

SILVIA VANNUTELLI

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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2021 (expected)

Dissertation Title: *Three Essays in Applied Microeconomics*

Dissertation Committee: Ray Fisman, Daniele Paserman, Johannes Schmieder

Visiting PhD Student, University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, 2019-2020

M.Sc., European Economy and Business Law, (*Summa Cum Laude*), Univ. of Rome Tor Vergata, 2015

B.S., Political Science (*Summa Cum Laude*), University of Roma Tre, 2013

Visiting Student (Erasmus Program), Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, 2012-2013

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Public Economics, Political Economy, Labor Economics

PUBLICATIONS

“Social Preferences in Larger Groups: Keeping up with the Joneses and Keeping Track of the Tails,” (w. Raymond Fisman and Ilyana Kuziemko), *Journal of the European Economic Association*, (2020)

WORKING PAPERS

“From Lapdogs to Watchdogs: Random Auditor Assignment and Municipal Fiscal Performance in Italy,” (Job Market Paper) October 2020.

“80 Euro for a Vote? The Electoral Effects of Stimulus Transfers in Italy,” 2020.

“Bringing Them in or Pushing Them Out? The Labor Market Effects of Pro-cyclical Unemployment Assistance Reductions,” (w. Gerard Domènech-Arúmi), 2020, *Submitted*.

“Rules, Discretion and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting,” (w. Francesco Decarolis, Raymond Fisman and Paolo Pinotti), 2019, *Submitted*.

“Gender and Bureaucratic Corruption: Evidence from Two Countries,” (w. Francesco Decarolis, Raymond Fisman, Paolo Pinotti and Yongxiang Wang), 2020, *Submitted*.

“The Distributional Preferences of Americans, 2013-2016,” (w. Raymond Fisman, Pamela Jakiela and Shachar Kariv), 2020, *Submitted*.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“The impact of immigration on local labor markets: Evidence from the 2007 EU enlargement” (w. Vittoria Dicandia)

PRESENTATIONS

TOBIN Project, Inequality and Decision Making Graduate Student Workshop (Discussant, October 2020)

Harvard University, Department of Government (November 2020, scheduled)

Northwestern University – Kellogg School of Business, Development Lunch Seminar (May 2020)

University of Chicago, Harris School of Policy – Political Economy in the Chicago Area (March 2020)

Harvard University, Department of Government - Graduate Lunch Seminar (December 2019)

University of Chicago, Harris School of Policy - Political Economy Lunch Seminar (November 2019)

EALE 2019, European Association of Labor Economists (Uppsala, September 2019)

ECINEQ 2019, Society for Economic Inequality (Paris, July 2019);

SIOE 2019, Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (Stockholm, June 2019)

IEB (Institut Economia Barcelona) 8th Workshop on Political Economy (June 2019)

TOBIN Project, Inequality and Decision Making Conference (April 2019)

Bank of Italy, Public Finance Division Workshop (Rome, December 2018)
World Bank - Bank of Italy Conference - Building Human Capital for the 21st Century (Rome, 2018);

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Manuel Abdala Gift Research Grant, Boston University, 2020
Graduate Research Abroad Fellowship, Boston University, 2020
Graduate Research Abroad Fellowship, Boston University, 2019
Visitinps Fellowship, Italian Social Security Agency, 2019
Research Fellowship, Italian Institute for Public Policy Evaluation (INAPP), 2018-2019
Summer Research Award, Boston University, 2018
Bank of Italy Summer Fellowship, 2017
Dean's Student Fellowship, Boston University, 2015
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) Summer School Fellowship, 2015
European Union Erasmus Fellowship - Paris 1 University Pantheon-Sorbonne, 2012-2013

DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

Women In Economics (WeOrg), Boston University, Co-Chair, 2017-2019
"Women In Economics: Research, Ideas, Solutions, Executions" (WeRise) Conference, Boston University, Organizer, Summer 2019
Graduate Economics Association, Boston University, Officer, 2017-2018

REFEREE EXPERIENCE

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Economic Inequality, Social Science Research

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Raymond Fisman, Boston University, Fall 2016 to Spring 2017, Fall 2020
Research Assistant for Francesco Decarolis, Bocconi University, Spring 2018 to Spring 2020
Research Assistant for Francesco Decarolis, Boston University Fall 2017

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Modern Difference-in-Differences Designs, ICPSR, University of Michigan, Summer 2020
Teaching Fellow, EC 367 Economics of the Public Sector, Boston University, Fall 2016
Teaching Fellow, EC 379 Markets and Development Economics, Boston University, Fall 2016

LANGUAGES: Italian (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate), Spanish (beginner).

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, R, Python, LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: Italian/F1

REFERENCES

Professor Raymond Fisman

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Professor Daniele Paserman

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Professor Ilyana Kuziemko

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Professor Johannes Schmieder

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From Lapdogs to Watchdogs: Random Auditor Assignment and Municipal Fiscal Performance in Italy (Job Market Paper)

Monitoring is a common tool to mitigate agency problems. Monitors themselves, however, may be biased or corrupted, in particular if they feel obliged to please the party that appoints them. In this paper, I evaluate whether shifting control over auditor assignments improves monitoring effectiveness and impacts outcomes of the audited party. In 2011, Italy switched from allowing mayors to appoint municipal auditors to a system of random assignment, to strengthen oversight and ensure the financial soundness of municipal budgets. My identification exploits the reform's staggered introduction across municipalities in a generalized difference-in-differences setting. I obtain three main findings. First, treated municipalities increase their net surpluses by 9% and debt repayments by 8%, in accordance with national government objectives. Second, the improvement is achieved through revenue-based consolidation, rather than by cutting expenditures. Third, treatment effects are significantly larger for municipalities that were more at risk of collusion before the reform, and for those that are matched to a more distant or less connected auditor. Taken together, these findings provide novel quantitative evidence of the importance of independence in auditing, and highlight the improvement in outcomes that may result from changes in the design of monitoring institutions.

80 Euro for a Vote? The Electoral Effects of Stimulus Transfers in Italy

This paper investigates the effect of a large stimulus payment on the electoral performance of the incumbent government. I leverage the quasi-exogenous variation at the municipal level in the share of beneficiaries of a large tax credit introduced in Italy in 2014, immediately before an election. I apply a difference-in-differences design to study the effect of the policy on electoral performance of the incumbent party in subsequent elections. The program yields significant electoral returns: a 1 percentage point increase in the share of recipients leads to a 0.19 percentage points increase in the incumbent party's vote share in subsequent elections. The effect persists up to 5 years after the policy introduction. Overall, results provide evidence of sustained reciprocity and retrospective voting.

Bringing Them in or Pushing Them out? The Labor Market Effects of Pro-cyclical Unemployment Assistance Reductions (with Gerard Domenech-Arumi) *Submitted*.

We causally estimate the effects of pro-cyclical unemployment-assistance (UA) reductions on job search behavior and re-employment outcomes using reform-induced changes in UA durations for older workers in Spain. Benefit reductions are effective in bringing workers back to work and reduce non-employment duration, but also induce displacements out of the labor force and strong substitution patterns towards less generous UA programs, highlighting the social insurance role of long-term benefits during economic downturns. Despite the sharp drop in non-employment duration, we also document a large decrease in re-employment wages, consistent with a reduction in workers' reservation wages and limited duration dependence.

Rules, Discretion and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting (with Francesco Decarolis, Raymond Fisman and Paolo Pinotti, 2019) *Submitted*.

We study discretion and corruption in Italian government procurement auctions, using a confidential database of firms and procurement officials investigated for corruption by enforcement authorities. We show that discretionary auctions are associated with corruption only when conducted with "too few" bidders or employing discretionary criteria. Further while "corruptible" discretionary auctions are chosen more often by officials investigated for corruption, they are used less by procurement administrations investigated for corruption. These findings fit with a framework in which discretion leads to efficiency and also theft opportunities, and a central monitor manages this trade-off by limiting discretion for high-corruption procedures and locales.