


The Core Journal

Volume VII / Spring 1998



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A Collection of Essays
on Core Texts and Authors



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The Story

*Of him who knew the most of all men know;
who made the journey; heartbroken; reconciled;*

*who knew the way things were before the Flood,
the secret things, the mystery; who went*

*to the end of the earth, and over; who returned,
and wrote the story on a tablet of stone. (Gilgamesh, i).*

You walk into the large lecture hall amid throngs of students, their nervous and excited voices blending with an ancient music you've never heard before into a strange symphony. Finding a seat with a new friend, you pull out a crisp notebook with an emblazoned cover, and a slick, sophisticated uni-ball. And then a man walks onto the stage, approaches the lectern, and begins to talk of epic heroism. . .

There may indeed be something heroic in the pursuit of scholarship, in the willingness "to try", as Montaigne did, a new idea, a fresh introduction, a controversial exploration. The papers, poetry, and responses in this year's edition of the Core Journal hope to represent both an overview and a synthesis of some of the many ideas that have been incubated and hatched over the past two years.

We would like to thank the distinguished professors of the Core Curriculum for their guidance, especially Professors Nelson and Jorgensen for their patience and insight. We also thank all of the students for submitting their work to the Core Journal. In the end, the Journal wishes to be more than just the sum of its parts, for its true spirit is in the many hours and countless pages that each student labored over in a truly heroic effort. Good luck to all Core scholars in the future, and remember the Master's teaching: "Learn as if you were following someone you were frightened of losing" (*Analects*, Book VIII, 17).

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The Fireside Tales

by Carrie Gross

In the month of February bleak and drear,
the bitter cold drew ten men near
to embark on a discussion before the fire.
And they agreed to talk and never tire,
for an answer they were trying hard to find
to whether Milton was really a great mind.
They took his great epic poem, *Paradise Lost*,
and tried to find out at any cost
whether religious ideas should be poetry
and whether with them they could agree.
There was first Chaucer who once spoke in tales,
hunched over and cynical, he did not fail
to make the others laugh at his witty comments,
although at their expense most were meant.
Next in the circle Cervantes did sit,
matching Chaucer with his considerable wit.
He regarded the others as he did Don Quixote
who had no idea that stories aren't reality.
Shakespeare did not even crack a smile,
for their bawdy jokes lacked all of his style.
He sat for the most part bored amid the din,
falling asleep with his hand supporting his chin.
There was the great poet Donne among the ten,
who was a little saddened by the lack of women.
Although he claimed he now thought sex was sin,
he wished a sweet blond would soon join in,
and with dotting ears listen to all he would say,
hoping his wise words would get him a roll in the hay.
Saying his prayers fervently sat Calvin,
preoccupied with the filth of all their sin.
He was dressed all in black, heaving many a sigh
mourning for Adam who had damned us all to die.
Machiavelli heard his prayers and laughed loud,
this man would never gain power in his religious cloud.
"A man has to be strong, confident and upright!"
Like Milton's Satan who put up a great fight?
Montaigne sat with Cervantes sharing some win.
He had really come to enjoy the talk and dine.
To Machiavelli, he called "Please keep it down,

Not all of us want to wear a powerful crown.”
Unlike Calvin, he felt life should be savored,
(especially good wine, which was berry flavored!)
Bacon sat with five test tubes filled with liquid blue,
trying to find an answer to whether it was true
that he could change the fate of the human race
by finding out what acid to mix with his base.
The others watched him with some suspicion
but decided not to disturb his concentration.
Spinoza could not bother to notice anyone,
for he was busy working on a new definition
to enlighten the world to follow his lead
for one could always deduce from his seeds.
Yet, lost in his intellect, he caused some smirks,
as he forgot his copy of Milton’s poetic works.
And in the corner Descartes sat shaking,
his pledge to stay in his room he was forsaking.
Still in his nightgown and looking about feverishly,
he was not sure of the reality of all he did see
illusions and images the others could be.
He ignored them, rereading Milton with a clear mind
to see without prejudgments what he could find.
If you are wondering why Petrarch was not present
at this great and memorable event,
I have to say that I truly do not know,
perhaps he never really made it down from Mont Ventoux.
And eventually Chaucer decided it was time
to talk about Milton and his lack of rhyme.
“Well, he does write in some amazing verse,
but I prefer my style, not to be terse.
Into my rhymes, I put all my energy,
maybe he couldn’t rhyme because he couldn’t see.”
Montaigne thought that wasn’t much of a joke,
“That’s low to make fun of his personal yoke!”
Chaucer continued on then to talk about Eve,
and how she was presented as so easy to deceive.
“Milton hates women even more than the Wife of Bath,
who for herself and her race felt considerable wrath.
Adam is made out to be this innocent loving boy,
who fell to the words of Eve who was so coy.”
Donne suddenly interrupted with a shout,
“Yeah, that Milton knows what it’s all about.
Women tempt you with their pretty, beseeching eyes,
and their tiny voices speak in loving cries.
Poor Adam, who only wanted to love her forever,

and live in goodness, his bond to God never severed.”
To which Calvin felt the need to reply,
“Poor Adam? If not for him, we would not die!
He could have resisted Eve’s fateful request,
and then our lives would not be of sin and unrest.
Just because you and Milton feel women make men weak,
I do not think Adam was really quite so meek.”
Cervantes then exploded, “What is the deal?
Don’t you know Adam and Eve weren’t real?
You believe in them just as ardently,
as my Don Quixote in his tales of knight errantry!”
Calvin in this heard all his beliefs denounced.
Usually a peaceful man, on Cervantes he did pounce.
He was predestined to heaven or hell anyway,
So why not do a little sinning in his day?
“Everything, they caused it, Adam especially!
I know he was real, I know he ate from the tree!
If he wasn’t then why, O tell me why,
will we all someday be doomed to die?”
Calvin then settled down and broke into tears
lamenting the fleeting passage of his years.
Montaigne put a comforting arm around Calvin and went,
“Listen, really, you have no need to repent
like Adam and Eve, though Milton says they do.
Hey, they ate from the tree, wouldn’t you?
They only did what they wanted at the time,
and you can’t turn back on an upwards climb.
It’s no use to live in constant regret.
You may as well continue life and forget
about the past, and attempt to feel cheer
for the good and bad which you must hold dear.”
Machiavelli stood up and clapped, “Here, Here,
Finally someone who does not live in constant fear!
Now just listen for a moment, and do not ban
from your mind the character of Satan
Who from Milton, fits my sense of prince
for with words Satan certainly does not mince.
He gains the worship of the fallen angels,
and in turn he does his tasks of evil well.
He wanted to ruin God’s glorious plan
of creating the perfect world for woman and man.
He does not act rashly, but with careful calculation;
he accomplishes his goal and his every intention.
Who else in the story can boast of such enterprise?
Adam and Eve fell to the whims of an enemy so wise.

So let me ask you all who you would rather be,
those who wallow in pity or the one who gains his glory?"

This remark was aimed directly at Calvin so
he yelled, "How can you call Satan a hero?
That's where Milton has gone so wrong,
making Satan seem to rise above a helpless throng.
Now he is mistaken by ignorant readers who choose,
to side with the one who does in the end lose,
for he is nothing but selfish and greedy.
of Adam and Eve's perfection he felt needy."

Machiavelli came back, "His motives may not have been pure,
But at least he has a certain hold over us forevermore.
I know Milton had some reason to note Satan's power,
for he was great in that he makes ordinary men cower!"

After this, all Calvin could do was stand up and wail,
While Cervantes cried, "Don't worry, it's just a tale!"

The noise woke Shakespeare who noted the power of literature,
"If the story was real or note, it really does not matter,
Milton has written in a way never tried about the Fall,
making the story accessible to each one of us all.
It teaches a valuable lesson about human frailty
although I prefer my own version of morality."

Spinoza broke in, "Actually, some of us cannot see,
why this story should be mapped in poetry.
Frankly I only understand mathematical geometry,
the only way to really get from Point A to B.
To our emotions Milton attempts to appeal,
but how can we be certain how we should feel,
if we have no way to define them, we cannot start
to understand the passions of our hearts.
So anyway, would you all like to hear,
the propositions I have written that make this clear?"

Cries of "No!" resounded in ways I cannot say,
Poor Spinoza got up in stiff anger and went away.
Bacon was actually glad to get rid of the man,
for now he could speak and so he began,
"Milton knows Adam and Eve wanted knowledge for desire,
but I wish he would note that knowledge is not so dire.
For knowledge purely for the "benefit and use of life" I
would surely not have caused such a similar strife.
Knowledge can be used to understand Nature and our place
within it, as well as bettering the entire human race."
"Knowledge that God does not want us to have is sin!"
cried the increasingly frustrated and gloomy Calvin.
"Why can't any of you come to understand,

the horrible consequences of the fall of man?"
Descartes finally looked up and to Calvin said,
"All I can be sure of is that I am not dead,
Because I am in this room thinking with you.
Otherwise I cannot be sure what to do.
This book that I hold may not really exist,
And all of you I might go through with my fist."
Cervantes interrupted a little drunk, you see,
"What the hell you say, you want to punch me?
Come here, try it, I assure you I'm real
And then we'll figure out if you can feel!"
Bacon came between them, "Now, now men,
Please we must finish talking about Milton.
Now, Descartes if this causes so much uncertainty,
maybe you should go home and rethink your philosophy."
And thus the discussion carried on for ages,
for none could agree among these sages.
But because they felt the need to make all this fuss
over Milton shows he can truly be considered a genius.

¹ Bacon, Francis. *New Atlantis and The Great Instauration*. Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1989. 16.

Deficient Deliberation

Karen Smith

Odysseus is a clever man, but according to Aristotle, he is not happy. According to Aristotle, "the good of man, happiness, is some kind of activity of the soul in conformity with virtue" (22). Aristotle, furthermore, defines virtue as "a characteristic involving choice...[that consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it]" (43). Odysseus knows how a virtuous man must act in a given situation, yet he fails to act in accordance with his knowledge and chooses instead a life of excess. Odysseus knows, for instance, that he must return home after the Trojan war, yet it takes him about ten years after the fall of Troy to finally return, while in the meantime he indulges in a love affair with the goddess Kalypso, among other dishonorable acts. Aristotle emphasizes that the happy man "will have the attribute of permanence...[and] will always or to the highest degree both do and contemplate what is in conformity with virtue..." (25). Odysseus does not exhibit the "permanence" of a happy man. Odysseus acts upon the knowledge he gains while in Hades, for example, and returns home immediately. Yet upon his return Odysseus departs from virtuous action and murders over a hundred suitors. Lacking virtue and the will to act upon his knowledge, Odysseus is unfulfilled.

Courage is a mean, according to Aristotle, between cowardice and fearlessness (68). Aristotle claims that "it is for a noble end that a courageous man endures and acts as courage demands" (71). Odysseus clearly exhibits courage at Troy, especially while within the Trojan horse, which he himself invented. Menelaos tells Telemakhos how, when Helen imitates the voices of all the Greek wives outside the horse to lure the soldiers, "Odysseus fought us down,

despite our craving, / and all the Akhaians kept their lips shut tight.... / So he saved us all..."

(Homer 61). Odysseus certainly battles the Trojans and afterward struggles on the open sea for a "noble end," that of a swift Greek victory that enables him to return home to his family.

However, he loses sight of his ultimate goal and spends years on Kalypso's island until he finally returns home in a rather roundabout manner. Odysseus' decision to senselessly murder over a

hundred suitors at his home poignantly displays his weakness of character. Murder, according to

Aristotle, is far from a "noble end," for it is an evil action that has no mean and is therefore

always unjust (44). Odysseus, then, does not always exhibit the "permanence" of virtuous action

characteristic of a happy man, and what appears to be his courage may more rightly be

considered a "spirited temper," a quality that Aristotle claims resembles courage (74). Aristotle

remarks that the man with a "spirited temper" is driven not by nobility but rather by pain (74).

Odysseus clearly seeks, by murdering the suitors, to rid himself of the mental anguish caused by

them. Aristotle comments that "anger gives men pain and revenge pleasure; and although those

who fight for these motives are good fighters, they are not courageous, for it is not the incentive

of what is noble that makes them fight, and they are not guided by reason but by emotion" (74-5).

Odysseus fails to contemplate the baseness of murder, and to observe the mean of a healthy

revenge, such as allowing a judge to decide a proper punishment for the suitors, and instead

immediately assumes the extreme: Odysseus has a "short temper," for "a gentle person [who

observes the mean] is forgiving rather than vindictive" (100-1). Aristotle suggests that "to digest

one's anger in oneself takes time" (101). Odysseus does not allow himself the time to

contemplate what is just action and, as a result, acts out of accordance with virtue.

Aristotle claims that, like men with a "spirited temper," "Adulterers, too, are prompted by

lust to do many daring things" (74). Odysseus, although still married to Penelope, has a love

affair with Kalypso for the many years he stays with her after the fall of Troy. Odysseus, however, comes to realize that he must return home to his wife, for he loves Penelope more than he does Kalypso, although Kalypso promises him immortality should he stay with her forever. Kalypso insists to Odysseus that “you wanted her forever,/ that bride for whom you pine each day,” and Odysseus agrees: “it is true, each day/ I long for home, long for the sight of home” (Homer 87). Regret characterizes Odysseus, for he realizes he should be at home with his beloved wife. Aristotle, then, would not consider Odysseus “self-indulgent” but rather “morally weak” for “A morally weak person...always feels regret [and]....pursues bodily pleasures to excess and contrary to right reason, though he is not persuaded (that he ought to do so)...” (197-98). Feeling regret, however, does not rectify Odysseus’s inappropriate actions, for “Though he [Odysseus] fought shy of her [Kalypso] and her and her desire,/ he lay with her each night, for she compelled him” (Homer 85). Odysseus has obvious reservations about sleeping with Kalypso, yet he continues to do so. He is again driven by his desires rather than by his intellect and so falls short of happiness.

Were Odysseus able to act upon the moral knowledge he possesses, Aristotle would consider him a happy man, and he and Penelope would most certainly share the “most perfect form of friendship [which] is that between good men who are alike in excellence and virtue” (219). Penelope is, unlike Odysseus, virtuous, for she remains faithful to Odysseus for the many years they are separated, although she is tempted by the riches and promises of the suitors. Penelope is, however, unhappy, for she is alone, and Aristotle comments that “in order to be happy, a man [or woman] needs morally good friends” (267). Penelope, then, possesses “practical wisdom,” that Odysseus lacks, for “to be a man of practical wisdom, one must not only know what one ought to do, but he must also be able to act accordingly” (Aristotle 201). Had

Odysseus and Penelope lived with one another for the greater part of their marriage, . they most likely would have developed "the most perfect form of friendship," for Odysseus and Penelope think alike, as illustrated by their verbal ingenuity and wit. Just as Odysseus tells fictitious tales in his travels to conceal his identity, Penelope acts as if she does not recognize the disguised weary traveler who magnificently wins the test of bow to become her husband. Odysseus should, then, model his actions after those of Penelope, so that "from the mold of the other each takes the imprint of the traits he likes..." (Aristotle 272). Odysseus is fortunate to be married to Penelope, a woman with the ability to persuade him to behave in a way suitable to his reason.

Until Odysseus learns to act in accordance with what he knows to be morally right, he will continue to be unhappy. However, Odysseus is able to deliberate, and indeed Aristotle claims that happiness "is an activity concerned with theoretical knowledge or contemplation..." (288). Aristotle comments that "the best thing in him [the morally weak man such as Odysseus] is saved: the principle or premise (as to how he should act)" (198). Furthermore, Aristotle remarks that "the kind of courage that comes from a spirited temper seems to be the most natural and becomes true courage when choice and purpose are added to it" (74). Odysseus is, then, on the brink of obtaining moral excellence and may, with discipline, eventually reach his goal of virtue and happiness. For Odysseus' ability to deliberate well under any circumstance not only ensures his survival, but characterizes him as human.

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Weber's "Brotherhood Ethic"

Elizabeth Adamo

Weber contends that the emergence of salvation religions gave birth to a "brotherhood ethic," a feeling of and belief in the brotherhood of all people. He goes on to argue that "religion of brotherliness" has always clashed with different spheres of life, or different world views. In the modern world, this clash is coming to a critical point. The different spheres of life are becoming more polarized as they adopt their own rationale of laws and beliefs. In Weber's eyes, this polarization threatens disaster; the brotherhood ethic, which he sees as necessary to peaceful living, is in jeopardy of disappearing as the religious sphere succumbs to other spheres of life.

Weber does not offer a solution to this impending crisis. Rather, he only frames the problem by explaining the emergence of the brotherhood ethic within the religious sphere and then systematically discussing how different spheres compete against the religious sphere, thereby threatening to destroy brotherhood. Weber's open-ended argument leaves many questions. First, one must question the validity of the framework: Does indeed a brotherhood ethic emerge out of salvation religion? Are all the other spheres so opposed to it? And, is it a necessity to human life? If one accepts the framework, the question becomes, is there a solution and, if so, what is it?

Weber's framework begins with the emergence of salvation religions and the resulting birth of a universal brotherhood ethic. According to Weber, before salvation religions came about, social and ethical conduct was regulated by "association of neighbors," meaning a code of ethics between "a community of villagers, members of the sib, the guild, or of partners in seafaring, hunting, and warring expeditions" (329). This original code of ethics had two main

principles. First, it created an “in-group” which was subject to the ethics, and an “out-group” which was not. Second, the moral relations between the in-group were regulated by “simple reciprocity: ‘As you shall do unto me I shall do unto you’” (329).

The emergence of salvation religions created an entirely new social community. The base of this community is not family or vocational association, but association through basic human suffering. Since suffering is common to all human beings, all of humanity is considered part of this community. Further, the psychology operating in religious experiences of “communion with God,” which is part of salvation religion, has “always inclined men towards the flowing out into an objectless acosmism of love” (330). Thus, through these two facts, a universal brotherhood ethic is born. This brotherhood ethic creates both a community of loving brethren” and an internal attitude of “love for the sufferer...for one’s neighbor, for man, and finally for the enemy” (330).

At this point, Weber lays out the crisis facing the modern world:

The religion of brotherliness has always clashed with the orders and values of this world, and the more consistently its demands have been carried through, the sharper the clash has been. The split has usually become wider the more the values of the world have been rationalized and sublimated in terms of their own laws. And this is what matters here (330).

This is the crisis according to Weber. In the modern world, different spheres of life, namely the spheres of economics, politics, esthetics, erotica, and intellectual thought, are increasingly becoming polarized from religion; they are developing their own internal laws and codes of ethics, or lack thereof, that threaten the religious sphere and its brotherhood morality.

The economic sphere is based on self-interest; this is obviously opposed to the ideal of a brotherhood ethic which is concerned for all of humanity. As capitalism becomes more

“rational, and thus impersonal,” the more polarized it becomes from religious morality. Weber illustrates this point with an example:

In the past it was possible to regulate ethically the personal relations between master and slave precisely because they were personal relations. But it is not possible to regulate...the relations between shifting holders of mortgages and the shifting debtors of the banks that issue these mortgages: for in this case, no personal bonds of any sort exist (331).

The modern economic sphere has developed its own set of rational, impersonal laws of self-interest that oppose universal brotherhood.

The political sphere, too, has become increasingly polarized from the ethic of brotherhood. Weber defines the state as “an association that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence” (334). In the past, patriarchal states made decision on a more personal basis, and thus were subject to “substantive moralization” (334). But, the modern “bureaucratic state apparatus” and the modern political man have become increasingly depersonalized. They “manage affairs, including the punishment of evil...according to rational rules of state order...without hate, and...without love” (333-34). Thus the state, too, has its own laws based on pragmatic “reasons of state,” and this set of laws is opposed to the brotherhood ethic of the religious sphere.

Economics and politics are rational spheres which follow their own laws and are therefore in tension with the religious ethic. The brotherhood ethic is also in conflict with “this-worldly life-forces whose character is essentially non-rational or...anti-rational” (341), namely, with the esthetic and erotic spheres.

The religious sphere focuses on meaning of actions and things as they relate to salvation, while the realm of the artistic focuses on form. The religious sphere considers form “as

something creaturely and distracting from meaning" (341). In the modern world, this inherent tension between the esthetic and religious realms is intensified as art becomes "a cosmos of more and more consciously grasped independent values." In the modern world, Weber argues, art is seen as another means to salvation: "it provides salvation from the routines of everyday life, especially from...theoretical and practical rationalism" (342). Art has been elevated to the level of religion in the modern world; it is another way to view the world and judge it ethically—a way that is lacking a brotherhood ethic. Weber illustrates his point with an example of this elevation present in the very language people use: In the modern world, one may say that something is in 'poor taste' rather than 'reprehensible' when referring to an ethical, moral situation (342). The realm of esthetics, according to Weber, does not create a brotherhood ethic, and is therefore a factor in the crisis of the modern world.

The Erotic sphere is also part of the crisis. Sexual love has been in conflict with the religious realm since notions of the chastity of priests and demons ruling sexuality emerged. In the modern world, however, this tension has intensified as eroticism has emerged. Eroticism is a turning away from the "sober naturalism of the peasant" in sexual matters to a "consciously cultivated...non-routinized sphere" (344). Eroticism is thus in competition with the religious sphere. It, too, offers a means to salvation: salvation through the "earthly sensation" of "mature love" (347). The religious sphere rejects this form of salvation, among other reasons, because it is "necessarily exclusive in its inner core" (349). It is a system of meaning and resulting "salvation" that exists between two people and only two people; it does not and cannot include a brotherhood ethic.

The intellectual sphere is the final realm that Weber sees as threatening the brotherhood ethic that is crucial to humanity. In the past, science was done in the name of religious

understanding, and its finding were used to support religious world views. In the modern world, however, "every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm" (351). Science has become not a supporter, but rather a competitor of religion. And, this competitor is incompatible with the brotherhood ethic. Weber explains this contention best:

...Science, in the name of 'intellectual integrity,' has come forward with the claim of representing the only possible form of a reasoned view of the world. The intellect, like all cultural values, has created an aristocracy based on the possession of rational culture and independent of all personal ethical qualities of man. The aristocracy of intellect is hence an unbrotherly aristocracy (355).

The intellectual sphere has its own set of rules for understanding the world and presents itself in the modern world as the better alternative to a religious world view. This scientific alternative does not include a brotherhood ethic.

At this point, the foundation ends and the questions begin. First, one must decide if indeed a brotherhood ethic is lacking in today's society, and if it is needed at all. It seems apparent that in many ways people of today are lacking brotherhood. Self-interest and self-gain seem to be the rule in much of today's society. However, one cannot deny that some ethic of brotherhood exists; there are examples of charity and altruism, both small and great, every day. It seems apparent that this brotherhood ethic, or perhaps today we would call it universal human morality, is indeed essential to humanity. Without it, it seems, we would be in a Hobbesian state of war.

Does universal human morality arise out of salvation religion? In the practice of many religions, the opposite effect comes about. Many religions create exclusive groups that believe only their particular group will be saved. But, in looking just at the ideal theory of salvation

religions, all of humanity is connected through the fact of human suffering, and the notion of a benevolent creator brings about the idea of universal human morality. So, in this sense, a brotherhood ethic is created.

In today's society, are all the spheres that Weber mentioned opposed to the brotherhood ethic, or at least unable to produce it? Certainly, it seems, politics and economics are too self-interest-oriented to create universal morality. Science seems too empirical, and eroticism too personal. One may question, however, whether the esthetic, artistic sphere falls into this category. It seems that the beauty inherent in human beings, and the injustice of certain human conditions, may be expressed well through art such as painting, literature, and music. This expression could, in turn, create a brotherhood ethic connecting all of humanity simply by expressing the essence of humanity. This connection, however, would be an abstract, loose connection and would not be accessible to all people.

Then, what is the solution? A return to religion is impractical in today's scientific, secular world. Perhaps the solution lies at the very beginning of Weber's argument. His description of ethical associations by neighbors may be at least the start of a solution. If there were some way to create the feeling that everyone is everyone else's neighbor, universal human morality may be the result. Today's communication technology can perhaps help to create this type of world community. Is this a powerful enough force to contend with the other spheres, especially with economic and political forces? Weber was wise to lay out just the framework of the problem, leaving time to answer the ultimate question.

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Lizaveta Ivanovna: Explication and Analysis

Nicole D. Peeler

Lizaveta Ivanovna-Explication

Lizaveta Ivanovna is only alive for the first seventy-one pages of Dostoevsky's 472 page book, *Crime and Punishment*, yet her character is the one that remains most vividly in my memory. Lizaveta's description remains constant, but different characters emphasize different characteristics. The reader is first introduced to her as, "... about thirty-five, tall, clumsy, timid, submissive, and almost idiotic" (55). We also learn she is, "... of lower rank than her sister, unmarried and awfully uncouth in appearance, remarkably tall with long feet that looked as if they were bent outwards" (58). Given this negative description we are surprised to learn that she is always pregnant. Men must find this awkward woman attractive. One admirer explains his attraction, saying,

"she is so dark-skinned and looks like a soldier dressed up, but she is not at all hideous. She has such a good-natured face and eyes. Strikingly so. And the proof of it is that lots of people are attracted by her. She is such a soft gentle creature, ready to put up with anything, always willing, willing to do anything. And her smile is really very sweet" (58).

However, her attractiveness to men is not a blessing. Her simplicity makes her an easy target for seducers.

Her half-sister, Alyona, also takes advantage of Lizaveta:

"She worked day and night for her sister, and besides doing the cooking and the washing, she did sewing and worked as a charwoman and gave her sister all she earned. She did not dare to accept an order or job of any kind without her sister's permission. The old woman had already made her will [...] and by this will she [Lizaveta] would not get a farthing" (58).

Alyona also physically abuses Lizaveta. Dostoevsky writes of Alyona, "she had a sister Lizaveta, whom the wretched little creature was continually beating, and kept in complete bondage like a small child" (57). Perhaps this is why a woman described as always

pregnant seems to have no children. We better understand Lizaveta's awkward, shy nature when we learn of her tragic life.

Lizaveta is also very religious, and although of questionable virtue herself, exhibits her fair nature by visiting the prostitute, Sonia, and praying with her. Lizaveta exhibits this same fairness working. She is a dealer of used goods, and "was frequently employed, as she was very honest and always fixed a fair price and stuck to it" (56). We read of one business transaction in which, "A family who had come to the town and been reduced to poverty were selling their household goods and clothes" (56). She deals with people who are desperate and down-trodden, yet she does not take advantage of their situation. Lizaveta gives them good prices when she could easily use their desperation to her advantage. This is completely unlike her swindling, harridan, step-sister who takes advantage of everyone she can.

Lizaveta is a physically imposing, mentally weak child of a woman who is beaten by her half-sister, and taken advantage of by various men. Despite this, she deals fairly with people in both her business and social life. In the end, however, her refusal to be the tyrant her sister is does not save her from the same horrific death as Alyona. Her weakness betrays her in her final moments. She comes home too early, and is murdered along with her sister in the "great experiment" of the student-playing-God, Raskolnikov. We watch her die:

"...this hapless Lizaveta was so simple and had been so thoroughly crushed and scared that she did not even raise a hand to guard her face, though that was the most necessary and natural action at the moment, for the axe was raised over her face. She only put up her empty left hand, but not to her face, slowly holding it out before her as though motioning him away. The axe fell with the sharp edge just on the skull and split at one blow all the top of her head. She fell heavily at once..." (71).

Her brutal life climaxes in a horrific death, the ultimate injustice for this patient, honest soul trapped in a savage world.

Lizaveta Ivanovna-Analysis

When I think of Lizaveta, I picture a woman tall as a man, but placid and gentle, with the soft, sweet eyes of a doe. Her nature, represented by her pliant, rounded figure, stands in sharp contrast to her harsh surroundings. Lizaveta's world is one of pain and drudgery, yet she is good. Alyona beats her and uses her as one would not use a slave. Men take advantage of her, leaving her continually pregnant. But her children are beaten out of her, or expelled by a traitorous womb. Even her gentle nature is used against her, as she cannot overcome her childishness enough to flee or even to raise her hands against the axe crashing at her skull. Yet despite this wretched life, she never sinks to the level of those around her. In her business, she deals with desperate people, and yet she never takes advantage of them. She accepts a prostitute as a woman of God, and comes to pray with her and read from the Bible. She is honest and dependable and gentle; characteristics ominously lacking, yet desperately needed, in the dark, harsh world she inhabits.

Raskolnikov, as his first observations of her illustrate, feels contempt for Lizaveta. Physically, he finds her awkward, ugly, and clumsy. He sees her as a woman of questionable virtue, abused by a tyrant because of her own stupidity. He does not consider her honesty and generosity. He does not stop to marvel at how a soul so tormented by abuse, betrayal, lost babies and lost hope can be so good. She has not received anything in her life, and yet she does nothing but give. When he learns that she was Sonia's friend, that they prayed together, and that they exchanged holy necklaces, he does not even *then* stop to wonder at the true nature of the woman he has murdered. When he thinks about his murders, he seems to forget that Lizaveta is one of his victims. As motivation for his crimes, he ponders who has the right to live, and is it right to kill one evil person so that hundreds will profit. Perhaps people would have profited if only Alyona had died. The world would be rid of a small tyrant and parasite. Certainly, Lizaveta would have been better off without her harridan sister, though I am sure she

would have mourned even the death of her torturer. If Raskolnikov had only killed Alyona, perhaps the *crime* in his vicious act would be less obvious. Certainly, it would still be illegal. And the strict moralist would say it was still a sin. But would not many of us feel an undertone of satisfaction at the vengeance enacted against this parasitic tyrant? We could picture a world with a little less darkness, and we could picture a freed Lizaveta. Perhaps we could see Raskolnikov as our Fury; meting justice to those who have sinned against their world. Instead, in the final act of injustice committed against her, Lizaveta is murdered along with her half-sister. Raskolnikov is no longer a bloody Robin Hood, he is a vicious murderer who has killed a good, gentle woman. Logically and morally, Alyona did not deserve her death any more than Lizaveta did, yet the darker sides of our hearts may put that fact aside. But no one can refute the evil of Lizaveta's murder; there is no secret, hidden thrill at her death, only profound sadness.

Raskolnikov seems to ignore the fact he murdered Lizaveta. I wanted him to say, "I was wrong, I killed someone good." But he never does. He feels guilt, but in such a disjointed and inhuman way. He usually addresses his crime only in terms of Alyona's murder. When he does think of Lizaveta after the crime, he is still contemptuous of her. She was a pathetic, six foot tall child to him, even after all he has learned about her. However, Lizaveta is the most tragic figure in *Crime and Punishment*. She has no one and nothing. Even her strong body betrays her with immobility as Raskolnikov murders her. Her one solace, religion, is shared with a skeletal prostitute who echoes her own weakness and sullied virtue. It is ironic that a woman Raskolnikov thinks so little of embodies all that is wrong with his arguments. A weak person does not signify an evil person, and the masses are made up of the good as well as the wicked. The great Napoleon, who Raskolnikov thinks so highly of, did not only murder the Alyonas of the world. He also killed women like Lizaveta, who, when viewed up close, turn out to be beautiful and tragic figures. Figures who cannot be reduced to the variables of an

experiment - figures who bear within their simple souls more true goodness and meaning than a thousand Napoleons.

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Aristotle and Lao-Tzu: A Comparison

Dove Pedlosky

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Lao-Tzu's *Tao Te Ching* seem to offer two very different philosophies. While Aristotle scientifically breaks his work into specific divisions that direct the reader, Lao-Tzu writes in a poetic style that purposefully refrains from grouping or categorizing, and it resembles a free-style or stream-of-consciousness work. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* teach that contemplation is the most divine pursuit, and Lao-Tzu heeds, "Know not-knowing: supreme." (saying 71). Although the two philosophers differ in their techniques for finding the Way, the philosophers' end goal, Lao-Tzu's Tao and Aristotle's Happiness, are not so contradictory. The great sage who acts in accordance with the Tao does not create divisions and sees the harmony or oneness of the universe. Aristotle's virtuous man, likewise, is most happy when he, too, feels himself in the flow or in harmony with the activity that he pursues. Both philosophers share the same end-result, but the way to achieve these goals must be modified, since Aristotle's *Ethics* is geared towards a society of active contenders, while Lao-Tzu speaks of a group of in-active observers.

Both the Tao and Happiness are pursued for their own sake, and they are the ultimate goal for man. In Taoist thought naming is a detrimental activity because it creates a disunion, breaking the harmony of nature. If one labels something as beautiful, its opposite, a vision of ugliness, is created as a comparison. To give an object a name also creates another division, that of the name-giver and the object being named. Lao-Tzu might find Aristotle's work injurious, for Aristotle believes that the greatest happiness comes from contemplation, which demands man to reason by picking apart and dividing information. Yet, Lao-Tzu would also realize that Aristotle's end goal was very similar to his own. Aristotle's idea of happiness is similar to being in the flow or in harmony with one's activity. When one grapples with a difficult mathematical equation or theory, and then suddenly comes to an understanding, one experiences a sudden rush of

euphoria, during which one loses one's identity in the activity one is performing. Being in the flow, and being one with the activity is similar to the experience of a man who seeks the Tao. Lao-Tzu says, "Therefore in following the Tao: Those on the way become the way, those who gain become the gain, those who lose become the loss" (23). Nor does Lao-Tzu's sage separate himself from the activity he pursues. For Aristotle, the divine must be, "A thought that thinks itself" (*Metaphysics* book XII) which is indeed a harmony or unity that does not conceive of fractions. If a thought thinks itself then it does not differentiate itself from others, and outside names or categories are of no relevance.

Aristotle's ideal is for man's soul to be in harmony while working in accordance with virtue, so that the sense of self or man's own selfish desires do not become overpowering. For Aristotle, a man who does the right thing but does it unwillingly cannot possibly be a virtuous man, because, although he is morally strong, he has "base appetites"

(*Nicomachean Ethics* book 7.9). The Aristotelian gentleman must, thus, be in harmony with his actions, just as Lao-Tzu's sage, who when following the Tao, becomes the Tao.

Lao-Tzu writes of in-action, and its superiority over contention. Lao-Tzu understand that man's desires lead him to fight for the possession of something, and acquisition only brings devastation. If man desires nothing, then he will lose nothing, and therefore, contending, even with courage, is not praised by Lao-Tzu. Lao-Tzu states, "Courage to dare kills, courage not to dare saves" (*Tao Te Ching* 73). This saying would appear to contrast with Aristotle, who claims that courage and the willingness for "facing particular dangers" was one of the gentleman's greatest virtues. While Lao-Tzu warned, "only do not contend, and you will not go wrong" (*Tao Te Ching* 18), Aristotle believes that the only way to learn is to first go out there and get your hands dirty. If an activity sounded frightening or challenging, Aristotle would encourage one to engage in that activity, for the experience would allow one to discover one's individual mean. Only experience for Aristotle could allow a man to realize his character, which he would learn through the constant judging and evaluating he does of himself while performing a certain

activity. Lao-Tzu says the opposite, that when a man acts, he focuses on a certain activity, and will consequently lose his peripheral understanding. Thus, it is very important for the Taoist sage not to go against the reversal movements of the Tao. This in-action or non-wavering from the Tao does not imply passivity, but rather that it is crucial for the sage to accomplish by laying low, and by avoiding contention, "Rivers and seas can rule the hundred valleys. Because they are good at lying low they are lords of the valleys" (*Tao Te Ching* 66). Water receives its power by following the river's movement, just as the sage triumphs following the Tao.

It is this opposition between action and in-action that creates the largest rift between Aristotle's and Lao-Tzu's philosophies. Yet, if one remembers why Aristotle placed such an importance on action, one could infer that it does not differ completely from Lao-Tzu's goal of in-action. Both Aristotle and Lao-Tzu believe in an individual mean that is impossible to calculate through mathematical reasoning. For Aristotle, a man with practical wisdom is one who has discovered his individual mean, and could thus act with wisdom in a given activity. Lao-Tzu, as well, stresses the importance of an object's individual proportion of Yin or Yang. A Taoist is born with a fluctuating balance of Yin and Yang, and it is the sage who realizes and accepts the mean or Yin/Yang of every object in the universe, "Understand the enduring pattern: This is called original Te" (*Tao Te Ching* 65). However, an Aristotelian is not born with a certain individual mean, for "Nothing which exists by nature can be changed by habit" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1), and thus the knowledge of one's own mean cannot be proclaimed at birth, but must be gained through experience in action alone: "Only a man who is utterly insensitive can be ignorant of the fact that moral characteristics are formed by actively engaging in particular action" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 5.5). So while the Taoists believe that a man's ration of Yin/Yang is innately his own by nature through birth, the Aristotelians believe that a man's understanding and knowledge of his mean can only be acquired through

action. If an Aristotelian desires practical knowledge to cultivate his mean, a Taoist seeks only to accept what by nature is his given make-up.

If everything in the universe contains an individual harmony or mean then it is the Taoist sage who recognizes that either all Yin or Yang is an excess. Like the Aristotelian gentleman who is neither extreme, Lao-Tzu claims the sage should "know what is enough-abuse nothing" (*Tao Te Ching* 44). The sage who is a harmony of two extremes embodies the perfect median, "the sage is both blank and open, yielding and willing to mix freely" (*Tao Te Ching* 8). The Aristotelian gentleman does not encompass both extremes, but rather he finds his own individual mean between the two excesses. And yet Aristotle's idea of a mean is similar to the sage's embodiment of two extremes, for too much of one thing and too little of the same thing, when they are mixed together, should create a perfect balance. Thus, the gentleman can be looked upon as possessing the ability to bring together opposites just like Lao-Tzu's virtuous sage. Aristotle emphasizes friendliness, generosity, and high-mindedness, and Lao Tzu, as well, praises the great virtue in treating others well. Both philosophers acknowledge the importance of honesty; Aristotle calls it "truthfulness" and Lao Tzu warns to, "stand by your word" (*Tao Te Ching* 8). Aristotle and Lao-Tzu likewise state that justice is crucial, but while Aristotle clearly depicts the various forms of justice, Lao-Tzu only says to "make fair rules" and "do the right thing" (*Tao Te Ching* 8). Again Aristotle's intricate definition of justice is crucial for a society of acting contenders. The sage, who is in-active, does not need such descriptions, for a definition of justice must only be created when action is involved. Lao-Tzu would probably even denounce a formal judicial system, believe that the sage who practices the Tao would not need instruction in how to be just.

Knowledge is represented quite differently by each philosopher. Aristotle believes that the study of theoretical knowledge is the highest activity and that its pursuit offers the most happiness. "All men by nature desire to know," Aristotle states in his *Metaphysics*, and it is through contemplation that man can become closest to the divine

state. Man cannot remain in this divine state forever because time and emotion affect man, and man is not invulnerable to nature. The *Tao Te Ching*, however, states that the Way or the Tao is "Deep beyond knowing" (*Tao Te Ching* 15). One of the prominent images in Taoist thought is the river, which appears to be passive and non-existent, but has the power to chisel through rock and land. If a man wades into the river, looking for its power, he will search to no avail. When a man cups the river into his hands, the water slips through the cracks of his fingers, and if he tries to put it in buckets, the river's power immediately vanishes. Yet, the river contains thousands of organisms, and it provides life and nourishment to all. One is made aware, at times, of the river's force by floating along with it, and it is then when man is at one with the river, and lets himself be carried by the river, that he best understands the river's force. For this reason, the Tao is deep beyond knowing, and it transcends human reasoners who attempt to classify and group their surroundings. Lao-Tzu says, "Banish learning, discard knowledge: people will gain a hundredfold" (*Tao Te Ching* 19). Although Aristotle's emphasis on contemplation, and Lao-Tzu's desire that man knows and not knowing oppose one another, both share the characteristic of being extremely hard to understand or grasp, yet, both are by nature simple. Lao-Tzu explains that, "Though simple and slight, no one under heaven can master it," (*Tao Te Ching* 32) and it is almost the Tao's simplicity that makes it impossible for a man to grasp hold of its concepts. As soon as man thinks he has understood the Tao, it has escaped him like the river's water that falls through the fingers. Aristotle's idea of theoretical knowledge's simplicity resembles that of the Tao. The concepts are beautiful in their simplicity and constancy, such as the planets' rotation and the stars' unchanging distance from one another. Aristotle explains in his *Physica* that man begins to understand nature using knowledge that is rather general, but comprehensible to man, in order to work towards the understanding of the Universals, which are not intuitively understood, but which are by nature simple and lucid: "So in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by

nature, but clearer to us, toward what is more clear and more knowable by nature" (*Physica* book 1). Aristotle points out in his *Metaphysics* that, "A man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant" (*Metaphysics* 1.1). As Aristotle's virtuous man strives harder to understand, he will realize his shortcomings, and he will discern that he is even farther from really knowing. Thus, while both philosophers agree that the Tao or the absolute truth is never completely attainable through knowledge, Aristotle does realize and encourage man to continue in his pursuit of theoretical knowledge. Aristotle does not believe that the universe completely transcends man, and he thinks man is at this height when he attempts to comprehend it.

Aristotle's ethics are directed toward a society of active men who must first be active literally in order to discover their individual mean, and who then have an active mind while contemplating the universals. In a sense, Aristotle claims that man should act so as to understand that which does not act or change, the universals or permanent laws. Lao-Tzu condemns action by saying that man should remain still in order to understand the unity of a universe composed of moving opposites, Yin and Yang. These opposing theories make it impossible to create identical works that preach the same path, although many comparisons can be drawn between the two philosophies.

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My love is as a fever, longing still
 For that which longer nurseth the disease,
 Feeding on that which doth preserve the ill,
 Th' uncertain sickly appetite to please.
 My reason, the physician to my love,
 Angry that his prescriptions are not kept,
 Hath left me, and I desperate now approve
 Desire is death, which physic did except.
 Past cure I am, now reason is past care,
 And frantic-mad with evermore unrest;
 My thoughts and my discourse as madmen's are,
 At random from the truth vainly expressed:
 For I have sworn thee fair, and thought thee bright,
 Who are as black as hell, and dark as night.

Analysis of Shakespeare's Sonnet 147

Brian McDonald

Shakespeare's Sonnet 147 constitutes part of the "dark lady sequence." In it Shakespeare combines intricate rhythms and word patterns with dismal themes of betrayal and madness.

Each line of the first quatrain juxtaposes an image of sickness with one of hunger or craving to depict the speaker's masochistic feelings for his mistress: "My love is as a fever, longing still / For that which longer nurseth the disease..."(ln. 1-2). The way this poem opens, with Shakespeare comparing his love to a fever, clearly echoes Dante and Petrarch. In fact, this sonnet follows the Dantean and Petrarchan conventions of love-sickness, until the ending couplet. It is significant that the first line is enjambed with the second. This allows Shakespeare to use a form of the word "long" twice in one thought, and prolongs the thought itself. His feverish love constantly "longs" for whatever will "longer nurseth the disease." The pun on

"nurseth" portrays the concept of both "nursing" one who is ill back to health, and a mother "nursing" or feeding her child (one should also note that the third line begins with the word "Feeding"). This mother and child image reflects back to his love-sickness that is nourished by his mistress. The word "disease" at the end of the second line can be read both as a spondaic and an iambic foot. When read as a spondee it sounds like the actual word "disease," but when read as an iamb it sounds like "decease." This device foreshadows what Shakespeare declares at the end of the second quatrain: "Desire is death" (8). As stated above, "Feeding" in the third line echoes the idea of a mother feeding her child, and then goes further with this idea of sustenance: "...on that which doth preserve the ill" (3). His love-sickness has become like a child that requires food and attention in order for it to survive; the fourth line reinforces this concept: "Th' uncertain sickly appetite to please..." He appeases his ailment, like parents who appease their children when they cry for food or milk. The phrase "sickly appetite" in this line offers another illness/hunger image, however this one seems more violent than the others. A "sickly appetite" in this line offers another illness/hunger image, however this one seems more violent than the others. A "sickly appetite" conjures up the idea of a person vomiting from what they ate, and the word "uncertain" placed before it seems to imply mad or insane rather than hesitant or wavering. This corresponds to the child-like theme of the rest of the quatrain, considering children, more specifically babies, often "spit-up" and have fits. Shakespeare uses this to state that his pathetic love-sickness has stripped him of his manhood, and left him to be a child dependent on his mistress. One should also note the rhymes in the first quatrain: "still" and "ill"; "disease" and "please." The footnote tells us that "still" means "always," and its correspondence to "ill" clearly implies the perpetual existence of his sickness. The rhyme of "disease" and "please" emphasizes the masochistic tendency he is experiencing, and the odd pleasure he takes in his pain.

Whereas he opened the first quatrain with a Petrarchan theme, Shakespeare looks to Aristotle in the opening of the second: "My reason, the physician to my love" (5). At one point he was able to moderate his mad love through reason, but when the physician, reason, sees that the poet refuses to obey his orders ("Angry that his prescriptions are not kept" (6)), he leaves him to wallow in his lunacy, and in it the poet wants only death: "Desire is death, which physic did expect" (8). On the surface of the phrase, "physic did except," the speaker means to state that the physic (reason) was the only thing that kept his love-sickness in check, and prevented him from committing suicide. However, "except" is a homonym, and pairs up with "accept." The speaker seems to be saying that even when he had his reason, it knew, or "accepted" that death would be the cure to his ailment. We also see in the rhyme of "love" and "approve" that he wants his reason to "approve" or "accept" his love, but the words do not truly rhyme, thus his reason will never *truly* be able to approve of this love, only in his insanity will his fleeing reason accept it. The rhyming of "kept" with "except" is also significant, in that "kept" implies restrained. His reason once restrained him, and would still do so "except/accept" it is departing.

In the third quatrain we see no such corresponding rhyme schemes because now the speaker is in mental disarray and incapable of such intricacies. In other words, "care" and "are," and "unrest" and "expressed" do not go beyond the rhymes, but by not doing so, it artistically displays the loss of reason the poet has experienced. The first line: "Past cure I am, now reason is past care" (9) suggests that the speaker was unable to go through with his suicide (death was supposed to be his "cure"), because his reason is so lost from that he is even incapable of doing that. This first line hints at an Italian turn, since a change in mood occurs at the ninth line.

Shakespeare adds this effect to strengthen the Petrarchan theme he has been weaving throughout the poem, so the thirteenth line that blatantly contradicts all Petrarchan conventions creates more

of a sting. The two lines before the final couplet completely set aside any chance at reason the poet might have left: "My thoughts and my discourse as madmen's are/ At random from the truth vainly expressed..." (11-12). If this were a true Petrarchan poem the ending couplet would say something about his madness being caused by the lady's beauty; instead, he offers proof of such a madness that causes him to think and speak, and make bold, yet false claims of truth like a lunatic: "For I have sworn thee fair, and thought thee bright,/ Who art as black as hell, as dark as night" (13-4). More simply put, the speaker is saying, "I have to be crazy if I loved a wench like you!" Instead of a Petrarchan praise, Shakespeare uses a biting insult that is written in perfect iambic pentameter which seems to add to the statement's penetrating plainness.

This poem raises the question that if the poet was out of his mind, and unable to speak the truth, why should we believe that his mistress is "as black as hell, as dark as night?" Could it be possible that it was not the woman who let him down, but his imagination of the woman? After all, how could he think her "bright," since her "eyes are nothing like the sun..." (Sonnet 130:1).

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The Vindication of the Rights of Woman

Jennifer Handley

A Work of Artifice by Marge Piercy

The bonsai tree
in the attractive pot
could have grown eighty feet tall
on the side of a mountain
till split by lightning.
But a gardener
carefully pruned it.
It is nine inches high.
Every day as he
whittles back the branches
the gardener croons,
It is your nature
to be small and cozy,
domestic and weak;
how lucky, little tree,
to have a pot to grow in.
With living creatures
one must begin very early
to dwarf their growth:
the bound feet,
the crippled brain,
the hair in curlers,
the hands you
love to touch.

Civilization as we know it is a predominantly male construct in which women exist in a precarious position. Historically woman's position in Western society has been tenuous at best, and based mostly on her relationships to men. The great philosophers whom instructed men in cultivating their inner qualities spoke exclusively to and of men. If they did mention women, it was most often in a denigrating fashion lending ever increasing credence to the idea that men were far superior to women. This tradition has been carried through even with more modern thinkers, such as Nietzsche and Freud, whose works tightened the bonds men have imposed on women as they struggled for freedom.

Women have been regarded as overgrown children, unable by their very nature to hold a position of authority in the world, where authority is synonymous with male activities. In *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, Mary Wollstonecraft's visionary ideas cut through over 2000 years of erroneous, enslaving ideas. Hers was the first voice to contradict the centuries old affirmations of men that women were inferior beings. She showed, beyond a shadow of doubt, that her sex *at present* was indeed flawed, but that this state of being was a direct result of the treatment of men, and not indicative of the true potential of womankind. She also proved that women were indeed moral agents capable of and designed for attaining the same virtues as men.

Mary Wollstonecraft based her ideas concerning women on the fact that there must be equality between them. She opens her remarks with the observation that "either nature has made a great difference between man and man, or that the civilization which has hitherto taken place in the world has been very partial," (Wollstonecraft 112). She confronts the idea of men and women being intrinsically different and challenges it; excepting the case of physical superiority, where she freely grants males the advantage over females. The first factor that Wollstonecraft cites as causal to the development of women is education. The sole goal of an eighteenth century woman's life was to get married. She prepared solely for this end, and society provided a very clear definition of what was desirable in a woman. Beauty, sensibility, passivity and child-like airs were all encouraged by men of that time, as was the dependency that necessarily followed from such a cultural education. She says of women that, "strength of mind and body are sacrificed to libertine notions of beauty," (Wollstonecraft 115). This idea is expressed by the poem, *A Work of Artifice*, by Marge Piercy. The author of the poem describes womankind as a bonsai tree, pruned back by a gardener to fit a tiny pot. The gardener is clearly representative of man in his attempts to prune back women into domestic beings as suits his pleasure. Women, like the bonsai, are carefully prevented from achieving the full potential of their own nature via the careful pruning of a male dominated society.

They are placed in their little "pots" and allowed to flourish in such a manner as the gardener sees fit, rather than according to their own nature.

Traditionally the male has been held to be the seat of reason, while the woman has been thought dominated by emotion. Not only are men and women considered separate, they are also unequal. Women are endowed with sensibility, according to men, and they are deficient in reasoning abilities. This necessarily attaches a stigma to beliefs about feminine capabilities. She is perceived as lacking something inherent unto males, and so is less than a man. For example, the Aristotelian definition of a woman is this: "The female is a female by virtue of a certain lack of qualities; we should regard the female nature as afflicted with a natural defectiveness," (Schneir 8). This is characteristic of the contempt which men feel for the opposite sex. Men on the whole tend to deny women the chance to better themselves via developing their faculties as men are allowed to, and then they add insult to injury by decrying inherently feminine virtues such as women do have. Women are in charge of running the household and rearing the future men and women of the world; yet they are held in low esteem and even looked down upon. Their duties are seen as having little worth in the real world, and culture in Mary Wollstonecraft's day had de-emphasized the crucial importance of feminine virtues to the point where women were even discouraged from pursuing those. This denigration of women's values and occupations is inherently linked in our language. To be said to do "women's work" is an insult; there is clearly a pejorative connotation to this phrase. On the other hand, the activities of men are viewed in a positive light- the active, political realm and its participants are held in the greatest of esteem. The denigration of woman has taken away her human dignity, leaving but a passive girl-child incapable of exercising reason and thus barred from the path to virtue by dint of the fact that men whom created this weak creature cannot see it fit for such pursuits.

The preponderance of inflamed passions which a woman's faulty education leads to leaves the woman unfit for those services which are supposed to be the very goal of her

being: to run a house and have a happy marriage. Instead they leave a woman dependent on a man for virtually everything; "fragile in every sense of the word, the are obliged to look up to me for every comfort...with parasitical tenacity,"(Wollstonecraft 135). Such a woman is unable to have a happy marriage, according to Wollstonecraft, because she is unable to truly captivate the heart of a man through an improved understanding and compassionate heart. She can only excite passion and desire for a short amount of time via her charming and capricious nature; after a time these pleasures begin to pall and the man looks elsewhere. It is the natural tendency of love to pale into friendship, but the woman who is a product of such a society is clearly not able to be the equal of her husband in reason and virtue. It seems clear that there is no basis for such friendly regard and contempt or unconcern will be the wages the wife reaps for her shallow youth frittered away. Women are also unfit to rear children or tend to the household affairs, in Wollstonecraft's judicious opinion, because they are "always tyrannizing to support a superiority that only rests on the arbitrary distinction of fortune,"(Wollstonecraft 139). She is not capable of true love for her children and is inconsiderate of her servants, having no concept of basic compassion. In addition, Wollstonecraft addresses the issue of practical dependency upon men for a living. In the event of parent's death, an unwed woman is forced to depend on the charity of her brothers for the basic human needs: shelter, food, and a place to live. While the brother remains unwed all is well with this arrangement, but once his new wife steps into the picture things are altered. Inevitably, Wollstonecraft argues that these wives allow their jealousy of the sister to plague them until they have succeeded in her removal from the house. This is an act of utter cruelty and heartlessness, but Wollstonecraft sagaciously observes that "the present mode of education does not tend to enlarge the heart any more then the understanding,"(Wollstonecraft 138). Thus even though these women are sisters in law and bound together by gender, it is not rare to see one turn on the other where fortunes are concerned. Were women properly educated, the problem of these dependent sisters

would not be so troubling, because at least then they could have hope of supporting themselves through honest work. The woman of Wollstonecraft's time was without this option. In a modern parallel, it is interesting to note that according to a survey of AFDC welfare recipients, there exists a high percentage of women in America who are unable to support themselves or their family by honest work, because the pay and benefits are so low.(Edin 204). They are forced to remain on welfare and supplement their income with money earned from the odd illegal jobs they can get with their low level of skills and education. These are not jobs that offer steady employment or the chance of advancement. The needs of women in our society are still not sufficiently being met educationally, although it is true that at least we now have the right to education, if not the financial wherewithal.

Wollstonecraft felt that the problem with women's development was clearly a product of our society itself. Historically speaking men have viewed women as a part of man's identity, not as a whole in and of themselves. In the biblical account of creation Eve is taken from a rib of Adam; this encourages the perception that woman is only a "part" of man. Wollstonecraft said that the predominant belief of her times was that "man was made to reason, woman to feel: and that together, flesh and spirit, they make the most perfect whole, by blending happily reason and sensibility in one character,"(Wollstonecraft 136). However, Wollstonecraft goes on to show that sensibility is a poor substitute for reason. It is only a device of men to try and keep women from being empowered; by false flattery they tighten the chains around women. Simone de Beauvoir, a 20th century French feminist, also found that womanhood as we know it is a social construct; she wrote that, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman,"(Schneir 3). This is exactly in accordance with the beliefs and arguments of Mary Wollstonecraft, who argues that if women were treated more like boys when they were growing up, then they would certainly develop into very different creatures than the current notion of girlhood. Wollstonecraft's belief was revolutionary in her times; in

recent years anthropological research has proved that culture is indeed the primary factor in determining ideals of womanhood. Personality traits that are considered to be traditionally feminine or masculine by conventional Western thought are perceived quite differently in other corners of the globe. For example, an article written by Meredith Brown states that among the Tchambuli people, women are in control economically while men spent great amounts of time in self-adornment,"(Kesselman 32). She also goes on to state that,

All societies do have a division of labor according to gender. And they all see such a division as natural... These roles are supported in the culture's systems of symbolism, mythology, and religion. For example, where women have positions as religious and political leaders, stories of how the world was created feature women in central roles.

Clearly then Wollstonecraft's beliefs have been born out by modern research into human society.

Another crucial thrust in Wollstonecraft's reply to the philosophers is her affirmation of women's moral agency. There are two primary elements to this argument: one is that it is true that women, as they are now, are not expected to attain the same virtues as her male counterpart, because she is considered too weak in understanding to do so. The second is that women are equally able in faculty to achieve moral virtue as men. Wollstonecraft states that she, "wishes to show that elegance is inferior to virtue, that the first object of laudable ambition is to obtain a character as a human being, regardless of the distinction of sex,"(Wollstonecraft 114). The reason that women of the time were not acting in a "moral" fashion was because it was not how they were taught to behave. She takes issue with Milton's statement in *Paradise Lost* about Eve being all softness and sweet attractive grace. She replies that she cannot imagine what he means by that, "unless, in the true Mahometan strain, he meant to deprive us of souls,"(Wollstonecraft 116). However, Wollstonecraft found lines where Adam is asking his Maker for an equal, because among unequals there can be no true friendship or trust.

Here, in a religiously based epic she has found sufficient material to support her claim that in order to have true fellowship, men and women were created equally by God. According to Rousseau, women should never for a moment feel independent because she should be governed by fear to exercise her natural cunning. He goes on to imply in the case of women that they should not be taught virtue but rather obedience. Wollstonecraft dismisses this notion, stating that even if woman were by nature inferior to men, "her virtues must be the same in quality, if not in degree, or virtues is a relative idea; consequently, their conduct should be founded on the same principles, and have the same name,"(Wollstonecraft 122). It seems ridiculous to her to say that women were created for the sole purpose of being subservient to men; God did not give Adam a slave to lord over and take pleasure from, but a companion. Wollstonecraft argues thus that man and woman were created as equals to attain the same end- to "unfold their own faculties and acquire the dignity of conscious virtue,"(Wollstonecraft 122).

Mary Wollstonecraft was a visionary whose genius and personal strengths as a human being allowed her to see clearly the unfortunate position of her fellow woman. She saw clearly the degenerate state of womanhood at her time; but she was also able to trace the behavior to its roots, deeply ingrained in Western culture and philosophy. *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* confronted these existing stereotypes head on and successfully parried the blows dealt to women by the society we live in. Mary Wollstonecraft successfully argued, without precedent, that women were both capable and deserving of a much better place in society than the role she occupied historically. Through her revolutionary writings, Wollstonecraft opened the door to the woman's liberation movement that would pick up speed approximately a hundred years after she seized the spotlight and began to set the record straight about women in modern culture.

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Conceiving the Inconceivable: The Creation of Mind

Jennifer Molter

The idea at the core of both Darwinian thinking and Artificial Intelligence—that life was not preceded by mind, but that mind instead was preceded by life—serves as a major threat to the concept of the mind as an essence of the soul inaccessible to science. Historically, the impossibility of cognition and awareness emerging from unconscious subparts has been deemed an irrefutable and self-evident fact. Thus, the question of consciousness arising in computers has been the subject of considerable debate in the field of Artificial Intelligence. The January 1990 issue of *Scientific American* published the opposing points of view of three professors of philosophy: John Searle, and Paul and Patricia Churchland. In his article, “Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program?”, Searle attempts to prove that mental phenomena are a product of a kind of biological causation that could never be reconstructed in computer form. His arguments, however, are weak, mainly because he falls into the trap of assuming—not proving—the uniqueness and transcendence of mind.

John Locke refuted evolution on the premise that “it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incognitive Matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing itself produce Matter” (Dennett 26). To Locke, the mere unfathomability of a progression from nothing to matter to mind was grounds enough for its utter disproof and abandonment. It is this same argument of unfathomability that is used today against Artificial Intelligence. Searle counters the accusation that a number of his arguments beg the question by dubbing even his most controversial assumption a “logical truth” (Searle 51). The inability of computer programs to cause mental phenomena is so clearly an incontrovertible fact in his mind that he ends up making an axiom out of the very issue he is trying to prove.

The critical axiom upon which Searle’s conclusions rely heavily is Axiom 3, in which he states that “syntax itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics.” According to

Searle, if no discernible meaning can be detected at each step of the process, then no meaning can be derived from the process as a whole. This he assumes to be an obvious fact, thus distinguishing it as an axiom. But, for good measure, he attempts to support it by pointing to his analogy of the Chinese room, an analogy that upon inspection turns out to be incredibly weak.

In the analogy, you are sitting in a room with baskets containing the symbols of a language you do not know—in Searle's case, Chinese—and a rule book for appropriately matching the symbols to one another. In response to incoming questions, you manipulate the symbols according to the rule book, thereby producing answers which are indistinguishable from those of a native speaker. But, no matter how intelligible your answers may seem to one who is familiar with the language, you have not attached any meaning to the symbols you are manipulating, and are not conscious of the semantic content of the conversation.

The most obvious flaw in Searle's Chinese room analogy is that there is only one person in the room manipulating the symbols. At best this could be a representation of digital computers, computers run according to serial processing that the Churchlands themselves agree would never be able to develop cognition. Searle's second analogy, that of the Chinese gym, comes closer to a representation of the processes evident in both the brain and current computer models, but it is also far too simplified to adequately prove his point. To approach the computational size and speed of the brain—which is what Artificial Intelligence aims to do—his gym would need to be filled with an integrated and recurrent hierarchy of trillions of people, each performing a different task in parallel. Searle, however, while conceding that higher-level mental features might emerge from enormous size and complexity, is able to dismiss the argument by stating that it has nothing to do with computation.

Now that doubt has been raised as to the relevance of the Chinese room, the only thing left is to return to Searle's third axiom which, although derived directly from the analogy, is nonetheless an axiom and conveniently considered a logical truth. Searle sees a significant difference between syntax and semantics and finds it unfathomable that a pattern of activity created by simple, meaningless syntactic elements could in and of itself be the very essence of

semantics. This belief, however, is at risk of disproving consciousness even in the human brain, so it is necessary for Searle to differentiate the brain from computers.

Searle first states that the most obvious difference between animal brains and computers that prohibits computers from bridging the gap from syntax to semantics—or, rather, from algorithms to consciousness—is the respective levels of specificity. The extraordinarily high specificity in the brain is what allows for consciousness. He then goes on to say that even if a computer were developed with an equally high level of specificity, there is yet another difference between the brain and the computer: the ability of the brain to not only represent patterns (like a computer) but also to cause mental phenomena, such as consciousness. So, basically, brains can cause consciousness and computers can't because brains can cause consciousness and computers can't.

Searle's difficulty with the notion of semantics developing from syntax perfectly illustrates the power of what Tufts University professor Daniel Dennett labeled Darwin's dangerous idea, the idea that the complexity of life in existence today is a product of mindless algorithmic processes unaided by mind or purpose. Deliberately likening the biological machine to the electrical one, Dennett uses the computer term *macro* to refer to the earliest ancestors of life on Earth, the viruses which served as the bridge between no life and life. The term fits because the viruses were not only huge macromolecules, but also "bits of program or algorithm, bare, minimal self-reproducing mechanisms" (Dennett 156), much like computer viruses. Over time, and by virtue of mere algorithmic processes, these original macros evolved into a myriad of macromolecular machines that, in combination with one another, form living, conscious organisms.

Searle leaves open the possibility that a non-biological machine could think, but he argues that such a property could not exist by virtue of a program alone. He stresses the need for something else beyond a pre-programmed set of rules in order for the emergence of consciousness. This point, when accepted, appears quite adequate on its own for abolishing any further question of consciousness in computers. But in some sense, humans, too, could be

considered machines running on a pre-programmed set of rules: those written out in nucleotide sequences throughout our DNA. What is it that is present in the biological mechanism that possesses or provides the causal properties necessary to the development of cognition? The Churchlands suggest that the answer lies in the recurrent and adaptive traits of the network, a view in many ways supported by Dennett's thought experiment of a robotic survival machine, and one that reopens the debate over conscious computers.

In Dennett's thought experiment, you are to imagine yourself creating a machine that will house and protect you in a comatose state until the year 2401. If your machine is going to survive for four hundred years, it will need to be able to adapt to its changing environment, which will require physical endurance, some form of locomotion, and a means of learning through experience. At the outset, the information that you have programmed into it serves only as derived intentionality; but, over the course of 400 years of trial and error in recognition, categorization and behavior, original intentionality will gradually develop. The robot that you have created as a survival machine "would, like you, owe its existence to a project of R and D [research and development] with other ulterior ends, but this would not prevent it from being an autonomous creator of meanings, in the fullest sense" (Dennett 422-7).

The possibility of a computer performing beyond the immediate bounds of its original program has been tested in the real world with positive results. Arthur Samuel created a chess program that enabled the computer, through self-adjustments and redesign, to become a better chess player than even Samuel himself. This refutes the common belief that computers can do only what their programmer tells them to do and provides a classic example of the algorithmic evolutionary process at work. And it also provides further support for the suggestion that the non-programmable element that Searle considers necessary for consciousness could actually be an emergent property of the very program itself, a result of a pre-programmed propensity for adaptation and readjustment.

The notion of the mind as a product of simple algorithmic processes may be both unfathomable and disturbing, but while skyhooks provide an appealing alternative to such an

intimidating prospect, mere incredulity is not an adequate rebuttal. Searle's conviction that semantics could not possibly arise from syntactic elements leaves him floundering for an explanation of the conscious phenomena produced in the brain. And until an adequate case can be made for the existence of exclusively biological causal properties entirely separate from syntactic mechanisms, the possibility of creating a fully conscious computer remains.

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Rousseau Revisited

Ryan Ferland

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is not a pervert, though it is doubtful he would agree with such an assessment of his character. Rousseau believes his early sexual experience-- the "precociously sexual" chastisement from Mlle Lamercier-- and his subsequent emotional and physical desire for women to sexually dominate him is both ridiculous and shameful (25). Rousseau perceives himself as a sexual freak, an oddity that must stifle his supposed sexual deviations from what is considered "proper" sexual behavior in the eighteenth century and therefore remain sexually frustrated. From the modern perspective, where sexual desires and fetishes seem to be more accepted, or at least more understood, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's denouncement of his sexual desires seems unwarranted. Rousseau mistakenly assumes that his sexual needs are a perversion of the sexual desires of the rest of society and are therefore wicked. Rousseau believes these desires stem from his beating by Mlle Lamercier, but he does not appear to know why. Rousseau fails to realize that these sexual desires may have developed, in part, as a result of his overwhelming longing-- even at such a young age of eight-- for fulfillment of his "sensitive heart"-- a heart Rousseau ultimately blames for his life's misfortunes. In our age of sexual liberation, Rousseau becomes, rather than a sexually immoral pervert, merely a lonely man who lets his fear of what others would think of him affect his very outlook on himself. We sympathize with his incessant struggle to repress his sexual desires; we care more about Rousseau's feelings of shame than the desires themselves. We understand Rousseau's sexual cravings, even if we do not approve of them. The modern reader perceives Jean-Jacques Rousseau's early sexual experiences and subsequent desires as neither shameful nor ridiculous; they were natural. They were his.

In the beating he received from Mlle Lamercier, Rousseau "discovered in the shame and pain of the punishment an admixture of sensuality which had left [him] rather eager than otherwise for a repetition by the same hand" (25). As a child of eight,

Rousseau found comfort in being dominated by a strong female figure: "Who would have supposed that this childish punishment, received at the age of eight at the hands of a woman of thirty," Rousseau writes, "would determine my tastes and desires, my passions, my very self for the rest of my life" (26)? This beating shaped the course of Rousseau's life, creating a man ashamed of his very nature. Rousseau characterizes himself as a sexual deviant. He labels his desires as "strange tastes which persisted with a depraved and insane intensity" (26). His "crazy fantasies," his "wild fits of eroticism", his "strange behaviour" seized him as he matured (27). Rousseau abhors his sexual desires. He views himself as a flawed person who can never be sexually fulfilled: "I have never during the whole course of my life, been able to force myself, even in extreme moments of intimacy, to confess my peculiarities and implore her [any woman he loved at the time] to grant the one favor which was lacking" (28). Rousseau feared the reactions of others.

Shame forced Rousseau to lead an imaginary life where sexual completion came only through his dreams. His "restless imagination" created a world of pleasures for himself, based upon situations he had encountered in books which would "calm [his] growing sensuality" (48). Rousseau in effect, resorted to the eighteenth century equivalent of pornography to satisfy himself-- to escape himself-- rather than face the threat of ridicule from a woman (or any one else) who may have found his tastes absurd. Rather than accept himself, Rousseau chose to flee from himself. Indeed, "the fictions" Rousseau created through his imagination made him "forget [his] real condition, which so dissatisfied [him]" (48). Rousseau's shame coerced him to live an illusory life. This shame created a man who found the need to "confess" these supposed sins as he grew older, due to his increasing awareness of his own mortality (as evidenced by the resigned tone of Rousseau's introductory remarks, "Let the last trump sound when it will, I shall come forward with this work in my hand, to present myself before the Sovereign Judge",) in search of exoneration, someone to say to him, "I understand" (17). "I know my own heart and understand my fellow man," Rousseau claims in the opening lines of his work,

but the reader gets the sense that Rousseau believes no one else knows him; why else would he proclaim "So let the numberless legion of my fellow men gather round me and hear my confessions"? (17). Rousseau needs an audience because he can no longer suppress his inner life; he can no longer hide from himself. Through confession, Rousseau hopes to find absolution from what he deems his most "dark and miry" character trait (28). Absolution, unfortunately, may have come two hundred years too late.

In the twentieth century, a reader of Rousseau's Confessions is immediately struck by Rousseau's candor-- his refreshing forthrightness-- more than his supposedly bizarre desires. What Rousseau perceived as "shameful and ridiculous" desires, we as modern-day readers are more apt to accept as natural, or at the very least understandable, due to the proliferation of a raised sexual consciousness in the news, pop culture, entertainment, and even in sexual education classes in middle schools. We-- with the advantage of modern psychology-- can offer reasons for why Rousseau's desires developed the way they did. We empathize. Rousseau either failed to realize or refused to realize that the desires which stemmed from Mlle Lamercier's beating may have been the logical outgrowth of his already low opinion of himself, his need for love and affection-- which apparently he did not receive much of-- as well as his later adolescent confusion concerning sex (as indicated by his "horror of prostitutes" and the nausea induced by thoughts of sexual intercourse) (27).

Rousseau came into this world believing he was inferior. His birth was the death of his mother, the "first of [his] misfortunes" which, in turn, created many more. Although Rousseau's father loved him, he nevertheless seemed cold and distant, as if he blamed Rousseau for his wife's death. "He seemed to see her again in me" Rousseau recounts, "but could never forget that I had robbed him of her; he never kissed me that I did not know by his sighs and his convulsive embrace that there was a bitter grief mingled with his affection" (19). Rousseau's earliest memories are painful in scope, lonely and heart-wrenching. Rousseau lacked affection. Before he moved into the home

of the pastor M. Lambercier after his father fled Geneva, Rousseau only knew the "lofty and theoretical emotions" of the literature he read (24). Loneliness stings Rousseau, even at the age of eight. Even the friendship Rousseau developed with his cousin Bernard at the Lambercier's was not enough: "By sudden transports I achieved moments of bliss, but immediately afterwards I relapsed into languor," Rousseau writes, "My strongest desire was to be loved by every one who came near me" (25). It is no wonder then, that when Mlle Lambercier-- a woman probably close to the age that Rousseau's own mother would have been had she lived-- treated Rousseau with both "a mother's love" as well as "a mother's authority" by beating him when he disobeyed that "this punishment increased [his] affection for the inflicter", leaving him wanting more (25). Rousseau became eager for more beatings because the stern hand of Mlle Lambercier became equated with love. In Rousseau's young mind Mlle Lambercier gave the disobedient Rousseau the loving discipline of the mother he never had. She fulfilled Rousseau's desire for affection--even if it was for just an instant. Rousseau, accordingly, spent his life wishing to find completion again: "I feasted feverish eyes on lovely women, recalling them ceaselessly to my imagination, but only to make use of them in my own fashion as so many Mlle Lamberciers" (26). Domination by a strong maternal figure, a desire developed at such an impressionable age, became Rousseau's fetish in his later years. "My own childish tastes did not vanish," Rousseau admits, "but became so intimately associated with those of maturity that I could never, when sensually aroused, keep the two apart...To fall on my knees before a masterful mistress, to obey her commands, to have to beg for her forgiveness, have been to me the most delicate of pleasures" (27-8). Yet, Rousseau never attempted to relive or relieve his sexual desires. Shame thwarted him.

We understand Rousseau's feelings of frustration. We pity him. How many times ourselves have we had to stifle our most intimate passions, satisfying them only in our dreams? The shame Rousseau endured so depleted his resolve that he was compelled to "confess" himself to the world. Rousseau's shame stemmed from his fear that he broke

from the set "moral" sexual practices of eighteenth century European society. What Rousseau failed to understand is that each individual has his or her own sexual desires and needs. There is no sexual norm-- each one of us is aroused and fulfilled sexually by different stimulants. We cannot chastise ourselves because we believe we are different. Rousseau's fetish for domination may seem a little odd to modern readers, but it does not surprise us. We hear such "confessions" frequently in our daily lives. We do not condemn Rousseau, rather we sympathize with him. He lived his life detesting his very nature, his very being, without ever attempting to accept himself until it was too late. Rousseau's Confessions were never published until after he was buried. He died without anyone truly knowing his innermost thoughts and passions, with no one to say "I understand". There's something sad about that, something really sad, something I don't believe any of us would want to happen to us.

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The Moral Structure of Dante's *Inferno* as Influenced by Aristotle's *Ethics*

Patrick Lake

In the words of Dante himself, "morality is the beauty of philosophy" (Boyde 26). And it was the moral theories of Aristotle, or "the philosopher" as he was often called by intellectuals of the thirteenth century, that influenced Dante's handling of morality in the *Inferno*. Aristotle viewed man as a responsible, rational being that is free to think, weigh matters, and choose. Thus man is, if he has the ability to act rationally (the sinners in Dante's *Inferno* are either unable to act in this way or abuse this unique human ability) and understand his situation and the choices that he makes, responsible for the consequences of his actions. Indeed, to show the depth of Aristotle's influence on Dante's view of morality, Dante wrote to his patron, Can Grande delle Sala, that the moral intention of his work was "to show man's freedom of choice and subsequent responsibility for his moral attainments and failures" (Reade 18). Dante was not just interested in classifying what constitutes virtue and vice; he cares more importantly about the consequences of such behavior. To Dante, the mode of one's existence in the afterlife was a direct result of one's mode of existence during life. Specifically, it was Aristotle's teleology -- ideas pertaining to the purpose or end of human existence, voluntary versus involuntary action, choice, deliberation, and responsibility as expounded in his *Nicomachean Ethics* that influenced Dante's ideas on morality and particularly his ordering of the gravity of sins in the *Inferno*. Dante's Hell, a place of viciousness and permanent punishment, is divided into nine distinct zones. Each zone is a place distinguished by a particular category of sin with an appropriate punishment (i.e. contrapasso). These zones can in turn be grouped into larger subdivisions of which there are three: sins due to self-indulgence, violence and fraud, and finally treason and betrayal.

Aristotle's philosophy is dominated by a teleology -- all things exist for a purpose. That is to say, all things desire and move towards their end or final cause; and when they have reached it they no longer desire (for desire implies a lack of something). It is the claim of Aristotle in his *Ethics* that all men desire happiness as their final cause (which could also be translated as fulfillment, completeness, joy, or end). Moreover, man possesses as part of his nature the means to reach this end; by perfecting his intellect and the rational elements of his soul, he is able to live a life of moral virtue and indeed to find happiness in the "just" life. Yet, most men are not able to realize this level of moral perfection. Although they may aim towards happiness as their end, many people derive happiness from the wrong source, for example, in money, sex, or other things the excess of which normally characterizes vice. Therefore, the question is not what the ultimate goal of a man is; the question is in what way does he hope to realize this goal. He is to be judged not by his ultimate end but by the way in which he achieves it.

To truly understand Aristotle's influence on Dante's view of morality, however, one must first of all understand that the gravity of sins increases in terms of a movement from the lower to the higher parts of human nature. For "whoever would understand Dante ... must forever dismiss the proper notion that the most reprehensible form of sin are those in which man most nearly resembles the beasts of the field" (Reade 205). It is a far greater sin to abuse the human powers of reason and deliberate in order to attain a vicious end than it is to be overcome by irrationality and be defeated by passion (Aristotle 197). For as Dante-pilgrim says as he reaches the gate of Hell, "[I have reached the place of] those who have lost the good of the intellect" (III. 18).

The first troubled souls that Dante-pilgrim encounters are not in Hell at all. They are the do-nothings, the Ignavi. They are, in fact, what they were: neutral. Yet Aristotle held that the final cause in most things consisted not in a state but in activity. And Dante, in following Aristotle's most basic tenet of what characterizes the moral nature of man, is left with no way to characterize these utterly inactive souls due to the simple fact that they took no action that would allow one to characterize them. They refuse to function as responsible human beings. The futile

nature of their lives is reflected in their punishment, which consists in running in circles after banners as they are goaded by wasps and hornets which forces them to take some sort of action, futile as it may be.

Beyond these spirits are the virtuous pagans who are also kept outside of the gates of Hell. Aristotle's view of the involuntary and voluntary as a way of distinguishing between the amount of guilt and blame one should have in relation to one's actions is vital to understanding the punishment of these spirits. For when virtue and excellence are voluntary "we receive praise or blame; when involuntary, we are pardoned and sometimes even pitied" (Aristotle 52). And it is for these souls that Dante shows some sort of pity, writing how during his encounter with Virgil "great sorrow seized [his] heart" (IV. 43). Virgil's "sin," if such it is, of not worshipping the Christian God was not an active choice that he made. He was simply born before Christianity was the official religion of the Roman Empire and never had a chance to know the Christian God. Therefore, his "fault" is not nearly as grave as those who have a knowledge of God yet still do not properly recognize Him, such as the heretics in the Sixth Circle of Hell and those like Satan in the lowest depths of Hell who openly rebelled against God or their masters in a more deliberate way. Therefore, the virtuous pagans deserve some sort of pity. The "sin" of Virgil is not a voluntary one and does not deserve the full-fledged punishment of Hell. The virtuous pagans are therefore punished perhaps forever being in the absence of the God who would satisfy their intellectual desires.

Thus, the first moral division in Dante's *Inferno* is determined by Aristotle's notion of voluntary versus involuntary actions. For the first sinners beyond the virtuous pagans are those that actively chose to sin. These sinners are characterized by self-indulgence, an irrational emotion, yet "considered no less a part of human beings than reasoning is, and hence, the actions of a man spring from passion and appetite. It would be absurd then to count them as involuntary" (Aristotle 57). The sins of self-indulgence include lust, gluttony, hoarding/spending, and unjustified wrath. These sins are found at the very top of Hell in Circles II through V. These are sinners who have been directed by their animal natures.

However, the sins are still considered to be voluntary according to Aristotle, because a voluntary action is one in which “the initiative lies with the agent who knows the particular circumstances in which the action is performed. This implies that acts due to passion and appetite are voluntary” because these sinners have a definite end in mind. They derive their happiness from self-indulgence and act in accordance with these goals. Thus the two lovers of the Second Circle, Francesca and Paolo, for example, deserve punishment for their voluntary sin of lust. Moreover, their acting in ignorance of the consequences of their actions is compounded by the fact that they do not regret what they have done. This lack of regret is another criterion for differentiating between a voluntary and involuntary agent according to Aristotle (55). Francesca and Paolo blame their sins on things like the writer of the love story that they were reading, despite the fact that they allowed themselves to be ruled by passion and therefore voluntarily sinned and should be held responsible for their sin. Furthermore, to praise and blame a person’s actions it is even more important “whether or not a man successfully resists compulsion” (Aristotle 54). Those whose sin is due to self-indulgence do not resist compulsion at all, since they do not subject their own irrational desires to reason. Moreover, they are responsible for their sins because, although it seems that they have no control over their self-indulgent tendencies, these people have “acquired these traits voluntarily ... for a given kind of activity produces a given kind of character [and] a self-indulgent man initially had the possibility not to become unjust or self-indulgent” (Aristotle 66).

Beyond the definition of the voluntary and the involuntary in Aristotle’s ethical scheme is the idea of choice. And it is choice, like the gap between voluntary and involuntary, that determines the next division in Dante’s *Inferno*. For sinners that chose their sin, thus employing the rational element of their soul, are more active, more voluntarily involved in their sin. They betray their unique, human ability to make a rational choice since choice “is not shared by irrational creatures” (Aristotle 58). That is why those that practice heresy, fraud, and those that commit suicide are punished more deeply in hell than the self-indulgent. Their sins are not only voluntary, but they are a result of careful, calculated deliberation. They sin with their intellect,

and they necessarily do it voluntarily, for the rational process of choice is brought about by deliberation. They are not simply carried away by the irrationality of self-indulgence because “choice involves reason and thought” (Aristotle 59). To Aristotle choice was, of course, voluntary, but:

it is not the same as voluntariness; voluntariness is a wider term ... we can describe an act done on the spur of the moment as a voluntary act, but not the result of choice ... It seems to be a mistake to identify choice as some people do, with appetite, passion, wish, or some other form of opinion ... choice seems to be concerned with the things that lie within our power ... a choice is praised for being directed to the proper object or for being correctly made. (Aristotle 59)

Suicide, for example, is the intentional taking of one's life and the corruption of the rational part of one's soul; those that practice fraud actively and rationally lie in order to bring about some previously planned end. Dante's prime example of fraud is Ulysses, a man characterized by a brilliant, skillful mind, who uses it for the purposes of deception. It is at this point in Dante's journey through Hell, incidentally, that the pilgrim sees without a doubt that he no longer has sympathy for these kinds of sinners and, in fact, kicks the head of one of the traitors, not entirely by mistake.

Finally, deliberation brings us one level lower, to the final level of Hell; although deliberation accompanies all aspects of choice, it chiefly characterizes choice that is made very carefully. And in the Circle of Treason, fraud and heresy are taken one step further. For treason is really just a more thoroughly planned and wider-reaching, more vicious form of fraud, and the open rebellion against God by Satan and others is a more purposeful, premeditated version of heresy. Not only are these sins thoroughly thought through but they are done with full knowledge of the agent that the action that they take is sinful; these types of sins represent the antithesis of a repentant sinner and characterize the lowest kind of sinner.

Such was the impact of Aristotle's Ethics on Dante that he regarded Aristotle not just as the “master of those who know” but as the “master of human life” (Boyde 293). To claim that

Dante's view of morality is completely determined by Aristotle would of course be incorrect. The Inferno is in many ways a synthesis of the traditional "deadly sins" of Christian theology, with reference to Aristotle's notions of choice, knowledge, reason, and responsibility (Boyde 294). The Divine Comedy can be read on many different levels, and something like Dante's handling of morality depends on so much more than the moral theory of Aristotle. Still, Aristotle has a strong presence in the Inferno and the thoroughness of Aristotle's logic in asserting the fact that man is a responsible agent complements very well Dante's view of Hell as a place of eternal damnation that sinners have brought upon themselves due to their immoral actions on earth.

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The Necessity of Trust

Gretchen Braun

Trust is a central theme running through many works in the field of social science. Some level of trust is essential for all productive human interactions. Although one can theorize about the solitary “natural man” who may have existed prior to society, observation shows that throughout history, humans tend to band together, and this interaction is contingent on mutual trust between human beings. Both religion and economics are closely related to this mutual trust. Without it, no society could function.

For human beings to form societies—which usually involves shared tasks, shared customs, and trade within the society and possibly with other societies—each individual must place some level of trust in others. Whether or not an individual actually believes that the society as a whole is worthy of his or her trust, he or she must act as if it is, abiding by its laws or customs as if he or she is sure to be treated fairly. One form of trust that has the capacity to strengthen a community is religious faith. Trust in God provides individuals with a sense of meaning in their lives and also draws them together in worship, solidifying community bonds. It is impossible to determine the degree of the genuine belief in a higher power of any particular individual within a faith community or how that belief truly affects his or her perceptions and actions. However, shared worship and shared religious doctrines definitely cultivate cohesiveness in a community.

This issue is discussed by Emile Durkheim in *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*. In his attempts to determine a pattern in the suicide rate that would suggest what motivates people to take their own lives and why some groups display a higher suicide rate than others, Durkheim

inquired, are Protestants more likely to kill themselves than Catholics or Jews? All three religions discourage suicide. Durkheim realized it would be necessary to look to cultural factors for an explanation. He arrived at the conclusion that the church structure of Protestantism and the culture associated with that faith tend to make the individual feel isolated. He explains,

[In Catholicism] a whole hierarchical system of authority is devised, with remarkable ingenuity, to render tradition invariable. All *variation* is abhorrent to Catholic thought. The Protestant is far more the author of his faith. The Bible is put in his hands and no interpretation is imposed upon him. ...the proclivity of the Protestantism for suicide must relate to the spirit of free inquiry which animates this religion (Durkheim 158).

Protestants, Durkheim suggests, are more inclined to suicide because their faith encourages them to come up with their own answers rather than putting faith in their priest, the church hierarchy, and each other. The individualism characteristic of the Protestant faith makes these communities less cohesive, leaving Protestants more prone to egoistic suicide. This demonstrates that firm, shared beliefs, unified faith in a leader, and rigid common customs can produce a society where there is a mutual sense of trust and community. Durkheim shows that trusting oneself and one's own judgment more than everyone else's can ultimately be self-destructive.

Another author who addresses the issue of the role trust plays in society is Max Weber. One point Weber makes in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is that some level of trust is necessary for economic activity to take place. Throughout history, the exchange of goods and services has involved implicit trust, for instance, "I assume that if you agree to give me three sacks of grain for this goat, you will not beat me up and take both grain and goat." Although many people have been deceived and taken advantage of, one must nonetheless assume one will be treated fairly in order to trade with somebody. This sort of exchange involving implicit trust can be described as a capitalistic action. The author clarifies what is meant by capitalism, saying,

We will define a capitalistic action as one which rests on the expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities for exchange, that is on (formally) peaceful chances for profit (Weber 17, *sic*).

Thus, capitalism, which is one of the oldest economic systems, is dependent on trust between people. Trust is particularly important in the West's modern capitalistic system. Weber emphasizes the importance of being perceived as honest in order to succeed in business in a rational capitalist society. People are inclined to put their faith in - and trust their money with - a man who has a reputation for paying debts promptly, being frugal, being industrious, and being honest (Weber 48-50). Although modern capitalism has been accused of excessive greed and unscrupulousness, Weber feels that on the contrary, it demands that a person check his greedy impulses and at least appear honest and trustworthy. No one would want to risk economic interaction with an unreliable or unscrupulous person; money could be lost. Weber explains,

Capitalism cannot make use of the labor of those who practise the doctrine of undisciplined *liberum arbitrium*, any more than it can make use of the business man who seems absolutely unscrupulous in his dealings with others.... (Weber 57).

Economic activity requires one to place at least a basic level of trust in one's trading partners, and as Weber shows, a reputation for trustworthiness and reliability is especially important in the modern capitalistic system.

Ibn Khaldun addresses the role of trust within the tribal community in *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. One prominent idea in this work is that Bedouin desert-dwelling tribes are superior to sedentary city-dwelling peoples. The hardship Bedouins must endure increases not only the toughness and religious piety of the individuals but also the cohesiveness of the group. (This concurs with Durkheim's finding that the cohesiveness of a community increases in times of crisis. For Bedouins, survival is a constant struggle). The "group feeling,"

to use Ibn Khaldun's term, is what makes a tribe strong. Group feeling is a difficult concept to provide a precise English equivalent for, but it may be approximately defined as the mutual trust, based on affection and respect, which exists between members of a tribe and is strongest among blood relatives. The Bedouin tribe is clan-like, blending family and political life. The author explains that:

Group feeling results only from blood relationship or something corresponding to it. (Respect for) blood ties is something natural among men, with the rarest exceptions (Ibn Khaldun 98, *sic*).

Thus blood ties are not the only source of group feeling, but they are an important one. Ibn Khaldun explains that group feeling is needed if a group is to survive in the desert, without laws to act as a restraining influence and city walls to protect the tribe from enemies:

The restraining influence among Bedouin tribes comes from their *shaykhs* and leaders. It results from the great respect and veneration they generally enjoy among the people. The hamlets of the Bedouins are defended against outside enemies by a tribal militia composed of noble youths of the tribe who are known for their courage. Their defense and protection are successful only if they are a closely knit group of common descent (Ibn Khaldun 97.)

Thus group feeling allows a desert tribe with limited resources to flourish. The author describes the power that strong group feeling affords a tribe, saying, "Group feeling produces the ability to defend oneself, to offer opposition, to protect oneself, to press one's claims" (Ibn Khaldun 110). However, as desert tribes garner wealth and political power through this strength, they eventually become sedentary, since "...urbanization is found to be the goal to which the Bedouin aspires" (Ibn Khaldun 93).

Once settled in the city, the tribe begins to deteriorate. Whereas a Bedouin of the desert must be alert and strong to protect himself and his tribe, a city man learns to rely on the laws and walls of the city to protect him. Ibn Khaldun explains how this weakens men, saying, "People

turned to sedentary life and assumed the character trait of submissiveness to the law. This led to a decrease in their fortitude" (Ibn Khaldun 96). Group feeling is diminished under these circumstances. Intoxicated by the luxuries of city life and lulled into a false sense of security by reliance on their government, city dwellers lose their "savage" strength. Instead of looking to their shaykh for leadership while relying on each other for restraint in personal disputes and protection from outside enemies, sedentary people trust blindly in their ruler to take care of all of their problems. Ibn Khaldun demonstrates that for a society to be strong, individuals must not only trust their ruler, but trust their own strength and judgment, and they must take a share of responsibility for the protection of the community.

Trust is vital to human society. Religious and economic activity depend on mutual trust within a society and can strengthen that mutual trust. For a society to be strong, its members must strike a balance, placing enough trust in each other and in their leader to form a cohesive community while retaining enough individual identity to be responsible for their own actions, and to a degree, their own protection. Although by placing trust in another human being, one risks emotional, financial, or physical danger, humans must rely on each other in order to survive and flourish.

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The Tao and Te of the Tao-Te Ching

Whitney Myers

Although the words *Tao* and *Te* are part of the title of Lao-Tzu's work, the *Tao-Te Ching*, their meanings are far from explicit within the text. Literally they mean "the way and the moral force," but the Taoist way of life can be ambiguous indeed. In fact, like many philosophies, Taoism is sensitive to interpretation in many lights, and thus the Taoist way of life is a unique combination of various central themes. In the end, however, Tao is a constant that is perhaps more hidden than clarified by analysis. It is a complex whole, transcending the world, following the *yin* and the *yang*, flowing within and without. Through the text of the *Tao-Te Ching*, the *yin* and *yang* become a kind of paradigm for the relationship between Tao and Te, action and non-action, and the named and the nameless, but finally, like the *yin* and the *yang*, all of these merge and become one under the Tao.

A general system for understanding the *Tao-Te Ching* can be found using the division between *yin* and *yang*. This may seem a bit contradictory to the teachings of Taoism, (as Taoism is a holistic religion), but it can still shed light on its central beliefs. *Yin* and *yang* are two aspects of the Tao; both opposed and equal. There is a harmony and balance of the two: "Shade and sunlight, yin and yang,/ Breath blending into harmony" (42). The *yin* is characterized by earth, water, dark, female, and emotion. It is the uncarved block, with its inherent characteristics exposed by the *yang*. On the other hand, the *yang* is sky, light, male, and logic. It is the mountain as *yin* is the valley; each necessary for the other. They are complete opposites and yet they are the same thing, because one does not exist without the other. This is illustrated in chapter 2: "Recognize beauty and ugliness is born./ Recognize good and evil is born./ Is and

Isn't produce each other." The Is and Isn't can be compared to the positive and negative space in a painting. The Isn't is the negative space (the absence), while the Is is the positive space (the visible). They interact within the painting, creating a central dimension, one defining the other.

One example of the *yin* and *yang* is the concept of action versus non-action. Non-action or *wu-wei* is emphasized by Lao-Tzu from the beginning. It is like the *yin*, flowing and uncontrived. He says: "Therefore the Sage is devoted to non-action,/ Moves without teaching,/ Creates ten thousand things without instruction,/ Lives but does not own,/ Acts but does not presume,/ Accomplishes without taking credit" (2). Another analogy that Lao-Tzu uses to illustrate this is comparing *wu-wei* to an infant; one with a mind that is completely free and natural. "It can scream all day and not get hoarse,/ Its harmony is complete" (55). As an infant would do, non-action means not disrupting the natural state of things, and working with the strength inherent in something. A part of non-action is getting rid of desires as well. "No desire is serenity,/ and the world settles of itself" (37). One must cultivate his mind to be "still"; to somehow lose its sense of active participation in the world. Conversely, action would be the *yang*; it is the carved block, or the conforming to a mold. There seems to be a force involved in action, whereas there is no force involved in non-action. Even so, non-acting itself is a way of acting. That is to say, things will be done by non-acting, or *yin*, because the acting will flow from it like *yang*. "Non-doing—and nothing not done" (48). Since the two are connected, and in fact the same, one will naturally produce the other. Therefore the harmony of the opposites is still preserved.

The opposites of the named and the nameless also follow the paradigm set by the *yin* and *yang*. The nameless is *yin*, "the origin of heaven and earth," while the named is *yang*, "the mother of ten thousand things" (1). There is a sense that the nameless is the Tao, while the

named is the Te. The force of *yang* is evident in the Te, as Te is moral force or character that is an expression of the Tao. When one follows Tao, Te is what is activated. Tao, however, is not named. Lao-Tzu explains this in the very first chapter when he says, “Tao called Tao is not Tao.” When Tao is named, its flow and motion are stopped, and hence it becomes “not-Tao.”

This idea is in accordance with non-action because one cannot conform the Tao, one must let it be. Naming it would be fitting it into a written mold, which would change its meaning.

Regardless, the named and the nameless are also a part of the complex set of paradoxes that Lao-Tzu describes. The nameless is the origin of the named, and just as the *yin* and *yang* become the same thing, so too do the named and the nameless.

Tao and Te have a relationship that is very similar to the flowing of the *yin* and *yang*. They have reached a kind of equilibrium—one moving into the other—maintaining harmony. The Tao is the *yin*—the origin, the female—while the Te is the *yang*—the expression, the male. “Great Te appears/ Flowing from Tao,” says Lao-Tzu in chapter 21. “Tao bears them,/ Te nurses them/ Events form them/ Energy completes them” (51). Everything is governed by the relationship between the Tao and the Te, and each thing flows from the next. “Tao engenders One,/ One engenders Two,/ Two engenders Three,/ Three engenders the ten thousand things” (42). Similarly, *yin* is the origin of *yang*, but *yang* comes back to its roots and is therefore also the origin. This is illustrated in chapter 65: “Original Te goes deep and far,/ All things reverse/ Return/ And reach the great headwaters.” The motion of the Tao, in fact, is reversal. Each thing comes back around to become its opposite, and every set of opposites are in a balance. “All things originate from being,/ Being originates from non-being” (40). The Tao depends on the Te and vice versa. There is no *yin* without *yang*, and there is no Tao without Te.

For this reason it becomes very difficult to continually separate nature into two halves. Part of the lesson of Taoism is that the world must be looked at as a whole. The principal analogy here is water. Water is unstoppable, renewing, the originator of all things. The Tao is the same because it is a part, but it is also the whole thing. The Tao is the “real” life. It is everything, and can embody the unique experience of everyone on earth. That is why one must not force the Tao—one must be open to the ebb and flow of life. Each thing (*yin*, non-action, namelessness) and its opposite are the same, and they are also Tao. “Tao is the mysterious center of all things” (62), and because it is *yin* it reaches toward the center of the circle, yet *yang* brings it back to the outside. Thus not only is the motion of the Tao reversal, but it is also circular. It is the pure center of the circle, but it is also the circle itself. Though Lao-Tzu describes each aspect of the Tao individually, they are all really the same thing.

The *Tao-Te Ching* is a complex account of the Tao that can appear to be a paradoxical journey toward understanding. Having arrived at one conclusion, Lao-Tzu frequently renounces it and then supports its complete opposite. At first glance this may indicate that the Tao has no definition, and that Taoism is merely a fancy name for lawlessness and anarchy. Upon closer inspection, however, Lao-Tzu’s treatment of the Tao provides a bit more clarity into its nature. It’s true that “Tao hides, no name” (41), but it also becomes evident that the truth of life is Tao. Lao-Tzu insists that the Tao is nameless, however, and for that very reason analysis of his text may prove to further shroud the essence of Tao. Perhaps that should be our clue that living the Tao is indeed the most important path towards understanding it.

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Don Giovanni and Heinrich Faust: A Lesson in Love and Fate

Rose Pugliese

History is full of myths and legends about heroes and villains who tried to attain that which was beyond their grasp and paid the ultimate price for their hubris. There is Icarus, who met his end in the depths of the Aegean Sea when he flew too close to the sun, causing his wings to melt from heat so intense as to destroy a mere mortal. There is Prometheus, who endured not only the sorrows and hardships of Pandora's Box, but also suffered the horror of having his liver continually torn out by an eagle as punishment for stealing fire from Olympus and giving it to man. There is the more modern figure of Macbeth, who aspired to be king when the throne was not rightfully his and met death at the hands of his enemies as a result of his ambition. Mozart's Don Giovanni and Goethe's Heinrich Faust have the same hubristic aspect to their characters, and it is only natural to assume that they will come to the same type of end. This, however, is not the case: Faust escapes the horrific fate that the others were not so lucky to avoid. The question is, why? Why does Goethe's Faust reach salvation when Don Giovanni, another victim of his own desires, is damned to Hell?

It is true that Faust and Don Giovanni committ terrible sins and inflict cruel injustices on innocent people. It is also true that they each deserve their individual fate. The reason for this is love. Poets speak of "the healing power of love," and this hints at the power of this emotion. Love can cause devastation as well as ecstasy, sorrow as well as joy, and, in the case of Faust, can give a person the means to accept his place in the universe and achieve redemption. The absence of love in the face of a life of sin is a great disadvantage to a man such as Don Giovanni, a man determined to break all boundaries and take what he pleases. Giovanni did not love; love led Faust to salvation.

Goethe believed that the ultimate sin was to stop striving, and this belief is manifested in Faust. Faust is always striving: he wants to know everything, including that

which man was not meant to know. He wants the totality of every experience. His ideal is to have both the macrocosm (knowledge) and the Earth Spirit (experience) completely. The moment in which the two phenomena would occur together is Faust's *augenblicke*. Just as Faust is beginning to doubt whether he will ever find it, Mephistopheles enters the picture.

Faust realizes on some level that his philosophy of striving, and his desire for the *augenblicke* are at odds with each other. His philosophy is that man is meant to strive; to him, action is the most important thing in life. This becomes evident when Faust is translating the Gospel of John from Greek. Faust rejects, "In the beginning was the Word" in favor of "In the beginning was the Deed" (1247). He considers "the word" to be stagnant and passive, while "the deed" is dynamic and active. However, if he were to find the *augenblicke* he would want it to stay forever, and thus his striving would come to an end. Faust cannot reconcile his belief with his desire, and therefore strives harder for the *augenblicke* while convinced he will never find it. It is this that prompts him to make the bet with Mephistopheles:

If I should ever tell the moment:
Oh, Stay! You are so beautiful!
Then you may cast me into chains,
Then I shall smile upon perdition! (1699-1702)

Mephistopheles believes he can give Faust the *augenblicke* and end his striving, thus giving the devil the right to take his immortal soul. Ironically, through Gretchen, Mephistopheles introduces Faust to something which motivates him to keep striving and that thing is love.

Don Giovanni's philosophy of life is far different from Faust's philosophy. If Giovanni is striving for anything it is to build his ego and lose himself in sensual pleasure by seducing as many women as possible. The only thing Don Giovanni is interested in knowing is how many conquests he has in his little black book. His only aria, the

"Champagne" aria, perfectly illustrates his outlook on life: "I'll read the harvest! . . . lay on a lavish celebration! . . . I can make love to whom I please!" (Act 1, track 25). This is a man whose only "serious" goal in life is to have fun. The music also paints the picture of a man to whom pleasure is the most important thing. The "Champagne" aria is not only *vivace*, or fast and lively, but *presto*, which is so fast that the words are difficult to make out. This aria is a *contradanse*, which is a lower-class dance that everyone can have fun with.

Giovanni is arrogant as well. He feels no remorse for his actions, blithely going about using women and breaking their hearts with no thought to their feelings, which demonstrates a profound lack of empathy for other people. He also tends to see others strictly in terms of his own needs. In spite of all this, he is extremely charming and charismatic, which no doubt helps him to be such an accomplished seducer. Today Giovanni might be called a sociopath. This is not a man who loves. This is a man who not only murdered, but had the arrogance to disrespect the spirit of his victim in the sacredness of the cemetery, thereby committing the grievous sin of blaspheming the dead. This is the act that most illustrates his hubris, which seems to be the only characteristic he has in common with Faust. Giovanni is not conflicted, as Faust is. He does not have the thirst for knowledge that Faust has. He sees no reason to combine the ultimate knowledge with the pleasure of experience, as Faust does. Giovanni is completely selfish, solely concerned with having fun and getting what he wants no matter what the cost to others. Giovanni is not a man who loves.

Faust, on the other hand, loves deeply. His love for Gretchen is unlike anything else he has ever experienced, and it is this love which drives his determination to rescue her from prison at the end of Part One. He wants Gretchen with him so that they can continue through life together, and this is where Mephistopheles may have miscalculated. The devil does not understand human nature, nor does he realize what Faust considers to be the true *augenblicke*. Mephistopheles hopes to furnish Faust with the one moment he

will want to last forever by trapping him in lust for a beautiful woman, and thus Faust's soul would belong to Mephisto for all eternity. This may have worked, for lust is an impulse; there is a certain point at which it can be satisfied. However, Mephisto does not quite understand love. Love is an emotion that is never completely satiated, it requires striving, which is the very thing that is most important to Faust. One might say that once love is satisfied, love is gone. Faust's love for Gretchen does not end until after her death, and he would not be satisfied with a stagnant, passive kind of love. God meant for man to strive and make mistakes because he knows that, "a good man in his dark and secret longings / is well aware which path to go" (328-329). The love that Faust has for Gretchen follows this exactly; it is a dynamic and active love, and this is what allows Faust to maintain his goodness, the true nature of man.

The final scenes of *Don Giovanni* and *Faust, Part One* provide many clues as to each character's fate. In *Don Giovanni*, Mozart foreshadows Giovanni's imminent damnation throughout the last scene, right up until the moment he is dragged down into Hell. The first scene of his impending doom comes when he has the nerve to invite the statue of the Commendatore, slain by Giovanni's own hand, to his villa for dinner. His disrespect for the dead is obvious and it becomes the means for his undoing. The most profound sense of foreboding surrounds Donna Elvira's visit to Giovanni in the closing scene of the opera. When she begs him to change his way of life he not only refuses, but reaffirms his commitment to his lifestyle, "Here's to the ladies and to good wine, the sustenance and glory of mankind!" (Act 2, track 24). Leporello shows his gift for perception when he subsequently remarks, "If her grief can't move him, his heart is flint or he has none!" (Act 2, track 24). The Commendatore gives Giovanni another chance to repent when his statue arrives for dinner and Giovanni again refuses. Blinded by his arrogance and his lust for a life of pure pleasure he does not see that he is about to come to a terrible end, and he pays the ultimate price.

The final scene of *Faust, Part One* foreshadows Faust's ultimate salvation. The fact that he cares about what happens to Gretchen and is willing to go to any length to rescue her not only proves that he is not selfish and callous, as Don Giovanni is, but also shows the depths of his feelings for her. His love is further illustrated by his obvious grief at her mad, tormented state. He is desperate in his desire to save her from prison, but she will not leave. She is overjoyed to see him and in fact escapes her madness when she realizes he has come for her, but at the same time she feels guilty for her sins and feels she must take responsibility for them. This parallels Faust's acceptance of his responsibility for the deaths of Baucis and Philemon at the end of *Part Two*, even though he did not intend for them to die. That is the first time he does not hide behind Mephistopheles to avoid taking blame for his actions, and it represents a huge moral step for Faust. The fact that Gretchen is saved despite her sins also suggests that Faust will be saved. They both sinned grievously, but love bound them together and allowed them to be saved. For Faust, God is pure meaning and Mephistopheles is pure experience. Love unites meaning and experience; Gretchen enabled Faust to find this balance and this is why he is saved.

The point is not that the fact Faust's love was enough to save him, or that Giovanni was damned solely because he never loved. Rather, the point is that love allowed Faust to be satisfied with his place in the universe and still gave him something to strive for, embodying the true nature of man. Don Giovanni, in not feeling love for anyone, did not avail himself of that opportunity that love gave Faust; that is, Giovanni did not allow himself the chance to benefit from the redemptive power of love that saved Faust. This gives a whole new meaning to Tennyson's phrase, "It is better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all."

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Milton's Eve: Mother of Both Cordelia and Regan?

Jim Patrick

In Shakespeare's *King Lear*, there are few characters which are as dissimilar as Lear's two daughters, Cordelia and Regan, yet within each are attributes which liken them to Eve in Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Cordelia and Regan stand as polar opposites in their disposition and actions throughout *King Lear*, differentiated by their attitudes towards their father and the motives which guide their behavior. Cordelia is Lear's favorite daughter, proud yet faithful, whose estrangement from her father helps facilitate his sad fall. Regan, along with her sister Goneril, is distinguished from Cordelia by her cold duplicity and powerful ambition. Yet for all their differences, each sister has in their respective personalities certain aspects which remind the reader of Milton's famous female character, either in their striking similarities with the biblical heroine or the sharp lengths with which they differ from her. Eve's personality possesses such depth that in her trials and decisions both the proud loyalty of Cordelia and the dangerous ambition of Regan is evident. Beyond this, however, Eve also differs from the two daughters of Lear in many ways, revealing other directions and avenues of thought that Shakespeare's women do not explore. Eve, the mother of mankind, illustrates many of the feelings and ideas which are contained in man's multifaceted heart, including the virtues and vices that Cordelia and Regan display so powerfully.

In some of their most admirable qualities, Cordelia and Eve seem kindred spirits. Both characters have an endearing sense of loyalty and are characterized by their great devotion. Cordelia, though rashly disinherited by her father the king, is the only one of his children who remains true to him. While her favored sisters plot to belittle and destroy their father, Cordelia, though scorned and away in France, attempts to save him. "All blest secrets, / All you unpublished virtues of the earth, / Spring with my tears! be aidant and remediate / In the good man's distress! Seek, seek for him" (Shakespeare IV, iv 15-19). Though she of all the daughters

has been treated the worst by Lear, Cordelia alone has pity for the old man and remains faithful to him. Similarly, throughout *Paradise Lost*, Eve is characterized by her loyalty and constancy towards Adam. From their innocent days in Paradise to the tragic times after The Fall, Eve's interests are invariably tied up with those of Adam. Even in her darkest hour, after partaking of the forbidden fruit, Eve's thoughts - though now tainted with fear and jealousy - inevitably return to her husband. "Adam shall share with me in bliss or woe : / So dear I love him, that with him all deaths / I could endure, without him live no life" (Milton IX:831-833). Eve remains loyal to Adam even as she breaks the laws of heaven. After the full effects of The Fall have left the original couple at odds, Eve seeks reconciliation with Adam first and foremost. "Forsake me not thus, Adam, witness Heav'n / What love sincere, and reverence in my heart / I bear thee" (Milton X:914-916). Eve's loyalty to Adam presupposes any fear she has of the wrath of God or the promise of death. Eve and Cordelia thus are united by the immense faith and loyalty that they have, in spite of the adverse situations that they face at times.

In sharp contrast to this is Regan, who displays none of the loyalty of Eve or Cordelia. She is opportunistic and able to forget all the favor and love her father ever showed her. She and Goneril, unlike the loyal Eve, are more than willing to forget their husbands in their pursuit of power. Goneril, regardless of her marriage, attempts to win Edmund, telling him that though "I must change names at home and give the distaff / Into my husband's hands" (Shakespeare IV, ii 17-18) she is in love with him or at least his power. Loyalty is something which Goneril and Regan shed at their convenience, unlike their sister or Eve.

Eve and Cordelia are also akin in their pride, a trait that often leads them into trouble. Cordelia, though lacking the deceptive powers of her sisters, is proud and unwilling to endure her father's ostentatious demands for praise and flattery. Her pride forbids her to indulge in the sycophancy and false adoration with which her sisters supply the king. It leads her to respond to his request for praise with "Nothing... I cannot heave / My heart into my mouth. I love your Majesty / According to my bond, no more no less" (Shakespeare I, i 91-95). Cordelia's disinheritance comes as a direct result of her disdain, and similarly, Eve's pride also plays a huge

role in her seduction and temptation by the snake. When Adam rebuffs Eve's suggestion that they split up to tend the Garden, she takes it as a criticism of her faith and dependability. "But that thou shouldst my firmness therefore doubt / To God or thee, because we have a foe / May tempt it, I expected not to hear" (Milton IX:279-281). Eve's pride interprets Adam's fear as a personal affront and consequently is more reluctant to give up on the idea, which ultimately leaves her vulnerable to Satan's advances. Cordelia and Eve share a similar streak of pride which proves to be a dangerous flaw.

However, though these two women are both proud, Eve is uniquely characterized by a sense of vanity which leaves her further open to temptation. Cordelia is proud and unwilling to play her father's pretentious and flamboyant games, but more than this Eve is overly taken by her own appearance. In a humorous scene she explains how she was originally more occupied with her own reflection than with Adam: "...yet methought less fair, / Less winning soft, less amiably mild, / Than that smooth wat'ry image" (Milton IV:478-480). An allusion to the myth of Narcissus, Eve's story foreshadows the danger of her vanity, which Satan uses to tempt her to break God's sole commandment and eat the apple. Playing off this flaw, he fills his speech to Eve with high flattery and dazzling charm, "...who shouldst be / A Goddess among Gods, ador'd and serv'd / By Angels numberless, thy daily Train" (Milton IX:546-548). Unlike the mere proud disdain of Cordelia, Eve is also imperiled by a basic narcissism, in addition to her pride, that makes her all the more vulnerable to the subtleties and artifice of the Devil.

Though Eve shares many qualities with Cordelia, she has an equally powerful affinity with Regan. Both are open to the strong influences of suspicion and jealousy. Regan, though in cohorts with her sister in their plans to ruin their father, is equally distrustful and at odds with Goneril over their mutual interest in the state and the love of Edmund. Regan speaks with Edmund, begging him to choose her over Goneril "I shall never endure her : dear my lord, / Be not familiar with her" (Shakespeare V, i 15-16). In a similar vein, the equally jealous Goneril remarks, "I had rather lose the battle than that sister / Should loosen him and me" (Shakespeare V, i 18-19). The envy that Regan and Goneril demonstrate over the love of Edmund is mirrored

in the tumultuous emotions of Eve once she takes of the apple. She is enticed by the words of the snake and envious of the power and wisdom of God. Eve proclaims that she will eat of the Tree "Till dieted by thee I grow mature / In knowledge as the Gods who all things know" (Milton IX:803-804). Similarly, fearful that she will die as the result of her trespass, Eve grows jealous of the idea that Adam will be given a second Eve to replace her. "...then I shall be no more, / And Adam wedded to another Eve, / Shall live with her enjoying, I extinct" (Milton IX:827-829). Such fear and jealous imagining convinces Eve to have Adam share of the fruit and her perdition. Once the apple corrupts Eve's original innocence she is opened to a world of jealousy and envy, which Regan knows so well.

Ambition is another trait which Eve shares with Regan. Throughout King Lear, Regan, as well as Goneril, deceptively plot against their father, their husbands, and each other in their ambitions to rule the kingdom. As soon as Lear relinquishes most of his power to them, they begin to seek after even more and to take what little authority he has left from him. Goneril proposes to Regan "Pray you, let's hit together; if our father carry authority with such disposition as he bears, this last surrender of his will but offend us" (Shakespeare I, i 306-309). The two sisters constantly seek the love and power that the other has, to the point at which their ambitions lead to their own deaths. Eve also knows the power and dangers of ambition, to which the apple opens her eyes. Once she has eaten it, she ponders whether to tell Adam of her fortune and share the fruit or to have it all to herself. "...keep the odds of Knowledge in my power / Without Copartner? so to add what wants / In Female Sex... render me more equal, and perhaps, / A thing not undesirable, sometime / Superior" (Milton IX:820-825). The power and knowledge of the apple initially invigorates Eve, whispering of the new heights to which she can aspire, tempting her with possibilities she never thought of before. In this manner, Eve possesses many of those qualities which drive Regan and Goneril in King Lear, chief among them their hungry ambition for power.

But ironically enough, while Eve is both proud like Cordelia and ambitious like Regan, she also is in many instances submissive to Adam and his desires, a trait completely unlike any

possessed by the other two women. Cordelia demonstrates early on in Shakespeare's play that she is willing to give up her share of the kingdom rather than submit to her father's showy displays. Similarly, Regan's ambition will not allow her to be restrained or subordinated by anyone- husband, father, or king. Eve, however, is constantly described as being submissive to Adam in her deeds and actions. Milton describes Adam as being enthralled by Eve's "beauty and submissive Charms" (Milton IV:498) and Eve herself calls Adam, "My Author and Disposer, what thou bidd'st / Unargu'd I obey" (Milton IV:635-636). Regan utters similar high sounding praises for her father, but here Eve sounds much more sincere. After the Fall she still remains deferential to Adam, begging him to forgive her "Now at his feet submissive in distress" (Milton X:942). She exclaims that "forlorn of thee, / Whither shall I betake me, where subsist?" (Milton X:921-922). Milton paints Eve as being ideally passive and meek next to Adam; her reason and pride only leading to their fall from God. Shakespeare's women in King Lear, though often brought low by their ambition, by contrast are never shown to be submissive, whether in reality or as an ideal.

In many ways, Eve is reminiscent of both Regan and Cordelia, demonstrating in one character the best and the worst in women. Eve reveals the pride and loyalty that estranges and reunites Cordelia with her father, while also showing the ambition and jealousy which drive Lear's other daughters, Cordelia and Regan, to such menacing lengths. Milton also makes Eve a unique character, from her idealized stance as a submissive wife to the perilous issue of her vanity. Eve stands as the mother of mankind, her emotions and qualities mixed both good and evil, containing in her heart the future possibilities of mankind, whether in the harshness of Regan or the honest hopes of Cordelia.

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The Hierarchy of Reality

Michael Dickerson

Men say that the senses are superior
to their objects, the mind superior to the senses,
understanding superior to the mind;
higher than understanding is the self.

~From the third teaching, verse 41

The First Teaching The Hierarchy of Reality

I asked Manas how to see the world
and grasping my hand he took me to a mountaintop
to view the ksetra from a distance
so I might remove myself from its confusing din

Manas

This is how to see the world
But you cannot live here
You must learn to see the world as if from here
with the eye of an eagle from the distance of stars

Do you see from here what I see?
I see the frenzy of a mighty hurricane
surrounding the ksetra with darkness and fear
and the hurricane's eye, still and calm

I see a powerful, swirling whirlpool
foaming and tossing, with murky water and wake
enclosing the ksetra with tossing waves of despair
and on the ocean floor center, dry and peaceful

I see a towering, swarming city of men
at war, defending its crumbling walls
encircling the ksetra are ramparts and weapons of war
and within the innermost temple a priest is praying

I see a spiral galaxy in the cosmos
in constant explosive motion
encompassing the ksetra with fiery, gaseous streaks
and it revolves around a star, silent and lucid

This is how to see the world:
the realm of all human interaction moves before you
the field of all human experience is laid out for your eyes
it reveals to you the Hierarchy of Reality

It has been called the Castes of Knowledge
the Order of Perception, the Ranks of Sight
You see the ceaselessly moving masses at the edges
and the stillness of those with knowledge in the center

The Second Teaching
The Inferiority of Objects to Senses

I asked Manas why the people congregated to the edges
and why they moved so furiously without regard for each other
I asked Manas why they needed to run without rest
and why they raised the dust so it blinded them

Manas

Do you see from here what I see?
I see a thousand newborn birds with open mouths
and no mother returning to feed them
as they cry for food they will never eat

I see a thousand desert wanderers with swollen tongues
crawling forward on empty bellies
seeking the oasis over the next dune
as they thirst for the water of a mirage

I see a thousand street-dwellers in the night
peering around corners to satisfy their lust
with dizzy and disturbing walks they scour the city
as they yearn for flesh they will never feel

I see a thousand reaching arms, a thousand pounding feet
I see a thousand groping hands, a thousand gaping mouths
clawing at the air, snatching at ghosts
desperately crazed to embrace the shadows of the wind

These are the multitudes who see only objects of the world
For them life is a race with the prize of more running
They live to quench the appetites of desire
and they move with the madness of possibility

For them there is only the chase

They run the most and never move
They have extensive knowledge of the world of things
focused, restless, tireless they pant for their ever-elusive goal

But within the hierarchy of knowledge, they rank low
They laugh at generosity and the indifference toward wealth
They know nothing of atman or their dharma
but only how to remain in the constant motion of dissatisfaction

They remain hopelessly fixated on material consideration
and helplessly ignorant of the bridges between themselves
and the external world with which they are concerned
They are aloof to all but the most objectified reality

The Third Teaching
The Inferiority of the Senses to the Mind

I asked Manas about the bridges he spoke of
and about the people further in from the edges
I asked why they remained so poised, darting here and there
dodging the many who ran after invisible dreams

Manas

Do you see from here what I see?
I see craftsmen who quietly and respectfully polish their tools
I see sages neatly putting away their pens and scrolls
I see sailors washing decks and farmers sharpening their plows

I see children arching their heads to hear stories
smiling at the pleasant caresses of their parents
while eating apples and smelling cinnamon
as they see the storybook prince in their minds

There on the ksetra are those who rely on their senses
and understand their superiority to the objects they perceive
These are the bridges of which I speak, the brightened pathways
between the world and the internal being

They move quickly, with sidesteps and pivots
to avoid the object-seekers who would stampede them
They listen for the pounding feet and smell the rising dust
They feel the turbulent air and see the fury of the chase

Such people have moved beyond the thankless search
They live more quietly, occupied with nobler pursuits

They see beyond the fruits of action and relish the tools of their senses
They believe without senses, objects would be useless

Such people have an intimate knowledge of function
They know and love the physical modes of perception
They remain undirected, for they lack a unity within their inner being
They know how to sense, but lack the knowledge of what they should sense

These people further in from the edges are deft and agile movers
They need only a sense of direction, a commanding overseer for movement
They must be willing to surrender to a masterful navigator
They require the long-range foresight of purposeful motion

The Fourth Teaching *The Inferiority of the Mind to Understanding*

I asked Manas about the sense of direction, the overseer he spoke of
and about the people still further in from the edges
I asked why they moved so slowly and deliberately
without hesitation towards the center of the ksetra

Manas

Do you see from here what I see?
I see the captain at the stern of a ship homeward bound
I see the general on the battlefield maneuvering troops through a valiant charge
I see the lioness leading a hunting party to watering wildebeest

There, further in on the ksetra are those with direction
They understand and possess the powers of the mind
They move with great surety towards the lucid, calm center
avoiding the outer flanks devoted to desire alone

Such people have abandoned the mere justifications of want
and remain unconvinced of the authority of the senses
They believe instead in the unification of external information
and the manipulation of the mind towards a higher goal

Such people are devoutly intent on reaching the center
They admire the serenity and warmth that radiates forth from it
Such people have knowledge of the mind and how it might be used for this goal
They know that without the mind, senses would be lost

These people move slowly, questioning and considering
thoughtfully reflection on their motion and their progress
They direct all their efforts towards achieving a cooperation of the senses

They meditate and contemplate and remain patient with themselves

These further fin from the edges move towards a brightness and warmth
They do not possess the understanding of what they are approaching
only how to get there
They tilt their heads but the form is shapeless and unclear

These people possess the great knowledge of mastering the senses
with the powers of the mind
They require the inner vision, the internal illumination
that will carry them towards what they seek

The Fifth Teaching
The Inferiority of Understanding to the Self

I asked Manas about the inner vision, the internal illumination
and the people just outside of the center
I asked why they walked upright, with wide eyes
even as the intensity of the light grew and grew

Manas

Do you see from here what I see?
I see the selfless gift of the martyr
I see the thoughtless actions of a protective mother
I see the absence of fear in the heart of the soldier
standing sentry over the fallen body of a wounded friend

I see the meditation of the priest
and the abstinence of the monk in the clothes of a peasant
I see the disregard for ahamkara and the detachment from karmapala
I see the lucid action of one with understanding

There outside the center of the ksetra are those who possess understanding
They can see without their eyes and hear without their ears
They are those who are directed from within
not from without

They concentrate on the center and detach themselves from pain
They gaze at the light and move with purpose
They remain focused and regard their environment
as a distraction hindering them from their goal

Such people know and understand their movement
and realize what it is they have yet to reach
They know that their goal is no goal of their own

but Krishna's, in the duty he bestows upon them

Such people look on those in the center
and slacken their pace for they know they're near
They gain a vast knowledge of the cosmos
as if looking into a mirror reflecting the whole of the universe

Desire is nearly absent in these people who surround the center
The pain of the light is lessened for them
as their own understanding radiates a warm glow
They believe that without understanding the mind would be unfocused

The meditations of these people resound in splendor
making the hectic din of the object-seekers
little more than a myth of fractured memory
these people lack only one element of understanding

They know the qualities of that which they lack:
They wait for total surrender and complete illumination
They wait for the permanent state of devotion
and the absence of all action at the center of the ksetra

The Sixth Teaching Devotion, Knowledge and Duty

I asked Manas about total surrender and complete illumination
and about the people at the center of the ksetra
I asked why they sat with bowed heads, repeating the syllable OM
without desire, without action, devoted to Krishna forever

Manas

Do you see from here what I see?
I see a unity greater than the oneness of all
I see a devotion unblemished by selfish concerns
I see a knowledge lucid and whole

I see the steady arm of the warrior
I see the resolute stare of the wandering beggar
I hear the unwavering voice of the orphaned child
I feel the inner calm of the priest who knows his self

There in the center of the ksetra
are those who have been illuminated with the knowledge of Krishna
learned detachment from worldly affairs
and meditate in constant devotion for eternity

Such people have knowledge of the self
the innermost actuality of being
Such people understand the timeless separation from the world
that flourishes from the understanding of duty

Such people are free from nature
A freedom granted in their eternal part
of unity and devotion to Krishna
and the permanent loss of karma

These in the center of the ksetra
have disrupted the temporal nature of their existence
These people bask in ceaseless lucidity
They believe that without knowledge of the self, understanding is incomplete

Study the brickwork, study the fortification;
climb the great ancient staircase to the terrace;
study how it is made; from the terrace see
the planted and fallow fields, the ponds and orchards.
This is Uruk, the city of Gilgamesh....

from: **Gilgamesh, Tablet I**
~Kimberly Santo

Live in a good place.
Keep your mind deep.
Treat others well.
Stand by your word.
Make fair rules.
Do the right thing.
Work when it's time.

from: **Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu (8)**
~Gretchen Braun

There is nothing that cannot be overcome.
There is no limit.

from: **Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu (59)**
~Sonal Bakaya

When I dance, I dance; when I sleep, I sleep; yes, and when I walk alone
in a beautiful orchard, if my thoughts have been dwelling on extraneous
incidents for some part of the time, for some other part I bring them back to
the walk, to the orchard, to the sweetness of this solitude, and to me.

from: **Of Experience, Montaigne (769-774)**
~Whitney Myers

But when in the end I was beaten I found the experience less dreadful in
fact than in anticipation; and the very strange thing was that this
punishment increased my affection for the inflicter. It required all the
strength of my devotion and all my natural gentleness to prevent my
deliberately earning another beating; I had discovered in the shame and
pain of the punishment an admixture of sensuality which had left me rather
eager than otherwise for a repetition by the same hand.

from: **The Confessions, Jean-Jacques Rousseau**
~Nicole Peeler (Dedicated to all those who wonder why we stuck with Core)

. . . And on the pedestal these words appear:
'My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

from: **Ozymandias**, Percy Bysshe Shelley
~Justine Pierce

To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, - that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost.

from: **Self Reliance**, Ralph Waldo Emerson
~Jennifer Handley

Stop this day and night with me and you shall possess the origin of all poems,
You shall possess the good of the earth and sun . . . there are millions of suns left,
You shall no longer take things at second or third hand . . . nor look through the eyes of the dead . . . nor feed on the spectres in books,
You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things from me,
You shall listen to all sides and filter them from yourself.

from: **Leaves of Grass [Song of Myself]**, Walt Whitman (24-29)
~Elizabeth Adamo

True, we love life, not because we are used to living, but because we are used to loving. There is always some madness in love. But there is also some reason in madness.

from: **Thus Spake Zarathustra**, Friedrich Nietzsche
~Hanna Kim