{"id":149,"date":"2023-02-05T08:55:02","date_gmt":"2023-02-05T13:55:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/chass\/?page_id=149"},"modified":"2023-03-11T06:25:14","modified_gmt":"2023-03-11T11:25:14","slug":"message-privacy","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/chass\/projects\/message-privacy\/","title":{"rendered":"Message Privacy"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/span>Here\u2019s the puzzle: someone wants to send a secure message online. It has to be so private, so secret, that they can deny they ever sent it. If someone leaks the message, it can never be traced back to the sender. It\u2019s all very Mission: Impossible. But there\u2019s a kicker: if that message peddles abuse or misinformation, maybe threatens violence, then anonymity may need to go out the window\u2014the sender needs to be held to account.<\/span><\/p>\n

And that\u2019s the challenge: is there a way to allow people to send confidential, secure, untraceable messages, but still track any menacing ones?<\/span><\/p>\n

Mayank Varia<\/a> might have cracked the conundrum. A cryptographer and computer scientist, Varia is an expert on the societal impact of algorithms and programs, developing systems that balance privacy and security with transparency and social justice. Working with a team of Boston University computer scientists, he\u2019s designed a program called Hecate\u2014fittingly named after the ancient Greek goddess of magic and spells\u2014that can be bolted onto a secure messaging app to beef up its confidentiality, while also allowing moderators to crack down on abuse. The team is presenting its findings at the 31st USENIX Security Symposium.<\/span><\/p>\n

Articles:<\/strong><\/h4>\n