{"id":1990,"date":"2021-11-28T11:18:38","date_gmt":"2021-11-28T16:18:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/?page_id=1990"},"modified":"2026-07-03T07:33:51","modified_gmt":"2026-07-03T11:33:51","slug":"bulronline","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/bulronline\/","title":{"rendered":"Boston University Law Review Online"},"content":{"rendered":"

Boston University Law Review Online<\/em>, formerly known as the\u00a0Boston University Law Review Annex<\/em>,\u00a0is\u00a0Boston University Law Review’<\/em>s online publication featuring symposia and essays, including invited responses, perspectives and student notes.<\/p>\n

For Online Symposia<\/strong> only, please visit this page<\/a>.<\/p>\n

For Online Essays<\/strong> (non-symposia) only, please visit this page<\/a>.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

All Online Articles<\/h2>\n
\n

Doing Legal Scholarship Bet-ter<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Ari Ezra Waldman<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Ryan Calo\u2019s Law and Technology: A Methodical Approach<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n106 B.U. L. Rev. Online 31 (2026)<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Self-Definition in Legal Scholarship<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Jessica M. Eaglin<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Ryan Calo\u2019s Law and Technology: A Methodical Approach<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n106 B.U. L. Rev. Online 35 (2026)<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Locating Meaning in the Methods of Law & Technology<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Kristen Thomasen<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Ryan Calo\u2019s Law and Technology: A Methodical Approach<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n106 B.U. Law Review Online 39 (2026)\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

On Predicting and Stopping Dystopia<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Evan Selinger<\/span><\/span><\/a> & Woodrow Hartzog<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\n<\/span>Online Symposium: Ryan Calo\u2019s Law and Technology: A Methodical Approach<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n106 B.U. L. Rev. Online 45 (2026)\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The Morality of Law and Technology<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Ryan Calo<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\n<\/span>Online Symposium: Ryan Calo\u2019s Law and Technology: A Methodical Approach<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n106 B.U. Law Review Online 53 (2026)\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Self-Determination and Default Procedures<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Pamela K. Bookman<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Lauren Sudeall’s\u00a0Self-Determination and Self-Represented Litigants<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n106 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2026).<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Social and Psychological Barriers to Self-Determination and Access to Justice<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/em><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n
\n

Share the Power of Questions: A Strategy for Overcoming Obstacles to Self-Determination in the Legal System<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/em><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

<\/span><\/span><\/a>Naomi Campbell<\/a><\/span> & Keila Perez<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Lauren Sudeall’s\u00a0Self-Determination and Self-Represented Litigants<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n106 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2026).<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Critical Legal Empowerment: Justice Work as Self-Determination for Self-Represented Litigants<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/b><\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n

Gabriela Elizondo-Craig<\/span><\/span><\/a>,<\/span> Stacy Rupprecht Jane<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span> & Hayley Cousin<\/span><\/a><\/span>
\nOnline Symposium: Lauren Sudeall’s\u00a0Self-Determination and Self-Represented Litigants<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n106 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2026).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Marital Privilege\u00a0<\/em>Symposium Response<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/b><\/i><\/h2>\n

Serena Mayeri<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Serena Mayeri’s Marital Privilege<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n105 B.U. L. Rev. Online 87 (2025).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

<\/span><\/a>Institutional Challenges in an Authoritarian Age<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/i><\/h2>\n

<\/span><\/span><\/a>Katie Eyer<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Serena Mayeri’s Marital Privilege<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n105 B.U. L. Rev. Online 79 (2025).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

<\/span><\/a>Formal Victories and Roads Not Taken: Excavating Departures and Throughlines in Challenges to the Place of Marriage<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/i><\/h2>\n

Linda C. McClain<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Serena Mayeri’s Marital Privilege<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n105 B.U. L. Rev. Online 69 (2025).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

The Historical Functions of Marital Privilege: A Distributive Analysis of Family Law<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/i><\/h2>\n

Deborah Dinner<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Serena Mayeri’s Marital Privilege<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n105 B.U. L. Rev. Online 63 (2025).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

<\/span><\/span><\/a>The Racial History of Marital Privilege<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/i><\/h2>\n

Jessica Dixon Weaver<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Serena Mayeri’s Marital Privilege<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n105 B.U. L. Rev. Online 59 (2025).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

<\/strong><\/b><\/span><\/a>The Benefits of Marriage<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/i><\/h2>\n

Cary Franklin<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Serena Mayeri’s Marital Privilege<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n105 B.U. L. Rev. Online 51 (2025).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/i><\/a>The Formal Limit on Privatizing Support<\/b><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/i><\/h2>\n

Albertina Antognini<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Serena Mayeri’s Marital Privilege<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n105 B.U. L. Rev. Online 43 (2025).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Innovation and the Limits of Predictive Governance<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n
\n

Nanaboozhoo and Derrick Bell Go for a Walk<\/i><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

<\/span>Matthew L. M. Fletcher<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Carla D. Pratt’s\u00a0Indianness as Property<\/em> (2025).<\/strong><\/span>
\n105 B.U. Law Review Online 17 (2025).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Rejecting the Racialization of Indianness<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

<\/span>Andrea J. Martin<\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Carla D. Pratt’s\u00a0Indianness as Property<\/em> (2025).<\/strong><\/span>
\n105 B.U. Law Review Online 1 (2025).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n

Comstockery’s Critical History<\/i><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Serena Mayeri<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Reva Siegel and Mary Ziegler’s\u00a0Comstockery<\/em> (2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 275 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Repealing Comstock (II)*<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

David S. Cohen<\/span><\/a> & Rachel Rebouch\u00e9<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Reva Siegel and Mary Ziegler’s\u00a0Comstockery<\/em> (2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 265 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Comstockery and Popular Constitutionalism<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Michael C. Dorf<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Reva Siegel and Mary Ziegler’s\u00a0Comstockery<\/em> (2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 257 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The Democratic Threat of Far-Right Lawyering<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Scott L. Cummings<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Reva Siegel and Mary Ziegler’s\u00a0Comstockery<\/em> (2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 249 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Repealing Comstock (I)*<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

David S. Cohen<\/span><\/a> & Rachel Rebouch\u00e9<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Reva Siegel and Mary Ziegler’s\u00a0Comstockery<\/em> (2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 243 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Are Voters Allowed to Protect Abortion?<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Laura Portuondo<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Reva Siegel and Mary Ziegler’s\u00a0Comstockery<\/em> (2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 237 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Can U.S. Law Schools Escape the Legitimacy Trap? <\/i><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Elizabeth Mertz<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Asad Rahim’s The Legitimacy Trap <\/em>(2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 233 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The Paper Chase: A Reflection upon Professor Asad Rahim’s The Legitimacy Trap<\/i><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Patricia J. Williams<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Asad Rahim’s The Legitimacy Trap <\/em>(2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 227 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Grappling with Langdell<\/i><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

William M. Treanor<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Asad Rahim’s The Legitimacy Trap <\/em>(2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 217 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Remaking the Matrix: Learning from the Legitimacy Trap to Transform Legal Education<\/i><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Susan Sturm<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Asad Rahim’s The Legitimacy Trap <\/em>(2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 211 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Annotated Bibliography: “Persons Born” and the Jurisprudence of “Life”<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Martha F. Davis<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Advancing Pregnant Persons’ Right to Life <\/em>(2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 161 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Reproductive Justice and the Thirteenth Amendment<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Rebecca E. Zietlow<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Advancing Pregnant Persons’ Right to Life <\/em>(2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 143 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Medical Authority and the Right to Life<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Jessie Hill\u00a0<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Advancing Pregnant Persons’ Right to Life <\/em>(2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 67 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Religion Clause Challenges to Early Abortion Bans<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Caroline Mala Corbin<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Advancing Pregnant Persons’ Right to Life <\/em>(2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 37 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The Free Exercise Right to Life<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

David A. Carillo<\/span><\/a>, Allison G. Macbeth<\/span><\/a> & Daniel Bogard\u00a0<\/span><\/a><\/span>
\nOnline Symposium: Advancing Pregnant Persons’ Right to Life <\/em>(2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 19 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n
\n

Addressing Our Unreasonable Fourth Amendment Doctrine<\/u><\/i><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

India Thusi<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Book Symposium: Devon Carbado’s\u00a0Unreasonable<\/em>\u00a0(2023-2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 15 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Illegal Blackness<\/span><\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/i><\/span><\/h2>\n

Joel Modiri<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Book Symposium: Devon Carbado’s\u00a0Unreasonable<\/em>\u00a0(2023-2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 11 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A Reasonable and Well-Reasoned Teaching Tool in Unreasonable Times<\/span><\/i><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Jasmine Gonzales Rose<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>
\nOnline Book Symposium: Devon Carbado’s\u00a0Unreasonable<\/em>\u00a0(2023-2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 8 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Constitutionalizing Racism<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Jonathan P. Feingold<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Book Symposium: Devon Carbado’s\u00a0Unreasonable<\/em>\u00a0(2023-2024).<\/strong><\/span>
\n104 B.U. Law Review Online 1 (2024).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

From the Devine Gift to the Devil\u2019s Bargains: Asian Americans in the Ideology of White Supremacy<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Vinay Harpalani<\/a><\/span>
\nOnline Symposium: Vinay Harpalani’s Asian Americans, Racial Stereotypes, and Elite University Admissions <\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 151 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

<\/strong><\/a>A Black Man May Eliminate Race-Conscious Admissions in the United States<\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/b><\/em><\/h2>\n

Shakira D. Pleasant<\/a><\/span>
\nOnline Symposium: Vinay Harpalani’s Asian Americans, Racial Stereotypes, and Elite University Admissions <\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 147 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

<\/strong><\/a>The Perils of Asian-American Erasure<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Matthew Patrick Shaw<\/a><\/span>
\nOnline Symposium: Vinay Harpalani’s Asian Americans, Racial Stereotypes, and Elite University Admissions <\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 140 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

<\/strong><\/a>Asian Americans, Dog Whistles, and the Psychological Wages of \u201cHonorary\u201d Whiteness<\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/b><\/em><\/h2>\n

Robert S. Chang<\/a><\/span><\/span>
\nOnline Symposium: Vinay Harpalani’s Asian Americans, Racial Stereotypes, and Elite University Admissions <\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 136 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Finding Common Ground<\/strong><\/a><\/span><\/b><\/em><\/h2>\n

Stacy L. Hawkins<\/a><\/span><\/span>
\nOnline Symposium: Vinay Harpalani’s Asian Americans, Racial Stereotypes, and Elite University Admissions <\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 131 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Forging a Future Title IX<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Naomi Mann<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 121 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The Irony of Title IX: Exploring How Colleges Implement Credibility Discounts Against Student Victims of Gender-Based Violence in Campus Misconduct Cases<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Kelly Alison Behre<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 109 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The Neglect of Alternative Resolution Processes in Title IX and the Need for Change<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Lexi Weyrick<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 103 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The Biden Administration’s Proposed Title IX Rule: An Intersectional Examination<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Kelsey Scarlett<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 96 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n
\n

NIL Compliance<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n

Josh Lens<\/span><\/a><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 69 (2023).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Reasonable, Yet Suspicious: The Maryland Supreme Court Wrestles with the Paradox of Flight from Police<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/b><\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Aliza Hochman Bloom<\/span><\/a><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 59 (2023).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Title IX’s Future: An Expansive Statute’s Breadth Continues to Grow<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Nancy Chi Cantalupo<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 53 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Shifting Scapegoats: Learning from the Past to Navigate Today’s Battles for Transgender-Inclusive Policies<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Kyle C. Velte<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 44 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A Brief Overview of the Mechanics and Civil Rights Challenges of Title IX in Athletics<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Phil Catanzano<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 35 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Fulfilling Title IX’s Promise Through the SAFER Act<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Shiwali Patel<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 25 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

The Case Against and for “Abolishing Title IX”<\/a><\/strong><\/b><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Alexandra Brodsky<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 19 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Title IX’s Unrealized Potential to Prevent Sexual Violence<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Katherine Silbaugh<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 12 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Title IX and the Challenges of Educating for Equality<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Linda C. McClain<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Title IX at 50: Learning from the Past & Looking to the Future<\/em>\u00a0<\/i>(2023).<\/strong><\/span>
\n103 B.U. Law Review Online 1 (2023).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Building a New Constitutional Jerusalem: A Review of <\/span><\/em>The Antiracist Constitution<\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Aderson B. Francois<\/span><\/a><\/span>
\nInvited Response: Aderson B. Francois,\u00a0Building a New Constitutional Jerusalem: A Review of\u00a0<\/em>The Antiracist Constitution<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 98 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Can the Fourth Amendment Keep People “Secure in their Persons”?<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Bruce A. Green<\/span><\/a><\/span>
\nInvited Response: Bruce A. Green,\u00a0Can the Fourth Amendment Keep People “Secure in their Persons”?<\/i>\u00a0<\/i>(2022).<\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 92 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n

Equality Through the Photographer’s Lens<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Mark P. McKenna<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Jessica Silbey, Against Progress: Intellectual Property and Fundamental Values in the Internet Age <\/i>(2022).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 87 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Progress Is Less Intellectual Property<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n

Orly Lobel<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Jessica Silbey, Against Progress: Intellectual Property and Fundamental Values in the Internet Age <\/i>(2022).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 82 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Whose Progress?<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n

Laura A. Heymann<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Jessica Silbey, Against Progress: Intellectual Property and Fundamental Values in the Internet Age <\/i>(2022).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 78 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Against Progress: The Value of Distributive Justice in Intellectual Property<\/span><\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Leah Chan Grinvald<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Jessica Silbey, Against Progress: Intellectual Property and Fundamental Values in the Internet Age <\/i>(2022).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 74 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

A More Progressive Progress<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n

Jorge L. Contreras<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Jessica Silbey, Against Progress: Intellectual Property and Fundamental Values in the Internet Age <\/i>(2022).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 69 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Precarity and Progress<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n

Margaret Chon<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Jessica Silbey, Against Progress: Intellectual Property and Fundamental Values in the Internet Age <\/i>(2022).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 65 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Less as More in Intellectual Property Law<\/span><\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Barton Beebe<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Jessica Silbey, Against Progress: Intellectual Property and Fundamental Values in the Internet Age <\/i>(2022).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 61 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In the words of British Prime Minster Margaret Thatcher: “There is no such thing as society.” Beebe critiques the “progress is more” theory of intellectual property law, and supports Silbey’s idea of progress as concerned with the well-being of creative workers and the intrinsic human rewards of creative labor.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The Law, Science, and Policy of Genome Editing<\/span><\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Paul Enr\u00edquez<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Paul Enr\u00edquez, Rewriting Nature: The Future of Genome Editing and How to Bridge the Gap Between Law and Science<\/em> (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 42 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

One of Enr\u00edquez’s goals in writing the book<\/em> Rewriting Nature was to help spur robust dialogue and debate about the future of genome editing and the synergistic roles that law, science and public policy can play in promoting or hindering specific uses of the technology. Enr\u00edquez continues the conversation.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Will the Past Be Prologue? Race, Equality, and Human Genetics<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Allison M. Whelan<\/span><\/a> & Michele Goodwin<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Paul Enr\u00edquez, Rewriting Nature: The Future of Genome Editing and How to Bridge the Gap Between Law and Science<\/em> (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 37 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Historically, presumptions about human genetics fueled racial stereotypes and weaponized law and medicine to inflict harm on vulnerable populations. To what extent does contemporary discourse on genetics reify the old or chart new and different pathways forward?<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Regulating Technology as We Rewrite Nature<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Sonia M. Suter<\/span><\/a> & Naomi R. Cahn<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Paul Enr\u00edquez, Rewriting Nature: The Future of Genome Editing and How to Bridge the Gap Between Law and Science<\/em> (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 29 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In this contribution, Suter and Cahn challenge Enr\u00edquez’s articulation of a constitutional right to use germline gene editing and question the appropriate means of regulation.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Writing Definitions in <\/span><\/em>Rewriting Nature: Lessons from FDA Law<\/em><\/span><\/a><\/h2>\n

Jacob S. Sherkow<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Paul Enr\u00edquez, Rewriting Nature: The Future of Genome Editing and How to Bridge the Gap Between Law and Science<\/em> (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 22 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Sherkow pushes back on Enr\u00edquez’s call for the “adoption of a (more) uniform definition of genome editing” using examples and lessons learned from FDA Law.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Rewriting (Non-Human) Nature<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Henry T. Greely<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Paul Enr\u00edquez, Rewriting Nature: The Future of Genome Editing and How to Bridge the Gap Between Law and Science<\/em> (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 16 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Walter Savage Landor once said, “There is nothing on earth divine besides humanity.” Greely, on the other hand, is tempted to consider humanity a metastatic tumor on the Earth’s biosphere. In this contribution, Greely discusses non-human genome editing in more depth.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Framing Germline Modifications of Human Embryos<\/span><\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Katherine Drabiak<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Paul Enr\u00edquez, Rewriting Nature: The Future of Genome Editing and How to Bridge the Gap Between Law and Science<\/em> (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 7 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

This commentary focuses on the section of the <\/em>Rewriting Nature that sets forth a framework describing how the law should classify germline modification of human embryos and offers an alternative analysis.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Rewriting Nature: The Case of Heritable Human Genome Editing<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/h2>\n

Dana Carroll<\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Paul Enr\u00edquez, Rewriting Nature: The Future of Genome Editing and How to Bridge the Gap Between Law and Science<\/em> (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/strong>
\n102 B.U. L. Rev. Online 1 (2022).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Genome editing is a powerful technology that allows the modification of individual DNA sequences in essentially any organism. The advent of Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (\u201cCRISPR\u201d) has simplified the procedures of genome editing, extending its range in research, medicine, and agriculture. While scientists are busy modifying genomes, discussions of how societies can find a path to derive the benefits of the technology and avoid its misuses are welcome and timely.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n
\n

Law and Culture<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Tamar Frankel<\/a>*\u00a0&\u00a0<\/span>Tomasz Braun<\/a>**
\n<\/span><\/strong>101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 157 (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Boston University Law Review Online is proud to present an essay by our distinguished emeritus professor Tamar Frankel and her colleague Tomasz Braun. This piece, written in Professor Frankel’s distinctive and thought-provoking voice, is a sequel to her book,<\/em> Living in Different Cultures, and examines how systems of law and culture relate to and affect each other.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Does Interest Convergence Today Offer Opportunities for the Working Class, Much As It Did for Minorities in the Fifties and Sixties?<\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n

Richard Delgado<\/a> & Jean Stefancic<\/a>
\nA Comment on Spencer Bowley<\/span><\/strong>
\n101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 148 (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Delgado & Stefancic respond to Bowley’s article on class-based interest convergence in the United States. This response further explores the the ongoing class-forward movement and puts forward another theory for interest convergence based on Marxist economics.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Learning from History: Predicting the Development of Class-Based Interest Convergence<\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n

Spencer Bowley<\/a>
\n101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 125 (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In this article, Bowley applies the interest-convergence theory first posited by Derrick Bell to class-based issues in the United States. The first analysis of its kind, Bowley explores the tenuous relationship between the United States and China and predicts interest convergence between the upper-class and America’s poor.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Rehabilitation Under the Rehabilitation Act: The Case for Medication-Assisted Treatment in Federal Correctional Facilities<\/i><\/a><\/h2>\n

Jaclyn S. Tayabji<\/a>
\n101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 79 (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

The Color Line<\/em>: A Review and Reflection for Antiracist Scholars<\/a><\/h2>\n

Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose<\/a>
\n101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 72 (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In this comment on <\/em>The Color Line<\/a> by David Lyons, Gonzales Rose praises the insightful history of race and racism in the United States, while also critiquing the use of common conventions that antiracist authors should avoid. “I hope that antiracist authors and readers continue to supportively push each other to be thoughtful and inclusive in our use of language and analysis.”<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Standing and Privacy Harms: A Critique of TransUnion v. Ramirez<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Daniel J. Solove<\/a> & Danielle Keats Citron<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 62 (2021).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Through the standing doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a new step toward severely limiting the effective enforcement of privacy laws.\u00a0 The recent Supreme Court decision,\u00a0TransUnion v. Ramirez<\/a>\u00a0(U.S. June 25, 2021) revisits the issue of standing and privacy harms under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) that began with\u00a0Spokeo v. Robins<\/a>, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012). In\u00a0TransUnion<\/a>,\u00a0a group of plaintiffs sued TransUnion under FCRA for falsely labeling them as potential terrorists in their credit reports. The Court concluded that only some plaintiffs had standing \u2013 those whose credit reports were disseminated. Plaintiffs whose credit reports weren\u2019t disseminated lacked a \u201cconcrete\u201d injury and accordingly lacked standing \u2013 even though Congress explicitly granted them a private right of action to sue for violations like this and even though a jury had found that TransUnion was at fault.<\/u><\/u><\/em><\/p>\n

In this essay, Professors Daniel J. Solove and Danielle Keats Citron engage in an extensive critique of the\u00a0TransUnion\u00a0case. They contend that existing standing doctrine incorrectly requires concrete harm. For most of U.S. history, standing required only an infringement on rights. Moreover, when assessing harm, the Court has a crabbed and inadequate understanding of privacy harms. Additionally, allowing courts to nullify private rights of action in federal privacy laws is a usurpation of legislative power that upends the compromises and balances that Congress establishes in laws.\u00a0 Private rights of action are essential enforcement mechanisms.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Rodrigo\u2019s Reappraisal<\/a><\/h2>\n

Richard Delgado<\/a> & Jean Stefancic<\/a>
\n<\/span>Online Symposium: Critical Legal Research: The Next Wave (A Panel in Honor of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic).<\/span><\/strong>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 48 (2021).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cActually, I was hoping to talk to you about one aspect of that very subject\u2014categorization. That and critical race theory. Do you have a minute?\u201d […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Prophets for an Algorithmic Age<\/a><\/h2>\n

Nicholas Mignanelli<\/a>
\n<\/span>Online Symposium: Critical Legal Research: The Next Wave (A Panel in Honor of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic).<\/span><\/strong>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 41 (2021).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Adapting Nicholas F. Stump\u2019s Critical Legal Research framework, I recommend that law librarians contend with this phenomenon by participating in algorithmic activism, practicing transgressive and archeological bibliography, and emphasizing the importance of \u201cunplugged brainstorming\u201d in their pedagogy. With my earlier article as a foundation, I will use the remaining pages of this Essay to further engage Professors Delgado and Stefancic\u2019s commentary on the \u201ctriple helix dilemma\u201d in the hope of suggesting where scholarship on AI and legal research might go from here. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Using Principles of Critical Information Theory to Teach Progressive Approaches to Regulatory Research<\/a><\/h2>\n

Julie Graves Krishnaswami<\/a>
\n<\/span>Online Symposium: Critical Legal Research: The Next Wave (A Panel in Honor of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic).<\/span><\/strong>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 38 (2021).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Regulatory research taught from the perspective of critical information theory is a pathway for the consideration of (1) regulatory transparency, (2) agency accountability, (3) due process and fundamental fairness in the context of agency adjudication and rulemaking, (4) private-public partnerships, and (5) agency expertise and discretion. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Biases in Law Library Subject Headings<\/a><\/h2>\n

Grace Lo<\/a>
\n<\/span>Online Symposium: Critical Legal Research: The Next Wave (A Panel in Honor of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic).<\/span><\/strong>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 26 (2021).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

This Article focuses on the LCSH strand of the \u201ctriple helix\u201d and how it continues to contribute to the \u201cdilemma\u201d identified by Delgado and Stefancic. Part I explains what the LCSH is and its role in codifying biases into research. Part II discusses two recent examples of movements to change specific subject headings in the LCSH as case studies in how different sources and perspectives are evaluated in canonizing authorized terms. Finally, Part III examines how long-standing, historical problems of bias in cataloging continue into modern day research tools like search engine algorithms. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Invisible Hands and the Triple (Quadruple?) Helix Dilemma: Helping Students Free Their Minds<\/a><\/h2>\n

Yasmin Sokkar Harker<\/a>
\n<\/span>Online Symposium: Critical Legal Research: The Next Wave (A Panel in Honor of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic).<\/span><\/strong>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 17 (2021).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Legal education should be liberating, and legal research classrooms and law libraries can be sites of liberation. They can be places where students discover the potential to oversee their own development, both professional and personal. They can be places where students see the possibilities in their world and envision themselves as agents of social change. They can be places where students discover their roles as lawyers and the potential to change the law itself. One way to foster liberatory thinking is through critical information literacy. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cNon-Reformist Reforms\u201d in Radical Social Change: A Critical Legal Research Exploration<\/a><\/h2>\n

Nicholas F. Stump<\/a>
\n<\/span>Online Symposium: Critical Legal Research: The Next Wave (A Panel in Honor of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic).<\/span><\/strong>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 6 (2021).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The contemporary Critical Legal Research (\u201cCLR\u201d) project exhibits much diverse and vital thought. However, this Essay draws, in particular, on CLR strains in the explicit Marxist- and socialist-steeped traditions. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

<\/a><\/h2>\n

<\/h3>\n

An Introduction to \u201cCritical Legal Research: The Next Wave\u201d<\/a><\/h2>\n

Ronald E. Wheeler<\/a>
\n<\/span>Online Symposium: Critical Legal Research: The Next Wave (A Panel in Honor of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic).<\/span><\/strong>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 1 (2021).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

This symposium continues and sustains the exchange of ideas initiated at a panel presentation offered at the 2021 American Association of Law Schools (\u201cAALS\u201d) Annual Meeting in January 2021. The panel was titled Critical Legal Research: The Next Wave, and here we advance and extend that conversation with written contributions from the panelists. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n
\n

Beyond VAWA: Localism as an Argument for Full Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction<\/a><\/h2>\n

Deanna Tamborelli<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 305 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In dismantling tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Natives and then returning limited jurisdiction in a piecemeal fashion, the federal government has stifled the ability of tribes to develop effective responses while further entrenching a white supremacist, colonial system over sovereign peoples. It is due time for the federal government to support these communities as they seek to heal and rebuild. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Optimism and Despair About a 2020 \u201cElection Meltdown\u201d and Beyond<\/a><\/h2>\n

Richard L. Hasen<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy<\/em> (2020).
\n<\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 293 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

We are certainly not living in the best of times. In many ways it does feel like the worst of times. It is easy under conditions of a pandemic, social unrest, increasing economic and political inequality, and rising political violence to despair of the potential for broad or even narrow positive social change. Perhaps, as Professor Abu el-Haj put it, we are living in a paradoxical period of \u201ctoo little hope\u201d and \u201cnot enough gloom.\u201d […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Voting During a Pandemic<\/a><\/h2>\n

Eugene D. Mazo<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy<\/em> (2020).
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 283 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

While some observers have argued that the threats identified in <\/em>Election Meltdown are \u201cnot exactly news,\u201d repeatedly educating Americans about them\u2014and especially the ways in which they may be used to place doubts in the minds of voters during the era of COVID-19\u2014will continue to be a worthwhile endeavor for some time to come. If the past few months have taught us anything, it is that the excuse of a pandemic can be used to block access to the ballot box just as much as incompetence, dirty tricks, or incendiary rhetoric. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Governing Elections Without Law<\/a><\/h2>\n

Derek T. Muller<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy<\/em> (2020).
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 278 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The field of election law, unsurprisingly, focuses on law. But Professor Rick Hasen\u2019s book <\/em>Election Meltdown rightly highlights that law can only take us so far in governing elections. As we think about the problems that persist in our elections, Professor Hasen moves us to think about long-term reforms, which are the best and perhaps only ways to respond to some of our elections\u2019 short-term perils. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Putting a Band-aid on a Gunshot Wound<\/a><\/h2>\n

Lorraine C. Minnite<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy<\/em> (2020).
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 273 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Over the last two decades, Professor Richard L. Hasen has been a trusted source of vital information and insight into the arcane field of election law for the public and scholars alike. Years ago, when such tools were relatively new, Hasen created an indispensable listserv for scholars, journalists, and practitioners who continue to receive a free near-daily roundup of news stories, reports, and developments in the law concerning elections, voting rights, and campaign finance. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Cracks in the Foundation<\/a><\/h2>\n

Lisa Marshall Manheim<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy<\/em> (2020).
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 268 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

When Richard Hasen wrote <\/em>Election Meltdown, he didn\u2019t yet know that Donald Trump had, in the days before taking office, openly delighted in the low turnout among Black voters. Nor did Hasen know that the President would so brazenly push for reduced voting rates as he sought his own reelection\u2014that he would, for example, threaten to block funding for the Postal Service in an effort to prevent mail-in voting; authorize his campaign to sue states for using ballot drop boxes;[4] or insist, without citing legal authority, that he would send \u201claw enforcement\u201d to the polls. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

American Democracy Is Healthier than It Appears<\/a><\/h2>\n

Anthony J. Gaughan<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy<\/em> (2020).
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 249 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

No scholar has had a greater impact on the field of election law than Professor Richard Hasen. Accordingly, when Professor Hasen warns that our democracy is in trouble, we should listen. In his superb new book <\/em>Election Meltdown, he puts the country on notice that the election law wars of the past decade pose a growing threat to American democracy itself. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Eight Months Later<\/a><\/h2>\n

Ellen D. Katz<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy<\/em> (2020).
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 243 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Rick published <\/em>Election Meltdown on February 4, 2020. It was the start of an election year, and, no doubt, he anticipated that disputes would soon emerge that would test, and in many cases, confirm his analysis. Eight eventful months have since passed. The COVID-19 pandemic has touched and altered every aspect of life with millions infected, millions more unemployed, and its radiating impacts expanding daily. Amid this evolving crisis came a second one as tens of millions of people worldwide joined Black Lives Matters (\u201cBLM\u201d) demonstrations to protest the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers and other cases of police violence. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Bug or Feature: The Long-Intertwined Legacy of Disinformation, Race, and Voting<\/a><\/h2>\n

Atiba R. Ellis<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Richard L. Hasen, Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy<\/em> (2020).
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 238 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The crisis Professor Hasen despaired of in <\/em>Election Meltdown is already happening. His book gives a snapshot of the current moment through its confluence of rhetorical and administrative malfeasance, hyper-partisanship and disinformation, and risk of outright disaster. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Keep the Federal Courts Great<\/a><\/h2>\n

Carl Tobias<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 196 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Ever since Donald Trump began running for President, he has incessantly vowed to \u201cmake the federal judiciary great again\u201d by deliberately seating conservative, young, and capable judicial nominees, a project which Republican senators and their leader, Mitch McConnell (R-KY), have decidedly embraced and now vigorously implement. The chief executive and McConnell now constantly remind the American people of their monumental success in nominating and confirming aspirants to the federal courts.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cAlive but Still Not Free\u201d: Nikki Addimando and Judicial Failure to Apply the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act<\/a><\/h2>\n

Christopher L. Hamilton<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 174 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

This Essay addresses the failure of the New York state judicial system to properly apply the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (\u201cDVSJA\u201d), with devastating implications for those whom the law was intended to protect. In order to remedy this serious problem, this Essay proposes detailed considerations that state judges should contemplate when deciding whether to apply the DVSJA to a defendant\u2019s sentencing.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Birth Rights and Wrongs<\/em>: Reply to Critics<\/a><\/h2>\n

Dov Fox<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Dov Fox,\u00a0Birth Rights and Wrongs: How Medicine and Technology are Remaking Reproduction and the Law<\/em> (2019)<\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 159 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The pandemic hasn\u2019t spared reproductive freedom. School closures and clinic restrictions make birth control and fertility treatment harder to get, while new regulations put abortion, surrogacy, and genetic testing out of reach for many in need. Birth Rights and Wrongs charts the landscape of harms like these and hundreds of other less familiar ones scattered across American jurisprudence\u2014from lab accidents to contraceptive sabotage.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Reproductive Exceptionalism In and Beyond Birth Rights<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Courtney Megan Cahill<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Dov Fox,\u00a0Birth Rights and Wrongs: How Medicine and Technology are Remaking Reproduction and the Law<\/em> (2019)<\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 152 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The law is no stranger to reproductive exceptionalism\u2014the idea that reproduction is unique and that its uniqueness justifies laws that treat reproduction differently from other kinds of human behavior. In Birth Rights and Wrongs: How Medicine and Technology Are Remaking Reproduction and the Law, Professor Dov Fox takes aim at reproductive exceptionalism in the law of tort, which, Fox argues, fails to remedy reproductive harm on the mistaken belief that reproductive harm is different in kind from the sort of harm that tort law ordinarily captures.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Birth Rights at War<\/a><\/h2>\n

Mary Ziegler<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Dov Fox,\u00a0Birth Rights and Wrongs: How Medicine and Technology are Remaking Reproduction and the Law<\/em> (2019)<\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 148 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In 2019 a record number of states passed laws banning all or most abortions, with each legislature vying to introduce the statute that would spell the end for Roe v. Wade. With the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in the United States, some states have functionally banned all abortions for the duration of the pandemic. Understandably, commentators have focused on what these laws would mean for women seeking abortions. But these bans will likely have significant effects on other areas of the law governing reproduction.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Is Tort Law the Tool for Fixing Reproductive Wrongs?<\/a><\/h2>\n

Christopher Robertson<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Dov Fox,\u00a0Birth Rights and Wrongs: How Medicine and Technology are Remaking Reproduction and the Law<\/em> (2019)<\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 143 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In his 2019 book, Birth Rights and Wrongs: How Medicine and Technology are Remaking Reproduction and the Law, Dov Fox offers a compelling argument for new torts allowing recovery for wrongful reproduction. These torts would include three sorts of cases, those where wrongdoing (whether negligent, reckless, or intentional) caused undesired reproduction; stymied desired reproduction; or confounded reproduction, causing birth of a child different than that intended by the parents.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Response to Birth Rights and Wrongs<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Janet Dolgin<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Dov Fox,\u00a0Birth Rights and Wrongs: How Medicine and Technology are Remaking Reproduction and the Law<\/em> (2019)<\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 139 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Birth Rights and Wrongs challenges limitations in the law\u2019s response to tort claims by people who have suffered reproductive wrongs. Arguing for a more flexible understanding of tort law in response to reproductive wrongs, Professor Fox offers a multitude of insights about the implications of negligent errors that have resulted in non-birth (reproduction deprived), unwanted birth (reproduction imposed), and the birth of children who upset parental hopes and expectations about a child\u2019s physical or mental condition (reproduction confounded.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Accountability, Eugenics, and Reproductive Justice<\/a><\/h2>\n

Susan Frelich Appleton<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Dov Fox,\u00a0Birth Rights and Wrongs: How Medicine and Technology are Remaking Reproduction and the Law<\/em> (2019)<\/span>.
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 134 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Dov Fox\u2019s Birth Rights and Wrongs makes a compelling case for a specific form of reproductive justice: Tort law should hold specialists in reproductive medicine accountable for their negligence, just as it would other health care providers. In pressing this thesis, Fox offers both an innovative taxonomy of varied ways that reproductive interventions can go astray,[2] inflicting lasting harm on individuals and families, and an effective critique of the myriad dodges used by courts to avoid imposing liability.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Rediscovering\u00a0Jacobson<\/em>\u00a0in the Era of COVID-19<\/a><\/h2>\n

Wendy E. Parmet<\/a>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 117 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

On May 29, 2020, as states across the country continued to ease the social distancing measures that had been put in place to stem the spread of COVID-19, the Supreme Court in\u00a0South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, by a 5-4 vote, denied an emergency request to enjoin California Governor Gavin Newsom\u2019s order limiting the number of worshippers at in-person religious services.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Suing China Over COVID-19<\/a><\/h2>\n

Paul J. Larkin, Jr.<\/a>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 91 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

On April 21, 2020, the state of Missouri filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the People\u2019s Republic of China (\u201cPRC\u201d or \u201cChina\u201d) and various other parties. The lawsuit seeks damages from the defendants for their role in unleashing the COVID-19 pandemic, an action that, as the state has alleged, roiled the world for the last three months, put millions of people out of work, and killed thousands in the process.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

This Court Doesn’t Deserve This Book: A Reflection on Justin Driver’s Schoolhouse Gate<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Joseph R. Fishkin<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate:\u00a0<\/em>Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind<\/em> (2018).
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong>100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 70 (2020).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Justin Driver\u2019s The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind offers a portrait of a century of dynamic interaction between the Supreme Court, the American public school system, and the American public that is elegantly written, well-paced, deeply researched, highly opinionated, sometimes disputatious, and ultimately a little romantic about the Supreme Court.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Education, Morality, and Human Development in Constitutional Decisions About Students’ Rights<\/a><\/h2>\n

Miriam Galston<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate:\u00a0<\/em>Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind<\/em> (2018).
\n100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 75 (2020).\u00a0<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The encyclopedic character of Justin Driver\u2019s The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind can obscure the most significant aspects of the author\u2019s pioneering volume. The work is not only a history of constitutional doctrines that address students\u2019 rights in elementary and secondary public schools, although its main purpose is to provide a detailed account of the emergence and evolution of those doctrines.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Policing the Schoolhouse<\/a><\/h2>\n

Brandon L. Garrett<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate:\u00a0<\/em>Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind<\/em> (2018).
\n100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 79 (2020).<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In his new book, The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind, Professor Justin Driver describes the risk that schoolhouse gates can open to jail cells as schools become Constitution-free zones. Many of the most troubling cases and examples in his account of how the U.S. Supreme Court, the focus of the book, has adjudicated public education cases involves criminal investigations.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Talking Out of Public School<\/a><\/h2>\n

Nancy Leong<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate:\u00a0<\/em>Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind<\/em> (2018).
\n100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 84 (2020).<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Justin Driver\u2019s engaging and provocative monograph explains that it \u201cexamines the intersection of two distinctively American institutions: the public school and the Supreme Court.\u201d Driver\u2019s work provides us with fertile ground on which to grapple with an uncomfortable truth: The members of the latter institution have virtually no experience with the former institution.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Constitutional Law and\u00a0The Schoolhouse Gate<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

David A. Strauss<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate:\u00a0<\/em>Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind<\/em> (2018).
\n100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 87 (2020).<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The list of impressive things about Justin Driver\u2019s The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind<\/a>\u2014it\u2019s not a short list\u2014begins with the subject of the book itself. Traditionally, cases about public education are scattered throughout the constitutional law curriculum.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

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The Constitutional Case for State Power to Eliminate Faithless Electors<\/a><\/h2>\n

Tyler Creighton<\/a><\/span>
\nStudent Note
\n100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 57 (2020)<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The 2016 election raised anew the prospect that the candidate who wins the most presidential electors in November might not be the candidate who receives the most electoral votes when the electors convene in their respective states in December or the candidate who Congress officially declares the next President when a joint session counts electoral votes in January.<\/em> […]<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Right on Time: <\/em>Not Quite Right on Economics<\/a><\/h2>\n

Douglas W. Allen<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Responses to Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern,\u00a0Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property<\/em>, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 395 (2019).
\n100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 1 (2020)<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Oliar and Stern\u00a0develop an economic framework to understand the timing and nature of a first possession rule to establish property, apply this framework to the acquisition of intellectual property, and consider various policy and legal implications. At the most general level, I think their approach has merit and the applications are reasonable. However, the economic framework is muddled and incorrect. Here I will only comment on their economic framework, where I arguably have a comparative advantage. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Claim Communication in Intellectual Property: A Comment on\u00a0Right on Time<\/a><\/h2>\n

Eric R. Claeys<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Responses to Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern, Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property
\n<\/em>100 B.U. L. Rev. 4 (2020)<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

There is a lot to like in Right on Time. Professors Dotan Oliar and James Y. Stern remind legal scholars that what they call first possession norms do not constitute \u201can essentially antiquarian topic.\u201d Olian and Stern have also provoked property and IP theorists to consider whether these norms apply in intellectual property (\u201cIP\u201d) law and policy. In IP scholarship, many, many works assume that, since intellectual works are nonrivalrous and nonexclusive, possession norms should not play any role in IP. That assumption seems wrong and deserves to be reconsidered. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The Acquisition of Property Rights in Animals: A Brief Comment on Oliar and Stern:\u00a0Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Richard A. Epstein<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Responses to Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern, Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property
\n<\/em>100 B.U. L. Rev. 11 (2020)<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In their impressive article,\u00a0Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property, Professors Dotan Oliar and James Y. Stern work diligently to develop a comprehensive theory that explains the acquisition of property rights in the full range of resources starting with land and animals, and then moving inexorably to deal with the three most important forms of intellectual property\u2014patents, copyrights, and intellectual property. […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The Importance of Communication to Possession in IP<\/a><\/h2>\n

Timothy R. Holbrook<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Responses to Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern, Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property
\n<\/em>100 B.U. L. Rev. 16 (2020)<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

A key aspect of intellectual property is time. Patent law is rife with issues of timing. At the most basic level, patent rights are time-limited, leaving the rights holder a finite period to extract value from the patent. Moreover, as to validity, time impacts when to assess whether an invention is new, nonobvious, useful, and adequately supported by the patent disclosure.\u00a0[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The U.S. Patent System was (and is) a Rule-of-Capture Property Rights Regime<\/a><\/h2>\n

Adam Mossoff<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Responses to Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern, Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property
\n<\/em>100 B.U. L. Rev. 19 (2020)<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In\u00a0Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property, Professors Dotan Oliar and James Y. Stern develop a conceptual framework that highlights the trade-offs in the choice between two different types of first possession regimes: the \u201cfirst-committed-searcher rule\u201d (early awards of property rights) and the \u201crule of capture\u201d (late awards of property rights). […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Right on Time, But How Much Does it Cost?<\/a><\/h2>\n

Carol M. Rose<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Responses to Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern, Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property
\n<\/em>100 B.U. L. Rev. 23 (2020)<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Professors Dotan Oliar and James Y. Stern have written an excellent\u00a0article\u00a0about the appropriate beginning time for intellectual property (\u201cIP\u201d) rights. They argue that the correct timing involves a trade-off between too-early allocation (rights go to someone who may not finish) and too-late (other potential creators may be scared off for too long, or alternatively, they may freeload). In an intriguing comparison, the authors map those choices onto first possession considerations in more conventional property, or what I am going to call \u201cPOP\u201d for \u201cplain old property.\u201d […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Failed First Possession and the Permanent Public Domain<\/a><\/h2>\n

Molly Shaffer Van Houweling<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Responses to Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern, Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property
\n<\/em>100 B.U. L. Rev. 28 (2020)<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Is it a good idea to think of intellectual property as property? It may seem like an odd question to those unfamiliar with the field and its policy and academic debates. We\u2019re talking about intellectual\u00a0property, after all. But the use of that umbrella term for fields of law including copyright, patent, and trademark is controversial.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

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\n

The Many Inequalities of International Law<\/a><\/h2>\n

Neha Jain<\/strong><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Anthea Roberts\u2019\u00a0Is International Law International?<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n99 B.U. L. Rev. Online 1 (2019)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

And what should they know of England who only England know?\u00a0Kipling\u2019s lament finds an unexpectedly radical ally in Anthea Roberts\u2019 masterful deconstruction of the \u201cuniversal\u201d and universalizing project of international law: what do different national communities of international lawyers, especially those who are educated, trained, and socialized in the developed West, know of international law? […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The Roberts Challenge<\/a><\/h2>\n

Jan Klabbers<\/a><\/strong>
\nOnline Symposium: Anthea Roberts\u2019 Is International Law International?<\/strong><\/span>
\n99 B.U. L. Rev. Online 5 (2019)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

In the late 1980s, the leading international lawyer Sir Robert Jennings publicly wondered what international law is, and how we can tell it when we see it. That was a useful question, and perhaps more important still today than in 1988. The good news is that Anthea Roberts provides us with part of an answer; the bad news is that her answer is not terribly comforting.\u00a0[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Is Private International Law International Law?<\/a><\/h2>\n

Pamela K. Bookman<\/strong><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Anthea Roberts\u2019\u00a0Is International Law International?<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n99 B.U. L. Rev. Online 9 (2019)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Anthea Roberts\u2019 new book, <\/em>Is International Law International?, has already made so much of a splash and had such an impact on the way international law is perceived that I need not begin by singing its praises. The book teaches\u2014or points out a truth that perhaps we should have known all along\u2014that \u201cwe approach international law from our particular national perspectives.\u201d[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

If International Law Is Not International, What Comes Next? On Anthea Roberts\u2019\u00a0<\/span>Is International Law International?<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Rebecca Ingber<\/strong><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Anthea Roberts\u2019\u00a0Is International Law International?<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n99 B.U. L. Rev. Online 14 (2019)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

I am thrilled that the editors of the\u00a0<\/em>Boston University Law Review\u00a0have chosen to review Anthea Roberts\u2019 recent book, <\/em>Is International Law International?, for their annual symposium. In order to answer the title\u2019s question, Roberts develops a research project to scrutinize a world she knows well: the field of teaching international law, her colleagues, and their students.\u00a0[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Beyond Universalism and Particularism in International Law\u2014Insights from Comparative Law and Private International Law<\/a><\/h2>\n

Ralf Michaels<\/strong><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Anthea Roberts\u2019\u00a0Is International Law International?<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n99 B.U. L. Rev. Online 18 (2019)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Anthea Roberts has written a formidable book, and the praise it has garnered, (as far as I can see nearly unanimous) seems well deserved. The book is full of useful insights and fascinating case studies; it provides access to a wealth of scholarly discussions that we are normally not privy to, and it presents a rich sociology of the field of experts in international law.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Unity and Diversity in International Law<\/a><\/h2>\n

William W. Park<\/strong><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Anthea Roberts\u2019\u00a0Is International Law International?<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n99 B.U. L. Rev. Online 22 (2019)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The primordial Greek sea-god Proteus could alter his shape at will, notwithstanding that his divine substance remained the same. Reinventing himself by adapting to new circumstances, Proteus still stayed unchanged in essence.\u00a0Unlike the sea-god\u2019s protean nature, the substance of international law may well undergo alterations when examined through the telescope of legal culture, or with predispositions of divergent educational backgrounds.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Reflections on\u00a0<\/span>Is International Law International?<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Anthea Roberts<\/strong><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Anthea Roberts\u2019\u00a0Is International Law International?<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n99 B.U. L. Rev. Online 37 (2019)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Is International Law International?\u00a0examines the world of international law and international lawyers and asks questions about who we are, what we are doing, and where the field is heading. Since the book\u2019s publication, I have been fortunate to receive reactions from a broad range of academics and practitioners throughout the world, in international law and beyond. In those discussions, certain themes recur, many of which appear in this excellent collection of essays.[…]<\/em><\/p>\n

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\n

Corporate Personhood and the History of the Rights of Corporations: A Reflection on Adam Winkler\u2019s Book\u00a0<\/span>We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Jack M. Beermann<\/a><\/strong>
\nOnline Symposium: Adam Winkler\u2019s\u00a0<\/span>We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights<\/span>
\n<\/em>98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 32 (2018)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Adam Winkler\u2019s book\u00a0<\/em>We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights\u00a0is an impressive work on several different levels. Because so much of the development of American constitutional law over the centuries has involved businesses, the book is a nearly comprehensive legal history of federal constitutional law […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Corporate Rights as Subplot<\/a><\/h2>\n

Larry Yackle<\/a><\/strong>
\nOnline Symposium:\u00a0Adam Winkler\u2019s\u00a0We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 36 (2018)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Adam Winkler makes an important contribution to the great body of academic work on corporations in American life. He concentrates on a small corner of the larger topic. He traces only the development of corporate \u201crights,\u201d and he describes, but does not critique, what he uncovers […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Corporate Constitutional Rights: Easy and Hard Cases<\/a><\/h2>\n

Kent Greenfield<\/a><\/strong>
\nOnline Symposium: Adam Winkler\u2019s\u00a0We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 40 (2018)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Adam Winkler has written one of the most important books of legal history of the last decade. The story of corporate constitutional rights is as long as our nation\u2019s history, yet few have plumbed it like Winkler does.\u00a0We the Corporations\u00a0is a brilliant work\u2014beautifully written and exhaustively researched […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Wrong Turns with Corporate Rights<\/a><\/h2>\n

Elizabeth Pollman<\/a><\/strong>
\nOnline Symposium: Adam Winkler\u2019s\u00a0We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 44 (2018)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

For over two centuries, the Supreme Court has heard corporations\u2019 claims for rights under the U.S. Constitution. A growing body of legal literature has examined in scholarly detail the contours of this jurisprudence and the history of corporate rights.\u00a0Yet there is something important and different about giving this case law and cast of historical actors the space to breathe over the length of a book […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The Eschatological Drift of Corporate Constitutional Rights: A Review of Adam Winkler\u2019s\u00a0<\/span>We the Corporations<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Tamara Piety<\/a><\/strong>
\nOnline Symposium: Adam Winkler\u2019s\u00a0We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 49 (2018)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

It is often said that the capitalist will sell you the rope to hang him with. The idea is that although the profit motive may drive prosperity, unless it is retrained by some outside force, it may also be an inherently destructive force.\u00a0This may also be true of a society in which the profit motive and private industry have created an economy that is dependent upon many practices inconsistent with long term human survival; yet we seem helpless to reform those practices […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Is Constitutional Doctrine the Source of Corporate Rights?<\/a><\/h2>\n

Michael C. Dorf<\/strong><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Adam Winkler\u2019s\u00a0We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n98 B.U. L. Rev. 59 (2018)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

We the Corporations, Adam Winkler\u2019s terrific history of the constitutional rights of corporations in America, does not have a surprise ending, but it does have what many readers will probably experience as a surprise beginning. Corporations, the reader learns, did not co-opt the language of the Constitution and civil rights for their nefarious purposes\u2014not recently, nor even in the Gilded Age […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The Long History of Corporate Rights<\/a><\/h2>\n

Adam Winkler<\/strong><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Adam Winkler\u2019s\u00a0We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights<\/em><\/strong><\/span>
\n98 B.U. L. Rev. 64 (2018)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Corporations have been fighting for equal rights since America\u2019s earliest days. Although<\/em>Citizens United v. Federal Election Commissionfirst drew broad public attention to the rights of corporations under the Constitution, businesses have quietly amassed a remarkable track record of success in the Supreme Court over the course of the past two centuries […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Hope and Fear for Democracy in America<\/a><\/h2>\n

Daniel Markovits
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Ganesh Sitaraman’s\u00a0<\/span>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution<\/span>
\n<\/em>98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 1 (2018)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The familiar saying \u201cmoney is power\u201d carries two meanings: one is common in the United States today; the other less so. The common meaning asserts that money <\/em>buys power and therefore that economic inequality tends towards, or causes, political inequality. According to this idea, the rich can use their income and wealth to pay lobbyists [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Reconstructing Democracy in an Era of Inequality<\/a><\/h2>\n

K. Sabeel Rahman<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Ganesh Sitaraman’s\u00a0<\/span>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution<\/span>
\n<\/em>98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 5 (2018)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Sitaraman\u2019s book, <\/em>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution, is the latest in a larger set of scholarly re-engagements with the theme of \u201claw and political economy\u201d (\u201cLPE\u201d). First, scholars in this vein have taken a number of overlapping approaches: recovering historical traditions of normative, legal, and constitutional thought around economic inclusion, opportunity, and democracy [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Ganesh Sitaraman’s Idealized American History<\/a><\/h2>\n

David Lyons
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Ganesh Sitaraman’s\u00a0<\/span>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution<\/span>
\n<\/em>98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 11 (2018)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

A popular theme among patriots is to celebrate America\u2019s special virtues, which distinguish it radically from European models. Ganesh Sitaraman tells us that political constitutions have generally been designed to prevent socially destabilizing class warfare between the rich, who seek greater domination, and the poor, who would like to redistribute the former\u2019s wealth. America\u2019s Constitution [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

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Sitaraman’s Mistaken Case for the Middle-Class Constitution<\/a><\/h2>\n

Richard A. Epstein
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Ganesh Sitaraman’s\u00a0<\/span>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution<\/span>
\n<\/em>98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 15 (2018)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Vanderbilt Law School Professor Ganesh Sitaraman, a close friend and former advisor of Senator Elizabeth Warren, does not pull his punches. By his title, <\/em>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality Threatens Our Republic, Sitaraman proclaims two themes that dominate his book. He writes, \u201cthe number one threat to American constitutional government today [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

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Why Growing Government is a Greater Political Menace than Growing Inequality<\/a><\/h2>\n

Ilya Somin
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Ganesh Sitaraman’s\u00a0<\/span>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution<\/span>
\n<\/em>98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 21 (2018)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In his important new book, <\/em>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution, Ganesh Sitaraman argues that growing economic inequality over the last several decades and the resulting decline of the middle class is \u201cthe number one threat to American constitutional government.\u201d He also contends that the American Founding Fathers sought to establish a \u201cmiddle-class constitution\u201d in [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

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The Middle-Class Constitution: A Response<\/a><\/h2>\n

Ganesh Sitaraman
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Ganesh Sitaraman’s\u00a0<\/span>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution<\/span>
\n<\/em>98 B.U. L. Rev. Online 27 (2018)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

I am very grateful to the <\/em>Boston University Law Review for bringing together such a terrific group of scholars to engage with my book, <\/em>The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality Threatens Our Republic. It is a testament to the work and excellence of the <\/em>Boston University Law Review that they pulled together [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

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Situational Ethics and Veganism<\/a><\/strong><\/h2>\n

Neil H. Buchanan<\/a><\/strong>
\n Online Symposium: Sherry Colb and Michael Dorf\u2019s\u00a0<\/span>Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights
\n<\/em>97 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 1 (2017)<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Although their arguments are important on their own merits, it is useful to emphasize that this book is in a very real sense a riposte, an answer to an accusation that goes like this: Vegans cannot truly believe in their stated reason for refusing to participate in animal cruelty. If they did, they would also <\/em>[\u2026]<\/p>\n

\n

Anti-Abortion Pro-Lifers and Animal Protection Pro-Lifers Have a Golden Opportunity to Work Together<\/a><\/strong><\/h2>\n

Charlie Camosy<\/a><\/strong>
\n Online Symposium: Sherry Colb and Michael Dorf\u2019s\u00a0Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights
\n<\/em>97 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 5 (2017)<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

I\u2019ve been anti-abortion since I found out what abortion was, but I became a pro-life feminist when I learned about the history of abortion-rights activism. For those who aren\u2019t aware, I just wanted to mention that issues surrounding animal protection are exploding in Christian theology. The <\/em>Journal of Moral Theology devoted an entire issue to <\/em>[\u2026]<\/p>\n

\n

The Value of Existence<\/a><\/strong><\/h2>\n

David N. Cassuto<\/a><\/strong>
\n Online Symposium: Sherry Colb and Michael Dorf\u2019s\u00a0Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights
\n<\/em>97 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 9 (2017)<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Locating identity over time is tricky and gets to the essence of personhood, which is central to both the abortion and animal rights debates. Why is painless killing morally wrong? Or, asked another way: On what basis can one claim an interest in continued existence? The answer depends on whether one believes that selfhood stays <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

Of Abortion and Animals: The Promise and Peril of Legal Rights<\/a><\/strong><\/h2>\n

Deborah Tuerkheimer<\/a><\/strong>
\n Online Symposium: Sherry Colb and Michael Dorf\u2019s\u00a0Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights
\n<\/em>97 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 13 (2017)<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

I want to focus my remarks on the law side of the legality\/morality divide that Colb and Dorf so deftly probe. On the one hand, the book tells a limits-of-law story, one that I find quite compelling. But the abortion\/animal rights juxtaposition also helps us to think about the promise of law\u2014and legal rights<\/em> […]<\/p>\n

\n

The Sentience Criterion<\/a><\/h2>\n

Sherry F. Colb<\/a> and Michael C. Dorf<\/a><\/strong>
\n Online Symposium: Sherry Colb and Michael Dorf’s\u00a0Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights
\n<\/em>97 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 17 (2017)<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Beating Hearts\u00a0addresses a puzzle: Why is there so little overlap between the pro-life and animal rights movements, given that both aim to protect innocent life from human violence? Our answer is that at their respective cores, the movements give very different moral weight to membership in the human species. Although of course all movements <\/em> […]<\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n
\n

Comments on\u00a0When God Isn’t Green<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Sarah Schindler<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Jay Wexler’s\u00a0<\/span>When God Isn’t Green: A World-Wide Journey to Places Where Religious Practice and Environmentalism Collide<\/span>
\n<\/em>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 1 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/strong>First, with respect to cumulative harms, a number of legal scholars have written about the fact that individuals, and their actions, cumulatively contribute to significant environmental harms. In the book, Jay provides many examples of religious practices that have negative effects on the environment. I view this book as falling within the literature addressing what <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

Reconciling Green and God<\/a><\/h2>\n

John Copeland Nagle<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Jay Wexler’s\u00a0<\/span>When God Isn’t Green: A World-Wide Journey to Places Where Religious Practice and Environmentalism Collide<\/span>
\n<\/em>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 7 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

One virtue of this approach is that it allows you to experience the actual places that give rise to legal disputes, rather than being limited to the stylized account offered in most judicial opinions. The experience is much richer when the author is as talented as Wexler. His reports from the friend remind us that\u00a0<\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

When God Isn’t Green<\/em>: Some Thoughts on the Thoughts of Nagle and Schindler<\/a><\/h2>\n

Jay D. Wexler<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Jay Wexler’s\u00a0<\/span>When God Isn’t Green: A World-Wide Journey to Places Where Religious Practice and Environmentalism Collide<\/span>
\n<\/em>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 15 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

I appreciate both Nagle and Schindler\u2019s observations that although the contribution of religious practices to environmental degradation may be relatively small compared to other sources of contamination, such as manufacturing and transportation, the contribution may nonetheless be more important than it would otherwise seem because of the cumulative nature of environmental harms\u2014harms that might <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

Marriage Equality and Marital Supremacy<\/a><\/h2>\n

Serena Mayeri<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 19 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The parallel between Reconstruction-era freedpeople and twenty-first century gay and lesbian Americans, as Franke is careful to acknowledge, is imperfect; it is discontinuity as much as similarity that makes the analogy fruitful. Most strikingly, the juxtaposition of these two cases spotlights how marriage equality advocates have succeeded, with astonishing alacrity, in normalizing what was once <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

Perils of Marriage and Neoliberal Politics of Care<\/a><\/h2>\n

Tamara Metz<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 25 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The rebranding and its success have much to do with the neoliberal politics of care. Specifically, same sex marriage was rebranded in the ways Franke outlines but also in the language of neoliberalism: first, there\u2019s the emphasis on freedom: commentators noted a crucial shift on the part of major activist organizations from the rhetoric of <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

Let’s Hope They’re Right<\/a><\/h2>\n

Tracy E. Higgins<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 29 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Katherine sounds like the queer mirror image of the conservative opponent of marriage equality: Marriage equality is going to ruin it for us patriarchal, heteronormative folks happily ensconced in traditional man\/woman marriages. How can we possibly continue to thrive if gay people can get married? Franke instead seems to be claiming, at times anyway: Marriage <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

Decentering Marriage Rights<\/a><\/h2>\n

Julie Novkov<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 35 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/em><\/strong>While she does not argue any direct causal or path-dependent developmental relationship between this history and the current effect of marriage equality for lesbians and gay men, Franke draws thoughtful analogies to illustrate both the negative effects that equality is already producing and to warn about other potential problems that the past history predicts<\/em> […]<\/p>\n

\n

Rhetoric and Reality in\u00a0Wedlocked<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

John G. Culhane<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 39 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The multiracial complexity of these families\u2014including the children who have been adopted, often from the foster care system\u2014presents a challenge to another of Franke\u2019s concerns. She is unsparing in her assessment of Judge Posner\u2019s decision in\u00a0<\/em>Baskin v. Bogan,\u00a0in which the prolific jurist noted the potential of same-sex marriages to increase the <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

Who Are the People in Your Gayborhood?<\/a><\/h2>\n

Libby Adler<\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality<\/span>
\n<\/em>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 43 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

As Franke\u2019s readers are surely aware, contemporary advocates of \u201cmarriage equality\u201d have long pressed an analogy between same-sex marriage and interracial marriage, or\u2014conversely\u2014between one man, one woman rules and the anti-miscegenation laws that were deemed unconstitutional in 1967 with the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in\u00a0<\/em>Loving v. Virginia.\u00a0William N. Eskridge, Jr., for example <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

Just Like Everyone Else<\/a><\/h2>\n

Solangel Maldonado<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality<\/span>
\n<\/em>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 49 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

To be fair, gays and lesbians paid what some of us would consider a high price for acceptance by the majority. As Franke demonstrates, the marriage equality movement had to pretend that sex is irrelevant to homosexuality and emphasize similarities with heterosexuals in order to appeal to the majority. One should not minimize these costs <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

Dreadlocked<\/a><\/h2>\n

Peggy Cooper Davis<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality<\/span>
\n<\/em>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 53 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Scholars inevitably race against developments in their fields. Wedlocked is a prime example. It reports research that was, by the author\u2019s account, undertaken to discourage advocacy for the cause of same-sex marriage, but completed and published in the wake of <\/em>Obegerfell v. Hodges\u2019s constitutional vindication of that cause. Professor Franke had taken as her starting <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

From Outlaw to Outcast to In-Law? Contesting the Perils of Marriage Equality<\/a><\/h2>\n

Linda C. McClain<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality<\/span>
\n<\/em>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 59 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/em>Wedlocked\u00a0is not only dubious about the association of marriage with freedom, but also worries about the cost of that freedom on those who find the \u201cpromise of liberty\u201d better realized by not taking the further step from outlaw to outcast to in-law. Franke contends that same-sex couples\u2019 new freedom to marry\u2014and the constitutional <\/em>[…]<\/p>\n

\n

The Author Meets Her Readers<\/a><\/h2>\n

Katherine M. Franke<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Katherine Franke’s\u00a0<\/span>Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality
\n<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/strong>96 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 65 (2016)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/strong>One of the things I appreciate most about the symposium\u2019s contributions is the diversity of views they offer. Far from a round of applause, the participants take the book\u2019s arguments seriously and give them serious critique. Of course, this book invites that kind of critical engagement, for it is far from a kind of post-Obergefell <\/em>[…]
\n<\/em><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n
\n

Abandoning Administrative Common Law in Mortgage Bankers<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Kathryn K. Kovacs<\/strong><\/a>
\nEssay<\/strong><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 1 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to eliminate a rule of administrative common law that conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d). When Congress enacted the APA, it deliberately chose to exempt interpretive rules from the Act\u2019s notice-and-comment requirements. The D.C. Circuit nonetheless invalidated a Department of Labor interpretive [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

King<\/em>, Chevron<\/em>, and the Age of Textualism<\/a><\/h2>\n

Abigail R. Moncrieff<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Essay<\/strong><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 9 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u201cIf you\u2019re right about\u00a0Chevron\u00a0[deference applying to this case], that would indicate that a subsequent administration could change [your] interpretation?\u201d As it turns out, that question was crucial to Roberts\u2019s thinking and to the 6-3 opinion he authored, but almost all commentators either undervalued or misunderstood the question\u2019s import (myself included). The result of [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Enforcing the Duties of Nonprofit Fiduciaries: Advocating for Expanding Standing for Beneficiaries<\/a><\/h2>\n

Eileen L. Morrison<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Student Note<\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 19 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Oversight of the nonprofit sector has long been a public concern. Nonprofits are largely self-regulated; otherwise, authority to exercise oversight is largely in the hands of states\u2019 attorneys general and the federal Internal Revenue Service (\u201cIRS\u201d). The public may vote with their dollars; innovations such as signaling intermediaries have helped the public vet organizations before [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The Internet Grows Up?<\/a><\/h2>\n

Neil M. Richards
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 33 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

I\u2019d like to take a step back from the problems of revenge porn and cyber-harassment, or the extent to which Citron\u2019s remedies comport with what the First Amendment does (or should) provide. When we do that, we see Citron\u2019s efforts (which are far broader than merely this wonderful book) as part of the maturation of [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Cyber-Exploitation and Distributed Enforcement<\/a><\/h2>\n

Jane R. Bambauer<\/a> & Derek E. Bambauer<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 37 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

In the near term, at least, we advocate for greater distributed enforcement, through measures such as tort claims and copyright litigation. If victims are given better tools to identify and bring claims against their harassers, a small subset who are willing to do so can perform effective work as \u201cprivate attorneys general.\u201d\u00a0Such efforts can [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Why Is It So Hard to Rein In Sexually Violent Speech?<\/a><\/h2>\n

Catherine J. Ross
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 41 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The speech at issue is largely aimed at individuals rather than taking the form of noxious group disparagement (racist or sexist rants about groups of people), but it is often based at least in part on gender, race or sexual orientation. Citron shows how the personal nature of the postings (often including the target\u2019s real [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Increasing the Transaction Costs of Harassment<\/a><\/h2>\n

Woodrow Hartzog<\/a> & Evan Selinger<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 47 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Wouldn\u2019t it be nice if the rules, agreements, and guidelines designed to prevent online harassment were sufficient to curb improper behavior? As if. Wrongdoers are not always so easily deterred. Sometimes these approaches are about as effective as attacking tanks with toothpicks. As Danielle Citron contends in her critically important work,\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

A New Taxonomy for Online Harms<\/a><\/h2>\n

Kate Klonick
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 53 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The Internet\u2019s powerful amplifying effects on this type of harmful behavior are also seen with cyber bullying. Bullying is generally understood among academics and educators as having to meet three criteria: (1) it must be verbal or physical aggression; (2) it must be repeated over time; and (3) it must involve a power differential.\u00a0When [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Online Harassment and Intermediary Immunity<\/a><\/h2>\n

William McGeveran
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 57 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

I admire Citron for listening to all sides and adopting a nuanced position that recognizes the thin line separating a cyber cesspool from a public-spirited open forum like Reddit or Wikipedia. But I am also pleased that in some ways her defensiveness is already a tad dated. Attitudes are changing\u2014partly because of scholarship by [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Censoring Women<\/a><\/h2>\n

Mary Anne Franks
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 61 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

To anyone who truly cares about the value of free speech, this history of silencing and exclusion should be an outrage. To defend the First Amendment is to defend equal access to its principles and its protections. To truly believe in the \u201cmarketplace of ideas\u201d means to reject speech monopolies and speech cartels, to challenge [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

For Whom the Bell Trolls<\/a><\/h2>\n

Ryan Calo
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 67 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

My comments amount to a simple observation: not all trolls are alike. Citron pays\u00a0appropriately significant attention to the\u00a0victims\u00a0of online hate, treating these individuals in all their depth and variety. Her portrait of the\u00a0perpetrator\u00a0is thin by comparison. Chapter Two (pages 56-72) discusses the various forces that foster and exacerbate cruelty online [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

How Citron Changes the Conversation<\/a><\/h2>\n

Andrew Koppelman
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 69 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The internet has been a great gift to humanity, but it has pathologies. Perhaps the best-known instance of the cyberharassment that Citron describes is what has been called \u201crevenge pornography\u201d\u2014the online posting of sexually explicit photographs without the subject\u2019s consent, usually by rejected ex-boyfriends. The photos are often accompanied by the victim\u2019s name, address, [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Hate Crimes at the Front and Back End of Free Speech Law<\/a><\/h2>\n

Mark A. Graber
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 73 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Contemporary free speech law is pushing Professor Danielle Citron and other proponents of banning hate crimes on the internet to concentrate their efforts of the back end of First Amendment law when regulating utterances and publications that ought to be excluded at the front end. The front end of constitutional free speech rights concerns what [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

A Comment on Danielle Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Robin West
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 77 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

First, Citron convincingly catalogues the range of harms, and their profundity, done to many women and some men by the sexual threats, the defamation, the revenge pornography, the stalking, and the sexual harassment and abuse, all of which is facilitated by the internet. The second contribution, and the bulk of the book\u2014the middle third [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Amplifying Abuse: The Fusion of Cyberharassment and Discrimination<\/a><\/h2>\n

Ari Ezra Waldman
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 83 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Cyberharassment devastates its victims. Anxiety, panic attacks, and fear are common effects; post-traumatic stress disorder, anorexia and bulimia, and clinical depression are common diagnoses. Targets of online hate and abuse have gone into hiding, changed schools, and quit jobs to prevent further abuse. Some lives are devastated in adolescence and are never able to [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The Liberal Divide and the Future of Free-Speech Law<\/a><\/h2>\n

Ronald K.L. Collins
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 87 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

It is now obvious: When it comes to the First Amendment, liberals are badly divided. Some liberals are more attracted to the equality side of the constitutional divide than they are to the liberty side, and vice-versa. This has real consequences for those of us caught in the liberal crossfire of a war over words [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Cyberharassment and Workplace Law<\/a><\/h2>\n

Helen Norton
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 93 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

First, Professor Citron’s work and related developments invite us to broaden our understanding of the universe of actors who shape access to job opportunities, as well as our understanding of how they can use speech to expand or constrain those opportunities. Although employment law has traditionally focused on regulating the relationship between “employers” and their [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Online Engagement on Equal Terms<\/a><\/h2>\n

Danielle Keats Citron
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 97 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

In 2007, when the media started covering the phenomenon of cyber harassment, the public\u2019s reaction was disheartening. Although the abuse often involved threats, defamation, and privacy invasions, commentators dismissed it as \u201cno big deal.\u201d Harassment was viewed as part of the bargain of online engagement. If victims wanted to enjoy the Internet\u2019s benefits, they had [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Online Harassment, Profit Seeking, and Section 230<\/a><\/h2>\n

Ann Bartow
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Danielle Keats Citron’s\u00a0Hate Crimes in Cyberspace<\/em><\/b><\/span>
\n95 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 101 (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Liberals, to paint with a very broad brush, generally believe that government regulation will give us a better world than a free market will. For example, the environment will be cleaner if there are restrictions on how much factories can pollute the land, air and water. And working conditions will be better if employers must [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n
\n

Editor’s Foreword<\/a><\/h2>\n

Perspectives: Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest<\/strong><\/span>
\n94 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 1 (2014)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Cell Phones, Search Incident to Arrest, and the Supreme Court<\/a><\/h2>\n

Tracey Maclin<\/span><\/a>
\nPerspectives: Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest<\/strong><\/span>
\n94 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 3 (2014)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court will soon decide whether police, pursuant to the \u201csearch incident to arrest\u201d rule, may search a cell phone found on a person lawfully arrested. Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, police can search an arrestee for weapons and evidence that the arrestee might try to conceal or destroy without any particularized [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Why\u00a0Arizona v. Gant\u00a0<\/em>Is the Wrong Solution to the Warrantless Cell Phone Search Problem<\/a><\/h2>\n

Adam M. Gershowitz<\/span><\/a>
\nPerspectives: Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest<\/span><\/strong><\/span>
\n94 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 9 (2014)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Some scholars have looked to <\/em>Arizona v. Gant to limit police searches of cell phones incident to arrest. Under the Gant test, police would only be permitted to search a cell phone if it were reasonable to believe it might hold evidence of the crime of arrest. The allure of the Gant framework is that [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest<\/a><\/h2>\n

George C. Thomas III<\/span><\/a>
\nPerspectives: Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest<\/span><\/strong><\/span>
\n94 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 13 (2014)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

In 1914, the Supreme Court stated that the right to search incident to arrest was \u201calways recognized under English and American law.\u201d These searches require neither a warrant nor any justification beyond the arrest itself. The issue presented in this Perspective is the extent to which police may read private documents found incident to arrest [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Can Big Brother Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest?<\/a><\/h2>\n

Jack Zanini<\/span><\/span>
\nPerspectives: Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest<\/span><\/strong><\/span>
\n94 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 17 (2014)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The question of whether the police may search an arrestee\u2019s cellphone, like all search issues, must be resolved in light of basic principles regarding privacy and the right of a person to be free from intrusion by the government. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally requires a search warrant issued by a [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

<\/h3>\n
\n

Anti-Stereotyping and\u00a0The End of Men<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Barbara Stark
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Hanna Rosin’s\u00a0<\/span>The End of Men<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>92 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 1 (2012)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

As scholars have recently shown, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg\u2019s earliest sex discrimination work was grounded in anti-stereotyping theory. The particular stereotype she challenged was that of males as breadwinners and females as homemakers. As Cary Franklin notes, Justice Ginsburg\u2019s approach was grounded in \u201cconstitutional limits on the state\u2019s power to enforce sex-role stereotypes. While Justice [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Sex As a Team Sport: A Reaction to Hanna Rosin’s\u00a0The End of Men<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Libby Adler
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Hanna Rosin’s\u00a0<\/span>The End of Men<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 1 (2013)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

If you access the online version of Hanna Rosin\u2019s 2010 article, The End of Men, you will find an embedded video in which, according to the caption, Rosin and her daughter \u201cdebate the superiority of women\u201d with Rosin\u2019s husband and son. For about five minutes, this two-parent family, headed by accomplished journalists, sits in the [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Sex and Equality<\/a><\/h2>\n

Katharine K. Baker
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Hanna Rosin’s\u00a0<\/span>The End of Men<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 11 (2013)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Hanna Rosin devotes the first substantive chapter of The End of Men to heterosexual sex. It is a poignant beginning. As Rosin so ably demonstrates throughout the rest of the book, most of what women do now \u2013 work, play, study, parent, run multinational corporations \u2013 can be done very well without men. But heterosexual sex, by [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

The End of Men, Again<\/a><\/h2>\n

Kara W. Swanson
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Hanna Rosin’s\u00a0<\/span>The End of Men<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 27 (2013)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

After a national election cycle in which notoriously liberal Massachusetts elected its first female senator, bringing the proportion of women in the U.S. Senate to a whopping twenty percent, and during which politicians fought over whether female contraceptives were part of basic health care or an accessory to sluttishness, it seems premature, if not downright [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Underneath Her Pantsuit: A Reflection on Hanna Rosin’s\u00a0The End of Men<\/em><\/a><\/h2>\n

Aziza Ahmed
\n<\/strong><\/a>Online Symposium: Hanna Rosin’s\u00a0<\/span>The End of Men<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 39 (2013)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

First, I argue that Rosin offers an account of women\u2019s relationship to violence, which can be used as a lens to critique assumptions about women that appear in international law and development. Second, I argue that despite the usefulness of her argument there is a danger in its presentation: she is heavily reliant on race [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Editor’s Foreword<\/a><\/h2>\n

Perspectives:\u00a0<\/span>Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 47 (2013)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Hard Facts, Muddled Law: Deciphering the Baby Veronica Decision<\/a><\/h2>\n

Barbara Ann Atwood<\/span><\/a>
\nPerspectives:\u00a0<\/span>Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 49 (2013)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl marks an unwise retreat from the Supreme Court\u2019s earlier embrace of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Animated by understandable empathy for the adoptive parents, Justice Alito\u2019s majority opinion devalues the Indian identity of the child (Veronica) and her relationship with her Indian father. In so doing, the majority\u2019s opinion [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Erasing the Last Vestiges of Human Property<\/a><\/h2>\n

James G. Dwyer
\n<\/span><\/a>Perspectives:\u00a0<\/span>Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 53 (2013)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) should be named the Indian Tribal Preservation Act. Although the ICWA was partly a reaction to practices in the 1970s that harmed some children, its primary purpose was to promote the perpetuation of Native American tribes, which were threatened by the largescale exodus of autonomous adult tribe members from [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Who’s the Father?<\/a><\/h2>\n

Naomi Cahn<\/a> & June Carbone<\/a>
\n<\/span>Perspectives:\u00a0<\/span>Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 57 (2013)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

When couples manage to be close enough to conceive a child, but not close enough to determine the child\u2019s future, who gets to decide when they disagree: mother, father, state courts, or a tribe? The litigation that produced the Supreme Court decision in <\/em>Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl demonstrates why we are no closer to [\u2026]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Indian Children and Their Guardians Ad Litem<\/a><\/h2>\n

Matthew L.M. Fletcher<\/a> & Kathryn E. Fort<\/a>
\n<\/span>Perspectives:\u00a0<\/span>Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/strong>93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 61 (2013)<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

One of the primary goals of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is to limit the influence or bias of state workers in decisions placing American Indian children out of their home and community. While this focus usually concerns state social workers, the officials who most often seek removal of a child, or the courts, the body that issues the orders and opinions, guardians ad litem (GALs) […]<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

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Boston University Law Review Online, formerly known as the\u00a0Boston University Law Review Annex,\u00a0is\u00a0Boston University Law Review’s online publication featuring symposia and essays, including invited responses, perspectives and student notes. For Online Symposia only, please visit this page. For Online Essays (non-symposia) only, please visit this page.   All Online Articles Doing Legal Scholarship Bet-ter Ari […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8484,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":43,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"page-templates\/no-sidebars.php","meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1990"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8484"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1990"}],"version-history":[{"count":59,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1990\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7604,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1990\/revisions\/7604"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bulawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1990"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}

Laura Pedraza-Fari\u00f1a<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nInvited Response: Laura Pedraza-Fari\u00f1a, <\/span>Innovation and the Limits of Predictive Governance<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n105 B.U. L. Rev. Online 27 (2025).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Kathryne M. Young<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a>
\nOnline Symposium: Lauren Sudeall’s\u00a0Self-Determination and Self-Represented Litigants<\/em><\/span><\/strong>
\n106 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2026).<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n