

PABLO CUELLAR

270 Bay State Rd

Boston MA 02215

Phone: (857) 265-6692

Email: pcuel@bu.edu

Web site: www.pablocuellar.com

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2021 (expected)
Dissertation Committee: Juan Ortner, Barton Lipman and Dilip Mookherjee

M.A. Political Economy, Boston University, Boston MA, 2019

M.A. Applied Economics, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile, 2014

B.S. Industrial Engineering, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile, 2012

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Applied Microeconomic Theory, Law and Economics

WORKING PAPERS

“Voluntary Disclosure of Evidence in Plea Bargaining,” September 2020. Job Market Paper.

“Venture Capital contracts under Disagreement,” June 2020.

“Bargaining over an Endogenous Surplus,” June 2020.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Delegation and Learning”

“Knowledge Transfer among Agents”

PRESENTATIONS

6th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Budapest, Hungary, 2021 (scheduled)

30th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook University, 2019

52nd Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association, Montreal, Canada, 2018

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Research Grant, Institute for Economic Development, Summer 2018

Graduate Scholarship, Boston University, 2015 - 2020

Master Scholarship, Chilean Government Conicyt, 2013 - 2014

WORK EXPERIENCE

Risk Analyst, BCI, Santiago, Chile, March 2015 - July 2015

Summer Intern, Fundación Sol, Santiago, Chile, Summer 2014

Summer Intern, Consorcio Seguros, Santiago, Chile, Summer 2013

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Legal Issues in Economics, Department of Economics, Boston University,
Summer 2019

Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston
University, Fall 2016

Teaching Fellow, Microeconomics I (master level), Department of Industrial Engineering,
Universidad de Chile, Fall 2013
Teaching Fellow, Microeconomics II (master level), Department of Industrial Engineering,
Universidad de Chile, Spring 2013
Teaching Fellow, Advanced Microeconomics (master level), Department of Industrial
Engineering, Universidad de Chile, Spring 2012 and Spring 2013
Teaching Fellow, Industrial Organization, Department of Industrial Engineering, Universidad
de Chile, Fall 2012 and Spring 2012
Teaching Fellow, Microeconomics, Department of Industrial Engineering, Universidad de
Chile, Spring 2012

LANGUAGES

English (fluent), Spanish (native)

COMPUTER SKILLS

MATLAB, Python, Java, LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS

Chile/F1

REFERENCES

Professor Juan Ortner
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-4399
Email: jortner@bu.edu

Professor Barton Lipman
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-2995
Email: blipman@bu.edu

Professor Dilip Mookherjee
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-4392
Email: dilipm@bu.edu

PABLO CUELLAR

Voluntary Disclosure of Evidence in Plea (Job Market Paper)

I study how voluntary disclosure of new information affects outcomes in plea bargaining. A prosecutor negotiates a sentence with a defendant, who is privately informed whether he is guilty or innocent. The prosecutor investigates for evidence about the defendant's type during the negotiation. If they fail to reach an agreement before the costly trial, payoffs are assigned depending on the evidence. Voluntary disclosure gives rise to endogenous second order uncertainty. Even though the prosecutor is purely motivated to get a high sentence, she might disclose exculpatory evidence. Voluntary disclosure leads to inefficient outcomes; they might fail to reach an agreement before trial. Mandatory disclosure is socially preferable: they always reach an agreement before the trial. Moreover, the prosecutor is better off under mandatory disclosure. The defendant is also better off if he is innocent and worse off if he is guilty.

Venture Capital Contracts under Disagreement

I study how disagreement about noncontractible future decisions affects the optimal investment contract between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist. The investment contract is incomplete, but it specifies control right and cash-flow rights for each party. The control rights are valuable because both parties openly disagree about the optimal future decisions. The optimal contract differs depending on which party offers it; when the entrepreneur offers it, he relinquishes control rights for high values of the required investment, and in general, more disagreement makes him less likely to keep the control rights. The entrepreneur is better off with more disagreement if either the required investment is low enough, or high enough. If the venture capitalist offers the contract she always keeps the control rights.

Bargaining over an Endogenous Surplus

I study a bargaining model between two players with endogenous probability of recognition and endogenous surplus. At each period they can make two types of effort: productive effort, that increases the surplus; and unproductive effort, that affects the probability of being recognized as proposer. With convex effort cost players increase the surplus for some periods before ending the game. I characterize how comparative advantages of each player affect the effort decisions over time. I show that comparative advantages in the unproductive effort affect the provision of both types of effort. But advantages in the productive effort only affect the effort decision of the productive effort. Different time preferences only affect the productive efforts if the probability of recognition is not persistent, and both types of efforts if it is persistent.