ENRICO DE MAGISTRIS

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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2022 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Three Essays in Economic Theory*
Main advisor: Barton L. Lipman

M.A., Political Economy, Boston University, Boston MA, 2018

M.Sc., Economics and Social Sciences, Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan, Italy, 2015

B.Sc., Economics and Social Sciences, Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan, Italy, 2013

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Mechanism Design

WORKING PAPERS

"Choice of Outside Options in a Bargaining Model," September 2021. Job Market paper.

"Incomplete Preferences or Incomplete Information? On Rationalizability in games with private values," March 2021, submitted.

WORK IN PROGRESS

"Information Design with Heterogeneous Priors," October 2018.

PRESENTATIONS

World Congress of the Econometric Society, Milan, Italy, 2020

GAMES 2020, Budapest, Hungary, 2021

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Summer Research Grant, Boston University, Summer 2018
Dean's Fellowship for Graduate studies, Boston University, 2016-2017
Scuola Matematica Interuniversitaria (SMI) participation scholarship, Summer 2015
(Summer school in Mathematics, graduate level)
Merit Award, Regione Sardegna, Italy (Fall 2010)

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Professor Jawwad Noor, Boston University, Boston, MA (Fall 2018)

Research Assistant for Professor Pierpaolo Battigalli, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy (Spring 2016 and Summer 2017)

Internship at Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER), supervised by Professor Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy (Spring 2015)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Game Theory (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2021

Teaching Assistant, Microeconomic Theory (PhD), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2021

Teaching Assistant, Mathematics for Economics (PhD), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2020

Teaching Assistant, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2019, Spring 2018 and Fall 2017

Teaching Assistant, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2019

Teaching Assistant, Mathematical Economics (Master's), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2020, Fall 2019 and Spring 2018

Teaching Assistant, Economics of Information (Master's), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2020

Teaching Assistant, Game Theory (Master's), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2019

Teaching Assistant, Behavioral Economics (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2018

LANGUAGES

Native in Italian
Fluent in English
Working knowledge of Spanish

COMPUTER SKILLS: MATLAB, LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: Italy/F1

REFERENCES

Professor Barton L. Lipman	**Professor Juan Ortner**	**Professor Chiara Margaria**
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Choice of Outside Options in a Bargaining Model (Job Market Paper)

I study bargaining between a buyer and a seller when the seller can invest in generating outside options at a cost, and the buyer cannot observe her investment choice. I model the negotiation phase as an incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational direct mechanism, which maximizes a weighted average of the buyer's and seller's expected payoff. When the weight on the seller is larger, trade happens with certainty, the price equals the buyer's valuation, and the seller does not invest in generating outside options. When the weight on the buyer is larger, the optimal mechanism is a posted price mechanism at the lowest outside option that the seller could have, provided that the cost function of the seller is increasing in first order stochastic dominance, and the probability of trade is strictly below 1, even if it would be socially efficient to trade.

Incomplete Preferences or Incomplete Information? On Rationalizability in games with private values

I propose a notion of Rationalizability, called Incomplete Preference Rationalizability, for games with incomplete preferences. Under an appropriate topological condition, the incomplete preference rationalizable set is non-empty and compact. I argue that incomplete orderings can be used to model incomplete information in strategic settings. Drawing on this connection, I show that in games with private values the sets of incomplete preference rationalizable actions, of belief-free rationalizable actions (Battigalli et al., 2011; Bergemann and Morris, 2017), and of interim correlated rationalizable actions (Dekel et al., 2007) of the universal type space coincide.

October 2021