect of Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers," (with Matthew Gudgeon, Johannes F. Schmieder, Simon Trenkle and Han Ye), September 2021, draft upon request.

WORK IN PROGRESS

"Behavioral Effects of a Generosity-Neutral Unemployment Insurance Reform," (joint with Dante Contreras)

PRESENTATIONS

BU Applied Micro Dissertation Workshop, Boston, MA, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021
BU Applied Micro Student Workshop, Boston, MA, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021
Chilean Pensions Authority Seminar Series, Santiago, Chile, 2018
Department of Economics Research Seminar, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile 2018

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Graduate Student Fellowship, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Boston University, 2016-2021
Institute for Economic Development Research Grant, Boston University, 2019
Best Graduate in Class, M.Sc. Economics, Universidad de Chile, 2015
Scholar, Advanced Human Capital Formation Program, CONICYT, Ministry of Education, Government of Chile, 2012-2013.

October 2021

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Johannes F. Schmieder, Boston University, Fall 2017-Current
Research Manager, Centro de Microdatos, Universidad de Chile, 2015-2016
Instructor Professor, Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, 2013-2015
Executive Editor, Journal *Estudios de Economía*, 2012-2013

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Labor Economics (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2020

Lecturer, Data Analysis (Graduate), Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Fall 2015, Fall 2016

Lecturer, Political Economy (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Spring 2014, Spring 2015

Lecturer, Labor Economics (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Fall 2015

Lecturer, Applied Microeconometrics (Graduate), Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Spring 2014

Lecturer, Econometrics (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Fall 2014

Teaching Assistant, Public Finance (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Spring 2012

Teaching Assistant, Econometrics (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Fall 2010, Spring 2010

Teaching Assistant, Microeconomics (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Fall 2010, Spring 2010

Teaching Assistant, Statistics (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Spring 2009, Fall 2010

LANGUAGES

Spanish (native), English (fluent)

COMPUTER SKILLS: Python, Stata, Matlab, LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: Chile/F1

REFERENCES

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Boston University
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PABLO GUZMAN-PINTO

Unemployment Insurance with Individual Savings Accounts (Job Market Paper)

Traditional Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems have undesirable negative effects on job search effort due to a moral hazard problem. Alternative UI designs have emerged with the goal of helping the unemployed without distorting their incentives. In this paper I study a system based on Individual Savings Accounts (ISA) where workers participate in a mandatory savings program. At job separation, they can withdraw these funds and in case of low savings the government provides supplemental resources. I analyze the efficiency gains of the ISA modality by estimating the effect of an extra monthly payment on nonemployment durations and comparing it with its analog estimate but when UI funds are provided by the government. I exploit eligibility conditions and administrative data available in Chile, where these two forms of funding coexist. I find that, by implementing a Regression Discontinuity Design, UI extensions financed by government funds have a larger effect on nonemployment durations compared to the case when the generosity of UI payments is given by the savings of the unemployed. For this last estimate I used a dynamic panel data model with individual fixed effects. Results are consistent with the prediction of the elimination of the moral hazard problem when ISA are used.

The Labor Supply Effect of Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers *(with Matthew Gudgeon, Johannes F. Schmieder, Simon Trenkle and Han Ye)*

Extending Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits can affect labor supply along two margins: it can lengthen the unemployment duration of an individual who is entering UI – the intensive margin – and it can alter the inflows into UI – the extensive margin. We study both margins of the labor supply effect of UI for older workers using German Social Security data and policy variation over 3 decades. We document extensive margin responses in the form of sharp bunching in UI inflows at various age discontinuities in UI eligibility among workers in their late 50s who use UI as a pathway into early retirement. We present evidence of intensive-margin responses among similarly aged workers using regression discontinuity designs at multiple age-based UI thresholds. To quantify the effects of UI extensions on time out of work along both margins, we use the reduced form bunching and RDD evidence to estimate a dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply in which individuals face retirement and search intensity decisions. We estimate and validate the model using moments that exploit extensive policy variation in UI and retirement institutions. Preliminary calculations suggests that both margins are important: for example, a 6-month UI extension for men above age 50 increases non-employment durations by around 0.84 months on the intensive margin, while the extensive margin effect is around two to three times as large.

Behavioral Effects of a Generosity-Neutral Unemployment Insurance Reform *(joint with Dante Contreras)*

In 2015 Chile implemented a reform to its Unemployment Insurance (UI) system that changed the replacement rates used for benefit calculations. Since this system is based on Individual Savings Accounts (ISA), we can study the behavioral impact of this measure given that the reform did not vary the generosity of UI payments. We set to test the standard rational-agent model that only predicts changes in behavior (job search effort) due to a relaxation of liquidity constraints, and we aim to verify whether models with behavioral biases better explain the empirical results.

October 2021