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CONTENTS

VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1: SPRING 2010

Boston University Department of Philosophy
Faculty 2009-2010

FULL TIME

Hugh Baxter
Alisa Bokulich
Peter Bokulich
Klaus Brinkmann
Tian Yu Cao
Daniel O. Dahlstrom
James Devlin
Juliet Floyd
Aaron Garrett
Charles L. Griswold
Jaakko Hintikka
Walter Hopp
Victor Kestenbaum
Manfred Kuehn
David Lyons
Krzysztof Michalski
Robert C. Neville
David Roochnik
John Silber
C. Allen Speight
Susanne Sreedhar
Daniel Star
Alfred I. Tauber
Judson C. Webb
Elie Wiesel

ADJUNCT

Alfredo Ferrarin
Michael Grodin
Knud Haakonssen
Ghita Holstrom-Hintikka
Philip J. Ivanhoe
Simon Keller
Jürgen Renn
Steven Tigner

Letter from the Editor

As Arché enters its fourth year of publication and more entrenched in the world of undergraduate publications, its authors have equally progressed in expanding their horizons and interests. This year's volume doubts, and then affirms, the real, physical, observable and considered- all questions that interest and draw in aspiring philosophy students today. It is a testament to the growing strength of modern philosophical ideas and the powerful draw our learned discipline still possess.

Matthew Friberg first has us consider Foucault's notion of personal freedom, an ever growing concern with our ever growing self-aware race. Next Connor McNulty reaffirms our strength in the existence of our world, and specifically, baseballs. Brian Tracz following as equally concerned with possible perception issues, allows us through the lens of philosophy to reaffirm our world view. Then without being facetious or purely academic Dylan Rose enters in for what really brought him to philosophy: the quest for answers. He blends two once much closer disciplines, drawing from his expertise in psychology while grounding it in the work of one of the truly great philosophers, Kant.

I hope this year's issue does the task of giving a quick survey of currently trending topics and showcasing the bright future represented by the authors in the field. These pages may not be filled with a multitude of recognizable names to a casual student of the subject, but it is an encouraging sign of diverse interests. Arché's own goal of subjecting its readership to broad and varying philosophical works is well fulfilled this issue.

Richard Cipolla
B.A. Philosophy, 2011
Boston University

Foucault, Freedom, and the Limits of Modernity

MATTHEW FRIBERG
Oberlin College

In order to locate and understand a notion of freedom in the later works of Michel Foucault, I will first offer a discussion of delinquency as described in *Discipline and Punish*. Within this discussion I will argue against Thomas Dumm's characterization of the delinquent as emblematic of freedom on the grounds that such a characterization is implicitly contested in *Discipline and Punish*. I will use aspects of Dumm's characterization of freedom to transition into my own reading of late Foucault as thoroughly attentive to historical limits. It is my reading of Foucault that, through a critical and continued engagement with the limits of modernity, one may able to work towards personal freedom. Freedom will be understood, here, as one's ability to enact some degree of autonomy. Indeed, in the face of the supposedly ubiquitous influence of power, I do not find this definition to be too modest. In locating this sort of freedom in late Foucault, I will draw upon Foucault's specific discussions each of genealogy, space, modernity, and the cultivation of the self, and will relate each to a notion of historical limits. It is my aim with this paper to articulate the importance, for Foucault, of a critical recognition of these historical limits towards a cultivation of possible freedom.

Delinquency, as defined by Foucault, is an effect of incarceration, as it is produced within the prison itself, and is a tool used for the supervision of illegalities. A cyclical relationship exists between the prison, the police, and the delinquent, as "police surveillance provides the prison with offenders, which the prison transforms into delinquents, the targets and auxiliaries of police supervisions, which regularly send back a certain number of them to prison"[i]. In this way, the prison system has succeeded in creating its own politically usable object of knowledge in the production of delinquency. As an object of knowledge, the delinquent is produced by the prison as the paradigmatic illegality, which acts as the pathologized subject of criminal behavior. Put another way, delinquency is that form of illegality that the prison is able to isolate, organize, and penetrate. The delinquent is useful to disciplinary power, then, as it

symbolically sums up all forms of illegality, making it possible to disregard those illegalities that must be tolerated. In this way, the delinquent is not the most dangerous of illegalities, and is not the form of illegality that must be eliminated through incarceration. Instead the delinquent is a necessary instrument of disciplinary power.

Dumm understands the delinquent as tied to freedom in two distinct ways. First, Dumm posits the delinquent himself as the emblematic figure of freedom in the modern world.[ii] The delinquent's status as a figure of freedom is due to the delinquent's role as disciplinary power's paradigmatic transgressor. In so fully cultivating a transgressive existence for the delinquent, disciplinary power has created that sort of social being whose role it is to work against societal norms. Dumm understands the paradox of the imprisoned delinquent's role as transgressor, as he states: "The double figuring of the delinquent as both prisoner and transgressor puts the most elemental aspect of freedom on the margins of a social order that claims freedom as its most important value."[iii] In this statement, I understand Dumm as considering resistance, or transgression, as the "most elemental aspect of freedom." By this characterization, that member of society most resistant to the norm is a symbol of freedom. Further, once released from prison, the delinquent remains a figure of freedom in practicing indiscipline. Indiscipline, as characterized by Dumm, is the manifestation in society at large of that transgressive behavior that has characterized the delinquent. In having been wholly constructed by disciplinary power, the delinquent in society possesses the "possibilities of resistance to discipline engendered by its domination."[iv] Again, as Dumm characterizes freedom as transgression, the delinquent in society, practicing indiscipline, represents freedom.

For Dumm, the second way that the delinquent represents freedom involves the delinquent's effect on society more broadly. That is, the techniques of surveillance are extended to the population at large through the continued surveillance of the delinquent after he is no longer incarcerated. In Dumm's view, this extension of the techniques of surveillance encourages new ways in which to resist this surveillance. Resistance against surveillance, then, continues to arise in different ways as surveillance finds new methods of infiltration. As supervision of the delinquent is the stated reason for the carceral system's entrance in society more broadly, and as the delinquent is responsible for this entrance, the delinquent's existence also plays a role in the resistances that arise against the carceral system. Again, freedom is characterized by the struggle against disciplinary power, and as resistance against the growth of that power's scope.

In arguing against Dumm's characterization of the delinquent, I will give a close reading of that section of Discipline and Punish regarding illegalities and delinquencies. In doing so, I will argue against Dumm's interpretation of carceral scrutiny as cultivating a unique transgressive capability in the delinquent. Instead, I interpret this carceral scrutiny as precluding the acquisition of the necessary means towards any sort of freedom. Indeed, the delinquent, once produced, experiences a fundamental disconnect with societal norms and behaviors. However because of physical constraints placed on the delinquent's body, which extend beyond the walls of the prison, the

delinquent is unable to enact successful forms of transgression. My argument will serve, hopefully, to remove the delinquent from the unique role of transgressor, and will set the stage for a broader discussion concerning freedom in modernity.

According to Foucault, the prison creates and maintains delinquency in a number of ways. This creation and maintenance takes place both within the walls of the prison as well as outside of that physical space. Inside the prison, through means of isolation and useless work, an "unnatural, useless, and dangerous existence(s)" is bestowed upon individuals.[v] Further, the prison produces delinquency through the violent constraints that it imposes on its inmates. That is, the prison is supposed to teach respect for the law, but instead abuses its power through various forms of corruption, employment of fear tactics, and exploitation. In creating delinquency in these ways, the prison fosters a feeling of solidarity amongst delinquent inmates against justice itself. It is within these sites of solidarity, which are most concentrated within the prison walls that a new morality is produced, and from which the delinquent breaks with everything that has previous bound him to society.[vi] I agree with Dumm, then, that Foucault describes the production of the delinquent as involving a certain encouragement towards transgression. It is within the realm of this production, which takes place within the prison walls, that the delinquent's character is altered towards a rejection of authority, and towards an untamable character. The impetus for transgression is, therefore, produced.

However, once the incarcerated delinquent is freed, the actualization of this transgression is thwarted by other elements of the carceral system. The carceral system is defined, by Foucault, as combining "in a single figure discourses and architectures, coercive regulations and scientific propositions, real social effects and invincible utopias, programs for correcting delinquents and mechanisms that reinforce delinquency."[vii] That is, first, the free delinquent is under continued police surveillance, restricted in areas of residence, and is unable to find work due to his delinquent status.[viii] Further, the delinquent's family is thrown into destitution due to the delinquent's inability to freely find work and residence. It is out of this individual and familial misery that the delinquent is condemned to recidivism. This recidivism, because of the intensity of the networks of surveillance, leads to further incarceration. If the delinquent does not succumb to recidivism, he is faced with the material insufficiencies described above. An inability to secure the means of sustenance precludes the ability to act freely in any sense, as one's energies cannot help but be bound to this struggle. Put another way, one may only act freely if one is able to secure one's means of sustenance. Therefore, as Foucault describes the delinquent as being able to secure the means of sustenance only through recidivism, which leads to further incarceration, the delinquent is a poor example of freedom in disciplinary society.

I disagree, also, with the second aspect of Dumm's perceived relation between delinquency and freedom. Dumm understands the new and continued ways in which the network of surveillance operates, which enter into society via the delinquent, as providing new and continued means of transgression. Indeed, Dumm is right to understand delinquency as the way in which surveillance enters society, as Foucault

states:

> …Delinquency, an object among others of police surveillance, is also one of its privileged instruments….Delinquency, with the secret agents that it procures, but also with the general policing that it authorizes, constitutes a means of perpetual surveillance of the population: an apparatus that makes it possible to supervise, through the delinquents themselves, the whole social field.[ix]

I begin to disagree with Dumm's view regarding surveillance's connection to transgressive behavior, however, after his characterization of the widespread resistance to the networks of surveillance. Indeed, as these methods of surveillance are part of an intricate network of disciplinary power, steps were taken to preclude such resistance. This prevention of resistance did not come through an obvious exertion of power, which would surely only serve to heighten resistance. Instead, the carceral system initiated a perception of the delinquent as Other, which served to posit a conception of the delinquent as dangerous to society, or as necessitating extensive techniques of surveillance. As Foucault highlights, there existed a:

> patient attempt to impose a highly specific grid on the common perception of delinquents: to present them as close by, everywhere present and everywhere to be feared…Delinquency appears both as very close and quite alien, a perpetual threat to everyday life, but extremely distant in its origin and motives.[x]

The remaining potential for resistance against these networks of surveillance was seized by the working class and placed in the context of the already existing conflict with the bourgeoisie. That is, the working class often came to the defense of the delinquent through articles written in the workers' newspapers. However, this defense of the delinquent was not directed against the carceral system. Instead, these papers argued that the origin of delinquency was society itself, as the distribution of wealth was so unequal as to produce a need for criminal activity. Regarding workers' perceived responsibility for delinquency, Foucault writes that:

> The man who kills you is not free to kill you. It is society, or to be more precise, bad social organization that is responsible…[This is so] because society is incapable of providing its fundamental needs…and the heart crushed by forced labor at too tender an age.[xi]

This way of arguing on behalf of the delinquent, in my view, simply subsumes transgressive potential against the networks of surveillance into the already existing workers' struggle. As the backlash against networks of surveillance became a part of this ongoing antagonism, Dumm's conception of a "transgressive impulse that comes

into play through the very establishment of limits" seems to posit a stronger correlation between networks of surveillance and impetus towards transgression than Foucault intends. Foucault does not identify networks of surveillance with new ways of resisting disciplinary power. Instead, he points to the appropriation of the delinquent's plight by the working class movement.

There is also a way in which these networks of surveillance would be even less explicit in modernity. Noting this change in governmental rationality is important, first, if Dumm is to posit the existence of delinquency in modernity, and therefore of delinquency as a site of modern freedom.[xii] More importantly,this change in governmental rationality is important for a broader argument against resistances to the networks of surveillance as sites of freedom in modernity. Foucault briefly addresses the modern sort of government rationality in the essay "Space, Knowledge, and Power." In this essay, Foucault cites the shift from a carceral presence that "...manage[d] to penetrate, to stimulate, to regulate, and to render almost automatic all the mechanisms of society," to a "limitation that applies to governmental actions such that things will occur...in conformity with the rationality of government, and without intervention."[xiii] The impetus for this change, as Foucault cites, was the discovery that the abundance of government intervention serves to produce results contrary to those desired. That is, to penetrate society too deeply through carceral intervention is to disrupt society's "complex and independent reality," and to therefore excite its "laws and mechanisms of reaction...its possibilities of disturbance."[xiv] These precautions were beginning to be taken already with regard to nineteenth-century delinquency, as articulated above. In any case, this argument suggests not only that resistance to the networks of surveillance was strategically prevented in nineteenth-century France, but that this sort of resistance is even less likely in modernity.

I have, above, argued that there are reasons given in *Discipline and Punish* against the understanding of delinquency as emblematic of freedom. Dumm's discussion of the delinquent, though, does highlight an important notion regarding freedom in disciplinary society. That is, for Dumm, freedom can be found, through transgression, within the limits of disciplinary power. Indeed, in "What is Enlightenment?" Foucault understands modernity's limits as important to a "critical ontology of the self." In exploring the relationship between freedom and limits, I will investigate the degree to which the sort of transgression that Dumm ascribes to the delinquent may lead to freedom. For the purpose of my argument, this sort of transgression may be characterized, so as to make general, as resistance to the limits of disciplinary society without a strong understanding of those limits. Further, I will attempt to articulate a new form of transgression as calculated and carefully considered in contrast to the delinquent's seemingly unreflective sort of resistance. It is my view that the possibility of free action within disciplinary society may be based on a direct acknowledgment of the limits of modernity, as well as a certain respect for these limits. I believe that this is Foucault's own interpretation of the subject's role in modernity.

I. Critical Ontology and the Limits of Modernity

In "What is Enlightenment?", Foucault offers a philosophical ethos with which one is to engage with modernity. This ethos is understood as a "mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task."[xv] I interpret this "belonging" as belonging to modernity and its attachment to Enlightenment values, and this "task" as being in a state of constant critique of modernity. This constant critique of both modernity and the Enlightenment poses a complicated relationship between the subject and her historical situation. That is, Foucault explains that this ethos' job is not to accept a simplistic view that presents itself as either wholly for or against the Enlightenment. Rather, the practitioner of this ethos must understand herself as partially determined by the Enlightenment and as working within these contemporary limits.[xvi]

More specifically, Foucault understands this philosophical ethos as a "limit-attitude" through which the subject may conduct a practical critique of modernity towards possible transgression. This practical critique comes in the form of a historical investigation, the goal of which is to understand oneself as the subject of how one has been constituted, and how one acts, within the limits of modernity. Further, this investigation tries to identify, within the contingent constitution of how one acts in modernity, the possibility of no longer acting that way. Thus, as Foucault states, this ethos of permanent critique seeks to "give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom ."[xvii]

Within this philosophical ethos there exists a definite consideration for the limits of modernity. Indeed, Foucault even makes a distinction between the "affirmation or the empty dream of freedom", which is to be avoided, and "this work done at the limits of ourselves [which] must…open up a realm of historical inquiry and…put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality."[xviii] This "empty dream of freedom" seems to correspond with the understanding of institutions or spaces of freedom as sufficient for the birth of freedom itself. These spaces may, in some sense, be more conducive to a cultivation of freedom than are other spaces. However, Foucault understands these spaces as ultimately unable to ensure any sort of freedom.[xix] Searching for freedom outside of one's own critical stance towards modernity is, then, an empty dream. The alternative to this empty dream, which is "carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings," consists in a systematic investigation into and test of the historical limits that we may go beyond.[xx] This philosophical ethos does not consist in actually attempting to transcend these limits, because, as Foucault states, there is no "hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute [these] limits."[xxi]

Foucault outlines two specific aspects of this historico-critical investigation that I find most pertinent to this discussion of limits. First, Foucault discusses the homogeneity of this critical work with regard to what individuals do, and the ways that they do it, as influenced by the practical systems of modernity. That is, the practitioner

of the philosophical ethos, in engaging in this critical investigation, must view the freedom with which they act as organized by the modern forms of rationality.[xxii] These ways of acting, as well as the critical investigations into these ways of acting, cannot help but adhere to some degree of homogeneity between individuals due to the shared limits that modernity imparts. If one were advised to, or even able to, step outside of these limits, there would be no reason for Foucault to emphasize this homogeneity as a necessary component of the philosophical ethos of modernity. One must remain within the limits of modernity, and be subject to this homogeneity, if one is to engage in Foucault's suggested critical ontology.

The systematicity of this historico-critical investigation, especially the systematicity that pertains to the relations with oneself, is the other aspect of Foucault's critical ontology which is relevant to the discussion of limits. The systematicity of this investigation, on my reading, can be characterized as the attempt to look more deeply into the realm of practices' influence on one's way of freely doing things, such that ways of going beyond the limits imposed by this realm may be discovered. Investigation into the specificity of the "axis of ethics," or the relations with oneself, serves to enhance the understanding of how one is constituted as a moral subject of one's own actions.[xxiii] In this way, one must attempt to search beyond the homogeneity of the historico-critical analysis of one's way of acting in modernity, and of one's relation to the modern realms of practice. That is, one must cultivate an understanding one's relations with oneself as potential autonomous actor. However, this position of autonomy over oneself is paradoxical in that one is "constituted" as a subject of one's own knowledge and moral actions. This constitution comes from the limits placed on the modern subject by the disciplinary practices of modernity itself, as Foucault writes:

> We have been able to see what forms of power relation were conveyed by various technologies…: disciplines, both collective and individual, procedures of normalization exercised in the name of the power of the state, demands of society or of population zones, are examples. What is at stake, then, is this: How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?[xxiv]

The possibility of autonomy over oneself is, then, embedded within a strong relation to the limits imposed by modern practices of discipline and power relations. As argued with regard to both the homogeneity and systematicity of one's critical investigation, one must appreciate modernity's limits in order to enact the critical ontology of oneself. Therefore, as this critical ontology is necessary before possibly going beyond these limits, freedom may only come through the initial critical engagement with modernity's limits, from within these limits.

II. Cultivation of the Self as Relation to Oneself

In further exploring the investigation of one's relations with oneself as necessary

for a proper philosophical ethos, I will appeal to Foucault's *Care of the Self*. More specifically, I will look at Foucault's investigation into the "cultivation of the self," as articulated in the second part of this work. I aim to show, here, that Foucault accounts historically for one's ability to relate to oneself, and that this relation may actively occur within the limits of one's historical period.

Foucault's discussion of the cultivation of the self, as pertaining to the self of Ancient Greece, emphasizes this cultivation's personal objective. That is, the cultivation of the self took place for the self, and this relation to oneself was to be considered when undertaking most activities. Foucault states:

> The common goal of these practices of the self…can be characterized by the entirely general principle of conversion to self…in the activities that one ought to engage in, one had best keep in mind that the chief objective one should set for oneself is to be sought within oneself, in the relation of oneself to oneself.[xxv]

In positing this relation to oneself, Foucault is not arguing that one must transcend historical limits in order to somehow cultivate a relation to oneself outside of power's reach. Instead, this cultivation is to focus on the pleasure that comes from such a relation, and specifically those pleasures that one may experience within the limits of history and power. In this way, one must not implement the notion that "one is answerable only to oneself…one exercises over oneself an authority that nothing limits or threatens"[xxvi] Instead, the relation to oneself may be defined as

> a concrete relationship enabling one to delight in oneself…the experience of self that forms itself in this possession is not simply that of a force overcome, or a rule exercised over a power that is on the point of rebelling; it is the experience of a pleasure that one takes in oneself. The individual who has finally succeeded in gaining access to himself is, for himself, an object of pleasure. Not only is one satisfied with what one is and *accepting of one's limits*, but one 'pleases oneself.'[xxvii]

Therefore, the relationship between the cultivation of the self and historical limits is not one involving transgression against those limits. Rather, one may experience pleasure through a deep relation with oneself within the limits of history.

It may be argued that this discussion of self-pleasure pertains specifically to ancient greece, and is therefore irrelevant to modernity. I understand this criticism as accurate, but only to a point. That is, in citing that cultivation of the self which took place in Ancient Greece, I am not arguing that we must look towards this cultivation of the self as an example for the modern relation to oneself. Indeed, Foucault has argued specifically against just this sort of "hatred of the present."[xxciii] Instead, I am simply pointing to an example of a relation to oneself that may occur within the limits of the historical period. Foucault characterizes this self-pleasure as accepting of one's limits,

which seems to imply that, in Ancient Greece, this relation to oneself was not critical of the historical period. However, the self-relation that may occur in modernity, as Foucault describes it, seems to entail a critical stance regarding modernity's influence on the subject's self. This difference in content, on my view, is not important in this discussion. What is important, at least for this discussion, is that a relation to oneself may occur, and has occurred, within the limits of one's historical period. It is the task of the modern subject to utilize this relation towards critical ends.

III. Spatial Limits and the Practice of Freedom

One may also argue on Foucault's behalf for remaining within the specifically spatial limits of modernity. This argument, which relies on Foucault's thoughts on society's spatial elements, does not make the above claim that one must work towards freedom from within modernity's limits. However, I will highlight a way in which Foucault argues that there is no spatial arrangement that explicitly precludes the practice of freedom. The notion of freedom that will be employed for this argument is the same as that used in the above discussion, which comes down to one's ability to employ autonomy over oneself. It is my view that Foucault understands this autonomy as remaining attentive to historico-spatial limits.

In an interview called "Space, Knowledge, and Power,"[xxix] Foucault doubts the supposed causal link between space and freedom. That is, on Foucault's view, there is no institution or law that has the capacity, on its own, to ensure freedom. Indeed, as has been implied above, freedom is a practice. However, the absence of a causal link between institutional space and freedom does not mean that there is no correlation between these concepts. Indeed, Foucault articulates the impossibility of separately understanding the practice of freedom and the space in which it is practiced, or as conceiving of one without appeal to the other. Foucault states:

> I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to disassociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they are separated, they become impossible to understand. Each can only be understood through the other.[xxx]

This relation seems to suggest that the only freedom that may be conceived of from within the limits and institutions of modernity is that which may be practiced within these limits. Therefore, it does not make sense, because it is seemingly impossible, to conceive of a freedom that is practiced outside of modernity's limits. One must, instead, recognize modernity's spatial limits, understood as its institutions and laws, in order to act freely.

IV. Genealogy and Modernity: Critiquing the Supra-Historical Perspective

Foucault specifically cites genealogy as a necessary component of the philosophical ethos' permanent critique of modernity. Using Foucault's *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, I will argue that certain aspects of genealogical investigation may be translated into positive expressions of critique, and that these aspects of the critique of modernity must be enacted with explicit attention paid to modernity's limits in order to be effective.

In expressing the importance of genealogy, Foucault introduces a way in which genealogy recognizes modernity's limits. That is, genealogy is an alternative to the "suprahistorical perspective," or that way of doing history by stepping outside if it. Foucault characterizes this sort of history as that "history whose perspective on all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development."[xxxi] Effective history, or genealogy, "refuses the certainty of absolutes…[and] corresponds to the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, separates, and disperses."[xxxii] In this way, genealogy is an important tool for critical ontology, as it helps to locate those aspects of modernity that constitute one as a subject of one's knowledge and actions. Further, if genealogical investigation is necessary for adopting a critical ontology, genealogy must be undertaken within the limits of modernity. Indeed, it is the job of genealogy to expose these limits as accidental, and as not necessary for the "constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects."[xxxiii] Since genealogy is necessary for this unveiling, we may not step outside of these limits until genealogy has determined their contingency and, therefore, our ability to possibly go beyond them.

More specifically, I understand Foucault's three immediate uses of effective history as appreciative of modernity's limits, if not only for the purpose of possibly finding fissures within these limits. That is, it is my view that Foucault's articulation of effective history's three uses further strengthens the claim that one must thoroughly understand these limits, and must work extensively within them, if one hopes to go beyond them. First, the parodic use of history is explicated as a response to modern individuals' adoptions of past identities. The genealogist parodies this adoption by applying a number of these identities to herself at different times, serving to uncover the transience of these identities and their applications. It is through this process of delegitimating modern identity-options, and exposing their "unreality," that the genealogist hopes to disrupt that supra-historical impulse to eternalize the past. Indeed, it is only through the supra- or traditional historical attempt to work outside of historical limits that this eternalization is attempted. Genealogy strives to highlight this attempt's illegitimacy not by going beyond these accepted alternative identities, and therefore going beyond modernity's limits, but by parodying these identities by excessively adopting them within historical limits.

Foucault's second use of history is the "systematic disassociation of identity."[xxxiv] This use of effective history is meant to indicate the plurality and competition of identities that are often misinterpreted as unified. The genealogical understanding of identity as a "complex system of distinct and multiple elements, unable to be mastered by

the powers of synthesis" emphasizes the mortality and discontinuity of one's identity. This allows, or forces, the genealogist to remain situated within this multiplicity, from which she can investigate so as to criticize those disparate elements of which she is comprised. Again, it is the traditional historian that hopes to sever ties with the contingency and plurality of identity so as to "possess in oneself an immortal soul" outside of the limits of history.

The final use of history, which is the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge, is that use which most explicitly attempts to understand historical limits, while working within those limits, so as to move beyond them. According to Foucault, the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge is an inevitable part of historical investigation, as it occurs as a consequence of both traditional and genealogical history. That is, there is an intrinsic "violence [in the] position that sides against those who are happy in their ignorance, against the effective illusions by which humanity protects itself, [in the] position that encourages the dangers of research and delights in disturbing discoveries."[xxxv] However, it is only the genealogist that explicitly addresses this sacrifice made by the "will to knowledge," and makes use of this sacrifice in criticizing modernity. The traditional historian, instead, makes this sacrifice without notice, in the name of objectivity and universality. The traditional historian claims to possess the capacity for absolute knowledge, outside of the constraints of history, whereas the genealogist deliberately sacrifices the traditional historian as the subject of absolute knowledge. The genealogist, then, engages in the "destruction of the man who maintains knowledge by the injustice proper to the will to knowledge," and thereby destroys the traditional historian's claim to objectivity and limitless knowledge.

We must now return to the case of the delinquent. It has been my aim, with this paper, to distinguish between Dumm's notion of freedom as ascribed to the delinquent and my interpretation of Foucault's notion of freedom as a critical engagement with historical limits. By interpreting Foucault's discussions of the modern self as very much related to the limits of that self's historical period, I have tried to put forth a subtle way in which the subject must engage critically and continuously with historical limits in order to possibly reach a place of sovereignty over oneself. I have not argued that this sovereignty is imminent for, as Foucault states, "I do not know whether we will ever reach mature adulthood."[xxxvi] Instead, I only hope to have shown that, on Foucault's view, the search for freedom necessitates an active and agonistic consideration of limits. Indeed, the delinquent does not meet this criteria first because it is not his constituted position in society to be reflective of these limits. Second because he is the embodiment, produced by disciplinary power, of those limits with which others may critically engage. In this way, the delinquent is important to the discussion of freedom and limits in Foucault because he is uniquely unable to effectively criticize these limits. Indeed, he is a limit with which the rest of society may engage. Therefore, the delinquent is an unfortunate yet helpful example-unfortunate because he is unable to work towards freedom, and helpful because he motivates the above discussion.

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ENDNOTES

1: Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 282.
2: Thomas Dumm, *Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., 1996), 111.
3: Dumm, 112.
4: Dumm, 114.
5: DP, 266.
6: DP, 267.
7: DP, 271.
8: DP, 267.
9: DP, 281.
10: DP, 286.
11: DP, 287.
12: Dumm does not discuss this notion in Michel Foucault and the Politics of Free dom. However, he may address some similar idea in his book Democracy and Pun ishment: Disciplinary Origins of the United States. I have not investigated whether or not delinquency comes up in this work, as doing so is outside the scope of this paper.
13: Michel Foucault. "Space, Knowledge, and Power," in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 242.
14: S, K, P, 242.
15: Michel Foucault. "What is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 39, italics mine.
16: WIE, 43.
17: WIE, 46.
18: WIE, 46.
19: I will address this concept more thoroughly later in the paper through a discussion of spatial limits and freedom.
20: WIE, 47.
21: WIE, 47.
22: WIE, 48.
23: WIE, 49.
24: WIE, 48.
25: Michel Foucault, *The Care of the Self* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 64.
26: COS, 65.
27: COS, 66, italics mine.

28: Foucault argues, in Spaces, Knowledge, and Power, that one must be careful not to "designate that which has just occurred as the primary enemy, as if this were always the principal form of oppression from which one had to liberate oneself…There is in this hatred of the present or the immediate past a dangerous tendency to invoke a completely mythical past."
29: In this discussion, Foucault uses the word "liberty" instead of "freedom". As liberty is commonly understood as a sort of "negative freedom," I think that it may be understood, in this context, as the absence of total constraint by the modern realms of practice.
30: S, K, P, 246.
31: Michel Foucault. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 87.
32: N, G, H, 87.
33: WIE, 46.
34: N, G, H, 94.
35: N, G, H, 95.
36: WIE, 48.

Of Baseballs and Epiphenomenalism: A Critique of Merricks' Eliminativism

CONNOR MCNULTY
University of Illinois

One of the central concerns in metaphysics is the nature of objects which populate the universe. What constitutes a composite object and how its supposed existence relates to its (alleged) causal powers occupies much of contemporary literature. In the chapter "Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism," from *Objects and Persons*, Trenton Merricks presents an argument for not believing in the existence of baseballs. He attempts this by drawing a distinction between baseballs and their constituent atoms, and attributing the causal powers to the atoms composing the baseball. Using a restricted version of Alexander's Dictum: "to be real is to have causal powers," Merricks argues that since the baseball has no causal powers, we have no reason to believe it exists. When challenged with the contention that we have reason to believe in baseballs because we can see them, Merricks tries to prove that claims of the form 'I believe x because I can see it' are arbitrary.

The intent of this paper is to challenge Merricks' objection to our belief in objects by virtue of being able to see them. To accomplish this, I will draw from Korman's treatment of strange linguistic communities in his paper "Strange Kinds, Familiar Kinds and the Charge of Arbitrariness." Rather than completely undo the argument Merricks outlines, the rest of the paper will defend his remaining premises, to arrive at the conclusion that baseballs, and other ordinary objects, are epiphenomenal.

I. The Argument for Elimination

In the chapter, Merricks considers the case of a baseball shattering a window. His argument can be sketched as follows:

(1) In the above case, only atoms arranged baseballwise cause the shattering of the window.

(2) If the atoms are the only cause of the shattering, then a baseball did not cause

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the shattering of the window.

(3) If baseballs do not cause the shattering of windows, then they do not cause anything.

(4) We have no reason to believe that objects without causal powers exist.

(C) Baseballs do not exist

Merricks defends (1) through application of bottom-up metaphysics, whereby he attributes the final causes to the atoms. He maintains that to reject this is to hold that the baseball shattering the window is overdetermined (having two distinct causes), in the same way had two rocks shattered the window simultaneously. Accepting this claim leads to systematic overdetermination, which he argues is unpalatable. His opponent is left with the option to say that the baseball has some emergent causal property beyond that of its atoms. However there is nothing a baseball does that cannot be accounted for by the atoms working together.[i]

Premise (2) is straightforward, as the atoms arranged baseballwise shattered the window and the baseball has no causally emergent properties. A clever philosopher may take the position that the baseball and its atoms are identical, however the existence and persistence conditions of a baseball and its atoms differ greatly. A baseball cannot survive having its atoms scattered across the universe, however the atoms composing said baseball are undamaged. Likewise, a baseball is one, while the atoms composing it are many. Leibniz's Law states that if two objects are identical, then they have the same properties, so baseballs and collections of atoms arranged baseballwise are not identical. Since the baseball and its atoms are not identical, and the window was shattered by the collection of atoms, we have reason to accept, that baseballs have no causal powers (3).

A possible objection to (3) is that while baseballs may not cause the shattering of windows, they cause us to perceive baseballs and subsequently believe in them. One could claim that the ability to generate perception in humans is an emergent property. Human perception is, fundamentally, a matter of physical chemistry. The sight of a baseball arises from the interaction of light emitted from the baseball's atoms and the corneas. All other human means of approbation rely fundamentally on chemical and physical interaction, whose causes can be reduced to the collection of atoms. Collections of atoms arranged baseballwise, not the baseballs, are what cause windows to shatter, people to see baseballs, baseball games to function, as well as a host of other baseball-involving activities.

With the baseball separate from the atoms that compose it, Merricks puts forward his eliminativist argument by using Alexander's Dictum (to be real is to have causal powers) in a restricted sense to argue that objects can cause things.[ii] Anticipating his critic's response that we have reason to believe in baseballs because we can see them, he claims that being able to see an object does not give any substantial reason to accept its existence. He considers the case of a child reared on an island of philosophers who accept unrestricted composition, the view that arbitrary sums, such as an object composed of a dog and the top half of a tree, exist. The child would have been taught at

an early age to accept arbitrary sums, and when challenged, would argue that an object composed of a dog and the top half of a tree exist, because she could just see it. With this example, Merricks contends that there is no serious epistemic difference between the child from the island of unrestricted composition and the critic who claims that baseballs exist because he can see them. As such, Merricks contends that if the critic wants to accept baseballs being seeable as a valid reason to accept their existence, then he has to accept the child from the island's reason for the existence of things such as objects composed dog and treetop wise. To accept one and reject the other would be arbitrary, and invalidate the argument.[iii]

II. Arbitrariness

The argument against our belief in baseballs by being able to see them is similar to what Korman classifies as the charge of arbitrariness in "Strange Kinds, Familiar Kinds and the Charge of Arbitrariness." Korman's "Charge of Arbitrariness" applies to a type of argument commonly applied by defenders of unrestricted composition, who seek to undercut opposing claims by making them seem arbitrary. While Korman's classification of the Charge of Arbitrariness applied to ontological statements about kinds, it can be repurposed for Merricks' argument:

(P1) There is no significant epistemic difference between the child from the island inhabited by unrestricted composition enthusiasts and me.

(P2) If so, it is objectionably arbitrary to accept my seeing baseballs as reason for existence, and not her seeing arbitrary sums as reason for their existence.

(C) If we are going to believe in baseballs because we can see them, then we have to accept arbitrary sums, such as objects composed of dogs and treetops.[iv]

Korman's treatment of strange linguistic communities enables a response to this type of claim. Korman's criticisms were limited to defending particularism, (the rejection of arbitrary sums) although his arguments can be extended to this case as well. Korman claims that the mere imaginability of communities with intuitive judgments different than ours need not challenge our own intuitive judgments.[v] Additionally, the nature of the belief held by the child can be brought into question. Would the child in this case actually believe in arbitrary or would the child merely indicate them because of conditioning? Be this the case, we have ample reasoning to reject (P1)

For Merricks' sake, let's assume that there was an island discovered and it was indeed populated by adherents of universal composition, and the child hailing from this island does believe in arbitrary sums, and justifies their existence by their being seeable to her. This still does not give us enough reason to doubt our own beliefs about the existence of baseballs. Drawing again from Korman's argument, were the child hailing from this strange community to challenge our ethical norms or modes of scientific inquiry, we wouldn't discard our standing institutions.[vi] If the child were to claim, by rational inquiry, she came to the conclusion that it is morally permissible to boil and eat all green-eyed babies at birth, we would not discard our non-baby eating

norms for fear of arbitrariness. Likewise, if someone challenged the heliocentric nature of the solar system, we wouldn't cease our inquiry for fear of arbitrariness, but rather "we would investigate, looking for possible sources of error on both sides."[vii]

The fact that we can imagine people who have different experiences, but similar perceptual and reasoning faculty does not give us sufficient reason to doubt our belief in things we see. The claim that we should believe in baseballs because we see them can be challenged, but it is not objectionably arbitrary, so (P2) fails. As such, Merricks has not undone our reasons to believe in baseballs, and has not given us reason to accept (4).

III. Epiphenomenalism

Without (4), Merricks cannot endorse eliminativism through an appeal to arbitrariness, although to discard the remnants of his argument would be hasty. The claim that the baseball is not identical to its constituent atoms holds water, and the demonstration that the baseball has no role in the shattering of the window (or any other activity involving baseballs) cannot be dismissed offhand. As Merricks presents in his chapter and demonstrated above, the baseball can be completely separated from all of the entities with causal powers. Merricks extends this distinction from baseballs to all non-living macrophysical objects, and from this he claims that all non-living macrophysical objects are epiphenomenal.[viii] While Merricks intended to demonstrate that we had sound reasoning to follow epiphenomenalism with outright elimination, the previous section demonstrates that Merricks has not entirely excised our reasons for believing in baseballs, or any other macrophysical object. The remaining premises insist that baseballs are epiphenomenal.

To salvage his argument, Merricks could resort to a spirited defense of Alexander's Dictum and insist that we only countenance existence as it is tied to causation. This would allow Merricks to bypass challenging the epistemological qualms raised by the example of the child hailing from the island of unrestricted composition, as there would be no need to raise a charge of arbitrariness. Unfortunately, this move would require Merricks enter into the present debate on Alexander's Dictum, and take relevant positions on perception and the status of abstract objects—something Merricks claims that he does not intend to do.[ix] If Merricks opts to defend Alexander's Dictum, he exposes the claim 'objects cause events' to challenge, as well as his claims on the status of biological entities. Alexander's Dictum presents a challenge to the argument this paper, although it presents a host of problems for Merricks' agenda.

Another challenge to be considered is that Merricks' failure to demonstrate the arbitrariness in our belief in baseballs means that we should privilege the overdetermined view of baseballs—that the baseball and the atoms arranged baseballwise cause the shattering of the window. The motivation behind such a challenge would be that given we still have reason to believe in baseballs, we should be able to recover our belief in their causal role in interacting with the world. To achieve this, the critic would need to challenge (1) and (2).

The obvious challenge to these claims is that the baseball is what causes the shattering of the window. To merely state that the baseball was the sole cause of the shattering of the window would suggest that baseballs are simples, which no philosopher would accept. Likewise, as shown previously, claiming the baseball to be identical to its atoms results in a violation of Leibniz's Law. The only remaining objection is a form of the trumping argument. Take, for example, the case of Wile E. Coyote attempting to assemble a trap for the Roadrunner. Naturally, the trap backfires horribly, and Wile E. is crushed by an anvil and the RMS Titanic. In any ordinary circumstance, the anvil by itself would have been sufficient to crush Wile E. Coyote, but as the Titanic is much heavier than the anvil, it seems the Titanic would be more causally relevant to his crushing.

This example is more nuanced than overdetermination, as overdetermination involves two separate causes working together to achieve an effect. (ie-two anvils falling on Wile E. Coyote, simultaneously) The involvement of the Titanic renders the anvil's squashing of Wile E. Coyote causally non-essential (if not downright irrelevant), as he would not have been in a better position were the anvil to miss him. On the other hand, to claim that the anvil either doesn't exist or doesn't play a role in the squashing is wrong, because the anvil hits Wile E. Coyote before the Titanic. If the critic could successfully claim that the baseball is akin to the anvil and the collection of atoms akin to the Titanic, the cause of the window shattering can be called into question, collapsing (1).

If we assume that this is the case the arrangement of the atoms baseballwise, it could be argued, are what play the critical role in the window smashing, but it could be imagined that the baseball was sufficient enough. For this to be possible, either the critic would have to claim that the baseball is identical with the atoms arranged baseballwise, or he would have to claim that the baseball has some property separate from the atoms. Identity claims render the trumping argument meaningless. What remains for the critic is to either morph this into an overdetermination claim, or claim that we have some reason to believe that the baseball trumps the effects of the atoms. If the critic were willing to accept that the baseball is separate from the atoms, then he would have to admit the possibility that, somehow, there could be a case where the baseball, but not the atoms could smash the window. This strange situation would seem to require more than the identity case, or the case of emergent properties in baseballs, as this would require baseballs to exert causal power independent of their constituent atoms. As with the Roadrunner case, Wile E. Coyote would have still been smashed by the Titanic had the anvil missed, but it seems unlikely that a situation could be imagined where a window was smashed despite the atoms arranged baseballwise smashing it.

IV. Conclusion

In "Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism" Merricks persued a form of bottom-up metaphysics, in which causation comes from the smallest possible source—in the

case of macrophysical objects like baseballs, the causal powers come from the atoms arranged baseballwise. Since the events baseballs allegedly cause are actually caused by the collection of atoms arranged baseballwise, and a baseball is not equivalent to the collection of atoms, we can claim that a baseball has no causal powers. Merricks attempted to demonstrate that this gave us cause to question our ordinary reasons for believing in baseball (being able to see them) by trying to show that these ordinary reasons were arbitrary. Korman's classification of the charge of arbitrariness and observations on strange linguistic communities enables a challenge against Merricks' claims of arbitrariness. Specifically, the real or imagined possibility of a community with different beliefs does not challenge our beliefs in ethics or science, and therefore should provide no challenge to our reasons for believing in macrophysical objects. Without this challenge, Merricks' eliminitavism fails.

The failure of eliminativism has no bearing on the status of the other premises. Identity claims fail on account of Leibniz's Law, whereas overdetermination presumes that baseballs have emergent causal powers beyond their atoms. The trumping argument was presented as an alternative, however for it to be coherent, it requires that there be a possible circumstance where a baseball can demonstrate causal powers outside the atoms arranged baseballwise. To refuse such a challenge makes trumping synonymous with identity. With causal work performed by collections of atoms, baseballs and other non-living macrophysical objects are epiphenomenal. By adopting such a position, we need not trouble ourselves with the potential that our conception of ordinary objects like tables and chairs are not mere preferences, and we can accept that organic composites like mollusks and people can interact with their environment.

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ENDNOTES

1:(Merricks, 59-60, 62) Merricks, Trenton. Objects and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 59-60.
2: Ibid, 66.
3: Ibid, 74-75.
4: Korman, Daniel. "Strange Kinds, Familiar Kinds and the Charge of Arbitrariness" in Oxford Studies of Metaphysics, forthcoming, p. 7.
5: Ibid, 26.
6: Ibid, 27-28.
7: Ibid, 29.
8: Merricks, 80-81.
9: Ibid, 65-66.

The Synoptic Image: Fusing the Worldview Dichotomy

R. BRIAN TRACZ
Boston College

Everyone has an understanding of beauty in the world, and this understanding of the world as beautiful flavors how everyone views the world. That said, can a scientific worldview—a fundamental understanding of the world—exist that accommodates an aesthetic understanding of the world? A "scientific worldview" seeks to uncover laws that are foundational both to art and to science. How can one reconcile something like quantitative physical laws with something that is so nebulous as art?

One solution is to partition the two areas into two separate worldviews. Such an approach espouses a stereoscopic analysis: this approach divides worldview into two fundamentally disjointed methods—one scientific and one not scientific. This stereoscopic outlook is routine in everyday contemporary thought, but is it justified? Heidegger is concerned with this routine thinking when he says,

> It will not do to admit … that, naturally, we are standing face to face with a tree in bloom, only to affirm the very next moment as equally obvious that this view, naturally, typifies only the naïve, because prescientific, comprehension of things…. For with that affirmation we have conceded … that those sciences do in fact decide what of the tree in bloom may or may not be considered valid reality. [i]

This purported tension between the non-scientific and the scientific views will be the central discussion in this paper. I claim that there is no understanding of the world that is not a unified understanding, for the scientific and non-scientific understandings do not exist separately. A stereoscopic analysis of worldview embraces a problematic conception of the nature of worldview, one that is either wholly hermeneutical or wholly epistemic in nature. By analyzing Friedrich Nietzsche's

 Arché, Volume 4, Issue 1: Spring 2010. pp. 25-33

Apolline/Dionysiac distinction in *The Birth of Tragedy* and, in turn, reconsidering Wilfred Sellars' manifest/scientific image distinction in "Science, Perception, and Reality," I will argue that a fundamental aesthetic is the basis for synoptic worldview.

I. The Necessity of an Aesthetic: Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy

Broadly put, one might describe an aesthetic as a novel method for interpreting the world. In "The Birth of Tragedy", Nietzsche characterizes two aesthetic approaches: the Dionysiac approach and the Apolline approach. Dionysus, the Greek god of wine and emotional experience, contrasts with Apollo, the Greek god of poetry and rational endeavors. Nietzsche sees these two approaches as occupying two poles of an aesthetic spectrum, claiming that "one might describe Apollo as the magnificent divine image of the principium individuationis.... Whenever the breakdown of the principium individuationis occurs, we catch a glimpse of the essence of the Dionysiac, which is best conveyed by the analogy of intoxication."[ii] Intoxication is understood as a kind of ceremonial loss of individual subjectivity called principium individuationis (the principle of individuation). This intoxication facilitated by the Dionysiac view "destroys the veil of maya" and brings about "one-ness as the genius of humankind, indeed of nature itself."[iii] Division is, therefore, a "maya," an illusion. The Apolline supports the principium individuationis, implying that the division of nature from the subject is justified in order to master nature. Both the Apolline and the Dionysiac contrast with "aesthetic Socratism," an extreme perversion of the Apolline view, where "in order to be beautiful, everything must be reasonable."[iv] Such a view posits a logical foundation that is uniform and predictable, particularly in things that are aesthetic in nature.

To clarify exactly why these divisions are important, let us consider Nietzsche's example of Euripides—a non-Dionysiac. Nietzsche perceives a fundamental shift in the tragic form of drama in Euripides. The stimulating characteristics of Euripides' drama included "paradoxical thoughts—in place of Apolline visions—and fiery affects—in place of Dionysiac ecstasies—and, what is more, thoughts and affects most realistically imitated, not ones which have been dipped in the ether of art."[v] The Apolline supports a division of nature so that it might be knowable and, while artistic, differs from the emotion of the Dionysiac view in favor of concrete "visions" of nature. The Dionysiac supports a unity of nature that is accessed through a hyper-emotional "ecstasy," ultimately rejecting the Apolline idea of nature as something to be divided and manipulated. The metaphor of "visions:ecstasies::Apolline:Dionysiac" is instructive in understanding Nietzsche's distinction between things observed and things felt. Nietzsche himself best summarizes that "our whole [Apolline] knowledge of art is at bottom illusory, because, as knowing creatures, we are not one and identical with the essential being which gives itself eternal pleasure as the creator and spectator of that comedy of art."[vi] The take-home message is that as mere "knowers" of the world, we will never be able to fully experience the "essential being" of the world in the form of a Dionysiac "ecstasy." The visions of the Apolline are mere appearance in comparison

to the real feelings of ecstasy of the Dionysiac. We thus see a symptom of a stereoscopic analysis—the Apolline's "knowing" fundamentally differs from the Dionysiac's "ecstasy."

The stereoscopic analysis becomes more apparent as we view Nietzsche's interpretation of Socrates' death. He notes that Socrates, esteeming rationality over emotion, finally realized that "things which I do not understand are not automatically unreasonable."[vii] Socrates, on his death bed, finally resorted to poetry composition—the repulsive activity of the Dionysiac. By Nietzsche's interpretation, Socrates realized the emptiness of the notion that beautiful things *ought* to be reasonable when all is said and done. For Nietzsche, the extreme Apolline view ultimately fails, and if we disagree with him, he invites us to look at what the great Apolline Socrates did on his deathbed, embracing the Dionysiac activity of poetry composition.

According to Nietzsche, the Apolline aesthetic, including aesthetic Socratism, ideally ought to give way to the Dionysiac aesthetic. According to the Dionysiac conception of art, "art [does] not simply imitate the reality of nature but rather [supplies] a metaphysical supplement to the reality of nature, and [is] set alongside the latter as a way of overcoming it."[viii] Art emulates the very reality of nature itself, and the resulting artistic metaphysics is an appropriate vehicle to discern the inner reality of nature. The extreme Apolline view is rejected because it embraces the *principium individuationis* of nature—subjectivity, by the Apolline view, is separated from a nature that is cut up into analyzable, individual pieces. Art embraces a unification that acts counter to the Apolline tendency. This implies that the individual things that we might call "facts" about the world have no privileged place in the unified aesthetic of nature that is the Dionysiac view.

Although the Dionysiac view is at first sight "unified" in its view of nature, one might still consider it a fragmented, stereoscopic viewpoint if one values any scientific, individual facts about the world in the creation of worldview. The ultimate goal of the Dionysiac view is to de-emphasize fact-claims that are individually known and to emphasize artworks that are holistically interpreted. Nietzsche's claim above that as "knowing creatures" we are unable to act in concert with "the essential being as creator and spectator" takes on a new significance if we value "known" things like the facts of physics and evolutionary biology. If known things have cash-value for one's worldview, then there is an issue with Nietzsche's analysis: knowing is forever severed from interpretation or, at best, placed beside it. Indeed, one might have anticipated such an issue at the outset considering Nietzsche's rejection that the objective foundation for "facts" exists in the first place.

Despite Nietzsche's insistence on the dichotomy between individual, known facts and unified, creative art, Nietzsche's claim that "only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified" is a deep insight for the discussion of worldview.[ix] If, as initially noted, an aesthetic is a method for interpreting the world, then Nietzsche is correct in noting that nothing is justified without some method of interpretation. Facts, even though they might be objective, do not interpret themselves. The major liability in Nietzsche's analysis is the dismissal of aesthetic phenom-

ena that have Socratic character, that is, aesthetic phenomena that are logical or scientific in nature. We can do better by attempting to subsume scientific facts in an aesthetic interpretation of the world. I will consider scientific observations as particular types of aesthetic observation requiring interpretation, not as a purely "reasonable," autonomous body of statements that speaks for itself. In Wilfred Sellars' argument, such a recognition that scientific phenomena must be aesthetic phenomena if they are to "justify the world and existence" is not taken for granted. This fact will be central to the criticism of Sellars that follows.

II. The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image

Like Nietzsche, Wilfred Sellars sees a divide between a scientific outlook and a non-scientific outlook. Sellars believes that the scientific view is the ideal view, even though one might simultaneously entertain both views. He calls the scientific view the "scientific image" and the everyday view the "manifest image." He calls either viewpoint an "image" on purpose: an image is ambiguous as to whether it is a picture, an impression, or a well-thought-out opinion. The manifest image is a refinement from a primitive man's worldview—say, a "Neanderthal's worldview"—in the same way that the scientific image is a refinement from the manifest image. Both the manifest and scientific images have an "empirical" component that separates them from very primitive images.[x] However, Sellars "[accepts] the view that the scientific account of the world is (in principle) the adequate image."[xi] This scientific image purports not to be aesthetic but to be neurophysiological (i.e. factual): "if the scientific image is interpreted [in accord with Science, Perception, and Reality, then our explanations] will be in terms of the constructs of neurophysiology [sic]."[xii] Furthermore, he is a staunch scientific realist who "[rejects] the view that the scientific image is a mere 'symbolic tool' for finding our way around the manifest image."[xiii] For Sellars, the statements of science are as real as everyday objects like chairs and cats. These statements are not constructs or interpretations that allow us to navigate the everyday world but are, instead, the very truth of the matter as far as worldview is concerned.

The manifest image is a "common-sense" view of the world that includes efforts in philosophical thinking while the scientific image is an scientifically nuanced view of the world derived from the results of scientific inquiry.[xiv] It becomes apparent that the manifest and scientific images are alike in their empirical tendencies. However, throughout Science, Perception, and Reality, Sellars comes back to one major point that separates the scientific and manifest images:

> The conceptual framework which I am calling the manifest image is, in an appropriate sense, itself a scientific image.... There is, however, one type of scientific reasoning which it, by stipulation, does not include, namely that which involves the postulation of imperceptible entities, and principles pertaining to them, to explain the behavior of

perceptible things.[xv]

The scientific view proceeds by the postulation of unobservables and theoretical entities whereas the manifest view is directly tied to observables. To tie in Nietzsche's terminology, recall the analogy "visions:ecstasies::Apolline:Dionysiac." An analogy exists between Sellars' scientific image and the Apolline view. The person of the scientific image is similar to the Apolline "knower": a person of the scientific image has a worldview informed by knowledge of things—via "visions"—as opposed to emotional impressions of things via "ecstasies."

Contrary to Sellars' understanding, perhaps the scientific image is more a type of manifest image than the manifest image is a type of scientific image. Sellars sets the aim of the scientific image as explaining physical phenomena, and he claims that this explanation can fuel the most satisfying image of the world: all of our commonsense (manifest) notions must not be "reconciled" with the scientific image but "joined" to it.[xvi] For Sellars, to view the world properly is to be scientific—to proceed by making hypotheses and testing them in a systematic fashion. One should not simply view science as an "alien appendage" but should embrace it in one's daily life.[xvii]

Before continuing, let us take stock of the stereoscopic nature of both Nietzsche's and Sellar's viewpoints. Nietzsche sees that our view of the world has two methods, one Apolline and one Dionysiac, and though one emphasizes knowing and the other emphasizes ecstasies, both components are aesthetic. Sellars, on the other hand, sees that our view of the world has two different methods, one manifest and one scientific, but both components are *empirical*. We thus see that Sellars and Nietzsche have different conceptions of what worldview actually is. Sellars notes that the goal of philosophy is a combination of "knowing that" and "knowing how."[xviii] Without going into detail, both of these goals of "knowing that" and "knowing how" are epistemic—they focus very much on known facts and the habits that we cultivate in understanding them. This is very much divorced from Nietzsche's concern for aesthetic justification of the world—a hermeneutic, not an epistemic, goal.

To explore this difference in overall goals, let us explore a fundamental part of many people's worldview—music. Take, for example, Chopin's Barcarolle or the last movement of Mahler's Fourth Symphony. Both are tone poems: they are meant to *represent* particular things. The Barcarolle represents a boat ride while Mahler's Fourth Symphony represents a child peering into heaven, and though they do not represent things in the mechanical vocabulary of science, they still represent parts of the world.[xix] At the bottom of every musical representation is a comment on the item represented. To put it into terms more friendly to analytic philosophy, Nelson Goodman noted that pieces of art not only represent something but also represent something as *thus and so*.[xx] Chopin's Barcarolle is meant to represent a *pleasant*, *contemplative* boat ride (perhaps down the Rhine, perhaps in Venice), while Mahler's Fourth Symphony represents a *painful*, *sentimental*, and *magical* fairytale. The italicized adjectives are the "representation as thus and so" that the music makes.

Sellars would be dissatisfied with the claim that music can represent things as thus

and so because "*thoughts* in the manifest image are conceived not in terms of their 'quality', but rather as inner 'goings-on' which are analogous to speech, and find their overt expression in speech."[xxi] If music could represent the world as thus and so, it would still be reducible to some thought that is formally linguistic. The "quality" of thought is a purely physiological phenomenon that is analogous to language.[xxii] Music would thus be an interesting objection: if music, specifically tone poems, can represent objects, then it naturally must be present in thought, which is to say according to Sellars' definition, it must be expressible in words. But music *is not* expressible in words alone, otherwise music's presentation—the sound in the symphony hall or from the radio—would be reducible to words. Music represents an object as thus and so with such accuracy at times that we are at a loss to describe that object as effectively using words. Thus, thoughts find their "overt expression" not only in the form of language but also in form of art and music.

Nietzsche shares this sentiment: "*Language*, as the organ and symbol of phenomena, can never, under any circumstances, externalize the innermost depths of music; whenever language attempts to imitate music it only touches the outer surface of music."[xxxiii] Just as music is not necessarily the quintessence of meaning, so too language does not share a special privilege as the goal of any description of the world. Attitudes toward the world need not be linguistic; the vast array of feelings captured in music attest to this. Furthermore, it is difficult to draw a non-trivial line between thought and "mere" attitude. Both, after all, are intentional—that is, they are both of or towards something (thought of books, attitude towards broccoli). Emotions can be intentional (you are mad at someone). This contradicts Wilfred Sellars' understanding of thought when he says that a neurophysiological account of thought would leave "no 'qualitative' remainder to be accounted for."[xxiv] If we take, as Sellars does, qualitative to mean "non-linguistic" then thought is qualitative in some way and the account of representation just traced reveals a fundamentally qualitative portion of thought to be accounted for in neurophysiology (at least "qualitative" by Sellars' standards).

One might claim that this is all well and good but that music still explains nothing. However, this arises from too grand a sense of explanation. Again, we need to consider whether worldview is epistemic, as Sellars implies, hermeneutic, as Nietzsche implies, or a combination of both, as I am arguing. The claim that music cannot be the primary constituent of a worldview because it does not deal with factual explanation of our knowledge arises only if one assumes that Sellars' epistemic conception of worldview is adequate. As we just saw, music does an impressive job of describing the parts of life that many consider to be of primary importance. At the same time, there is nothing prohibiting the general meaning of one's scientific knowledge to be of primary importance. In a well-developed worldview, one ideally understands both science and music under the heading of a unified interpretation of the world. What is critical to note is that neither a scientific conception nor a non-scientific conception have any meaning whatever until they are interpreted. This is to say that they are not views of the world at all until they receive interpretation.

Although scientific and non-scientific explanation are both "deep" in respect to

meaning, the types of descriptions supplied by art and science are obviously not equal. The major differences come in the representation of art and science—either method of representation might be more effective for describing one thing or another—and in the aim of art and science—the former aims at personal expression of one's attitudes toward the world while the other aims at objective understanding and manipulation of physical laws. To understand the similarities and differences between scientific and artistic description, let us clarify the nature of representation. As prominent philosopher of science Bas van Fraassen notes, "representation" is not necessarily "resemblance."[xxv] Thus, the Barcarolle might represent a boat ride without having any actual aural *resemblance* to it, the splash of waves is atonal! A scientific theory represents a certain phenomena, but it does not really make sense to say that it resembles it: the trajectory of a missile represented on a two-dimensional graph only vaguely resembles the three-dimensional reality of the trajectory. In all cases, be they artistic or scientific in nature, van Fraassen observes that "what determines the representation relationship … can at best be a relation of *what is in it* to factors *neither in the artifact itself nor in what is being represented* [sic]"—factors such as use, practice, and context.[xxvi] Thus, the common sense notion that "F=ma" randomly inscribed in the sand by a turtle does not represent Newton's second law because of the context of representation. Though the inscription might *resemble* Newton's second law, nevertheless it does not *represent* it—the context of "a turtle using sand to express itself" is untenable. That we have a certain use in mind when we represent something further implies that a representation will inevitably leave out certain properties of the phenomena which it purports to represent. Such a view of scientific representation suggests that Sellars' epistemology of "knowing that"/"knowing how" does not receive any scientific meaning until we interpret the various symbols involved in scientific representation.

Referring to Sellars' quote above, one can object that both music and science involve the "postulation of imperceptible entities." While Chopin's Barcarolle refers to a phenomenon in the world—namely boat riding, it nevertheless involves an entity that is completely abstract and "theoretical," namely, my particular imagination (at the time of the performance of the piece) of an ideal boat ride. This imagination is theoretical—it is based on my past observations, opinions, and notions about boat riding in general. Likewise, while a scientific theory refers to a phenomenon in the world, such as that of falling bodies, it also involves a component that is completely abstract and "theoretical," namely, the theory of gravitation that claims that all bodies—not just this one in front of me—exert an attractive force on other massive bodies. On account of their differences, the comparison between the imperceptible entities of art and science is not perfectly parallel. However, the point is taken that both represent things and postulate things that are abstract, things that are not directly derivable from this observation right here in front of me, though they represent observable phenomena.

Sellars' point of differentiation between the manifest and scientific images is becoming less clear. Where does aesthetic (musical) experience fit into Sellars' scheme? If it involves the postulation of abstract things like an ideal boat ride, then it cannot

be part of the manifest image. Perhaps we might claim that music and the like must be part of the scientific image. This obviously seems unsatisfactory. What if we loosen the strict dichotomy between the scientific and manifest image until it boils down to a unified "image"? The two images do not exist by themselves, and from this conjecture we might reject Sellars' dichotomy between two modes of viewing the world as inadequately describing how worldview is.

III. Working Past the Dichotomy

Towards a remedy to this problem, let us consider William James' suggestion that "men's beliefs at any time are so much experience *funded*."[xxvii] Indeed, we are talking about *beliefs* and *attitudes* when we talk about worldview. Although the natural sciences are among the most principled methods of codifying sense experience, we must still reconcile our worldviews, comprised both of beliefs justified by scientific inquiry and beliefs validated by personal experience, with any new judgments and facts whenever they arise. If, as James says, "truth is the function of the beliefs that start and terminate among [a body of facts]," [xxviii] then when two versions of a phenomena contradict, one must find the *true* version among the facts of experience. Critically, however, we now see that from beliefs and attitudes we must develop a hermeneutical system by which to interpret the "experience funding." One's ability to sort through the facts is contingent on a method of interpretation—a hermeneutical principle—which transcends the divide of "scientific"/"non-scientific" perception. Though the two sources of experience funding are different, nevertheless a single entity sorts through the funds and arranges them in a manner that is meaningful. Bas van Fraassen comments:

> So in science too, we find interpretation at two different levels. The theory represents the phenomena as thus or so, and that representation itself is subject to more than one tenable but significantly different interpretation. As in art, we find the persons involved (those who create the work, those who peruse or appreciate it) often unconscious of the non-uniqueness of their interpretations and of the creative element in their response as readers. The texts of science are open.[xxix]

A major consequence of blending the manifest and scientific images is that the divide between art and science becomes increasingly vague—is a car design a work of art or a scientific model? Scientific and non-scientific judgments of the world fall under the broad heading of interpretive attitudes toward the world, and the dichotomy, as it concerns worldview, yields no fruit. Nietzsche is right in saying that worldview requires a hermeneutical capacity, while Sellars is right in emphasizing the importance of an empirical epistemology in one's worldview.

We return, though, to the claim that "only as an aesthetic phenomenon do existence and the world appear justified."[xxx] Claiming that one interprets the world in a

certain way because a scientific conjecture claims that it ought to be interpreted in that way is as mistaken as saying that one interprets a work of art in a certain way because the art claims that it ought to be interpreted in a certain way. Heidegger asks "Whence do the sciences derive the right to decide what man's place is, and to offer themselves as the standard that justifies such decisions?"[xxxi] I answer here that it derives this right from the same place that art derives the same right: the right is derived from our interpretation of the world. Without a hermeneutic component, a scientific perspective is impossible as a complete worldview. This is not to say that we should adopt Nietzsche's "aesthetic metaphysics." On the contrary, I think that Sellars is most right when he says that science should no longer remain an "alien appendage" in the consideration of worldview. But, as we have seen, science does not interpret itself; worldview is not something to receive passively but is, rather, something to struggle with daily. The resulting interpretation is not a fragmented view but a holistic worldview in which "the world appears justified."

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ENDNOTES

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3: Nietzsche, 21.
4: Nietzsche, 62.
5: Ibid.
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8: Nietzsche, 113.
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10: Wilfred Sellars, In the Space of Reasons (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 404. Science, Perception, and Reality is the original book in which Sellars published "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man."
11: Sellars, 375.
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13: Ibid.
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17: Ibid.
18: Sellars, 369.

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20: Bas C. Van Fraassen, Scientific Representation (New York: Oxford, 2008), 17.
21: Sellars, 401.
22: Ibid.
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24: Sellars, 402.
25: Van Fraassen, Scientific Representation, 11.
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27: William James, Pragmatism (Cleveland: Meridian, 1965), 146.
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29: Van Fraassen, Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale, 2002), 151.
30: Nietzsche, 113.
31: Heidegger, 43.

Kant and Koch: Considerations on the Nature of Meaningful Knowledge

DYLAN ROSE
Boston University

In the introduction to *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Kant notes that "it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration of a science, when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced, that the question should at last occur, whether and how much a science is possible?"[i] It has been suggested that psychology, as a discipline distinct from the study of behavior and of brain chemistry, is facing just such a crisis.[ii] This is revealed by the fact that after more than a century[iii] as a "science", "psychology has not one sure sense of direction but several quite unsure directions."[iv] Although there is certainly theoretical and methodological disagreement in all branches of every science, in psychology, "though our century-long cumulation of a vast technical literature may contain several thousand law-like statements, not a single statement can be yet counted a law."[v] That scientific psychology has in this way failed to generate a concrete body of theory has prompted some to ask whether it is only chasing a phantom or a linguistic illusion. At stake on this chaos are therefore two questions:

1). Are psychological phenomena defensible as ontologically distinct, i.e., can they be said to exist independently of an organism's behavior or biology ?
2). Is it possible and worthwhile to study psychological phenomena systematically?

I contend that much like the crisis in metaphysics with which Kant was concerned,[vi] the crisis of modern psychology which involves these questions is methodological and not--to use the term loosely--ontological. The problems which modern scientific psychology faces do not demonstrate the weakness of the psychological model of the human, but only that current methods of psychological analysis do not respect the ontology of psychological phenomena. Again, much as with Kant's critique of the metaphysics of his contemporaries, I believe that a truly ontology respecting science of psychology can only exist when its current programmatic dogmas have

been eliminated. I therefore affirm both 1). and 2)., though the arguments I will present in support of 1). require an important revision of the methods currently deployed by psychologists in support of 2).

To defend my claims, I will consider whether Koch's proposed "psychological studies" demonstrates the way to an ontology respecting study of psychological phenomena. I assert that this program is a viable alternative to current methods of scientific psychological analysis, and that careful consideration of its development reveals the process by which meaningful knowledge is developed more generally. In order to do this, I will first consider the difficulties in relying on knowledge generated through pure logical reasoning through a brief description of Kant's concept of antinomy. I will then consider the degree to which such problems descend from the realm of the purely logical into the realm of what is called generally the "psychological." I will then attempt to link the structure of antinomial problems with the formulation of logical sets by identifying the limits of any conceptual set with the appearance of antinomial problems in that set as logically invalid attempts at self-inclusion. Finally, I will conclude with a description of the alternative methodology to scientific psychology which Koch developed.

To begin, then, a question: can we confidently trust our reason to inform us about the world?

I. Logic, Validity, and Meaningful Truth

The first thing which epistemology teaches us is that logic, when executed purely and without error, does produce a kind of truth through validity. If the consequences of the premises of a syllogism are resolved correctly to their conclusion, then it is a valid conclusion and therefore strictly true in that it is the only possible conclusion which is not identical to the premises and which includes all premises without compromising any. However, the second lesson of epistemology is that this principle produces truth about the world only under very particular conditions and in a limited set of circumstances. Although a complete proof that all swans are white is valid and therefore logically true, in a vital sense, we understand it to be meaningfully true only in the degree to which its conclusion intersects with experience. By this I mean that the fruits of logic, when disconnected from experience, often seem empty or moot. This is because the truth of logical claims lies not in their content but in their structure. In other words, the truth of the "white-swan conclusion" is not really about white swans, but rather about the rules which permit the formulation of this conclusion. Logical conclusions can therefore be considered true even in the face of contradicting evidence in experience. However, it takes an obstinate if perhaps—admirable—species of dedication to see the "white-swan conclusion" as a meaningful participant in the truth about the world when one has discovered an abundance of black swans.

Many philosophers have therefore constructed logical systems to purify and strengthen the relationship between the conclusions of logic and the extension of

these conclusions to our physical and sensual experience of the world. However, if any of these projects had succeeded to the satisfaction of the interested community, we would have known so immediately by virtue of this project's ability to "silence all challengers." This is obviously not the case, as many such systems minimize or neglect aspects of their respective problems to such a degree that they bear little resemblance to the original and desired form of their associated questions. This process is often defended by suggesting that such questions must first be carefully "reconstructed" before they are deemed "intelligible." Such demands for logical reconstruction are a good indication of the frustrations reason faces in drawing conclusions which are both logically valid and meaningfully true. To exemplify this point, consider the following scenario: you have been shot with an arrow, and are now bleeding to death. As much as you may wish to know who was responsible for the wound, asking for the party responsible will not stop your bleeding. Although you may get an answer, it is likely to be related only tangentially to the problem which prompted you to seek it out.

I am therefore inclined to ask: is the resolution of philosophical problems through logic only a distraction from the pursuit of some other, potentially more rewarding way of knowing? In other words, when we struggle with philosophical problems, is the real problem with which we are grappling a function of our manner of asking and not with the questions themselves? Philosophy shows us that unaided, logic cannot perform the complex feats of recursion and meta-analysis necessary for a true set of first principles upon which reliable knowledge of the world might be built. While philosophy demands a patience for the intractability of the grand and the intangible, little prepares the philosophy student for the recognition that most--if not all--of her questions may be unanswerable on the terms of logic alone. In "The Antinomies of Pure Reasoning and the Antinomies of Impure Living", Koch acknowledges this difficulty as Kant's insight "that there is a class of questions, intensely meaningful to all human beings--questions over which many experience great anguish--which 'transcend the competence of human reason'"[vii] ; this is an identification of what Kant calls *antinomy*.

II. The Antinomies of Pure Reason

Before I explain the concept of antinomy, some background in Kant's philosophy of the reason is required. To him, all knowledge is first predicated upon "the supposition that space and time are the pure forms of our intuition of all objects originating in the structure of our own sensibility, not anything derived from the independent properties of objects as they are in themselves."[viii] Space and time are the objects of intuition which the understanding furnishes our sensations of the world, but which are not themselves derived from sense experience. Rather, they are the "form" of the intuition, "the two primitive quanta of all our intuition"[ix] in which "all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations"[x] , and without which sensation would be unintelligible. The mind also contains a priori judgments as well as a prior concepts or categories of the understanding, both of

which, like space and time, "are necessary conditions for our own thought of objects rather than the principles derived from any particular experience of those judgments."[xi] A priori judgments are the mediators between the intuition, the conception of an object which is developed from this intuition, and further or additional concepts within the mind; it links and organizes intuitional impressions and those concepts which have already been formed in the mind. Although the judgment performs the essential coordinating function which is the basic activity of all cognition, a priori concepts link or synthesize the impressions of the intuition and form the mental objects upon which the judgment may act.

By this account, meaningful truth about the world emerges in the relationship between what is furnished to human reason a priori and what is received through the faculty of the intuition, or the senses. Although knowledge begins in sensation, these intuitions are made intelligible only by the application of the categories of the understanding by way of judgment. Our knowledge is therefore not knowledge of the world "itself", but represents only a human understanding or perspective on the world. He therefore notes with regard to scientific practice, "however exaggerated, however absurd it may sound to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, thus of the formal unity of nature, such an assertion is nevertheless right and appropriate to the object, namely experience." In short, he suggests that the structure of the human understanding determines the appearance and ultimate intelligibility of the physical universe.

To Kant, all philosophy though especially metaphysics, had suffered as a consequence of the "dogmatic" divorce of the pure reason—those parts of the mind which exist a priori of experience like judgment or the categories—from the intuition, especially on those problems which involved spatio-temporal objects, e.g., the question of a rational cosmology. Some "of the doctrines of traditional metaphysics" are therefore "fallaciously derived by attempting to use concepts of the understanding without corresponding evidence from sensibility."[xii] The result of this movement are the antinomies, or the problems of the infinity or finitude of space and time, the existence of the free will, and the existence of god. These are questions for which a contradicting thesis and antithesis can both be proven to be true, for although they concern subjects about which valid conclusions are possible on the terms of pure reason, their conclusions are not ultimately applicable to the spatio-temporal objects with which they were at least partially concerned.

III "The Antinomies of Impure Living"

Although Kant identified only four antinomies, Koch extends their domain into the territory of the psychological, i.e., to problems specifically concerned with human thoughts, feelings, and motivations. He notes:

> the class of such undecidable yet meaningful propositions is far broader than the four antinomies that Kant thought it necessary to develop in

> pursuit of his systematic objective…Moreover, if metaphorical extension of the notion be permitted, it rapidly becomes evident that a very broad range of human concerns, and even processes, exhibit, as it were, an antinomial texture.[xiii]

No explication of this point should be required. In the course of a single day, hour, or minute, a sensitive person is menaced almost continually by a spectrum of questions which are deeply troubling, yet which also appear to be undecidable. To acknowledge that the consequences of a decision lack any form of truly impartial or broadly metaphysical criteria for acceptability; to see that the behavior of those most close to us may be nothing more than the workings of a causal chain of purely physical events; to have even one's good deeds robbed of their value by an awareness that the goodness one feels in them is purely the result of "self-interest"; this is to grapple continually with a fine and highly rarefied form of madness. What is more, antinomy is a property that is very easily extended to problems even simpler and more commonplace than this. Koch suggests:

> Consider now the enormous range of ambiguity inherent in the human condition suggested by, say, the unrecoverability of particular motives and, indeed, the principled impossibility of achieving a full motivational analysis of any action; the ubiquitous problems of self-sincerity, altruism versus egocentrism, guilt versus innocence, sinful versus good deeds…of whether in particular instances or in general, one is loved or hated, liked or disliked, or perhaps regarded indifferently, whether one is beautiful or ugly or somewhere in between…When is one lying; when isn't one? When is one being lied to; when not?

It must be remembered that this is by no means an exhaustive list: any object or relationship of human significance could be understood as entangled with questions of a similar nature. If the "metaphorical extension" of the term is permitted, then I believe what these examples indicate are psychological antinomies, or what Koch refers to as "the antinomies of impure living." If antinomial problems are those which "human reason must necessarily confront, but which are rationally undecidable"[xiv] , then many psychological questions, like those which Koch identifies, may possess at least an "antinomial texture."

IV The Metaphorical Unity of the Antinomies

Koch's observations make it clear that antinomy is a phenomenon that extends beyond the purely philosophical. The very ordinariness of these concerns is proof that most people have no choice but to confront antinomy on a daily basis. I believe that the willingness with which many discard such considerations as obtuse or meaningless stems from the fact that they are so troubling. Indeed, the best proof of the existence

of this phenomenon is the reluctance with which many people approach philosophy. Philosophical questions are often only identified as such by non-professionals by virtue of their scope, which is held in deep suspicion. Admittedly, the existence of God or a free will is a much broader problem than certain knowledge of a person's honesty, and the case might be made that such broad questions are unlikely to produce very narrow or definite answers. What most fail to recognize is that this is only a difference of scale and not a difference of kind; the fear and trembling which an honest person feels in recognizing their uncertainty about a friend's motives is at the heart the same which they feel in considering the existence of God. In both cases, their fear is directed less toward a definite object or state and more to the simple fact that this is a thing which by the conditions of their reasoning is finally undecidable, and thus ultimately unknowable.

To my eyes, the thing which Kant and Koch's antinomies have in common, the very thing that them both important here, is exactly the fact of their resistance to resolution by reason. Antinomy straddles the realms of "pure logic" and "impure living" in testing the limits of our reasoning mind, and in this it unites them. One may see the truth of this statement by observing that when extended to their limit, many perfectly ordinary psychological questions require answers to philosophical questions as conceptual starting points. I believe that this difficulty emerges because we hope such answers might invest the terms of our more limited psychological problems with the meaning they require for intelligibility, and it is this elusiveness of meaning which ultimately makes epistemological confidence so slippery. To ask a question such as "Can I trust my friend's motives in this situation?", we first require a full understanding of what words like "trust", "motive", "friend", and "I" actually express. In discovering that little or nothing in the immediate power of our reasoning mind may produce final and indubitable truths about these concepts, we retreat to further levels of logical abstraction, hoping to find therein something certain which may infuse the terms of our initial concerns with enduring content.

The problem with relying upon logic for this is that even the most rarefied logic is still an essentially relational discipline. In logic, simply stating a is not an informative statement; we understand what a is in the simplest sense by making a relational identity statement like "**a**=**a**." Logic operates by making comparisons between things, even if the comparison made is only between objects and themselves. The special challenges reason faces in producing logical conclusions which are both valid and true are by this fact made clear. Logic is only one part of the individual's mental faculties, and in seeking to produce formal validity as well as truth, it is inevitably extended beyond it's own boundaries to the sensual realm, whose contents do not meet the formal requirements for inclusion as propositions in logic. This is part of the the gap which exists between validity and meaningful truth, and it is one proof that we inhabit a world in which logic is only a participant. The world of sensation beyond the mind appears chaotic and unpredictable; logic holds out the hope that this chaos might be reduced to terms easily managed by the power of the intellect. I have already suggested that philosophical and psychological considerations deploy logic in an attempt to generate

a set of true first principles, i.e., to draw meaning into a set of terms upon which further logical conclusions might be securely built. In failing this attempt, however, the antinomies demonstrate where meaning actually lies.

V. Antinomy and Meaning

In one sense, the antinomies emerge when the principles of logical reasoning are confused for absolute or universal truths. When this occurs, logic collapses upon itself and is rendered unable to perform even the intellectual functions with which it is credited. Without rules to isolate and delimit its contents, logic cannot be considered a technique of thinking distinct from the information which surrounds it; it becomes the very chaotic universe of appearances that it's development and formalization sought to avoid. We are aware of the existence of and need for meaning, I believe, precisely because we are aware of the tension between the stable interior functioning of conceptual systems like logic and the territory of information which they fail to encapsulate. Meaning is a property which is without place, as the moment in which antimony appears--where the division between the "inside" and "outside" of a system like logic is collapsed--is precisely where it emerges. Though logic points the way to our answers, it cannot see us through to our destination. The meaning of God or a particular feeling exists in that fleeting instant in which the substance of the world around us is complete and open to reason but not completely collapsed into the terms of either the reason or the senses alone; meaning is an intermediary process which links these two worlds.

Meaning, I therefore suggest, is a transcendent property of the relationship between a knowledge system and the universe of information that surrounds and contains it. Logic is simply one limited way of knowing about the world, and requires for it's existence an informational "ground" that completely transcends its own boundaries. To transcend validity in pursuit of meaningful truth, logic must reach beyond itself to connect with the realm of the senses.

VI. The Empirical Sciences

In the face of the apparent failure of pure logic to produce meaningful truth, many have turned to the physical sciences as an alternative and hopefully more certain method of inquiry about the world. At first, these do seem to achieve the required balance between logic and the more “concrete” realities of human phenomenal and sensual experience for creating meaningful truths. Their success is in many ways still a product of the elaboration and exploration of the philosophical school of empiricism. Empiricists, at the broadest possible stroke, believe that reliable knowledge is derived ultimately from sense experience and not from the principles of logical reasoning alone. However, I would suggest that empiricism provides no greater epistemological certainty than reason abstracted from sense-experience, for it involves a process of informational collapse which reflects that which logic demands--though the informa-

tion involved is sensual and not purely "intellectual."

My reading of Koch suggests that this claim is at least a part of the stance which he takes on the physical sciences. Although it is never expressed directly as such, we might infer that Koch believes that scientific results are not ascribed meaning because they in some way illuminate metaphysical or absolute truths about the universe. Rather, the conclusions that science permits us to draw are terms defined and derived in accordance with the rules of a scientific system. To study physics or biology is to operate within the boundaries of a type of logical system, and there is nothing wrong with believing that the conclusions these systems derive are in this sense true qua valid. In science, truth exists as a function of the candidacy of a statement for re-inclusion within the context of the scientific framework. In other words, science may be said to produce a particular kind of truth about the world because as it gradually expands its own limits through the production of results, these are in turn constructed in such a way that they remain formal elements of this system.

But does this render the fruits of these endeavors meaningfully true? From medicine to the exploration of the atom, science offers the hope that man's reason may penetrate the utter reaches of the universe. It is easy, however, to falsely equate the speed and optimism of its progress with the development of meaningful truths about the world. The ability of science to extend mankind's reach beyond its imagination are good proof of this hazard: knowledge of atomic physics produced weapons of unimaginable power, and anti-biotic medicines were handed out as treatments for ailments for which they were utterly irrelevant, creating wide-spread anti-biotic resistance. In the terms of the definition of meaning I have developed, this is a failure to account for the participation of scientific propositions in a universe of information that exceeds its own limited terms. This is acceptable if we hold science to be nothing more than a closed—albeit highly useful—system for generating a particular sort of result. Its standard of truth is only therefore that its results do not contradict themselves or escape the boundaries of the system's limits.

We must not forget, however, that this conclusion is defensible only insofar as it is held to be strictly logical, i.e., that it is developed in accordance with principles of formal set generation. Naturally, a formal system cannot accept new terms which do not meet that system's criteria for admission, for to do so is to create an entirely new system with a new set of laws and formal elements; the same is true of logic. Some might claim that none of these points prevent the unlimited extension of the "truthfulness" afforded to scientific results, rendering science an absolute guarantor of knowledge about the world. After all, if the set of scientific knowledge propositions may expand its scope infinitely, as long as this expansion does not produce or include results that nullify the set's original terms, then it does indeed have a technically infinite range of truthful conclusions. Koch's historical analysis of the development of scientific psychology provides a fine example of the confidence with which this conclusion was endorsed by early physical scientists. He quotes Mill:

> If there are some subjects on which the results obtained have finally

> received theunanimous assent of all who have attended to the proof, and others on which mankind have not yet been equally successful; on which the most sagacious minds have occupied themselves from the earliest date, and have never succeeded in establishing any considerable body of truths, so as to be beyond denial or doubt; it is by generalizing the methods successfully followed in the former inquiries, and adapting them to the latter, that we may hope to remove this blot on the face of science.[xv]

The view that Mill is here asserting is exactly what which I wish ultimately to contest: as the "moral sciences" (psychology) fail to meet criteria for scientific admission, science must include and correct them. The assumption implicit in this statement is enormous; Mill suggests by this that that which is scientifically false is as a consequence also elsewhere untrue. However, this point neglects an absolutely critical component of the logic which permits it's generation: sets are defined as much by what they include as by what they cannot or do not include.

Consider, for example, how although all books share certain common traits that give them their "bookness", an understanding of what books are is determined in equal measure by knowledge of what books are not. Stars are rendered distinct objects as much by their brightness as by the darkness which surrounds them. Scientists regularly make similar discriminations regularly, and it is right to discard elements which do not meet criteria for inclusion in the scientific system. What is wrong is to assume that what is discarded from science is in some hard metaphysical sense unreal. To suggest that science is the absolute arbiter of truth is to ignore the fact that if the meaning of it's conclusions is held to be strictly non-metaphysical, they function only as a formal system of propositions about the world. Failed candidates for inclusion into the system of science are untrue only insofar as they are held to science's standards; this exclusion does not make the content of failed propositions unreal.

This is the great danger of empiricism: its relationship with the senses offers it apparent security that may blind the scientific practitioner to the fact that they are not "at play in the fields of the gods." If science is only a useful conceptual short-hand for organizing the information of the senses, then it is not in any way illuminative of metaphysics. Science does not therefore determine reality, for it is ultimately a technique derived from and defined negatively by the entire scope of the real. Science, properly understood, is a useful tool like logic, but by virtue of its relationship to the senses, we fail to see that the meaningfulness of scientific truths is critically related to a transcendental process which necessarily limits their ultimate applicability. Given this, we may conclude that as a formal system, science may make reasonable truth claims for propositions generated in accordance with its own rules and in terms which it defines as acceptable. Although propositions or objects that do not meet these criteria are scientifically invalid, they are not as a consequence of this rejection also unreal.

I wish now to suggest that the two claims I have made—1). that science functions

as a standard of truth only for those propositions that are framed by science and 2). that as a formal system and set of propositions, science is therefore defined negatively by sets which are structurally similar but differ in the class of propositions and elements they contain--yield interesting conclusions regarding antinomy and the fate of psychology. Specifically, I assert that antinomy is an important criteria for determining the integrity of a field of knowledge. Therefore, although psychology has "failed" to meet standards of empirical decidability required for admission to the field of science, the existence of the psychological antinomies is an indication that psychology is a worthwhile field of study.

VII. Psychology and Science

As I have already established, science may be understood to function as one formal system for truth generation amongst a potentially infinite universe of similar systems. Science produces scientific truths in the derivation of results using formally defined elements and laws of operation. New elements and operations in this system are generated either through proofs created within the system or by the identification of elements and operations in other systems which are functionally non-contradictory to it's own, and for which it provides increased explanatory power or clarity. The reduction of biology and chemistry to physics is an example of one case in which this second technique has succeeded; psychology is not.

Considered in the light of my argument to this point, we might understand the failure of psychology "qua science"[xci] as a failure to find a substantively analogous set of formal terms and laws between two domains of human knowledge or "conceptual sets." As I have already suggested, it is my belief that an important criteria for the inclusion of a new conceptual set under the auspices of science is that the reduction of this set to scientific terms is critically related to simplification. The natural sciences are considered functionally reducible to physics because physical laws can explain the entire scope of their phenomena of interest with fewer formal terms and laws than they themselves possess: it is easier to explain the behavior of molecules as the function of the four basic forces than to account for the behavior of each pure element in interaction with all others. However, this technique does not succeed in all cases, and the social sciences are the probable result of this difficulty. At the heart of the matter is a question of scale: it is simply too difficult to account for the functioning of organisms as complex as human beings in terms of the interactions of atomic forces. Although it is strictly possible, the project might be likened to an attempt to map the topography of a beach by examining the shape and position of every grain of sand thereupon. While nothing about organisms with psychology strictly escapes description by physics, it is far more more effective to deal with a larger number of terms and laws that psychology posits but which also permit a manageable technique for analysis.

However, this does not mean that the failure of scientific psychology is necessarily a product of it's positing a non-real "mental stuff," a belief that is often held responsible for psychology's apparent inability to generate a concrete body of theory. Rather, the class of objects of interest for psychologists exceeds the descriptive power of pure physical science, and thus falls outside of the strict functioning of science itself. While complex phenomena like motives or feelings could in one sense be accounted for in the terms of physics, the lack of a neat isomorphism between the two conceptual sets effectively prevents this.

VIII. Psychology Beyond Science

But what does this mean for psychology? Having failed to meet the commonly held litmus test for meaningful truth about the world through science, should the study of psychology be discarded? I agree with Koch that the answer to this question is, broadly, a resounding no. Ironically, it is the antimonial texture of psychological problems that may offer an assurance of psychology's worth. I make this claim by asserting that antinomial problems may be derived only in conceptual sets which are structurally complete. In other words, no conceptual set which is self-contradictory or incompletely derived may contain antinomial results. This is because antimony emerges as the result of an attempt at set self-inclusion that is impossible for sets whose boundaries are not clearly defined. Conceptual sets that are boundless would not be faced with antinomial problems, as new elements and laws could be added to the set at will. However, as I have already indicated, such a set ultimately fails the criteria for generating meaningful truth, as it collapses the world beyond the formal "interior laws" of the conceptual set into its own terms, thus eliminating the transcendental ground required for the creation of meaning.

The case could be made that modern scientific psychology has struggled as the result of a similar informational collapse into the terms of the physical sciences. Having released it from an obligation to the physical sciences for their ontological security, however we may readily accept to some extent the phenomenological security of psychological concepts. We might therefore, at least at first, elect to take psychological phenomena at face value. If science is not determinate of the real, then it is perfectly reasonable to abandon scientific reduction where its use as a tool of sensual and intellectual organization fails. Whatever their ontology may be, human beings appear to experience psychological phenomena, which are as a consequence of this potentially meaningful as light or gravitation. The special difficulty that psychology faces is that all the tools upon which one typically relies for deriving truths about the world are necessarily dependent upon it. Reasoning, creativity, curiosity, and sensation are all psychological constructs which are held to be prerequisites for the creation of knowledge, but which as a consequence cannot "double back" on themselves. In this regard, modern psychology may be the most limited of all disciplines, as the study of the human mind is bounded on all sides by it's own functioning. The irony of this realiza-

tion is that to some extent it also renders psychology the most meaningful of all disciplines: the limitations of self-knowledge that it reveals shed more light on the human condition than any single physical analysis or result possibly could.

This conclusion would seem to contradict my earlier claim that we need not discard psychology. I should perhaps modify this point to suggest that a meaningful psychology is possible, but might appear unrecognizable to contemporary psychologists. The only way it would seem one could avoid the antinomial boundaries that bind the field so tightly is to take a kind of naive empiricist approach to their study. I mean by this that to study psychology is to take psychological phenomena, as I have already suggested, at face value. I believe that this is what Koch is suggesting when he describes the "psychological studies" as an alternative to psychological science. While we may never be able to penetrate the ontology of psychological objects and events, there is a vast and largely unexplored world of information contained within their very appearance. As I have already demonstrated, this is in fact all that is required for the meaningful study of a particular discipline. As with logic and the physical sciences, all that is required to begin this project is the careful consideration of whether psychological phenomena appear and function in ways distinct from those phenomena to which the word "psychological" is not attached. What is required, in short, is a transcendental psychology.

I cannot say whether this is a name that Koch would have willingly appended to his "Psychological Studies", but I believe that this helps to clarify the nature and goals of a project that is only partially articulated in his writing. Rather than trying to understand what motivation is, he suggests, it might be instructive to first consider what objects or events are attributed motivational significance at all. This, of course, is only possible in the contexts in which they emerge. If we wish to understand the nature of motivation, the first step is simply to determine through as broad an investigation as possible where, in whom, and at what times objects or persons are understood to be "motivated." What separates this process from an inquiry on purely scientific terms is that it is a naive and not a reductive process of observation; the goal is not adapt what one observes to the conceptual languages of physics or biology. One example of how this technique has already been explored is Koch's study of creativity at the Boston University Aesthetics Research Center. The bulk of the work which this center produced was a series of in-depth and penetrating interviews regarding the personal history and thoughts on the artistic process from a large number of renowned artists and authors. The aim of this project was to produce an illuminating series of conversations with these individuals about their work and their creative talents without any attempt to reduce or formalize the contents of their reports to the terms of some other conceptual set. The hope of this work was simply to allow the information contained within these reports--over time and through careful comparison--to coalesce as conceptual blocks that were "ontology respecting" to both the explicit and implicit creative processes of the individuals interviewed.

But why should we call such a project an attempt at a transcendental psychology? I believe the answer lies in Koch's attempts to allow the phenomenon of interest to

distinguish itself as distinct from the informational territory that surrounds it. The work of the BUARC allowed Koch to carefully define those contexts in which creativity was certainly at work and in what ways the creative process functioned. An understanding of creativity and motivation emerges at the point at which we recognize them as phenomena distinct from other sorts of mental properties. The meaning of these concepts is thus made apparent by the act of filling the concept of "creativity" with a particular group of propositions about objects, events, and processes which appear to surround creative activity and thinking while, simultaneously defining creativity negatively by the exclusion of what is apparently unrelated to it. Modern psychology has struggled to generate a body of meaningful theory not because its objects of study do not exist, but rather because our current approach to the systematic study of psychology compromises the conditions under which meaningful knowledge about the world is generated at all.

Koch's Psychological Studies is an attempt to generate a body of theory regarding a particular set of phenomena not in accordance with the laws that delineate any other set, but rather in accordance with the conditions of the human understanding themselves. Koch's Psychological Studies are therefore a transcendental project in the Kantian sense, as they do not substitute a "dogmatic" reliance upon the laws of physics and biology for the guiding principles of understanding in searching to develop meaningful truths about psychological concepts.

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ENDNOTES

1: Kant, Emmanuel. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. p.2.
2: See Koch, Sigmund. "Psychology versus the Psychological Studies" in Psychology in Human Context. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
3: Wilhelm Wundt founded what is generally considered to be the first psychology laboratory in 1879 at Leipzing University.
4: Koch, Sigmund. Psychology: A study of a Science. p.5
5: Koch, Sigmund. "The Limits of Psychological Knowledge." p.396
6: See the "Preface to the First Edition" in Critique of Pure Reason, p. 13. Colonial Press: New York. 1900.
7: Koch,Sigmund. Psychology in Human Context. David Finkleman Frank Kessel. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 403.
8: Guyer, Paul. "Introduction: The starry heavens and the moral law." p.13. in The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge University Press: New York. 1992.
9: Kant, Immhnuel.Critique of Pure Reason. p.233
10: Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. p.22
11: Guyer, Paul. "Introduction: The starry heavens and the moral law." p.14. in The

Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge University Press: New York. 1992.
12: Guyer, Paul. "Introduction: The starry heavens and the moral law." p.15. in The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge University Press: New York. 1992.
13: Koch, Sigmund. Psychology in Human Context. David Finkleman Frank Kessel. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 406.
14: Koch, Sigmund. "The Limits of Psychological Knowledge." p.396
15: Koch, Sigmund. Psychology in Human Context. David Finkleman Frank Kessel. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 124.
16: See Koch, Sigmund. "The Limits of Psychological Knowledge." p.396

Contributors' Notes

Matthew Friberg is a senior at Oberlin College majoring in Philosophy and Politics. His philosophical interests primarily lie in the intersection between political philosophy and post-structural thought. Matthew has just completed Honors work in political theory based on the recent work of William E. Connolly. He hopes to pursue graduate studies in political theory.

Connor Mcnulty is a senior in at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, majoring in philosophy and history, and pursuing distinction in both fields. His philosophical interests include logic, ethics, and philosophy of science, especially psychology. Other academic interests include social and military history. Connor intends to undertake graduate study at Georgetown University.

R. Brian Tracz is a sophomore at Boston College, double majoring in biology and philosophy. His focus is on molecular and cognitive neuroscience with an interest in the philosophy of science and philosophy of mind related to these fields. He is especially interested in synthesizing continental and analytic approaches to philosophy of mind to work beyond the analytic/continental divide. He is grateful to Prof. Dan McKaughan for his assistance and support.

Dylan Rose is a senior at Boston University. In addition to majoring in philosophy, he has earned a minor in Modern Greek Studies. His primary philosophical interests are in ancient philosophy, though he also has a deep interest in Kierkegaard. He intends to pursue ancient philosophy and classical studies, but will postpone further studies in order to find work in Athens, where he hopes to perfect his knowledge of Greek.

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