PRIVACY HARMs

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ABSTRACT

The requirement of harm has significantly impeded the enforcement of privacy law. In most tort and contract cases, plaintiffs must establish that they have suffered harm. Even when legislation does not require it, courts have taken it upon themselves to add a harm element. Harm is also a requirement to establish standing in federal court. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court ruled that courts can override congressional judgment about cognizable harm and dismiss privacy claims.

Case law is an inconsistent, incoherent jumble with no guiding principles. Countless privacy violations are not remedied or addressed on the grounds that there has been no cognizable harm.

Courts struggle with privacy harms because they often involve future uses of personal data that vary widely. When privacy violations result in negative consequences, the effects are often small—frustration, aggravation, anxiety, inconvenience—and dispersed among a large number of people. When these minor harms are suffered at a vast scale, they produce significant harm to individuals, groups, and society. But these harms do not fit well with existing cramped judicial understandings of harm.

This Article makes two central contributions. The first is the construction of a typology for courts to understand harm so that privacy violations can be tackled and remedied in a meaningful way. Privacy harms consist of various different types that have been recognized by courts in inconsistent ways. Our

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typology of privacy harms elucidates why certain types of privacy harms should be recognized as cognizable.

This Article’s second contribution is providing an approach to when privacy harm should be required. In many cases, harm should not be required because it is irrelevant to the purpose of the lawsuit. Currently, much privacy litigation suffers from a misalignment of enforcement goals and remedies. We contend that the law should be guided by the essential question: When and how should privacy regulation be enforced? We offer an approach that aligns enforcement goals with appropriate remedies.
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INTRODUCTION

Harm has become one of the biggest challenges in privacy law.¹ The law’s treatment of privacy harms is a jumbled, incoherent mess. Countless privacy violations are left unremedied not because they are unworthy of being addressed but because of the law’s failure to recognize harm.² As Ryan Calo has observed, “courts and some scholars require a showing of harm in privacy out of proportion with other areas of law.”³

Privacy law in the United States is a sprawling patchwork of various types of law, from contract and tort to statutes and other bodies of law.⁴ As these laws are enforced, especially in the courts, harm requirements stand as a major impediment.⁵ When cases are dismissed due to the lack of harm, wrongdoers escape accountability.⁶ The message is troubling—privacy commitments enshrined in legislation and common law can be ignored.

In several ways, harm emerges as a gatekeeper in privacy cases. Harm is an element of many causes of action.⁷ Courts, however, refuse to recognize privacy harms that do not involve tangible financial or physical injury.⁸ But privacy harms more often involve intangible injuries, which courts address inconsistently and with considerable disarray.⁹ Many privacy violations involve

¹ Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 508 (2010) (“Delineating remediable harms has been a challenge for law and policy makers since the early days of the Internet.”).
² Id. at 505 (explaining monetary damages compensate economic harm, but “[c]ourts and legislatures have been slow to compensate plaintiffs for nonmonetary harms resulting from a privacy incursion”).
³ Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 361 (2014); see also Ryan Calo, Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 33, 48 (2019) (“Courts . . . do not understand privacy loss as a cognizable injury, even as they recognize ephemeral harms in other contexts.”).
⁴ DANIEL J. SOLove & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 2 (7th ed. 2021). (“Information privacy law is an interrelated web of tort law, federal and state constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, evidentiary privileges, property law, contract law, and criminal law.”).
⁵ Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, supra note 3, at 362 (explaining, for example, that in Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper, the Supreme Court’s reading of the Privacy Act to require “‘actual damages’ limited to pecuniary or economic harm” prevented plaintiff from recovery (quoting Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012))).
⁶ Id. (citing instances where, absent a finding of cognizable harm, privacy actions were dismissed for lack of standing).
⁷ Id. at 361 (noting harm is a “prerequisite to recovery in many contexts”).
⁸ Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 798-99 (2016) [hereinafter Citron, Privacy Policymaking] (“For most courts, privacy and data security harms are too speculative and hypothetical, too based on subjective fears and anxieties, and not concrete and significant enough to warrant recognition.”). ⁹ Lipton, supra note 1, at 504-05 (explaining that economic loss is “readily cognizable” but intangible harms like shame, embarrassment, ridicule, and humiliation are more difficult to quantify).
broken promises or thwarted expectations about how people’s data will be collected, used, and disclosed. The downstream consequences of these practices are often hard to determine in the here and now. Other privacy violations involve flooding people with unwanted advertising or email spam. Or people’s expectations may be betrayed, resulting in their data being shared with third parties that may use it in detrimental ways—although precisely when and how is unknown.

For many privacy harms, the injury may appear small when viewed in isolation, such as the inconvenience of receiving an unwanted email or advertisement or the failure to honor people’s expectations that their data will not be shared with third parties. But when done by hundreds or thousands of companies, the harm adds up. Moreover, these small harms are dispersed among millions—and sometimes billions—of people. Over time, as people are individually inundated by a swarm of small harms, the overall societal impact is significant. Yet these types of injuries do not fit well into judicial conceptions of harm, which have an individualistic focus and heavily favor tangible physical and financial injuries that occur immediately.

Some statutory laws recognize government agency or state attorney general enforcement that is less constrained by judicial conceptions of harm, but these enforcers have limited resources so they can only bring a handful of actions each year. To fill the anticipated enforcement gap, legislators have often included statutory private rights of action. The financial rewards of litigating and winning cases work like a bounty system, encouraging private parties to enforce the law. To address the difficulties in establishing privacy harms, several privacy statutes contain statutory damages provisions, which allow people to recover a minimum amount of money without having to prove harm.

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10 Id. at 498-99 (noting “the greatest harms in the present age often come from unauthorized uses of private information online” including the improper collection, aggregation, processing, and dissemination of information).


12 Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 8, at 799 (“Federal authorities cannot attend to most privacy and security problems because their resources are limited and their duties ever expanding. Simply put, federal agencies have too few resources and too many responsibilities.” (footnote omitted)).

13 See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (listing several examples of federal and state privacy laws with private rights of action).

14 See Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The award of statutory damages could also be thought a form of bounty system, and Congress is permitted to create legally enforceable bounty systems for assistance in enforcing federal laws . . . .”).

15 See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (explaining that, for example, under Fair Credit Reporting Act, a person who willfully violates any part of the statute is liable for at least $100 in damages, and listing other statutes which do not require a showing of harm).
Courts, however, have wrought havoc on legislative plans for statutory damages in privacy cases by adding onerous harm requirements. In Doe v. Chao, for example, the Supreme Court held that a statutory damages provision under the federal Privacy Act of 1974 would only impose such damages if plaintiffs established “actual” damages. As a second punch, the Court held in Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper that emotional distress alone was insufficient to establish actual damages under the Privacy Act. In a variation of this theme, in Senne v. Village of Palatine, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff had to prove harm to recover under a private right of action for a violation of the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”) even though the provision lacked any harm requirement.

Courts have also injected harm as a gatekeeper to the enforcement of the law through modern standing doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs cannot pursue cases in federal court unless they have suffered an “injury in fact.” Specifically in the privacy law context, in 2016, the Supreme Court concluded in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, a case involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), that courts could deny standing to plaintiffs seeking to recover under private rights of action in statutes. The court stated that, even if a legislature granted plaintiffs a right to recover without proving harm, courts could require a plaintiff to prove harm to establish standing.

Due to judicial intervention, the requirement of privacy harm is inescapable. Even when legislation does not require proof of harm, courts exert their will to add it in, turning the enforcement of privacy law into a far more complicated task than it should be. Privacy harm is a conceptual mess that significantly impedes U.S. privacy law from being effectively enforced. Even when

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17 Id. at 616 (holding “[p]laintiffs must prove some actual damages to qualify for a minimum statutory award”).
19 Id. at 299-304 (holding “the Privacy Act does not unequivocally authorize an award of damages for mental or emotional distress” and adopting narrow interpretation of actual damages limited to pecuniary harm).
20 784 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2015).
21 Id. at 448.
22 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (declaring that injury-in-fact requirement is met only by showing “injury to the plaintiff”).
24 Id. at 341 (holding that plaintiffs alleging “bare procedural violation” of FCRA do not satisfy injury-in-fact requirement of Article III and thus lack standing).
25 Id. at 337-38 (noting that Congress does not have power to give plaintiffs statutory right to sue unless those plaintiffs also satisfy Article III standing requirements).
organizations have engaged in clear wrongdoing, privacy harm requirements often result in cases being dismissed.26

In this Article, we clear away the fog so that privacy harms can be better understood and appropriately addressed.27 We set forth a typology that explains why particular harms should be legally cognizable. We show how concepts and doctrines in other areas of law can be applied in the context of privacy harms.

In addition to the issue of what should constitute cognizable privacy harm, we also examine the issue of when privacy harm should be required. In many cases, harm should not be required because it is irrelevant to the purpose of the lawsuit. The overarching question that the law should ask is: When and how should various privacy laws be enforced? This question brings into focus the underlying source of the law’s current malaise: the misalignment of enforcement goals and remedies. We propose an approach that aligns enforcement goals with appropriate remedies.

Properly recognizing privacy harm is not just essential for litigation. It is essential for its expressive value as well as for legislation and regulatory enforcement. Appropriately identifying the interests at stake is essential for the law to balance and protect them.

This Article has five parts. Part I discusses when the law requires cognizable harm in order to enforce privacy regulation. Part II examines several challenges that make it difficult to recognize certain types of privacy harms. Part III examines when privacy harm should be required in privacy litigation and how the law should better align enforcement goals and remedies. Part IV discusses the importance of recognizing privacy harm. Part V sets forth a typology of privacy harms, explaining why each involves an impairment of important interests, how the law tackles them, and why the law should do so.

I. COGNIZABLE HARMS: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF PRIVACY HARMS

Requirements to establish harm are major hurdles in privacy cases. Harms involve injuries, setbacks, losses, or impairments to well-being.28 They leave people or society worse off than before their occurrence.29 Frequently,

26 E.g., Senne, 784 F.3d at 448 (holding that even though defendant’s display of plaintiff’s personal information amounted to a disclosure under DPPA, plaintiff could not recover absent finding of harm).

27 Previously, we wrote an article about data breach harms. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 737 (2018) [hereinafter Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety]. We write separately on privacy harms because they are quite different. Data breach harms often involve either anxiety or a risk of future identity theft or fraud. Privacy harms are more varied than data breach harms and involve many other dimensions that pose challenges for the law.

28 A taxonomy of privacy developed by one of us (Solove) has focused on privacy problems. Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (2008). Problems are broader than harms. Problems are undesirable states of affairs. Harms are a subset of problems.

establishing harm is a prerequisite to enforcement for privacy violations in the judicial system. A *cognizable harm* is harm that the law recognizes as suitable for intervention.\(^{30}\)

Through harm requirements, courts have made the enforcement of privacy laws difficult and, at times, impossible. They have added requirements for harm via standing.\(^{31}\) They have required harm for statutes that do not require such a showing.\(^{32}\) They have mandated proof of harm even for statutes that include statutory damages, undercutting the purpose of these provisions.\(^{33}\) They have adopted narrow conceptions of cognizable harm to exclude many types of harm, including emotional injury and dashed expectations.\(^{34}\) Because courts lack a theory of privacy harms or any guiding principles, they have made a mess of things. This Part discusses the varied ways that harm is involved in privacy cases.

A. *Standing*

To pursue a lawsuit in federal court, a plaintiff must have standing. Standing is based on Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which states that courts are limited to hearing “cases” or “controversies.”\(^{35}\) In a series of cases starting in the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court placed harm at the

\(^{30}\) *Id.* at 34 (“It is only when an interest is thwarted through an invasion by self or others, that its possessor is harmed in the legal sense . . . .”); *see also* OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (“The business of the law of torts is to fix the dividing lines between those cases in which a man is liable for harm which he has done, and those in which he is not. But it cannot enable him to predict . . . [a]ll the rules that the law can lay down beforehand are rules for determining conduct which will be followed by liability if it is followed by harm,—that is, the conduct which a man pursues at his peril.”); Thomas C. Grey, *Accidental Torts*, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1272 (2001) (discussing Holmes’s harm-based approach).

\(^{31}\) *See, e.g.*, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (holding proof of harm is necessary to satisfy “injury in fact” requirement in Article III standing).

\(^{32}\) *See, e.g.*, Senne v. Village of Palatine, 784 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2015) (denying plaintiff recovery on grounds that plaintiff did not prove harm even though statute plaintiff was suing under lacked harm requirement).

\(^{33}\) *See, e.g.*, Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 627 (2004) (refusing to award plaintiff minimum statutory damages under Privacy Act of 1974 on grounds that plaintiff did not sufficiently show harm resulting in “actual damages”).

\(^{34}\) *See, e.g.*, Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 299 (2012) (adopting narrow interpretation of “actual damages” such that only proven pecuniary harm suffices).

\(^{35}\) *U.S. Const.* art. III, § 2.
center of standing doctrine. State courts generally do not require proof of standing.

The Supreme Court has developed a rather tortured body of standing doctrine, which is restrictive in its view of harm as well as muddled and contradictory. Under contemporary standing doctrine, plaintiffs must allege an “injury in fact.” The injury must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” If a plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim, a federal court cannot hear it.

Three cases decided during the past decade focused on privacy issues. In 2013, in Clapper v. Amnesty International, a group of lawyers, journalists, and activists challenged the constitutionality of surveillance by the National Security Agency (“NSA”). The plaintiffs contended that because they were communicating with foreign people whom the NSA was likely to deem suspicious, they feared their communications would be wiretapped. The plaintiffs took measures to avoid governmental surveillance that would pierce attorney-client confidentiality, including spending time and money to travel in person to talk to clients. The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to prove that they were actually under government surveillance or that such surveillance was “certainly impending.” The plaintiffs’ “speculation” about being under surveillance was insufficient.

E.g., Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181.


Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)) (noting that to satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, plaintiff must show injury in fact, causation, and redressability).

Id. at 180.

Id. ("The Court has] an obligation to assure [itself] that [plaintiff] had Article III standing at the outset of the litigation").


Id. at 415 ("Respondents claim . . . the threat of surveillance sometimes compels them to avoid certain e-mail and phone conversations, to ‘tal[k] in generalities rather than specifics,’ or to travel so that they can have in-person conversations." (second alteration in original)).


Clapper, 568 U.S. at 422.

The Clapper case comes with a dose of cruel irony. Although the government diminished the plaintiffs’ concerns about surveillance by arguing that the plaintiffs could not prove that they were subject to it, the government knew the answer all along (it was surely engaging in such surveillance), but because the program was classified as a state secret, the plaintiffs did not and could not know for sure that they were being subject to surveillance. See Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 756-57 (2016) (describing the Bush Administration as engaging in a “strategy of deep secrecy” which resulted in details of surveillance only being known by a “charmed circle of initiates” who would not face legal scrutiny).
footnote, the Court noted that, “in some instances,” a “‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur” would be sufficient to confer standing to a plaintiff.\textsuperscript{45} The Court never explained what would constitute a “substantial risk.”

Although \textit{Clapper} had a significant impact on data breach cases, a subsequent case took center stage for standing in privacy cases. In 2016, in \textit{Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins}, the Supreme Court attempted to elaborate on the types of harm that could be sufficient to establish standing.\textsuperscript{46} The Court focused on whether statutory violations involving personal data constituted harm sufficient to establish standing. The plaintiff alleged that Spokeo, a site supplying information about people’s backgrounds, violated the federal FCRA when it published incorrect data about him.\textsuperscript{47} Spokeo’s profiles were used by employers to investigate prospective hires, an activity regulated by the FCRA. The FCRA mandates that firms take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of data in people’s profiles.\textsuperscript{48} The plaintiff’s dossier was riddled with falsehoods, including that he was wealthy and married, had children, and worked in a professional field.\textsuperscript{49} According to the plaintiff, these errors hurt his employment chances by indicating that he was overqualified for positions he sought or that he might not be able to relocate because he had a family.\textsuperscript{50}

Although the district court held that the plaintiff properly sued under the FCRA’s private right of action, it nevertheless held the plaintiff lacked standing because he had not suffered an injury based on the erroneous information included in his credit report.\textsuperscript{51} The Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the statute resolved the question of whether a cognizable injury existed: the FCRA explicitly allowed plaintiffs to sue for any violation of its provisions.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Clapper}, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153 (2010)). In \textit{Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus}, the Court, quoting \textit{Clapper}, held that “[a]n allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014).

\textsuperscript{46} 578 U.S. 330, 340-42 (2016) (noting that history and “judgment of Congress” are meaningful in determining whether intangible harm amounts to injury in fact).

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Id.} at 333-34 (describing website as “people search engine” and explaining Robins’s claim that site violated his (and other similarly situated individuals’) rights under the FCRA when it published false information).

\textsuperscript{48} 15 U.S.C. § 1681(e)(b) (mandating that consumer reporting agencies “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates”).

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Spokeo}, 578 U.S. at 336.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Id.} at 350 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Id.} at 336.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.}, 742 F.3d 409, 411-14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 578 U.S. 330 (2016); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (imposing civil liability for willful violations); \textit{Id.} § 1681o (imposing civil liability for negligent violations).
The Supreme Court took up the case, issuing an opinion purporting to clarify standing doctrine but instead creating significant confusion.\(^{53}\) Instead of deferring to congressional judgment for when plaintiffs could sue for violations of the FCRA, the Court added harm into the equation through standing.\(^{54}\) Reversing and remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit, the Court explained that harm must be “concrete” and that “intangible harm” could be sufficient in some cases to establish injury.\(^{55}\) According to the Court, a “risk of real harm” could satisfy the concreteness inquiry because long-standing common law has “permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”\(^{56}\) The question would turn on “whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”\(^{57}\) Unfortunately, the common law invoked by the Court points in different directions. The Court’s discussion of “intangible harm” ended up creating further confusion rather than clarity.

The Court confounded matters in yet another way—it instructed courts to assess “the judgment of Congress” to figure out “whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact.”\(^{58}\) The Court began by noting:

> [W]e said in [\textit{Lujan}] that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, \textit{de facto} injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case explained that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”\(^{59}\)

Although Congress could independently define “concrete injury” in a way that enlarged the concept, the Court also said that Congress could deviate only so much:

Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. For that reason, Robins could not, for example, allege a bare procedural

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\(^{53}\) \textit{Spokeo}, 578 U.S. at 337-42 (deciding even where Congress created private right of action for statutory violations, plaintiffs must show concrete and particularized harm to satisfy injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing).

\(^{54}\) \textit{Id.} at 337-40.

\(^{55}\) \textit{Id.} at 340-42.

\(^{56}\) \textit{Id.} at 341.

\(^{57}\) \textit{Id.} at 340-41.

\(^{58}\) \textit{Id.} at 341 (first quoting \textit{Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife}, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992); and then quoting \textit{Lujan}, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.60

As to how far Congress could deviate from courts in defining injuries, the Court failed to provide a clear answer. As an example, the Court noted that courts could reject a “bare procedural violation” of a statute as an injury, but this example was muddled with further explanation: “[T]he violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”61

The Court thus said on one hand that a mere violation of a procedural right can be sufficient for concrete injury without any additional harm. But, on the other hand, a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm” cannot satisfy the harm requirement.62 So, how are courts to distinguish between when a violation of a procedural right is a concrete injury and when it is not?

The Court tried to explain its reasoning by noting that Congress passed the FCRA “to curb the dissemination of false information,” so bare procedural violations would not support standing if they did not operate to prevent such inaccuracies.63 The Court explained that consumers may not be able to sue a consumer reporting agency for failing to provide notice required by the statute if the information in their dossiers was accurate. The Court further complicated matters by stating that “not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of harm.”64 The example provided by the Court was an incorrect zip code. The Court explained, “It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”

The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to examine “whether the particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”65 The Court noted that it was not taking a particular position about whether Robins properly alleged an injury.66

In the wake of Spokeo, courts issued a contradictory mess of decisions regarding privacy harm and standing. On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Robins had suffered harm, justifying standing.68 The court applied a test

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60 Id.
61 Id. at 341-42.
62 Id. at 341.
63 Id. at 342.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 343 (Thomas, J., concurring).
67 See id. at 343 (majority opinion) (“We take no position as to whether the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion—that Robins adequately alleged an injury in fact—was correct.”).
68 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo II), 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We are satisfied that Robins has alleged injuries that are sufficiently concrete for the purposes of Article III.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018).
from the Second Circuit that assessed whether a statutory provision was designed to protect people’s concrete interests and whether those interests were at risk of harm in a particular case. Other courts have extracted a two-prong test from the wreckage, first looking to a “historical inquiry” that “asks whether an intangible harm ‘has a close relationship’ to one that historically has provided a basis for a lawsuit,” and second, looking to a “congressional inquiry” that “acknowledges that Congress’s judgment is ‘instructive and important’ because that body ‘is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements’.”

In the lower courts, no clear principles have emerged to guide the harm inquiry for standing in privacy cases. Rather than a simple circuit split or other clear disagreement in approach, courts have produced a jumbled mess by grasping at inconsistent parts of Spokeo. Predictably, courts have reached opposing conclusions as to the very same or similar FCRA violations. In Dutta v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an employer’s alleged FCRA violation—failing to provide the plaintiff with a copy of his inaccurate credit report before disqualifying him from the hiring process—was not a harm because the correct information in the credit report prevented him from getting a job anyway. By contrast, in Long v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the Third Circuit found the plaintiffs had standing to sue an employer under the FCRA for its alleged failure to provide them with copies of their fully accurate background checks before rejecting them for a job.

As the Third Circuit stated in another case involving a FCRA violation, in some cases, we have appeared to reject the idea that the violation of a statute can, by itself, cause an injury sufficient for purposes of Article III standing. But we have also accepted the argument, in some circumstances,

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69 See id. at 1113 (citing Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016)) (holding the two-prong Strubel test “best elucidates the concreteness standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Spokeo II” and applying it to Robins’s alleged harm).


72 895 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2018).

73 Id. at 1175-76 (holding plaintiff “plausibly [pled] a violation of [FCRA]” by alleging State Farm disqualified him before providing copy of his credit report but “fail[ed] to demonstrate actual harm or a substantial risk of such harm” because disqualification was based on report’s accurate information).

74 Long, 903 F.3d 312.

75 Id. at 316-17, 322-24 (finding “the use of Plaintiffs’ personal information . . . without Plaintiffs being able to see or respond to it” was “sufficient concrete harm” to establish standing).
that the breach of a statute is enough to cause a cognizable injury—even without economic or other tangible harm.\textsuperscript{76}

Similarly, the Sixth Circuit declared when it dismissed a case for lack of standing, “It’s difficult, we recognize, to identify the line between what Congress may, and may not, do in creating an ‘injury in fact.’ Put five smart lawyers in a room, and it won’t take long to appreciate the difficulty of the task at hand.”\textsuperscript{77}

In its coup de grâce, the Supreme Court in 2021 revisited standing and the FCRA in \textit{TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez}.\textsuperscript{78} TransUnion incorrectly labeled the plaintiffs as potential terrorists in their credit reports. The Court held that only the plaintiffs whose credit reports had been disclosed to businesses had standing; plaintiffs whose credit reports had not yet been disseminated had not suffered a concrete injury.\textsuperscript{79} As the Court pithily concluded, “No concrete harm, no standing.”\textsuperscript{80}

To determine whether harm is concrete, the Court reiterated the position it had previously espoused in \textit{Spokeo}: “Central to assessing concreteness is whether the asserted harm has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts . . . .”\textsuperscript{81} Yet still, the Court provided scant guidance about how close the relationship must be to traditionally recognized harm. Another difficulty with this test is that harm traditionally has not been required at all for violations of individual private rights, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent.\textsuperscript{82} Additionally, the harms that courts have recognized have evolved considerably in the common law.\textsuperscript{83} Pointing to tradition means that the target is constantly moving.

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{76} In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 635 (3d Cir. 2017) (footnote omitted).
\textsuperscript{77} Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 2018).
\textsuperscript{78} 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200-02 (2021) (determining class action plaintiffs’ standing on claims arising from TransUnion’s FCRA violations).
\textsuperscript{79} Id. at 2200 (holding 1,853 class members whose “misleading credit reports [were provided] to third-party businesses” had “demonstrated concrete reputational harm and thus had Article III standing,” while the remaining 6,332 did not).
\textsuperscript{80} Id. For more background about \textit{TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez} and our extensive critique of the decision, see Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, \textit{Standing and Privacy Harms: A Critique of TransUnion v. Ramirez}, 101 B.U. L. REV. ONLINE 62 (2021) [hereinafter Solove & Citron, \textit{Standing and Privacy Harms}].
\textsuperscript{81} TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 530, 341 (2016)).
\textsuperscript{82} See id. at 2217 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Where an individual sought to sue someone for a violation of his private rights, . . . the plaintiff needed only to allege the violation. Courts typically did not require any showing of actual damage.” (citation omitted))).
\textsuperscript{83} Solove & Citron, \textit{Standing and Privacy Harms}, supra note 80, at 67-68 (critiquing \textit{TransUnion’s} reliance on “messy and inconsistent” common law that “is constantly evolving”).
In the end, applying this test is difficult because the tradition of the common law is complicated, nuanced, and ever-shifting. The Court in TransUnion appeared to have a different conception of the tradition in mind, and other courts will likely interpret the tradition in diverging ways. Ultimately, looking for a close relationship to traditionally recognized harms leaves the door open for courts to reach wildly different conclusions in cases. Standing doctrine in privacy litigation will thus remain muddled and inconsistent.

B. Harm in Causes of Action

For plaintiffs in federal court, standing is just the first harm hurdle. The second is showing harm as an element of claims alleged in the lawsuit. Additionally, in state courts, although there is no constitutional standing requirement, most causes of action nevertheless have harm as one of the elements. Different types of causes of action recognize cognizable harm differently.

1. Contract Law

Contract law might seem to be a relevant body of law to regulate many privacy issues, as many privacy violations involve organizations breaking promises made in privacy policies. These policies could be deemed contracts or at least be subject to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. But, on the main, courts have been reluctant to recognize privacy policies as contracts.86

84 Salib & Suska, supra note 37, at 1169-72 (explaining states have “comparatively lax” standing requirements because Article III does not apply (citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989))).

85 See Bernard Chao, Privacy Losses as Wrongful Gains, 106 IOWA L. REV. 555, 559-64 (2021) (detailing various privacy policy violations by, inter alia, tech companies, retailers, automobile producers, and nonprofits).

86 Courts have decided surprisingly few cases involving contract law theories for privacy notices. Of those cases, few have held that privacy notices are contracts. A group of academics published an empirical analysis of cases and concluded that many courts were holding that privacy notices were contracts. See Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Searching for the Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 28 (2017) (concluding that “privacy policies are typically recognized as contracts”). These academics used their study as part of their project with the American Law Institute, the Restatement of Consumer Contracts. See id. at 8. However, Gregory Klass critiqued the study, finding that the cases were incorrectly evaluated. See Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 45, 50, 67 (2019) (rejecting Bar-Gill et al.’s conclusions because majority of cases upon which they relied did not classify privacy policies as contracts and were decisions on motions to dismiss in federal district courts). Klass found “little support” for any “trend towards contractual enforcement of privacy notices.” See id. at 50 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE L. CONSUMER CONTS. § 1 Reporters’ Notes 15 (Am. L. INST., Discussion Draft No. 4 2017)). A subsequent analysis of the Bar-Gill study sided with Klass. Adam J. Levitin, Nancy S. Kim, Christina L. Kunz, Peter Linzer, Patricia A. McCoy, Juliet M. Moringiello, Elizabeth A. Renuart & Lauren E. Willis, The Faulty Foundation of the Draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL.
Even if privacy policies were contracts, the plaintiffs would still lose due to the absence of cognizable harm. Under contract law, courts typically require harm amounting to economic loss.\textsuperscript{87} Failing to fulfill promises made in privacy policies and thus betraying people’s expectations has not counted as a cognizable harm.\textsuperscript{88} For example, in \textit{Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Electronic Transactions, Inc.}\textsuperscript{89} the court stated that the “[p]laintiff must . . . plead loss flowing from the breach [of contract] to sustain a claim.” In \textit{Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc.},\textsuperscript{91} the court held that “[m]ere disclosure of [personal] information . . . without a showing of actual harm[] is insufficient” to support a breach of contract claim.\textsuperscript{92}

2. Tort Law

Most tort claims require that plaintiffs establish harm.\textsuperscript{93} As tort law developed in the nineteenth century, a lively debate centered on whether tort law concerned the recognition of wrongs or, alternatively, the redress of harms.\textsuperscript{94} In \textit{The Common Law}, Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that tort law provided remedies for activities “not because they are wrong, but because they are harms.”\textsuperscript{95} Modern tort law has largely embraced the Holmesian approach.\textsuperscript{96}

The privacy torts grew out of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s influential article in 1890, \textit{The Right to Privacy}.\textsuperscript{97} Warren and Brandeis primarily took a


\textsuperscript{89} No. 09-cv-04567, 2010 WL 1799456 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010).

\textsuperscript{90} Id. at *10.

\textsuperscript{91} No. 5:12-cv-01399, 2012 WL 5471149 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012).

\textsuperscript{92} Id. at *6.

\textsuperscript{93} See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, \textit{Recognizing Wrongs} 28 (2020) (“Every tort involves a person injuring another person in some way, or failing to prevent another’s injury: every tort is an injury-inclusive wrong.”).

\textsuperscript{94} See John C.P. Goldberg, \textit{Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy}, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1505 n.15 (2002) (describing debates in nineteenth century concerning tort’s status as a substantive area of law or merely “part of civil procedure and/or remedies”).

\textsuperscript{95} Holmes, supra note 30, at 130.

\textsuperscript{96} See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 93, at 5-6, 44 (noting Holmesian pragmatism, including concept that purpose of tort law is to compensate victims for losses, is modern view of many academics). There is a robust and important literature on tort law as the recognition of wrongs. \textit{See generally id.}

\textsuperscript{97} Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, \textit{The Right to Privacy}, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see also Danielle Keats Citron, \textit{Mainstreaming Privacy Torts}, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805,
rights-based approach rather than a harms-based approach to privacy, conceiving of privacy as the protection of “individuals’ ability to develop their ‘inviolate’ personalities without unwanted interference.” The judicial development of the privacy torts can be attributed to William Prosser, the leading torts scholar of the twentieth century, who played an enormous role in mainstreaming and legitimating the privacy torts. Prosser made the turn to harm explicitly and clearly, and courts followed suit. In 1960, in an article entitled Privacy, Prosser summed up a scattered body of case law to identify four torts: (1) “Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion”; (2) “Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff”; (3) “Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye”; (4) “Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” As chief reporter on the influential American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Torts, Prosser added the four categories of privacy torts to the Restatement. Prosser followed the Holmesian harms-based approach in constructing the privacy torts. After Prosser’s article and the Restatement, courts readily embraced the privacy torts. Although Prosser strengthened the privacy torts, his work ossified them. No new privacy torts have been created in the years following Prosser’s shining the spotlight on them.


98 Citron, Privacy Torts, supra note 97, at 1820 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 205).


100 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 388-89 (1960) (identifying four privacy torts from “over three hundred cases in the books”).

101 Richards & Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law, supra note 99, at 1890 (“[Prosser] was also the chief reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts, in which he codified his scheme for tort privacy.”).

102 Citron, Privacy Torts, supra note 97, at 1821-24 (discussing Prosser’s adoption of “Holmes’s focus on specific injuries caused by particular conduct”).

103 Richards & Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law, supra note 99, at 1903-04 (observing Prosser’s work on privacy torts in the span of four decades “transformed” privacy law “from a curious minority rule to . . . a doctrine recognized by the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions”).

104 Id. at 1904-07 (arguing Prosser’s efforts to ensure acceptance of his theory “fossilized [tort privacy] and eliminated its capacity to change and develop”); see also G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History 175-76 (1980) (describing development of Prosser’s privacy torts as “[a] classification made seemingly for convenience” in 1941 that ultimately, by 1971, had become “synonymous with law”).
Today, nearly all states recognize most of the privacy torts.\textsuperscript{105} Courts rarely question the existence of harm or the fact that the basis of harm for many privacy torts is pure emotional distress. In fact, they tend to presume the existence of harm.\textsuperscript{106} And yet while the privacy torts handily address the privacy problems of Warren and Brandeis’s time, such as invasions of privacy by the media, this is not the case for modern privacy problems involving the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data. Because courts cling rigidly to the elements of the privacy torts as set forth in the Restatement, the privacy torts have little application to contemporary privacy issues.\textsuperscript{107}

Other mainstream torts have been invoked to address privacy issues, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of confidentiality, and negligence. These torts are often limited by harm requirements, making it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain redress. For example, the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort requires proof of “severe emotional distress,” which can be difficult to establish.\textsuperscript{108}

3. Statutory Causes of Action

Many state and federal privacy statutes provide for private rights of action. Typically, the assumption is that a private right of action is a legislative recognition of harm, though no rule or doctrine commands that all private rights of action in statutes redress harm. Some might be there to facilitate private enforcement of a law or to deter violations.

Countless federal and state privacy laws have private rights of action. At the federal level, notable laws with private rights of action include the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”), the FCRA, and the Cable

\textsuperscript{105} Richards & Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law, supra note 99, at 1904 (“Today, due in large part to Prosser’s influence, his ‘complex’ of four torts is widely accepted and recognized by almost every state.” (citing ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 77 (2001)).

\textsuperscript{106} Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 27, at 768-70.

\textsuperscript{107} Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 8, at 798 (“Overly narrow interpretations of the privacy torts—intrusion on seclusion, public disclosure of private fact, false light, and misappropriation of image—have prevented their ability to redress data harms.”); Citron, Privacy Torts, supra note 97, at 1826-31 (arguing privacy torts fail to address modern data breaches and leaks and preclude recovery with high burdens of proof).

\textsuperscript{108} See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (recognizing liability for “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another”). This tort was of particular interest to Prosser, who wrote a key article about it in 1939. William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939). In the first edition of his treatise on tort law, published in 1941, Prosser noted that “the law has been slow to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent legal protection, even against intentional invasions. It is not until comparatively recent years that there has been any general admission that the infliction of mental distress, standing alone, may serve as the basis of an action, apart from any other tort.” WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 54 (1941).
Communications Policy Act, among others. At the state level, the California Consumer Privacy Act has a private right of action, but only for data security breaches. Several state unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws (called “UDAP” laws) have private rights of action. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) also has a private right of action.

Congress has recognized statutory damages for these private rights. Under the FCRA, the federal law at issue in Spokeo, any person who willfully violates “any requirement” in the statute is liable in an amount equal to the sum of damages sustained by the consumer or “damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” There is no harm requirement in the Wiretap Act, the


110 California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150 (West 2022) (providing private right to of action to “[a]ny consumer” for breach of personal information “as a result of the business’s violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures”).


113 The meaning of a private right of action with statutory damages is debatable. Is a private right of action a recognition of harm, with the statutory damages being imposed because harm can be difficult for plaintiffs to establish? Or is the purpose of the statutory damages to enable recovery in the absence of any harm because of other goals? Either way, the presence of statutory damages means that courts do not have to hold bench or jury trials on the question of recovery—lawmakers have supplied their judgment as to the appropriate extent of redress.

114 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(A)-(C), 1681b (regulating creation and use of consumer reports by consumer reporting agencies for credit transactions, insurance, licensing, consumer-initiated business transactions, and employment); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 334-35 (2016) (discussing § 1681a(d)(1)(A)-(C) and § 1681b).


The Supreme Court has complicated recovery under these private rights of action by forcing plaintiffs to prove harm even though the statutes provide for statutory damages. For example, the Supreme Court has made recovery of damages under the federal Privacy Act exceedingly difficult. In \textit{Doe v. Chao}, the U.S. Department of Labor improperly disclosed the Social Security Numbers of people filing for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. A group of plaintiffs sued under the Privacy Act. The lead plaintiff stated that he was “torn . . . all to pieces” by the disclosure and was “greatly concerned and worried.”\footnote{\textit{Doe v. Chao}, 540 U.S. 614, 617 (2004).} The U.S. Supreme Court held that the statutory damages provision under the Privacy Act was only available if plaintiffs established actual damages.\footnote{Id. at 614; see Calo, \textit{Privacy Harm Exceptionalism}, supra note 3, at 362-63 (discussing the Court’s refusal to recognize emotional harm as a basis for statutory damages under Privacy Act).}

In a subsequent case, \textit{Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper}, the Supreme Court held that emotional distress alone could not amount to actual damages under the Privacy Act of 1974.\footnote{566 U.S. 284, 299 (2012) (“[The Court] adopt[s] an interpretation of ‘actual damages’ limited to proven pecuniary or economic harm.”).} Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. They argued that Congress passed the Privacy Act to protect against an agency’s disclosure of personal information that could result in “substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual.”\footnote{Id. at 309 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10)) (discussing requirements for agencies under Privacy Act).} The result of the Court’s holding was that a “federal agency could intentionally or willfully forgo establishing safeguards to protect against embarrassment and no successful private action could be taken against it for the harm Congress identified.”\footnote{Id.}

The overall effect of \textit{Chao} and \textit{Cooper} has been to drastically limit the enforcement of the Privacy Act through private rights of action. Plaintiffs now have to prove willful conduct as well as establish harm, and they are forbidden from using emotional distress, which is a common type of harm in privacy cases.\footnote{Calo, \textit{Privacy Harm Exceptionalism}, supra note 3, at 362-63.} Congress created the private right of action with statutory damages as an enforcement mechanism in the law, but the Court effectively nullified it. The Privacy Act now has few enforcement actions.

Even when federal statutes do not mention having to prove damages, some courts have taken it upon themselves to add a requirement of harm. Consider
Senne v. Village of Palatine. In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could not pursue a private cause of action for a violation of the DPPA because the plaintiff could not demonstrate injury. The Village of Palatine had a practice of including identifying information, such as people’s height and weight, on parking tickets placed under their windshield wipers. Although the Village’s practice was a clear DPPA violation, the court concluded that “we need to balance the utility (present or prospective) of the personal information on a parking ticket against the potential harm.” The court acknowledged that “the Act does not state that a permissible use can be offset by the danger that the use will result in a crime or tort,” yet it created a harm requirement anyway. The court struck down the right to sue under the DPPA because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of harm, such as “stalking or any other crime (such as identity theft),” “tort (such as invasion of privacy),” disclosure over the Internet, or the involvement of “highly sensitive information” like a social security number.

Through interpretations like these, coupled with standing, courts are undercutting the enforcement of privacy laws by creating harm requirements out of whole cloth. Courts are generally supposed to be deferential to the legislative policy goals, striking down laws only when they traduce a constitutional boundary or infringe upon a right. But courts are trading deference for activism, undermining laws in an underhanded way. Harm requirements are being invented to prevent the enforcement of privacy protections.

To sum up, courts have blocked statutory private rights of action by: (1) adding a requirement for harm via standing; (2) interpreting statutes with statutory damages in ways that require proof of harm to obtain statutory damages, thus undercutting the purpose of statutory damages provisions; (3) interpreting statutory private rights of action to require harm even when they do not have a harm requirement; and (4) adopting narrow conceptions of cognizable harm to exclude many types of harm.

The enforcement of privacy laws is a challenging issue, and unfortunately, courts are making a mess of things. Courts often lack a theory of privacy harms or any guiding principles. As Lauren Scholz observes, in many cases, the “analysis as to why a harm is not present is often superficial or absent.” Decisions involving harm lack a coherent vision; they are creating mischief rather than good policy.

C. Harm in Regulatory Enforcement Actions

Regulators are often much less constrained by harm requirements. In many cases, the laws that they enforce do not require harm. The enforcement of

123 Senne v. Village of Palatine, 784 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2015).
124 Id. at 447.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 448.
127 Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653, 662-63 (2019).
statutes by regulators often occurs outside of the judicial system, so the issue of harm never arises.\textsuperscript{128}

However, there are circumstances where harm is a requirement for regulators to enforce, most notably Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) enforcement of “unfair” acts or practices. Since the mid-1990s, the FTC has used its enforcement power under section 5 of the FTC Act to address privacy issues.\textsuperscript{129} Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”\textsuperscript{130} A “deceptive” act or practice is a “representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer . . . acting reasonably in the circumstances . . . to the consumer’s detriment.”\textsuperscript{131} There is no mention of harm in this definition, though it does indicate that the deception must be to the “detriment” of the consumer.

The definition of unfairness is much more directly focused on harm. An “unfair” act or practice is one that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”\textsuperscript{132} This definition explicitly includes “likely” harm. The FTC recognizes traditional harms (and risks of such harms) such as economic and physical harms, but “more subjective types of harm” such as emotional harm are usually not considered substantial for unfairness purposes.\textsuperscript{133} On the other hand, the FTC is able to focus on harm to consumers generally, which allows it to look to harm in a broader manner than most tort and contracts cases, which involve specific individuals.

Although regulators are less constrained by the requirement of harm, they are often limited in resources and must be highly selective about the matters they enforce.\textsuperscript{134} State attorneys general vary considerably on how actively they enforce privacy laws.
enforce; some are aggressive whereas others have not brought any enforcement actions under many privacy laws that they are authorized to enforce.\footnote{Id. at 755 (“In the past fifteen years, a core group of states have taken the lead on privacy enforcement: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.”).}

Because of these limitations, many privacy laws rely upon private litigants for enforcement. The TCPA is a prime example of this type of enforcement mechanism. The law restricts unsolicited commercial telemarketing calls, robocalls, and faxes, and it is enforced by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and state attorneys general.\footnote{See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3); see also Spencer Weber Waller, Daniel B. Heidtke & Jessica Stewart, The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing Technology, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 343, 358 (2014).} To augment this enforcement, the law includes a private right of action with statutory damages of $500 for each violation and $1,500 for each knowing or willful violation.\footnote{47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).} Because the TCPA enforcement process is tedious and time-consuming and because many TCPA cases involve small matters that do not make splashy headlines, FCC enforcement has been modest.\footnote{Waller et al., supra note 136, at 376-78.} In one year, for example, there were 47,704 complaints, but the FCC only issued twenty-three citations.\footnote{Id. at 378.} In practice, private litigation has become the primary source of TCPA enforcement.\footnote{Id. at 375 ("Private parties have largely been responsible for enforcement of the TCPA.").}

Litigation by private parties thus supplements enforcement by regulatory agencies and state attorneys general, and in a number of instances, private litigation serves as the primary enforcement mechanism of a law. Based on this enforcement role, private parties enforcing a law through private litigation are often referred to as “private attorneys general.”\footnote{See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2130 (2004).} As the Seventh Circuit aptly explained:

The award of statutory damages could also be thought a form of bounty system, and Congress is permitted to create legally enforceable bounty systems for assistance in enforcing federal laws, provided the bounty is a reward for redressing an injury of some sort (though not necessarily an injury to the bounty hunter).\footnote{Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2001).} And these cases typically require a showing of harm, which is often the death knell if plaintiffs cannot show financial or physical harm.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF PRIVACY HARMs

Privacy harms present several challenges that make their recognition difficult.\textsuperscript{143} One challenge is that many privacy harms are small and caused by a multitude of actors. Privacy harms often involve increased risk of future harm, and the law struggles mightily to grapple with the concept of risk.\textsuperscript{144} Finally, privacy harms often have a significant societal dimension, and the law (especially in litigation) often has a highly individualistic focus.

A. Aggregation of Small Harms

A major complicating dimension of many privacy harms is that they are small but numerous. When these harms happen to an individual repeatedly by different actors, they become significantly more harmful. For example, receiving an unwanted email is a minor inconvenience. Receiving hundreds of unwanted emails becomes a major imposition and distraction.

Another aspect of this difficulty is that sometimes an organization will cause a very small amount of harm but on a very large scale—to hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. From the standpoint of each individual, the harm is minor, but from the standpoint of society, where the harm to everyone is aggregated, the total amount of harm is quite substantial.

Privacy harms often involve the aggregation of many small harms to each individual, which is compounded by the aggregation of all these harms to many individuals.\textsuperscript{145} The result makes privacy violations large-scale problems that cause a significant societal impact but do not readily fit into the traditional way the law assesses harm.

FTC enforcement has successfully addressed this problem. In its policy statement about unfairness injury, the FTC noted: “An injury may be sufficiently substantial . . . if it does a small harm to a large number of people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”\textsuperscript{146}

However, when it comes to private litigation, for each individual, bringing a lawsuit for a small harm is not worth the time or resources.\textsuperscript{147} Class actions are the predominant way to address this problem. They enable people to aggregate

\textsuperscript{143} See Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1041 (2018) (noting that “privacy harms are hard to pin down”).

\textsuperscript{144} Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 27, at 751.


\textsuperscript{146} FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 132, at 1073 n.12 (“An injury may be sufficiently substantial, however, if it does a small harm to a large number of people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”).

\textsuperscript{147} Eric Goldman, The Irony of Privacy Class Action Litigation, 10 J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 309, 313 (2012) (discussing cost-benefit analysis of individual lawsuits versus class actions).
their small harms into a single lawsuit that is large enough to justify the costs of litigation.

Class actions, however, are an imperfect vehicle to address privacy problems. Cases often quickly settle because litigation expenses are high. The lawyers often earn significant sums, maximizing their own financial interests. Many class actions become the equivalent of a shake down, with companies paying the lawyers to go away.

If class actions do not settle, then there is another problem. Companies have data on millions or billions of people, and even small damages can add up to enormous sums that can put companies out of business. These sums can become disproportionate to what the company did wrong. As we have previously stated, “Judges are reluctant to recognize harm because it might mean bankrupting a company just to give each person a very tiny amount of compensation.”

B. Risk: Unknowable and Future Harms

In many cases, the harm is not fully knowable, and the law struggles greatly to address these situations. We explored this challenge for data breach harms in *Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms*. In that article, we noted that a major complication in recognizing harm from a data breach is that often plaintiffs have not yet suffered from identity theft or fraud. Plaintiffs argue that they suffer harm in the form of a future risk of injury. Courts are inconsistent in recognizing future risk of injury as a cognizable harm.

Risk is involved with many different types of privacy harm. A credit report with inaccurate information—like denoting someone as a terrorist as in *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*—poses a significant risk of economic and reputational harm. Online posts that include someone’s home address present a risk of physical attack. And yet even with privacy harms that courts widely recognize, such as physical, economic, and reputational harms, courts are reluctant to recognize them when there is only a risk that they will occur.

Privacy harms often not only involve a future risk of injury but also are compounded by an additional dimension of complexity: the range of possible future injuries is much more varied. To fully understand the implications of the collection, use, or disclosure of personal data, one must know about the future uses to which the data will be put. For example, if Company A improperly discloses personal data to Company B, the harm will depend upon what Company B does with the data. Company B might not immediately use the data.

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148 *Id.* at 314 (“[C]lass action lawyers often advance their own financial interests at the expense of the class members’ interests.”).
149 *Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra* note 27, at 783.
150 *Id.* at 750.
151 *See id.*
152 *Id.* at 739.
153 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021).
in a harmful way and might not do so until after the statute of limitations expires. Company B might never use the data in a harmful way.

Privacy harms are highly contextual, with the harm depending upon how the data is used, what data is involved, and how the data might be combined with other data. Sharing an innocuous piece of data with another company might provide a key link to other data or allow for certain inferences to be made.

Because of these difficulties, many privacy statutes use statutory damages. It is far easier to enforce laws with statutory damages than to try to figure out the harm that would involve future uses that may or may not occur. Through standing doctrine and cases like Spokeo and TransUnion, however, courts are undermining statutory damages provisions by forcing tired old judicial concepts of harm into the enforcement of these statutes. For cases not involving statutes with statutory damages, harm can become quite a speculative matter if there is uncertainty in one of two dimensions—the possibility of harm and the nature of harm.

C. Individual vs. Societal Harms

Privacy harms often involve injury not just to individuals but to society. Several scholars have argued that privacy is “constitutive” of society. As Joel Reidenberg contends, “Society as a whole has an important stake in the contours of the protection of personal information.” Robert Post argues that the privacy torts promote “rules of civility that in some significant measure constitute both individuals and community.” According to Julie Cohen, privacy protects individual autonomy and creativity that are essential for society to develop a rich culture. Paul Schwartz contends that privacy is essential to democracy and freedom.

These considerations are often omitted from the law’s evaluation of harm because they do not fit the individualistic focus that courts have for cognizable harm. Although certain lawsuits seek mainly to vindicate individual interests,

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155 Reidenberg, supra note 88, at 882-83. We have both emphasized the societal significance of privacy in our separate scholarship. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (2014) [hereinafter Citron, HATE CRIMES] (emphasizing privacy’s inextricable relationship with equality); Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 Yale L.J. 1870 (2019); Solove, Understanding Privacy, supra note 28.


many group lawsuits (such as class actions) also seek to protect broader societal interests. Courts, however, often still fail to consider the societal impact of privacy harms even in these cases.159

III. REALIGNING PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES

With the law’s relentless focus on privacy harms, it is easy to overlook the broader challenges afoot. Privacy harms are just a piece of a larger pie involving the enforcement of privacy law. In addition to the question of what should constitute cognizable privacy harm, we should also ask whether privacy harm should even be required in particular circumstances. In many cases, harm is irrelevant to the purposes of the litigation. To determine when privacy harm is an issue that should even be part of a case, we must answer a broader overarching question: When and how should privacy law be enforced?

Many of the law’s difficulties with handling privacy cases are due to misalignments between enforcement goals and remedies. Configuring the proper alignment will make the law more coherent and effective.

Privacy law enforcement has three predominant goals:

(1) Compensation—awarding monetary damages to people who have been harmed;

(2) Deterrence—preventing future violations of the law; and

(3) Equity—making things right by means other than compensation.

Problems emerge when a remedy is misaligned with an enforcement goal. For example, monetary damages are a proper remedy when compensation is the goal. They are not a well-tailored remedy when deterrence or equity is the goal. The law becomes messy and riddled with problems when it insists upon a single remedy to address a multitude of goals. It is understandable why the law tries to do this: sometimes multiple enforcement goals exist in the same case. If that is so, then the law should address all of those goals. But trying to use a remedy well suited for one goal but poorly suited for another is a recipe for failure.

An analogy can deepen our understanding of the point. A wrench is a great tool for unscrewing a nut. One could also try to use a wrench to hammer in a nail, but a wrench is a poor tool to use, as it might cause damage. The nail requires a hammer for its installation. The law is akin to a bad repair person: it is constantly trying to use the wrong tools to achieve enforcement goals. Just because in a given situation there is a nut to unscrew and a nail to be hammered does not mean that only a wrench or a hammer should be used. Both tools should be used.

This point might seem obvious, but the law almost entirely misses it. Modern tort law is premised on the notion that lawsuits to compensate people with damages can also double as a means to achieve deterrence. Of course, it is certainly true that compensatory damages can further the goal of deterrence, but

159 Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 27, at 785.
this is akin to the use of the wrench to hammer in the nail—the wrench can be used, but it is the wrong tool, and it will not work optimally. In privacy cases, because of the challenging nature of privacy harms, the misfit in tools is exacerbated.

A. **The Goals of Enforcement**

Understanding the goals of enforcement is essential to making progress toward the effective enforcement of privacy law. Compensation involves awarding a plaintiff with monetary damages to provide redress for wrongful harm. The typical tort rule accords with this rationale by awarding damages equal to a victim’s loss.\(^\text{160}\) Corrective justice theory embraces an Aristotelian concept of justice that requires injurers to make victims whole.\(^\text{161}\) The goal is to hold actors responsible for losses that they wrongfully caused.\(^\text{162}\)

Deterrence involves imposing a penalty that deters future wrongdoing. Specific deterrence involves deterring wrongdoing by the particular wrongdoer against whom enforcement is sought. General deterrence involves deterring wrongdoing by other actors. The penalty imposed on a particular wrongdoer will serve as a lesson to teach others to avoid wrongdoing. Many organizations will only take laws seriously when there are likely and painful consequences for failing to comply.

Equity involves righting wrongs in situations where compensation is not an adequate way of addressing them. Equitable remedies aim to restore things to their original state before the wrongdoing or to otherwise help fix situations where damages will not. The law has a number of equitable remedies, such as injunctions and specific performance.\(^\text{163}\)

B. **Aligning Remedies with Goals**

1. **The Problem of Misalignment**

The law suffers when it fails to align appropriate remedies with enforcement goals. When compensation is the enforcement goal, compensatory damages are the appropriate remedy, and these damages are based on harm. When deterrence is the enforcement goal, private rights of action enable “private attorneys


\(^\text{161}\) *Id.* at 320 (explaining corrective justice “imposes the duty to repair the wrongs one does”); *Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law* 56-57 (1995) (noting Aristotle’s account of corrective justice involves “the direct transfer of resources from one party to the other” representing plaintiff’s wrongful injury and defendant’s wrongful act).

\(^\text{162}\) *Coleman, supra* note 160, at 324 (“The duty of wrongdoers in corrective justice is to repair the wrongful losses for which they are responsible.”).

\(^\text{163}\) One of us (Citron) has argued that injunctive relief is crucial for what it will say and do for victims of intimate privacy violations. Danielle Keats Citron, *Privacy Injunctions*, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 11).
general” to enforce a law. In such cases, compensatory damages are not relevant. The remedy should be an amount that provides optimal general and specific deterrence. When equity is the enforcement goal, appropriate equitable remedies should be used. Harm should not be required. The main issue should be whether there is a problem that can be fixed or ameliorated with legal intervention.

Tort law attempts to achieve both the goals of compensation and deterrence simultaneously. This attempt to do both might seem efficient, but the goals differ. For example, when lawsuits are tied to compensatory damages, the existence of liability insurance can complicate the goal of deterrence. When the magnitude of the defendant’s insurance premiums does not track the magnitude of the defendant’s liabilities, the threat of liability may fall short of promoting optimal deterrence because the defendant can externalize the risk of liability through the purchase of insurance.

On the flip side, liability for compensatory damages can be far greater than is optimal for deterrence. Compensation even for very small harms can become outsized if multiplied by millions of people. Deterrence is the more meaningful goal, and compensation in these instances might be counterproductive. For example, providing a few cents to a billion individuals might do little for their social welfare, but could put companies out of business. It might result in overdeterrence, leading companies to abandon socially beneficial personal data practices.

2. The Value of Private Enforcement

In many instances, private litigation is used primarily as a vehicle to enforce a law and thus to deploy law’s deterrence power. Legislatures often include a private right of action in statutes so that plaintiffs acting as “private attorneys general” will help enforce the law. The goal is to increase enforcement to deter violations. In such cases, compensation is a secondary goal or a goal in only a small number of cases. As the Illinois Supreme Court noted in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., regarding the Illinois BIPA, harm is not a requirement of the statute, and the legislature included the private right of action not just to compensate plaintiffs but because it is “integral to implementation of the legislature’s objectives” to deter BIPA violations. In other words, the redress provides an incentive for plaintiffs and counsel to enforce the law—not for compensation’s sake but for deterrence.

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165 2019 IL 123186.

166 Id. ¶ 37 (“When private entities face liability for failure to comply with the law’s requirements . . . those entities have the . . . incentive to conform to the law and prevent problems before they occur and cannot be undone.”).
Some courts, however, miss the point about private attorneys general. For example, in *Stoops v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, plaintiff Melody Stoops bought thirty-five cell phones to try to ensnare companies that made telemarketing calls in violation of the TCPA. The TCPA provides penalties of $500 for each violation with penalties trebled for willful or knowing violations. The court dismissed her case for lack of harm: “Plaintiff’s privacy interests were not violated when she received calls from Defendant. . . . Because Plaintiff has admitted that her only purpose in using her cell phones is to file TCPA lawsuits, the calls are not ‘a nuisance and an invasion of privacy.’” According to the court, “Plaintiff has not suffered an injury-in-fact because her privacy and economic interests were not violated when she received calls from Defendant.” The court reasoned that “it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit” and that “it is unfathomable that Congress considered a consumer who files TCPA actions as a business when it enacted the TCPA.”

Stoops may have been opportunistic, but her motives do not negate the wrongfulness of the defendant’s activity or the fact that she suffered a harm. Trying to catch a wrongdoer does not mean that one is unharmed by the wrongdoer’s actions in the process. Ultimately, however, harm should not be relevant to the *Stoops* case. Congress wrote the private right of action under the TCPA without a requirement of harm. Deterrence—not compensation—is the goal. The fact that lawyers and plaintiffs benefit financially from enforcing privacy laws is a necessary side effect of private rights of action. Litigation must be sufficiently remunerative to incentivize private enforcement.

Contrary to the court’s view of Stoops’s actions, she engaged in crucially important activity. She helped catch privacy violators and took the time to enforce the TCPA, which is what federal lawmakers sought to incentivize. She held privacy violators accountable when enforcement agencies did not. The main benefit of a private right of action in a law is to encourage private enforcement of that law because government agencies often lack the resources to enforce a law rigorously and consistently enough.

3. An Approach for Realignment

In privacy cases, how should the law better align the goals of enforcement with remedies? When should harm be required? In our view, harm should be an

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168 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (stating court may use discretion and triple award if defendant “willfully or knowingly violated the regulation”).
169 *Stoops*, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 800 (noting calls were not “the nuisance, invasion of privacy, cost, and inconvenience” from which Congress intended to protect consumers”).
170 *Id.* at 805 (noting purchasing cell phones with hope of receiving calls to collect statutory damages inconsistent with purposes of TCPA).
171 *Id.* (citations and internal quotations omitted) (explaining plaintiff’s injury falls outside zone of interests sought to be protected by TCPA).
issue *only* to the extent that compensation is the enforcement goal. In many instances of privacy litigation, the enforcement goals involve deterrence and equity, not compensation. For these cases, harm should be legally irrelevant. The amount of damages in such cases should be tailored to the enforcement goal. When the goal is deterrence, attempting to conjure up some amount of compensation (often based on pretext) will not be optimal for achieving this goal. The issue of harm just gets in the way and confuses matters when the essential issue is clear: *What amount of damages would be optimal for deterrence?*

For cases where equity is the goal, nonmonetary remedies should be imposed. Redressing harm can certainly be one of the aims of equity, but goals of equity extend far beyond traditional conceptions of harm. Equity is a way to right wrongs—to stop wrongs from continuing without end.

More specifically, we propose the following approach: First, courts should require harm to the extent that claims are brought to secure compensation. Establishing harm should be restricted only to the ability to obtain compensatory damages. To the extent that tort claims seek equitable relief, they should not turn on harm.

Second, for contract cases, courts should enforce the contract. Courts should use remedies, such as specific enforcement, restitution, or recission. Attorneys’ fees and some modest damages should be paid to compensate for the time and hassle of having to litigate to make the defendant adhere to the contract.

Third, courts should not inject harm into cases involving privacy statutes that have private rights of action. Modern standing doctrine has strayed too far from the constitutional requirement of “cases” or “controversies” to shut the doors to the courts to many cases that should be heard. Standing has become a conceptual mess, with courts spending too much time questioning harm and losing sight of the important issues.

Standing doctrine is a significant impediment to the coherent operation of privacy laws. Standing forces harm into cases where it should not be required. *Spokeo* is part of a lineage of Supreme Court cases that shifted to a harms-based approach as a mechanism to shut off courts as vehicles to achieve social justice. According to Cass Sunstein, modern standing doctrine is an attack on the enforceability of much modern regulation: “[T]he very notion of ‘injury in fact’ is not merely a misinterpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act and Article III but also a large-scale conceptual mistake.”[^172] Sunstein argues that the injury-in-fact requirement “injects common law conceptions of harm into the Constitution.”[^173] It purports to be a “purely factual inquiry” but is “inevitably a product of courts’ value-laden judgments.”[^174]


[^173]: Id. at 167.

[^174]: Id.
Likewise, Felix Wu argues that “standing law seems to be serving no purpose other than to constitutionalize a deregulatory agenda.”175 “Until recently,” Wu observes,

tangibility and other questions about the quality of the harm suffered by the plaintiff simply were not part of the Supreme Court’s standing analysis. Lower courts nevertheless incorporated such considerations into their analyses of standing in privacy cases. The Supreme Court has now done the same, thus shifting the law on standing, while professing that nothing has changed.176

As Rachel Bayefsky notes, before the shift in standing doctrine, instead of requiring harm, courts required merely a “legal right” to bring a lawsuit based on property, contract, tort, or statute.177

Dissenting in TransUnion, Justice Thomas observes that the requirement of concrete harm is a relatively late addition to standing doctrine and did not exist for nearly two centuries.178 At the founding, “[w]here an individual sought to sue someone for a violation of his private rights, such as trespass on his land, the plaintiff needed only to allege the violation.”179 Justice Thomas also notes that the First Congress enacted a copyright law that provided for damages without a showing of monetary loss.180

Spokeo and TransUnion’s invitation to courts to look to historically recognized harms in the common law further ossifies the common law’s protection of privacy beyond the ossification already caused by Prosser.181 Warren and Brandeis aimed to generate new causes of action to rise to the problems. Locking down privacy law to four narrow torts contravenes the very spirit of their article. For Warren and Brandeis, the common law looks not just backwards but forwards as well.182 The common law is progressive, not regressive.

The requirement of harm in standing that overrides private rights of action invites judicial overreaching. Courts should approach statutory private rights of

176 Id. at 439-40 (noting while doctrinal shifts not necessarily problematic, “shifts that occur without awareness or discussion run the risk of being unprincipled”).
178 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2219 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing court introduced injury in fact centuries after ratification of Article III and therefore “it is worth pausing to ask why ‘concrete’ injury in fact should be the sole inquiry”).
179 Id. at 2217.
180 See id.
182 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 193 (“[T]he common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”).
action with more humility. Legislatures do not provide private rights of action loosely. Private rights of action are one of the most contested elements of laws, and when legislatures deem that violations of a law require the recognition of private rights of action, judges ought to show more respect for the legislature’s determination.

Nullifying a law’s enforcement component can thwart the way the law is supposed to work. When Congress passes statutes, it will sometimes preempt state laws on the same issue, so plaintiffs might be barred from suing in state court for state law violations. Preemption is a kind of bargain, where plaintiffs might lose out on pursuing actions in state court but will be allowed instead to pursue actions based on the federal statute. This is how the FCRA works, as it preempts certain state laws and directs plaintiffs to sue under its provisions.\(^\text{183}\) When Congress enacted the FCRA, its private right of action was included in exchange for restricting state privacy and defamation tort actions.\(^\text{184}\) Plainly said, the Supreme Court has turned an explicit trade by Congress into a gift to defendants. Plaintiffs were stripped of their ability to seek tort redress but provided a right to sue under federal law. Now, they are denied both tort redress and its substitute because courts have decided that they lack standing to seek redress under the alternative cause of action provided by the FCRA. By requiring harm, courts are pulling the rug out from the bargain, leaving plaintiffs with nowhere to pursue their cases.

Congress weighs various enforcement mechanisms from agency enforcement to state attorney general enforcement to private rights of action. Many statutes have a mix of different types of enforcement. Through those choices, Congress has determined the efficacy of that particular enforcement mix. When courts nullify a component of Congress’s enforcement mix, they undermine the statutory recipe.

Focusing on individual harm for these latter types of lawsuits is missing the point and purpose of the lawsuit. Many class action lawsuits would not be worth the significant costs if their sole benefit were to compensate individuals for any harm. For many class action lawsuits, the amount of compensation individuals receive is trivial. If this were the main benefit of these lawsuits, then we ought to reconsider whether they are worth the costs. The real value of many class action lawsuits is that they hold defendants accountable for their wrongdoing. In doing so, class actions deter specific defendants, and they generally deter other similarly situated entities.

The law must break away from the rigid formalistic approach that favors compensatory damages even for very small harms. The law should also eschew its rigidity in dismissing cases when there is no cognizable harm. The rigidity makes litigation fit poorly with enforcement goals.


\(^{184}\) The FCRA provides partial immunity from lawsuits in state court based on defamation and invasion of privacy. Plaintiffs can only sue when defendants acted “with malice or willful intent to injure” plaintiff. Id. § 1681h(e).
In class action cases where there may be only a small harm to individuals, courts should be able to fashion a remedy without resorting to compensatory damages. Compensatory damages for large classes could end up adding to an excessive sum beyond what is necessary to achieve optimal deterrence. At the same time, a miniscule amount of damages for each class member will not address the goal of compensation in a meaningful way. In such a situation, the enforcement goal is the meaningful one, and this goal, rather than deterrence or compensation, should be the driver of the appropriate remedy.

In other cases, the amount of compensatory damages might be too low for optimal enforcement. If the compensation to the class is minimal, then compensatory damages are not a meaningful remedy, and courts should be able to fashion a more appropriate remedy with punitive damages or equitable relief.

To avoid unnecessary class action lawsuits, in statutory cases where only deterrence is a goal and compensation is not involved, courts might be given the option of evaluating the extent to which the statute has already been enforced. If a regulatory agency has already effectively enforced a law for the violation, then a statutory requirement for establishing harm might be appropriate, as the only goal of a lawsuit under these circumstances would be compensation. Legislatures could thus write laws to permit courts to dismiss lawsuits in situations where regulatory enforcement has been sufficient for deterrence and other enforcement goals are not present.

IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERLY RECOGNIZING PRIVACY HARMs

Under the current U.S. approach to privacy litigation, harm plays a central gatekeeping role, and failing to recognize privacy harm shuts down important cases and prevents many privacy statutes from being effectively enforced. Under our proposed approach, harm would be required only if justified. Standing doctrine would be restored to what it was before the Court dramatically twisted it to the detriment of privacy policy and law. Harm would need to be established only in cases involving compensatory damages.

Because our approach would require a rather substantial change in current law, establishing harm is likely to remain a key component for most privacy cases. Even if our approach were adopted, establishing harm still would play an important role, just not its current oversized one.

Recognizing privacy harms is valuable for other reasons. Law is expressive. It changes the social meaning of activities, thus shifting societal attitudes, expectations, and practices. Lawmakers’ recognition of privacy harms helps ensure that the law provides adequate protection while encouraging the provision of adequate resources and the development of sufficient enforcement strategies.

A. Properly Identifying the Interests at Stake

Under the current approach, some courts locate harm in trivial costs or use of resources simply because they have to go through the exercise of finding harm.
Because courts require plaintiffs to allege tangible and concrete harms, complaints endeavor to lay out concrete harms that are not the heart of the matter at all. It is those harms that enable plaintiffs to get beyond motions to dismiss even though they are miniscule and—crucially—do not capture why plaintiffs are bringing suit in the first place.

One theory of harm that has gained traction is the loss of device battery life and storage space. In In re iPhone Application Litigation, plaintiffs alleged that Apple breached promises in its privacy policy to protect users’ personal data because its operating system readily facilitated the nonconsensual collection and use of their data by apps. The court found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged harm in claiming that the unauthorized transmission of data from their iPhones taxed the phones’ resources by draining the battery and using up storage space and bandwidth.

In Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., the court held that unwanted calls to prepaid cell phones “cause direct, concrete, monetary injury by depleting limited minutes that the consumer has paid for” and also “deplete a cell phone’s battery, and the cost of electricity to recharge the phone.” The court noted that, “[w]hile certainly small, the cost is real, and the cumulative effect could be consequential.” As another court noted, although the harm from “a single call or text (whether from depleted battery life, wasted time, or annoyance) would be de minimis,” the TCPA “is clear that a violation can occur from a single call.” As another court has noted: “Regardless of how small the harm is, it is actual and it is real.”

In those cases, the actual harm to plaintiffs, however, was not lost storage space or slightly drained resources. The problem wasn’t the cost of electricity or phone minutes. The litigants invoked those costs because judicial decisions forced their hand—while financial costs existed, the real privacy harms lay elsewhere, as we shall explore in the next Part. Yes, those costs sounded in the language that courts had chosen to accept but not because they fit what plaintiffs suffered. We have seen the emergence of an odd sort of legal fiction, where the law redresses “harm” that is not the real interest interfered with as a means to redress a harm at the heart of the matter.

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186 Id. at 1056.
188 Id. at 644-45.
189 Id. at 645 (noting such calls also cause intangible injuries, including fact “that they required the plaintiff to tend to them and wasted the plaintiff’s time”); see also Martinez v. TD Bank USA, N.A., 225 F. Supp. 3d 261, 270 (D.N.J. 2016) (finding plaintiff’s allegations of economic injury “due to the need to recharge her phone as a result of depleted battery life from receiving Defendants’ phone calls” to be sufficient injury).
The law fails to focus on whether certain practices actually create privacy problems that set back privacy interests that we care about. Lucky plaintiffs can identify some minor tangible impact, which often has little to do with privacy. By contrast, plaintiffs who can point to a severe problem that does not involve a negligible tangible impact are out of luck. The law perversely redresses trivial setbacks while ignoring major problems and real costs to individuals, groups, and society.

It is essential to properly identify the interests at stake. Using concrete, yet ill-fitting harms results in a balancing of interests based on fictions, leading to haphazard results in cases. This is a recipe for an arbitrary and incoherent body of law.

B. The Expressive Value of Recognizing Harm

We lose something important when courts fail to articulate privacy harms appropriately. Looking for irrelevant financial or physical harms and ignoring a vast array of real tangible and intangible privacy harms sends the message that those real privacy harms do not matter. We lose the chance to harness the educative power of law.

In addition to its coercive role, law has a crucial expressive character. Law serves as our teacher by creating “a public set of meanings and shared understandings between the state and the public.” It shapes the social meaning of conduct. It draws our attention to privacy violations and proclaims that they are wrong and should not be tolerated. In creating and shaping social norms, law has “an important cultural impact that differs from its more direct coercive effects.”

Individuals whose privacy has been violated need to hear the message that law is concerned with the harms they have suffered. Law’s recognition of privacy harms tells individuals that their suffering is real and that it is not just a fact of life that should be endured. In this way, the law allows individuals to see themselves as harmed.

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192 One of us (Citron) has explored how education and law can help us combat destructive social attitudes. CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 155, at 95 (“Feminist activists and lawyers taught judges, officers, legislators, and ordinary people about women’s suffering.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 407 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Law’s Expressive Value] (explaining that law played important expressive role in “detrivializing workplace sexual harassment and domestic violence during the last quarter of the twentieth century”).

193 Citron, Law’s Expressive Value, supra note 192, at 407-08 (noting media coverage of sexual harassment following court rulings legitimated view that sexual harassment is harmful and “deepened the public’s appreciation of the problem”).

194 Id. at 407.

195 Id.

196 Id.; see also Rachel Bayefsky, Remedies and Respect: Rethinking the Role of Federal Judicial Relief, 109 Geo. L.J. 1263, 1266-68 (2021) (arguing federal judicial remedies for parties that suffered dignitary harm should follow “expressive approach” that “acknowledges
In clarifying and recognizing privacy harms, the law provides lessons for wrongdoers. It declares that the privacy harms that defendants inflict will not be ignored, that they will have to face responsibility for their privacy violations. It makes clear that wrongdoers must internalize the costs that they slough off onto others.197

Society receives the message too. With law as a guide, privacy harms would become part of the risk calculus for any person or entity handling personal data. Companies would design new gadgets and services with the knowledge that they are responsible for the privacy harms these devices cause.198

Failing to recognize privacy harm sends the opposite message, one that is malignant. When cases are dismissed for lack of harm in the face of violations of privacy law, the message is that these violations do not matter. Organizations learn that they do not need to take the law seriously. Denials of standing for statutory violations belittles protections in privacy statutes. These expressive messages undermine compliance with laws.

C. Legislative and Regulatory Agenda

Lawmakers and law enforcers would benefit from clarity around privacy harm as well. U.S. states have been actively working on new privacy laws.199 Several states, such as California, Virginia, and Colorado, have passed broad privacy statutes within the past few years.200 Many other states are showing an interest as well. Crucial to those efforts is a clear understanding of privacy harm. If lawmakers fail to appreciate the full breadth of the harm suffered by their citizens, then they will draft laws that are insufficiently protective. Getting the harm calculus right is all the more important given the heightened attention being paid to privacy in state capitols.

The recognition of privacy harms also might affect the agenda for regulatory enforcement agencies. Violations of privacy laws that are understood to cause harm to consumers are more likely to spark an investigation and enforcement action. Regulators have limited resources and can pursue only a fraction of violations.201 Failing to recognize harm for certain types of violations might lead to precious enforcement resources being used elsewhere.

the plaintiff’s significance, full membership in a social group, and entitlement to avoid undue exposure”).

197 See Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 155, at 1878.


200 Id. ("After the California Consumer Privacy Act passed in 2018, multiple states proposed similar legislation to protect consumers in their states.").

201 See Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 8, at 799 ("Simply put, federal agencies have too few resources and too many responsibilities.").
V. A TYPOLOGY OF PRIVACY HARMs

Privacy harms have been a challenge to conceptualize because they are so varied. Privacy is an umbrella concept that encompasses different yet related things. It is no surprise that privacy harms involve different yet related concerns. Privacy harms not only differ in type but also in their severity.

In this Part, we discuss the various types of privacy harms and whether the law currently recognizes them. For many types of privacy harms, the law lacks clarity and consistency as to whether the harm is cognizable. We contend that in most cases, these distinct types of harms should be treated as cognizable harms. For several of these types of harms, there is support in case law and doctrines in other contexts to support recognition of cognizable harm. In many circumstances, courts recognize the direct harm for certain types of harm but fail to recognize the risk of harm. Our typology of privacy harms is set forth in the figure below.

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202 SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 28, at 1 (“Currently, privacy is a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other things) freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over personal information, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations.”).

203 The typology of privacy harms differs from the taxonomy of privacy problems that one of us (Solove) has developed. See id. at 101-61. The taxonomy concerns the concept of privacy, which involves attempts to deal with a set of related problems. Many of the problems in the taxonomy can create the same type of privacy harm.
Our typology groups privacy harms into seven basic types: (1) physical harms; (2) economic harms; (3) reputational harms; (4) psychological harms; (5) autonomy harms; (6) discrimination harms; and (7) relationship harms. We identify several different distinct subtypes of psychological and autonomy harms.

A. Physical Harms

Privacy violations can lead to physical harms, which are harms that result in bodily injury or death. Physical harms are well recognized as cognizable under the law. Indeed, setbacks to physical health, where clear and obvious, have rarely been disputed as cognizable harms.
The improper sharing of personal data can create unique opportunities for physical violence. Rebecca Schaeffer, a model and actress, was murdered after a stalker obtained her home address with the help of a private investigator who obtained it from California motor vehicles records. The Internet has made it even easier for such sharing of personal data to lead to physical assault. In December 2009, an online advertisement on Craigslist featured a woman’s photograph next to her interest in “a real aggressive man with no concern for women.” The woman’s ex-boyfriend Jebidiah Stipe wrote the post. More than 160 people responded to the ad, including Ty McDowell. Stipe sent McDowell text messages with the woman’s home address and falsely informed him of her desire to be “humiliated, physically and sexually abused, and pimped out to his friends.” McDowell attacked the woman as she returned home, forcing his way inside. At knifepoint, he raped her and abused her with a knife sharpener. When caught by the police, McDowell said that the woman had asked him to rape her.

Entities handling personal data have been found liable for negligently, knowingly, or purposefully paving the way for a third party to physically injure someone. In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., a disturbed man named Liam Youens purchased personal data about Amy Boyer from data broker Docusearch. To satisfy Youens’s request for the address of Boyer’s employer, Docusearch hired a person to find out by calling Boyer, lying to her about the reason for the call and inducing her to reveal the address. Docusearch gave the address to Youens who then confronted Boyer at work and killed her.

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206 Id.


211 Id. at 1005-06.

212 Id. at 1006.

213 Id.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that a data broker or private investigator “owes a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject the third person to an unreasonable risk of harm.” For the court, the risk of criminal misconduct was sufficiently foreseeable so that an “investigator has a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third person’s personal information to a client.” According to the court, data brokers should know that stalkers often use their services to obtain personal data about victims.

Privacy claims involving the negligent enablement of physical injuries can be traced to premises liability cases. In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., the plaintiff was attacked and robbed in the hallway just outside her apartment. The landlord left the building unguarded even though tenants had been assaulted and robbed in the building’s common areas. The court held that residential apartment owners had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect tenants from third-party violence. The landlord was in a better position than the tenant to adopt precautionary measures and better situated than the police to diminish the risk of criminal assault on its premises.

Although courts clearly recognize harm from physical injuries, courts are reluctant to hold online service providers responsible when their activities promote, facilitate, or enable such harm. The physical harm facilitated via online stalking is akin to the physical injuries that result when landlords fail to secure their property. In cases involving owners of residential property, hospitals, day care centers, and shopping malls, courts have extended liability to the owners for a third party’s criminal acts. Similar to these owners, online platforms and service providers exercise control over the use and security of their services, yet courts treat them differently. Due in part to section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and the legal shield it provides, courts have not taken up the invitation to treat digital spaces with the same set of rules as with physical places.

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\footnote{214}{\textit{Id.} at 1007.}
\footnote{215}{\textit{Id.} at 1008.}
\footnote{216}{\textit{Id.} at 1007 (“It is undisputed that stalkers, in seeking to locate and track a victim, sometimes use an investigator to obtain personal information about the victims.”).}
\footnote{217}{439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).}
\footnote{218}{\textit{Id.} at 479.}
\footnote{219}{\textit{Id.} at 487.}
\footnote{220}{\textit{Id.} at 480.}
\footnote{221}{Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, \textit{The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime}, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1582 (2005).}
\footnote{222}{See Citron, \textit{Privacy Torts}, supra note 97, at 1852.}
\footnote{223}{CITRON, \textit{Hate Crimes}, supra note 155, at 141; Danielle Keats Citron, \textit{Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet as It Is (and as It Should Be)}, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1089 (2020) (book review); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, \textit{The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity}, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 423 (2017).}
Courts sometimes struggle with cases involving the disclosure of personal data that creates a risk of physical harm but that still has not resulted in actual physical injury. Doxing—the disclosure of personal data to facilitate people being located, contacted, and harassed—creates a serious threat of physical harm. Courts often focus on the nature of the data involved, which is often innocuous in the abstract, such as home addresses. Such information may already be available online from other sources. But when this data is used to dox victims, the data no longer is innocuous. Courts are generally reluctant to view the disclosure of home addresses as harmful (or even as a violation of privacy) unless plaintiffs have done everything that they can to keep their home addresses from the public (such as removing their addresses from the white pages).

A few courts have recognized the harm. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, an anti-abortion activist group doxed abortion doctors. Some of these doctors were murdered, and the living ones whose personal information was posted online sued and argued that they feared for their safety. The court sided with the doctors. Cases like Planned Parenthood are rare, however, and few plaintiffs have been able to use litigation to combat doxing.

Doxing actually involves a fusion of two types of harm—a risk of physical harm as well as psychological harm consisting of the fear that accompanies this risk. In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis observed back in 1890 that the law had matured sufficiently to recognize not just physical injuries as harms but also the fear of such injuries. They noted that “with the recognition of the legal value of sensations, the protection against actual bodily injury was extended to prohibit mere attempts to do such injury; that is, the putting another in fear of such injury. From the action of battery grew that of assault.” They observed that these developments in the law “came with the advance of civilization.” We will discuss psychological harms later on.

B. Economic Harms

Economic harms involve monetary losses or a loss in the value of something. Privacy violations can result in financial losses that the law has long understood as cognizable harm. Even small economic harms are deemed cognizable by courts. In cases involving identity theft, plaintiffs can prove harm when

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224 See, e.g., Benz v. Wash. Newspaper Publ’g Co., No. 05-cv-01760, 2006 WL 2844896, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006) (refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s public disclosure claim stemming from defendant’s publication of her home address online next to suggestion that she was interested in sex because her home address was not listed in phone book).
225 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
226 Id. at 1077.
227 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 193-94.
228 Id. at 195.
229 LaVigne v. First Cmty. Bancshares, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1146 (D.N.M. 2016) (“Regardless of how small the harm is, it is actual and it is real.”).
identity thieves steal their personal data and use it to conduct fraudulent transactions in their names.230 Difficulties arise if plaintiffs are eventually able to clear up the financial pollution left by identity thieves. Suppose an identity thief takes out a credit card in a victim’s name. The victim spends a considerable amount of time clearing up the mess and establishing that the debt is not the victim’s responsibility. Victims might argue that their time, stress, and anxiety to mitigate future economic harm should be compensated, but courts often look askance at these things as bases for cognizable harm.231 Many cases involving economic harm are data breach cases. As we noted in our article on data breach harms, plaintiffs have difficulty providing a causal link between particular data breaches and identity theft.232 Moreover, in many cases, the identity theft has not yet occurred, and many courts refuse to recognize a harm for the risk of future economic loss.

In cases involving the use and sharing of personal data, courts often refuse to find economic harm. In Dwyer v. American Express Co.,234 a group of cardholders sued American Express for creating profiles of them based on their spending habits and using these profiles for marketing. The cardholders argued that this activity was a violation of the tort of appropriation of name or likeness. They contended that American Express appropriated for its own use or benefit their names or likenesses without their consent. The court, however, concluded that although “each cardholder’s name is valuable to defendants,” the value of the American Express lists was due to its “categorizing and aggregating these names.”235 American Express’s use of the information does “not deprive any of the cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.”236 Thus, the cardholders could not establish harm.

Many privacy violations involve the loss of important opportunities rather than direct financial injuries. We could not find any privacy cases recognizing a harm for loss of productivity or time to deal with privacy violations. In other contexts, however, courts readily recognize a similar type of harm. For example, courts recognize loss of consortium, which is defined as “[t]he benefits that one person, [especially] a spouse, is entitled to receive from another, including companionship, cooperation, affection, aid, financial support, and (between spouses) sexual relations.”237 The concept of “consortium” translates the loss of

230 Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 27, at 754-56 (“Along these lines, courts have recognized claims for privacy violations only where redress is sought for tangible financial losses.”).
231 Id. at 748-53.
232 Id. at 756-60.
233 Id. at 750-52.
235 Id. at 1356.
236 Id. For a different outcome in an action brought by the New York Attorney General under state UDAP law, see Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 8, at 772.
quality time into an economic harm. Although this concept has firm roots in the law, it has not developed to encompass the loss of quality time more generally and has not become part of privacy cases.

Another area of struggle in recognizing economic harms is when risk is involved. As we argued extensively in our article, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, courts are often uncomfortable with risk, and they cling to notions of vested harm even though risk is a concept thoroughly embraced in other domains such as insurance, business, and public health, among others.238 Several cases involve organizations that fail to follow security safeguards, creating risks that make people more vulnerable to potential future harm. Courts are inconsistent in finding harm under these circumstances. For example, the FCRA mandates that no more than five digits from a credit card number can be printed on a receipt, but far more digits are printed on receipts in violation of the mandate. In cases where this provision is violated, some courts have held that there is an injury, and other courts have concluded that there is none.239

Consider these opposing findings. In Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc.,240 the Eleventh Circuit held that printing more digits of a person’s credit card on a receipt is an injury in fact because it is akin to a breach of confidentiality.241 However, in Bassett v. ABM Parking Services, Inc.,242 the Ninth Circuit concluded that printing more credit card digits on a receipt was not a sufficient harm because “Bassett did not allege that another copy of the receipt existed, that his receipt was lost or stolen, that he was the victim of identity theft, or even that another person apart from his lawyers viewed the receipt.”243

At first blush, the Bassett court notes a number of things that seemingly make the risk of future harm from the receipt low. But having the information on the receipt presents a risk if the receipt is lost or thrown away. The law’s restriction of the digits on the receipt is not to shield the data from the customer who bought

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238 Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 27, at 760 (“People have a meaningful interest in avoiding risk. They will go to the doctor to monitor their health. They will pay for insurance to insure against particular risks. Indeed, the insurance market is proof that protection against risk has a monetary value.” (footnote omitted)).


240 922 F. 3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019).

241 Id. at 1191 (“Under these circumstances, we think the risk of disclosure bears a close enough relationship to the disclosure of confidential information actionable at common law to satisfy Article III.”).

242 883 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018).

243 Id. at 783.
something and has the receipt. Instead, it is to enable everyone to be able to throw away receipts without having to worry about shredding them. This commitment promotes good security and alleviates the need for people to go to greater lengths to protect themselves.

In contrast to courts, the FTC has brought enforcement actions against companies with inadequate security in the absence of a data breach. For example, in *Microsoft Corp.*, the FTC faulted Microsoft for failing to follow the promises it made about the security of a single login service. In *Guess.com, Inc.*, the FTC enforced on a similar deception theory. More recently, in *Zoom Video Communications, Inc.*, the FTC used an unfairness theory to fault Zoom for “limiting the intended benefit of a privacy and security safeguard provided by [the] Safari browser.” This created a “vulnerability” on users’ computers, but the enforcement actions were not based on any malicious actors actually exploiting this vulnerability.

C. Reputational Harms

Reputational harms involve injuries to an individual’s reputation and standing in the community. Privacy violations can result in reputational injuries, which have a long history of recognition. Reputational harms impair a person’s ability to maintain “personal esteem in the eyes of others” and can taint a person’s image. They can result in lost business, employment, or social rejection.

The law has treated reputational harms as distinct from physical and property injuries. As Justice Potter Stewart remarked of defamation law, an individual’s right to the protection of his good name reflects “our basic concept of the

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245 Id. at 2-3 (“In truth and in fact, respondent did not maintain a high level of online security by employing sufficient measures reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances to maintain and protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal information obtained from or about consumers in connection with the Passport and Passport Wallet services.”).


247 Id. (“In particular, Respondents failed to implement procedures that were reasonable and appropriate to: (1) detect reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities of their website and application and (2) prevent visitors to the website from exploiting such vulnerabilities and gaining access to sensitive consumer data.”).


249 Id. at 8.

250 Id. (discussing user susceptibility to phishing).

251 SOLove, UNdErSTUnding PRIVacy, supra note 28, at 175.
essential dignity and worth of every human being.”252 Under the umbrella of defamation law, the torts of libel and slander impose liability when a person makes a “false and defamatory statement concerning another.”253 The tort of false light, which emerged from Warren and Brandeis’s The Right to Privacy, protects against widely publicizing “a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light” that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”254

A long-standing rule in defamation law is that certain defamatory falsehoods—such as the claim that someone has a sexually transmitted disease—warrant the recovery of damages without evidentiary proof.255 Although presumed damages have been disallowed for defamation lawsuits by public officials and public figures, such damages are permitted in a “vast number of cases.”256 Additionally, in other cases where plaintiffs must prove reputational damage but cannot do so, they still may obtain “nominal damages”—typically one dollar.257 Although common in defamation cases, nominal damages are not restricted to defamation.258 As Megan Cambre notes, “An award of nominal damages recognizes that a plaintiff’s right has been violated. It further provides recovery for that legal wrong.”259 There is currently a circuit split on whether nominal damages are sufficient to confer standing.260

In at least one case, Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp.,261 a court recognized reputational harm caused indirectly when personal data was misused by a social media platform to grow membership in the platform’s user base.262 In Perkins, the professional social network site downloaded users’ email contacts and used them without permission to ask users’ contacts to connect on the site. Users sued

254 Id. § 652E.
255 Mike Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1492, 1492 (2014) (“Despite heavy criticism, the presumed damages rule has had remarkable staying power in American law.”).
256 Id. (discussing how “the presumed damages rule continues to apply in many jurisdictions” when there are no intersecting First Amendment interests).
257 Megan E. Cambre, Note, A Single Symbolic Dollar: How Nominal Damages Can Keep Lawsuits Alive, 52 GA. L. REV. 933, 936-37 (2018) (“In a wide variety of cases, every federal appellate court has upheld or granted awards that consist of only nominal damages.”).
258 Id. at 937.
259 Id. at 949 (footnote omitted).
260 Id. at 947-48 (discussing how nominal damages alone are insufficient to establish standing in the Sixth Circuit but can establish standing in the Third Circuit). But see Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 802 (2021) (holding “that a request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element of standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed violation of a legal right.”).
262 Id. at 1252 (“This type of reputational harm,” uniquely associated with LinkedIn’s sending of reminder emails, “is precisely the harm against which the common law right to publicity seeks to protect.”).
LinkedIn on the grounds that sending repeated invitations to their contacts caused them reputational harm because their contacts might think that they sent the repeated invitations. The court concluded that they had alleged cognizable harm: LinkedIn engaged in misleading commercial speech causing injury.263

A significant risk of reputational harm can be created by sloppy, incomplete, and incorrect records. Many privacy laws require that organizations adhere to the principle of “data quality”—keeping data accurate, complete, and up-to-date.264 Courts are inconsistent in whether inaccuracies in data constitutes a cognizable harm. To return to Spokeo, the Court was skeptical about whether inaccurate data rose to the level of being cognizable. Recall that the plaintiff had complained about errors in his consumer report that falsely stated that he was married and had professional degrees. The Court did not examine the specific errors that the plaintiff complained about. Instead, the Court spoke generally about errors: “An example that comes readily to mind is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”265 Unfortunately, the Court chose a rather poor example, as a lot can be inferred about a person based on their zip code, including demographic generalizations about race, religion, ethnicity, and income.

The Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the errors in the plaintiff’s records were sufficiently harmful.266 On remand, the Ninth Circuit held Robins had alleged a cognizable harm.267 The court noted that accuracy and other components of data quality involved “interests protected by FCRA’s procedural requirements are ‘real,’ rather than purely legal creations.”268 According to the court, “given the ubiquity and importance of consumer reports in modern life—in employment decisions, in loan applications, in home purchases, and much more—the real-world implications of material inaccuracies in those reports seem patent on their face.”269 Further, the court observed that “[c]ourts have long entertained causes of action to vindicate intangible harms caused by certain untruthful disclosures about

263 Id. at 1252-55 (recognizing plaintiffs’ alleged reputational harm as cognizable and denying LinkedIn’s motions to dismiss).
264 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (describing, under the FCRA, consumer reporting agencies’ legal requirements related to data accuracy disputes); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (making funds contingent, under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, on educational agencies and institutions providing opportunity for parents of students to challenge inaccurate student records and the correction or removal of inaccurate records).
266 Id. at 334 (“We therefore vacate the decision below and remand for the Ninth Circuit to consider both aspects of the injury-in-fact requirement.”).
268 Id. at 1114.
269 Id.
individuals, and we respect Congress’s judgment that a similar harm would result from inaccurate credit reporting.\textsuperscript{270}

However, courts are more reluctant to find harm for errors in records without disclosure to others. These situations involve a significant risk of harm, so they are akin to the future risk of harm cases in data breach litigation. A key case regarding erroneous records is the recent Supreme Court decision in \textit{TransUnion}.\textsuperscript{271} As discussed earlier, TransUnion falsely noted in the plaintiffs’ credit records that they were potential terrorists. The Court held that even information this damaging does not create a concrete injury unless it is disclosed to third parties.\textsuperscript{272}

Finding specific harms for incorrect information in records can be challenging because errors or omissions could lead to a variety of consequences at some point in the future, long beyond the statute of limitations for most causes of action.\textsuperscript{273} Suppose, for example, that a credit report erroneously states that a person went bankrupt. Whether the error causes any harm will depend upon how the report is used. A wise person would likely refrain from seeking a loan while the error remains in the report, as this could result in denial of the loan or a higher interest rate. For example, in \textit{Sarver v. Experian Information Solutions},\textsuperscript{274} the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish actual damages based on an inaccurate bankruptcy notation in his credit report because he had not yet applied for credit from a third party.\textsuperscript{275} But to have courts recognize harm, should a person have to go through the charade of applying for a loan in order to generate proof of economic harm?

In \textit{TransUnion}, TransUnion’s FCRA violations also involved the failure to notify the plaintiffs that their records labeled them as potential terrorists and to inform them about their rights to respond to this matter. The Supreme Court’s view that there is no harm for these violations prevents plaintiffs from enforcing these provisions of the law, which exist to help people prevent harmful errors from wreaking havoc on their lives. Such a view is akin to saying that cancer does not cause harm until it metastasizes and spreads to vital organs. Recognizing harm before it becomes more severe is essential to preventing needless injury and suffering. To use another analogy, waiting until a train has gone over a cliff is a foolhardy trigger for a corrective intervention. A clear risk is sufficiently concrete.

\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Id.} at 1115.

\textsuperscript{271} \textit{TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez}, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021) (holding that only class members for whom TransUnion provided “misleading credit reports to third-party businesses” demonstrated reputational harm and consequently possessed standing to sue).

\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Id.} (holding that majority of 8,185 class members did not have concrete injury because TransUnion had not provided credit reports for these individuals to third-party businesses).

\textsuperscript{273} See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Id.} at 2210-11 (holding that plaintiffs’ whose credit reports were not provided to third-party businesses failed to “demonstrate that the risk of future harm materialized”).

\textsuperscript{274} 390 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2004).

\textsuperscript{275} \textit{Id.} at 971.
Inaccuracies create risk of future harm that are difficult to predict, but they are still harmful in the present day because they cause a loss of data hygiene.\(^\text{276}\) Imagine that someone that you invited into your house takes all your clothes out of the drawers and closets and throws them on the floor. The person removes all your books from the shelves and shoves them in a corner. The person tracks dirt all over your floors, though the dirt does not permanently stain them. No structural damage is done to the house, but it is now a mess. You have been harmed even though the value of your home is not diminished. You have suffered a loss. You would likely find the mess and dirt in your home to be unpleasant. You might not invite guests over to your home until it is cleaned. The harm is not the diminishment in value of the house; it is the interference with your enjoyment of your home as well as the time and expense to clean up the mess. When data is sullied with misleading or incorrect information, there is a similar mess—just one in digital space rather than in a physical place. And, unlike in real space, the contamination can be difficult to eradicate. It can be hard for individuals to find out about errors, and, when they do, third parties will ignore requests to correct them without the real risk of litigation costs.

D. Psychological Harms

Psychological harms involve a range of negative mental responses, such as anxiety, anguish, concern, irritation, disruption, or aggravation. Although there is a wide array of feelings that can arise from privacy violations, most can be categorized into one of two general types—emotional distress or disturbance. Emotional distress involves painful or unpleasant feelings. Disturbance involves disruption to tranquility and peace of mind.

1. Emotional Distress

One of the most common types of harm caused by privacy violations is emotional distress.\(^\text{277}\) Emotional distress encompasses a wide range of emotions, including annoyance, frustration, fear, embarrassment, anger, and various degrees of anxiety.

The impact of emotional harm varies depending upon the emotion triggered. Fear can be among the most damaging emotions given its impact on people’s life choices. One of us (Citron) has chronicled the devastating impact that fear has had on women who faced a perfect storm of impersonation, doxing, nude photos, and threats online.\(^\text{278}\) Privacy violations can cause emotional distress that


\(^{277}\) See Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 27, at 746 (discussing how vast majority of states allow plaintiffs to recover for emotional distress under privacy tort law).

\(^{278}\) Citron, Hate Crimes, supra note 155, at 35-55 (describing threats and harassment experienced online by prominent tech blogger, law student, and revenge porn victim).
can impede someone’s life as much as certain physical injuries. The emotional
toll of identity theft can adversely affect victims’ work and relationships.279
Courts, however, have struggled with how to recognize emotional distress as
a cognizable harm, resulting in a messy and inconsistent body of case law.280 In
one sphere of tort law—the privacy torts spawned from Warren and Brandeis’s
article—courts have consistently recognized emotional distress alone as
cognizable harm. The privacy torts, however, are more of an exception than the
rule. The special oasis afforded to the privacy torts likely is due to their genesis
from the Warren and Brandeis article, which emphatically noted that privacy
violations primarily involve an “injury to the feelings.”281 Privacy invasions
interfered with a person’s “estimate of himself,” inflicting “mental pain and
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”282
Specifically addressing judicial reluctance to recognizing emotional harm,
Warren and Brandeis began by noting how the common law had matured to
recognize and redress a variety of types of intangible harms beyond physical
ones. “[I]n early times,” they wrote, “the law gave a remedy only for physical
interference with life and property.”283 Subsequently, the law expanded to
recognize incorporeal injuries: “From the action of battery grew that of assault.
Much later there came a qualified protection of the individual against offensive
noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and excessive vibration. The law of
nuisance was developed.”284 They noted how defamation law protected a
person’s name without requiring proof of financial or physical harm.285 In
essence, Warren and Brandeis argued that recognition of emotional harm was a
sign of a more advanced civilization and that, by implication, failure to recognize

Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61, 68-81 (2009) (describing how
anonymous mobs threaten, harass, and invade the privacy of women, among other Internet
users, online).
279 ERIKA HARRELL & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DOJ, VICTIMS OF
[https://perma.cc/ZSQ2-EDTZ] (presenting survey results showing that, among identify theft
victims, approximately 1% reported “significant problems at work or school,” 4% reported
“significant problems with family members or friends,” and 36% reported that their level of
emotional distress was either moderate or severe).
280 Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 27, at 746 (discussing how courts
frequently dismiss anxiety as a cognizable harm in the context of data-breach cases, while
accepting “various forms of emotional distress, including anxiety, as sufficient harm” in other
contexts).
281 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 197 (describing how law at the time did not
recognize any “principle upon which compensation can be granted for mere injury to the
feelings”).
282 Id. at 196-97.
283 Id. at 193
284 Id. at 194 (footnote omitted).
285 Id. (describing the development of the law of slander and libel); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (providing that defamation liability includes
redress for emotional distress caused by the defamatory publication).
emotional harm would be crude and uncivilized. Because Warren and Brandeis tied the privacy torts so tightly to emotional harm, it would be somewhat odd and nonsensical for courts to recognize the privacy torts but not allow pure emotional harms for recovery.

Privacy tort cases readily allow emotional distress as the sole basis of harm.286 Cases “collectively reject any suggestion that special damages or physical injuries are a threshold pre-condition to recovery.”287 Courts have recognized as cognizable harms feelings of violation, mortification, fear, humiliation, and embarrassment, among other things.288 The Restatement (Second) of Torts clearly indicates that plaintiffs can recover for emotional distress alone.289

In countless privacy tort cases, courts do not question the viability of the harm.290 The issue is so clear and settled that courts do not even bother to mention it. Oddly, beyond the four privacy torts, courts view pure emotional distress with skepticism. Perhaps this odd disjunction is due to judges being relatively unfamiliar with the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts, and thus lacking an appreciation of the clear recognition of emotional distress in these cases.

In contract law, courts have been reluctant to recognize emotional harm, but they have shifted on this issue to move toward a greater allowance of recovery for emotional harm. The general rule is that emotional distress damages are not permitted for breach of contract.291 The rule emerges from the famous English case from 1854, Hadley v. Baxendale.292 Although Hadley is the prevailing rule, it was once considered a radical departure from the existing rule that damages for breach of contract could encompass all losses suffered by the plaintiff, including emotional distress.293 Hadley was part of a general movement in

286 Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (Ky, 1927) (holding that individual whose right to privacy is violated “is entitled to recover substantial damages, although the only damages suffered by him resulted from mental anguish”); Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 27, at 769-71 (discussing courts’ recognition of “harm based on pure emotional distress or psychological impairment” in context of privacy torts and breach-of-confidentiality tort).
287 DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 3:8 (2020) (footnotes omitted).
288 Id. (listing types of emotional distress that courts have recognized as cognizable harms).
289 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H cmt. b (“The plaintiff may also recover damages for emotional distress or personal humiliation that he proves to have been actually suffered by him, if it is of a kind that normally results from such an invasion and it is normal and reasonable in its extent.”).
290 Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 27, at 769-71.
292 (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145; 9 Ex. 341, 341 (limiting damages for breach of contract to those which each party reasonably would have anticipated when making contract).
England to limit the discretion of juries and to shift more power to judges.  

Justifications for the Hadley rule in U.S. contract law are based on fears of fabricated claims, disproportionate compensation, and unforeseeable damages.

Nonetheless, courts have been making a number of exceptions to the Hadley rule, such as “when the breach is willful or wanton in nature or if the breach causes bodily harm.” Another exception is when the “contract is personal in nature,” such as contracts to take photographs, to supply wedding dresses, or to perform cosmetic surgery. As one commentator has noted, “courts have frequently allowed non-economic damages in breach of contract actions, despite forging the limiting rule, and clearly have not applied it inflexibly.”

Although the law of recovery of emotional distress damages from breach of contracts is in flux and does not clearly encompass privacy and security issues, there is enough of a foundation in the law for courts to at least explore the issue as law develops.

2. Disturbance

Disturbance involves unwanted intrusions that disturb tranquility, interrupt activities, sap time, and otherwise serve as a nuisance. Many courts have held that unsolicited telephone calls and text messages in violation of the TCPA constitute injuries in fact sufficient for standing. As one court explained, the harm can involve “wasting the consumer’s time” and “interruption and distraction.” In Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group LLC, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[u]nsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients.” Other TCPA cases are similar. As the Fourth Circuit explained

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294 Id. at 486-91 (discussing judges’ increasing control in mid-19th century over setting damages, a determination that had been “entirely the province of the jury”).

295 Id. at 493 (discussing justifications for “general rule” that damages for “mental or emotional distress in breach of contract actions” are not available).

296 Id. (discussing exceptions to general rule that damages for breach of contract do not encompass emotional distress); see also 11 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 59.1, at 539 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2005) (exceptions to Hadley rule include “(1) cases where such suffering accompanies a bodily injury; and (2) where mental distress was caused intentionally or in a manner that is wanton or reckless”).

297 Kent, supra note 293, at 501 (discussing how courts award noneconomic damages for breach of personal contracts).

298 Id. at 493 (quoting E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.17 (3d ed. 1999)).


300 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017).

301 Id. at 1043.

302 See, e.g., Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 351-52 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that intangible injuries, such as nuisance and invasion of privacy, constituted very harm that Congress sought to prevent in enacting the TCPA); Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that unsolicited text messages, like unwanted
in *Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C.*,\(^{303}\) the harm the TCPA addresses is receiving calls that people “previously took steps to avoid.”\(^{304}\) Rejecting the notion that this harm was too intangible to be cognizable, the court stated: “There is nothing ethereal or abstract about it.”\(^{305}\)

Some courts, however, have rejected harm for certain types of communications under the TCPA, such as text messages. In *Salcedo v. Hanna*,\(^{306}\) the Eleventh Circuit found that the receipt of a single text message does not constitute a concrete harm because a text message is different than a phone call or fax because a text message was nothing more than a momentary annoyance.\(^{307}\) In contrast, in *Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc.*,\(^{308}\) the Seventh Circuit concluded that unwanted text messages cause harm because the “undesired buzzing of a cell phone from a text message, like the unwanted ringing of a phone from a call, is an intrusion into peace and quiet in a realm that is private and personal, [which] is the very harm that Congress addressed [in the TCPA].”\(^{309}\)

Some courts have been skeptical of harm for the receipt of spam. In *Cherny v. Emigrant Bank*,\(^{310}\) the defendant bank improperly shared its customers’ email addresses with third parties, in violation of its privacy policy.\(^{311}\) As a result, the plaintiff received spam. The plaintiff sued the bank based on breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. The court held that “[t]he receipt of spam by itself, however, does not constitute a sufficient injury entitling Cherny to compensable relief.”\(^{312}\)

E. **Autonomy Harms**

Autonomy harms involve restricting, undermining, inhibiting, or unduly influencing people’s choices. People are prevented from making choices that advance their preferences. People are either directly denied the freedom to decide or are tricked into thinking that they are freely making choices when they are not.

There are many types of autonomy harms: (1) coercion—the impairment on people’s freedom to act or choose; (2) manipulation—the undue influence over

\(^{303}\) 925 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2019).
\(^{304}\) *Id.* at 653.
\(^{305}\) *Id.*
\(^{306}\) 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019).
\(^{307}\) *Id.* at 1167 (describing text messages as qualitatively different from types of disturbances that give standing under Eleventh Circuit precedent).
\(^{308}\) 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020).
\(^{309}\) *Id.* at 462 n.1.
\(^{310}\) 604 F. Supp. 2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
\(^{311}\) *Id.* at 607 (describing bank’s alleged violation of their privacy policy).
\(^{312}\) *Id.* at 609.
people’s behavior or decision-making; (3) failure to inform—the failure to provide people with sufficient information to make decisions; (4) thwarted expectations—doing activities that undermine people’s choices; (5) lack of control—the inability to make meaningful choices about one’s data or prevent the potential future misuse of it; (6) chilling effects—inhibiting people from engaging in lawful activities.

1. Coercion

Coercion involves a constraint or undue pressure on one’s freedom to act or choose. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act of 1996 prohibits conditioning medical treatment on agreeing to provide data for marketing or other uses.313 The California Consumer Privacy Act restricts penalizing people who exercise their privacy rights with higher prices.314

We could not find many cases involving coercion, but we surmise that coercion would readily be recognized as causing harm. Coercion is visceral. It has all of the classical attributes that make it readily cognizable. Many problematic privacy practices, however, are manipulative rather than coercive, and manipulation exists more in the hazy zone for recognizing harm.

2. Manipulation

Manipulation involves undue influence over a person’s behavior or decision-making. Manipulation is one of the most prevalent forms of autonomy harm in the consumer privacy context. There is a spectrum of ways to influence decisions and behavior. Distinguishing between acceptable influencing (persuasion and nudging) and unacceptable influencing (manipulation) is challenging and contestable.

Ido Kilovaty contends that manipulation “impairs the ability of individuals to make independent and informed opinions and decisions. . . . It effectively deprives individuals of their agency by distorting and perverting the way in which individuals typically make decisions.”315 According to Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum, manipulation “is a kind of influence—an attempt to change the way someone would behave absent the manipulator’s interventions.”316 They distinguish manipulation from persuasion and coercion: “Persuading someone leaves the choice of the matter entirely up to them, while coercing someone robs them of choice.”317 A coerced person understands that they are coerced; on the other hand, a manipulated person might not realize that they are being turned into a puppet:

317 Id. at 15.
Coercion is blunt and forthright: one almost always knows one is being coerced. Manipulation is subtle and sneaky. Rather than simply depriving a person of options as the coercer does, the manipulator infiltrates their decision-making process, disposing it to the manipulator’s ends, which may or may not match their own.318

According to Cass Sunstein, manipulation involves “an effort to influence people’s choices counts as manipulative to the extent that it does not sufficiently engage or appeal to their capacity for reflection and deliberation.”319

In a survey of various definitions of manipulation, Shaun Spencer observes that they all share some common elements: “[T]hey all contain the notion of circumventing the subject’s rational decision-making process” and most require intent to manipulate.320 Drawing from these definitions, Spencer defines manipulation as “an intentional attempt to influence a subject’s behavior by exploiting a bias or vulnerability.”321

Ryan Calo contends that manipulation “creates subjective privacy harms insofar as the consumer has a vague sense that information is being collected and used to her disadvantage, but never truly knows how or when.”322 Manipulation “also creates objective privacy harm when a firm uses personal information to extract as much rent as possible from the consumer.”323 According to Sunstein, the harm of manipulation “is that it can violate people’s autonomy (by making them instruments of another’s will) and offend their dignity (by failing to treat them with respect).”324 Tal Zarsky contends that manipulation is harmful because “[m]anipulative practices impair the process of choosing, subjecting it to the preferences and influences of a third party, as opposed to those of the individuals themselves.”325

Manipulation can affect not just individuals but also create societal harm, as people’s decisions can affect not just themselves but society as well. The Cambridge Analytica incident involved the use of personal data on a mass scale to influence people’s decisions in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and in the United Kingdom’s vote for Brexit.326

318 Id. at 17.
321 Id. at 990.
323 Id.
324 Sunstein, supra note 319, at 217.
The FTC has recognized that trade practices that prevent consumers from “effectively making their own decisions” are ones that cause substantial injury.\textsuperscript{327} “Most of the Commission’s unfairness matters are brought under these circumstances. They are brought, not to second-guess the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.”\textsuperscript{328}

When it comes to private litigation, manipulation has not been the subject of many privacy cases. As Cass Sunstein notes, “[b]ecause of the pervasiveness of manipulation, and because it often does little or no harm, the legal system usually does not attempt to prevent it.”\textsuperscript{329} Spencer is also skeptical about the law’s ability to regulate manipulation because “it will be difficult, if not impossible, to establish that the allegedly manipulative stimulus caused the consumer harm.”\textsuperscript{330} People respond very differently to manipulation, and people might not even realize that they are being manipulated.

3. Failure to Inform

Failure to inform involves failing to provide individuals with information to assist them in making informed choices about their personal data or exercise of their privacy rights. Failure to inform involves autonomy because it limits people’s ability to make choices consistent with their preferences.

Courts are inconsistent in recognizing harm for failing to inform. In \textit{Robertson v. Allied Solutions, LLC},\textsuperscript{331} for example, the plaintiff Robertson applied for a job at Allied. Allied obtained a background check on Robertson. Although the FCRA requires that applicants be provided a copy of the report and information about their FCRA rights, Allied failed to provide either to Robertson. The Seventh Circuit held that she was harmed because she “was denied information that could have helped her craft a response to Allied’s concerns.”\textsuperscript{332} Even if the information in the report is true, the court noted, a consumer might want to “bring additional facts to the employer’s attention that put matters in a better light for the consumer.”\textsuperscript{333}

In \textit{Long v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority},\textsuperscript{334} an employer rejected applicants based on background checks that turned up information about convictions involving illegal drugs. Although the FCRA requires that the applicants be provided a copy of their background check report and a written statement of their FCRA rights, the employer failed to provide

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{327} FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 132, at 1074.
\item \textsuperscript{328} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{329} Sunstein, supra note 319, at 219.
\item \textsuperscript{330} Spencer, supra note 320, at 997.
\item \textsuperscript{331} 902 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2018).
\item \textsuperscript{332} Id. at 697.
\item \textsuperscript{333} Id. at 696.
\item \textsuperscript{334} 903 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2018).
\end{itemize}
The court concluded that the failure to provide a copy of the reports harmed plaintiffs by denying them the right to “see or respond” to them. But regarding the failure to inform the applicants about their FCRA rights, the court concluded that they lacked standing because the plaintiffs knew their FCRA rights “to file this lawsuit within the prescribed limitations period, so they were not injured.”

When individuals are not informed of their rights or not given important information, they are harmed because they lose their ability to assert their rights at the appropriate times, to respond effectively to issues involving their personal data, or to make meaningful decisions regarding the use of their data. Laws that mandate that people be informed of their rights are designed to empower individuals and arm them with appropriate knowledge. The holding in Long creates a closed circle where plaintiffs will never be able to enforce the FCRA’s rights disclosure requirement. If the plaintiffs do not know about their rights, then they likely will not know they can bring a lawsuit. If they bring a lawsuit, then courts will throw it out because they knew enough about their rights to sue.

In cases where people are not informed that their personal data was used to make a decision about them, they are harmed because informing them is to allow them to understand how their data affected a decision and to give them an opportunity to respond. This response might not be a direct refutation of the data. The response could take many forms, from providing additional data to explaining a situation to raising other unrelated considerations that might outweigh the negative impact of the data. Even if the response might fail to change minds, people should still have a chance to make their case. By way of analogy, denial of people’s day in court is harmful even if they would likely have lost their case. The harm is in their losing their right to be heard.

4. Thwarted Expectations

The harm caused by thwarted expectations involves the undermining of people’s choices, such as breaking promises made about the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data. Thwarted expectations is an autonomy harm because it results in people’s inability to make choices in accordance with their preferences.

Courts are generally dismissive of thwarted expectations as a cognizable harm unless it is accompanied by other harms, such as reputational, economic, or emotional harm. As Margot Kaminski aptly observes, “in the information privacy context, the Supreme Court and others have repeatedly asked for privacy plaintiffs to show something more.”

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335 Id. at 317.
336 Id. at 324.
337 Id. at 325.
When data is used improperly without people’s consent, courts tend to look for economic harm rather than recognize that improper use of personal data can be harmful to autonomy. In In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, plaintiffs sued Google for using their personal data in different ways than had been promised, but the court found that they lacked standing because they failed to allege how Google’s “use of the information deprived the plaintiff of the information’s economic value.” In Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., the court also focused on economic value when it concluded that plaintiffs suffered harm when Facebook used their “likes” to promote products without their permission. The court held that “personalized endorsement” to friends “has concrete, provable value in the economy at large.”

Generally, courts have not found harm when companies share personal data with third parties in violation of their privacy policies. In Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, for example, the court concluded that plaintiffs suffered no harm when a bank sold their personal data to third parties in violation of its privacy policy: “[C]lass members were merely offered products and services which they were free to decline. This does not qualify as actual harm.”

Plaintiffs have fared better when statutes are the source of the expectation that data will not be shared. In In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, the court concluded that Viacom’s improper collection of personal data about the videos people watched on its website and its disclosure of the data to Google was a cognizable harm. The court noted that “when it comes to laws that protect privacy, a focus on ‘economic loss is misplaced’ and that ‘the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information’ was ‘a clear de facto injury.’” In Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded that sharing personal data with a third party in violation of the VPPA was a harm because “both the common law and the literal understanding of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.”

In contract law, courts are adamant about focusing on economic harm. In In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Privacy Litigation, Google tracked users’ Internet activity in violation of its promise to respect users’ “do not track”

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340 Id. at *5.
341 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
342 Id. at 799-801.
343 Id. at 799.
345 Id. at 102.
346 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016).
347 Id. at 272-74.
348 876 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2017).
settings. The court held that the plaintiffs could not prove harm because they could not demonstrate that Google interfered with their ability to monetize their personal data. In a series of cases involving airlines that shared passenger data with the government in violation of their privacy policies, courts held that the plaintiffs failed to show harm. For example, in In re Jet Blue Airways Corp. Privacy Litigation, the court held that recovery in contract “allows only for economic losses.”

Many courts fixate on whether plaintiffs have read and relied on the privacy policy of a company, but the privacy policy plays a small role in forming people’s privacy expectations. This is especially true because hardly anyone reads privacy policies, and it is not rational to do so given the vast number of organizations collecting data about people. Instead of focusing on the promises in privacy policies in isolation, courts should consider more broadly people’s reasonable expectations regarding privacy. Website or browser privacy settings, company advertising, statements, and other design elements have an influence on people’s expectations. Courts, however, will not go this far, and cases to date have focused mainly on violations of explicit promises in privacy policies or statutory requirements.

However, there is a basis in contract law to recognize thwarted expectations as a harm. When a party to a contract fails to perform a term in a contract, even if it is a matter of mere personal taste that lacks value, courts will still enforce the term. In construction contract cases, for example, the difference in the value of property with and without the plaintiff’s preferences might be slight or nil. Instead of assessing damages based on the difference in actual value, courts assess damages for the “cost of completion” because the “fair market value of a home does not necessarily reflect the value to the homeowner.” As Judge

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351 Id. at 442 (noting that their ability to monetize was neither “diminished or lost”).
353 In re Jet Blue, 379 F. Supp. 2d 299.
354 Id. at 326 (quoting Young v. DOJ, 882 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1989)).
356 Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note 145, at 1881.
357 Hartzog, supra note 355, at 1650.
358 Id. at 1653.
Cardozo famously stated in *Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent*,³⁶⁰ in a construction contract, “[t]here is no general license to install whatever, in the builder’s judgment, may be regarded as ‘just as good.’”³⁶¹ These cases suggest that, while the failure to respect people’s preferences is a cognizable harm, even these preferences do not add any economic value. For many people, their privacy preferences are an important consideration about whether or not to use a particular service or product.

In contrast to contract law, the FTC readily enforces for violations of privacy policies. Under the FTC’s enforcement of the prohibition on “deceptive” acts or practices under section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has viewed broken promises in privacy notices to be sufficient for harm.³⁶² Deception need not just involve statements made in privacy notices, as the FTC has found other statements about privacy to be deceptive.³⁶³ The very crux of deception as used in the context of broken promises is that the harm is in personal data being used in ways that differ from how companies informed people it would be used. One of us (Solove) has argued that the FTC could and should extend its jurisprudence further to pursue cases where people’s expectations were thwarted even if no false statements are made.³⁶⁴

Critics claim that the FTC should curtail the extent to which it recognizes harm for thwarted expectations. James Cooper and Joshua Wright contend that the FTC has become undisciplined about how it recognizes privacy harms.³⁶⁵ They argue that “unexpected data practices do not always equate to privacy harm.”³⁶⁶ They use an example of a smart oven app that records oven usage data, which is improperly shared with third parties. They argue that the FTC should not recognize harm in this case because the app’s thwarting of privacy expectations “may be mediated through the market or the legal system.”³⁶⁷ They argue that “a focus on expectations, rather than harm, necessarily will be overly inclusive.”³⁶⁸

The market, however, is not adequate to address the problems with the app. When people use an app that thwarts their privacy expectations, people’s ability to assess the risks of using the app is impeded. The market cannot work fairly if people’s expectations are completely wrong, if people lack knowledge of

³⁶⁰ 230 N.Y. 239 (1921).
³⁶¹ Id. at 243.
³⁶³ Id. at 630-33.
³⁶⁴ Id. at 667-69.
³⁶⁶ Id. at 480.
³⁶⁷ Id.
³⁶⁸ Id.
potential future uses of their personal data, and if people have no way to balance the benefits and risks of using products or services.

5. Lack of Control

Lack of control involves the inability to make certain choices about one’s personal data or to be able to curtail certain uses of the data. Many statutes provide certain rights or restrictions regarding the retention and use of personal data independently from what is promised in an organization’s privacy policy. The harm for violations of these rights or restrictions is not thwarted expectations, as people might not have known about these statutes. Instead, the harm involves the loss of control over personal data.

Courts have been inconsistent in recognizing the loss of control as a harm. In *Braitberg v. Charter Communications, Inc.*,369 for example, the Eighth Circuit denied standing to plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against a cable company for failing to delete their personal data in violation of the Cable Communications Policy Act.370 The court concluded that the mere improper retention of data was not sufficient, by itself, to create a “material risk of harm.”371 In *Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.*,372 the court denied standing to a cable subscriber suing a cable company for improperly retaining personal data under the Cable Act because there was no harm for merely holding data.373 Similarly, in *Rivera v. Google, Inc.*,374 the court denied standing to plaintiffs who sued Google for storing their biometric data without their consent, a violation of the Illinois BIPA.375 The court concluded that there was no harm because the data was not shared with anyone.376 However, there are other courts that recognize the loss of control as a harm sufficient to justify standing.377

Losing control over our personal data constitutes an injury to our peace of mind and our ability to manage risk. In the clutches of organizations, personal data can be used for a wide array of purposes for an indefinite period of time. Privacy laws seek to regulate data flows to protect individuals from potential downstream uses. The practicalities of litigation, which are constrained by

369 836 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016).
370 Id. at 930.
371 Id.
372 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017).
373 Id. at 910-11.
375 Id. at 1005.
376 Id.
377 In contrast to *Gubala* and *Rivera*, the Illinois Supreme Court in *Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.* concluded that plaintiffs seeking relief under BIPA “need not allege some actual injury or adverse effect” to be considered aggrieved persons. 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 40. *Rosenbach* diverges from *Gubala* and *Rivera* because it involves a holding that an actual injury is not required by BIPA, and standing is not required in state court. Id.
statutes of limitation, require an assessment of the situation before the end of the data life cycle.

Warren and Brandeis based their argument upon an English case from 1848—Prince Albert v. Strange. This case involved a suit at equity to prevent William Strange from publishing a catalog describing etchings that the royal couple made about their family. The court enjoined the publication of the catalog. Warren and Brandeis argued that the case involved the protection of “inviolate personality.” The case did not involve lurid images or embarrassing secrets (they were endearing hand drawn images of a mother with her child), and the couple had shared these personal etchings with loved ones. Thus, the harm, as imagined by Warren and Brandeis, was the undermining of control over the extent to which personal information is circulated. This type of harm should be enough.

6. Chilling Effects

Chilling effects involve harm caused by inhibiting people from engaging in certain civil liberties, such as free speech, political participation, religious activity, free association, freedom of belief, and freedom to explore ideas. As Frederick Schauer observes: “The very essence of a chilling effect is an act of deterrence.” According to Neil Richards, the failure to protect privacy can chill individuals from engaging in reading or researching. In cases involving rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, courts have sometimes recognized harm when people are chilled from exercising rights, such as free speech or free association.

Chilling effects have an impact on individual speakers and society at large as they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed and the nature of expression that is shared. Monitoring of communications can make people less likely to

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379 Id. at 295; 2 DE G. & SM. at 656.
380 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 205.
381 See id. at 202.
385 Solove, First Amendment, supra note 382, at 143-51.
386 Richards, supra note 384, at 180 (arguing that chilling effect pits “the intellectual development of our citizenry at risk”); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 419, 419 n.199 (2008) (describing how chilling free expression impedes “intellectual exploration”); Cohen, supra note 157, at 1425 (“The opportunity to experiment with
engage in certain conversations, express certain views, or share personal information.\textsuperscript{387} Consider the impact of the news that the gay dating app Grindr had shared subscribers’ HIV status with analytics firms. Subscribers expressed profound dismay. Individuals told the press that they would no longer share that information on that app or any dating app—it was simply not worth the possibility that employers or others could find out their HIV status and hold it against them.\textsuperscript{388}

Courts have been uneasy about recognizing chilling effects, and the law has wavered. In \textit{Laird v. Tatum},\textsuperscript{389} the Supreme Court limited the chilling effect doctrine by concluding that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”\textsuperscript{390} Courts have subsequently struggled to determine the line between an objective and subjective chill.\textsuperscript{391}

Despite the somewhat murky status of the law, the concept of chilling is widely accepted even if its precise contours remain unclear. Although the chilling effect doctrine emerges from cases involving the First Amendment, the concept could certainly be applied to other legal contexts.\textsuperscript{392}

\textbf{F. Discrimination Harms}

Discrimination harms involve entrenching inequality and disadvantaging people based on gender, race, national origin, sexual orientation, age, group membership, or other characteristics or affiliations. Discrimination harms thwart people’s ability to have an equal chance to obtain and keep jobs, to secure affordable insurance, to find housing, and to pursue other crucial life opportunities. Because discrimination harms disproportionately affect marginalized communities, they have systemic effects on these communities and broader negative societal effects.

Discrimination often involves the curtailment of autonomy, but it differs from autonomy harms in that discrimination involves unequal treatment that creates shame and stigma as well as societal consequences of further entrenching disadvantages to marginalized groups. Discrimination creates harm far beyond lost opportunities; it leaves a searing wound of stigma, shame, and loss of esteem preferences is a vital part of the process of learning, and learning to choose, that every individual must undergo.”).

\textsuperscript{387} \textit{Richards}, \textit{supra} note 384, at 180 (“When the right to privacy is eroded or stripped away, people are more likely to abandon or curtail their exploration of unpopular and unorthodox points of view.”).

\textsuperscript{388} \textit{See} Danielle Keats Citron, \textit{A New Compact for Sexual Privacy}, 62 \textit{Wm. & Mary L. Rev.} 1763, 1795 (2021) [hereinafter Citron, \textit{New Compact}].

\textsuperscript{389} 408 U.S. 1 (1972).

\textsuperscript{390} \textit{Id.} at 13-14.

\textsuperscript{391} Solove, \textit{First Amendment}, \textit{supra} note 382, at 143-44 (describing how courts have not found injury from surveillance without evidence of deterrence).

\textsuperscript{392} \textit{See generally} Penney, \textit{supra} note 383 (describing various types of legal chilling effects).
that can turn into permanent scars. It produces psychological harm of a distinct and distinctly harmful type—knowing that one is viewed as less than human, as not worthy of respect.

The misuse of personal data can be particularly costly to women, sexual and gender minorities, and non-White people given the prevalence of destructive stereotypes and the disproportionate surveillance of women and marginalized communities in their intimate lives.\footnote{Citron, New Compact, supra note 388, at 1770. One of us (Citron) has explored the integral connection between privacy violations and discrimination throughout her scholarship. See generally, e.g., Citron, The Fight for Privacy, supra note 198; Citron, Hate Crimes, supra note 155; Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 155; Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1243 (2015); Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 278. That work has been inspired by and built on the pathbreaking insights of privacy scholar Anita Allen. See generally, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide? (2011); Anita L. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (1988).} For example, employers and health insurance companies can access information that women share with period-tracking apps (including their moodiness and cramps), which could result in raised premiums and denied promotions.\footnote{Drew Harwell, Is Your Pregnancy App Sharing Your Intimate Data with Your Boss?, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/10/tracking-your-pregnancy-an-app-may-be-more-public-than-you-think/.} Women and minorities are often disproportionately targeted for vicious online harassment, which often involves doxing—the sharing of their personal data, such as home address and location—in order to expose them to physical danger.\footnote{Citron, Hate Crimes, supra note 155, at 53 (providing details of invasions of privacy and harassment).} Harassers post victims’ nude photos and embarrassing information about their sex lives or sexual health, causing them substantial emotional and reputational harm.\footnote{Id. at 54; Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 155, at 1914-15 (discussing up-skirt photos taken and shared without victim’s consent).} Although these types of harm are separate categories in our typology, there is a distinct and additional dimension that they add: the entrenchment of existing patterns of inequality.

In cases involving cyber mobs that inundate victims with crude, threatening, and abusive comments, plaintiffs have sought to protect themselves by bringing privacy tort cases.\footnote{Citron, Hate Crimes, supra note 155, at 53; Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 155, at 1933.} But litigation is complicated by the fact that the harm is often caused by the totality of the privacy-invasive comments and posts, making it hard to allocate the harm among the multitude of commenters.\footnote{Citron, Hate Crimes, supra note 155, at 136-37.} The members of the mob are often anonymous, and it is difficult and expensive to identify them.\footnote{See, e.g., Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2018).} Even when the perpetrators are tracked down, suing them is often impractical because they often are unable to pay enough monetary damages to
incentivize lawyers to litigate. To combat cyber mobs effectively, victims turn to social media platforms to shut down the mob, but section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes these platforms from liability for user-generated content.

Beyond doxing and threats targeted at people in marginalized groups, there are less overt forms of discrimination harms. These harms are difficult to redress because they often occur in the shadows. The decision-making process of employers, insurance companies, landlords, and other powerful actors is opaque. If an employer used a third-party hiring service to score candidates, then rejected applicants will have no way to know that the hiring service relied upon their intimate information (like their painful periods or infertility).

A key aspect of discrimination harms is the unequal frequency, extensiveness, and impact of privacy violations on marginalized people. People of color are disproportionately targeted by surveillance. Algorithms that appear neutral often have disproportionate effects on minorities. Poor people are often subjected to oppressive surveillance as part of public assistance bureaucracy. Black mothers are “stripped of formal privacy rights claims by signing an encompassing waiver” when applying for assistance. As Khiara Bridges contends, “poor mothers are not given privacy rights because society, and thus the law, presumes that their enjoyment of privacy will realize no value or a

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400 Citron, Hate Crimes, supra note 155, at 122 (“Even if victims can afford to sue their attackers, they may be reluctant to do so if their attackers have few assets.”).

401 Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet 152 (2007); Citron, Hate Crimes, supra note 155, at 170-71; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 278, at 116.


403 Alvaro M. Bedoya, Privacy as Civil Right, 50 N.M. L. REV. 301, 306 (2020).


negative value.”  Mary Anne Franks notes that surveillance often does not affect marginalized and nonmarginalized people equally: “For the less privileged members of society, surveillance does not simply mean inhibited Internet searches or decreased willingness to make online purchases; it can mean an entire existence under scrutiny, with every personal choice carrying a risk of bodily harm.”

Privacy torts and other tort claims lack the language and concepts to address discrimination harms. The disparate effects of certain privacy violations are not considered as part of the harm equation. In contrast, federal statutes do recognize privacy violations as producing discrimination harm, such as the federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). GINA prohibits employers from requesting, requiring, or obtaining employees’ genetic information. The ADA limits the ability of employers to make medical examinations or inquiries of job applicants under a number of circumstances.

The civil rights legal tradition has the capacity and vocabulary to address discrimination harms—the denial of social and economic opportunities due to one’s membership in a protected group. Federal and state civil rights laws secure the ability to work, attend school, use the telephone, secure housing, and vote on equal terms. But these laws still have not been applied sufficiently to privacy violations. One of us (Citron) has proposed situating and treating privacy as a civil right so discrimination harms caused by privacy violations can be addressed.

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407 Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 453 (2017); see also SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON, PRIVACY AT THE MARGINS 2 (2020).

408 See supra Section I.B.2.

409 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to request, require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an employee . . . .”).

410 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1) (“The prohibition against discrimination as referred to in subsection (a) shall include medical examinations and inquiries.”).


addressed.\footnote{See Citron, The Fight for Privacy, supra note 198; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 278, at 89 (“Traditional tort and criminal law fail to respond to such systemic harm and, indeed, may obscure a full view of the damage.”).} Existing civil rights laws admittedly do not cover all social goods in need of protection\footnote{In her important new book, Robin West calls for a transformative understanding of civil rights that does not merely prohibit discrimination but that entails rights essential to the justice of the nation. Robin L. West, Civil Rights: Rethinking Their Natural Foundation 12 (2019). One of us (Citron) builds on West’s conception of civil rights to make the case for intimate privacy as a civil right—understood as both a right owed to all of us and as protection against invidious discrimination. Citron, The Fight for Privacy, supra note 198.} or all parties given the state action doctrine.\footnote{WEST, supra note 414, at 2-4 (exploring various ways that civil rights laws have failed to fulfill their potential to protect social goods themselves).} They mostly do not constrain corporate handling of personal data.\footnote{As scholars have explored, antidiscrimination laws like Title VII are ill-suited to address the use of discriminatory algorithms in employment matters. See Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 Va. L. Rev. 811, 846 (2020); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 857, 867 (2017); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 675 (2016).} Nonetheless, situating private sector surveillance of intimate life as a matter of civil rights helps begin the conversation about what those freedoms should be in the context of privacy law specifically and civil rights law more generally.

G. Relationship Harms

Relationship harms involve the damage to relationships that are important for one’s health, well-being, life activities, and functioning in society. Privacy violations can harm personal and professional relationships as well as relationships with organizations. People modulate personal relationships by maintaining boundaries around their information or by withholding information from some people and not others.\footnote{See Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 19 (1959) (noting that people wear “masks” and play “roles” as a natural and justifiable part of life); Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity 107 (1963) (describing how people need time to build trust in relationships before revealing secrets); Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 35 (1967) (summarizing Goffman’s work to demonstrate value of privacy).} Strangers develop close relationships by entrusting each other with deeply personal information. Consider communications among people using fertility tracking apps. On apps like Clue, subscribers gather online to explore struggles with miscarriages, abortions, and infertility.\footnote{Clue Period and Ovulation Tracker, CLUE, https://helloclue.com/period-tracker-app [https://perma.cc/69GY-Y2YM] (last visited Feb. 17, 2022).} They often form bonds with each other. Their relationships depend upon trusting each other to maintain the confidentiality of their information.

Relationship harms are twofold: most immediately, the loss of confidentiality and in the longer term, damage to the trust that is essential for the relationship.
to continue. As Nancy Levit remarks, the “development of protection for relational interests evidences a communitarian view of the role of tort law. . . . The vision being promoted is one of the responsible social interaction: a commitment to the value of the permanency of relationships and to appropriate treatment within those relationships.”

The law has recognized relationship harms, though it has done so inconsistently. Evidentiary privileges restrict the disclosure of communications between attorney and client, priest and penitent, husband and wife, and psychotherapist and patient. The point of protecting certain relationships is to foster candid expression and the preservation of the relationships.

The law of fiduciary relationships also safeguards against relationship harms. A fiduciary relationship has long been part of the law of trusts and has been recognized as a special relationship. Because the trustee is in a “position of special trust, the trustee owes certain special duties to the beneficiary.” As one of us (Solove) has noted, a wide array of relationships have been deemed to be fiduciary ones, and the law is open-ended about recognizing such relationships. According to Jack Balkin, “[b]ecause of their special power over others and their special relationships to others, information fiduciaries have special duties to act in ways that do not harm the interests of the people whose information they collect, analyze, use, sell, and distribute.” Fiduciaries owe

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421 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 499-504.
423 Id. at 157-58.
426 Id. at 103 (“The types of relationships that qualify as fiduciary ones are not fixed in stone.”).
special duties including confidentiality, loyalty, transparency, care, and others.\textsuperscript{428}

The list of relationships recognized as fiduciary ones is open-ended rather than fixed. In breach of confidentiality cases, courts have recognized fiduciary relationships between doctor and patient, lawyer and client, bank and customer, as well as school and student.\textsuperscript{429} One of us (Solove) has argued that the concept of fiduciary relationships can be expanded to regulate consumer privacy because “companies collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship with us.”\textsuperscript{430}

Recently, a number of scholars have further developed this argument, most notably Jack Balkin, Woodrow Hartzog, Neil Richards, and Lauren Scholz. As Lauren Scholz observes, “Fiduciary law’s core goal [is] preventing opportunistic behavior.”\textsuperscript{431} She contends that “[i]mplying a fiduciary relationship has the advantage of enabling courts and the justice system to allow and enforce expectations as they are situated in concrete relationships.”\textsuperscript{432} Thus far, however, the application of the law of fiduciary relationships to privacy has developed slowly, mainly in breach of confidentiality cases in a limited set of professional relationships, but it certainly has potential to develop further in the future.

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As we have pointed out above, the law lacks coherence and consistency regarding the recognition of cognizable privacy harms. Courts often fail to recognize privacy harms and thwart the enforcement of privacy violations or leave them unremedied. Our typology of privacy harms aims to help explain why each type is harmful. We also have endeavored to show that there are concepts in other legal contexts that could be applied to recognize certain types of privacy harms.

CONCLUSION

A well-calibrated legal response to privacy cases would permit socially beneficial personal data practices while requiring robust protections for the handling of personal data. Its primary focus should be on the deterrence of violations with the goal of encouraging widespread compliance. Compensation is important for individuals who have suffered significant harm.

\textsuperscript{428} Lauren Henry Scholz, \textit{Fiduciary Boilerplate: Locating Fiduciary Relationships in Information Age Consumer Transactions}, 46 J. CORP. L. 143, 192 (2020) (“[Fiduciary duties] may include duty of loyalty, duty of care, duty of disclosure and honesty, duty of confidentiality, and a heightened duty of good faith.”).

\textsuperscript{429} Richards & Solove, \textit{supra} note 422, at 157-58 (listing fiduciary relationships to which courts have applied tort of breach of confidentiality).

\textsuperscript{430} SOLOVE, \textit{The Digital Person}, \textit{supra} note 425, at 103.

\textsuperscript{431} Scholz, \textit{supra} note 428, at 193.

\textsuperscript{432} \textit{Id.}
Legal intervention should be designed to ensure that socially beneficial information practices continue. Our economy depends upon the collection and sharing of personal data. At the same time, personal data practices are inherently risky. Privacy law aims to ensure that personal data is used properly, that individuals have the ability to make decisions about their personal data, and that there are meaningful guardrails and boundaries about how data is collected, used, or disclosed.

But struggles with recognizing cognizable privacy harms have impeded the law’s effectiveness. Failing to recognize harm caused by certain activities can result in the failure to legislate to protect against such harms or develop regulatory strategies that adequately enforce against them.

The most deleterious impact of failing to recognize harm has occurred in litigation. Crabbed conceptions of harm have led courts to dismiss cases that are a key lynchpin for privacy law enforcement. The common law as well as litigation of private rights of action have much to contribute to the development of privacy regulation. The common law remains underdeveloped. Although at present, the common law has failed to develop adequate protections of privacy in the digital age, the common law has doctrines, concepts, and remedies that can be very effective tools for protecting privacy.

Private litigation can play a major role in effective privacy law enforcement, and there are foundations in the law for it to develop in productive ways. For example, one of us (Citron) has contended that strict liability has been underutilized in privacy cases.433 Strict liability obviates proving fault, and the vast repositories of personal data that are being maintained about people can be analogized to the ultrahazardous activities of the Industrial Age. Lauren Scholz argues that restitution is a viable remedy for many privacy violations.434 Restitution involves returning benefits that unjustly enriched a defendant. Scholz also recommends that “[g]iven the cramped nature of the privacy torts, a better avenue for tort law for data trafficking lies in torts related to wrongful business practices. This family of torts has the aim of promoting basic fair play in commerce.”435 Scholars have recommended developing the protections of fiduciary relationships to apply to companies that process personal data, including one of the authors of this Article.436 Moreover, various federal statutes lacking a private right of action can still serve as the basis for the standard of

434 Scholz, supra note 127, at 659 (arguing that restitution provides most appropriate remedy for many instances of privacy infringement).
435 Id. at 668 (footnote omitted).
436 See, e.g., SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 425, at 103 (“I posit that the law should hold that companies collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship with us.”); Balkin, supra note 427, at 1186 (arguing that many technology companies “should be seen as information fiduciaries toward their customers and end-users”); Scholz, supra note 428, at 146 (arguing that “implying fiduciary relationships into consumer contracts is feasible and desirable”).
care in common law tort actions, such as UDAP laws, negligence, breach of confidentiality, and others.437

The requirement of harm has been a significant impediment to the law’s development. The rigid clinging to an approach where enforcement goals and remedies are misaligned results in cases that are inconsistent and incoherent. With the proper alignment, a broader recognition of privacy harms, a better understanding of privacy problems, and a more flexible approach, the law can more effectively protect privacy in ways that are fair to all stakeholders.

437 See supra text accompanying notes 109-16.