Martin Heidegger was born on September 26, 1889, in Meßkirch, a small town in an area long known as “Catholic country.” With the help of Camillo Brandhuber, the pastor of the local church where his father was sacristan, he attended public high schools in Constance and Freiburg from 1903 to 1909. At Constance he resided at St Conrad’s Seminary, a residence that assured seminarians, usually of modest means, second-class status among the regular, better-off students at the high school. Nonetheless, Heidegger recalls his studies at the two “humanistic” gymnasiums as a time of “fruitful learning from excellent teachers of Greek, Latin, and German.” His spiritual adviser at St Conrad’s was its rector, Conrad Gröber. Like Brandhuber, Gröber was active in conservative Catholic politics and, in the spirit of these mentors, Heidegger pens popular articles from 1910 to 1912, bemoaning the decadence of modernity and individualism (Farias 1989; Ott 1993).

In 1907 Gröber presents Heidegger with a particularly propitious gift: a copy of Franz Brentano’s 1862 dissertation: On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle. Attempting to refute the modern charge that Aristotle lacks an argument for his categories, Brentano presents the primacy of the categorical over the other meanings of being identified in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (accidental, true, potential/actual). Though Heidegger would later argue that being-true is the primary meaning, he acknowledges that Brentano’s “question of what is simple in the manifold of being” was a relentless stimulus to his 1927 masterpiece, Being and Time (Kisiel and Sheehan 2007: 9).

After ill-health aborted repeated attempts to study for the priesthood, Heidegger spends two years studying mathematics, physics, and chemistry, before enrolling in the department of philosophy at the University of Freiburg. During this period (1911 to 1914), he studies with the Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, but becomes increasingly preoccupied with Husserl’s phenomenology. The stamp of Husserl’s thought is especially evident in Heidegger’s 1914 dissertation on The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism where, following Husserl’s lead, he argues that the logical character of judgment lies outside the purview of a psychological study.

During the war Heidegger begins teaching at Freiburg, marries the Protestant student Elfridie Petri, and is in and out of the military for health reasons until ending the war as an army weatherman. On home leaves, Heidegger seeks out Husserl who arrives as Rickert’s replacement in Freiburg in 1916. Eventually, Husserl reciprocates
and the two phenomenologists are frequent interlocutors for the better part of the next decade.

In 1919, Heidegger pens the following prescient lines to the Freiburg theologian Engelbert Krebs:

Epistemological insights that extend to the theory of historical knowledge have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me – but not Christianity and metaphysics, that, however, in a new sense.

(Kisiel and Sheehan 2007: 96)

These lines mark a major turning point in Heidegger’s life. The former seminarian, apparently primed to find a position in a Catholic faculty, was formally signaling his decision to break with Catholicism. Career-wise, the decision was undoubtedly a precarious one at the time, given the recent birth of his first son as well as the financial troubles and stiff competition for academic positions in post-war Germany. But the reasons that Heidegger gives for his decision are particularly revealing. Heidegger sees no conflict between metaphysics and the historical insights prompting the break with the religion of his parents. Indeed, for the next decade or more, he actively pursues “metaphysics … in a new sense.”

Not surprisingly, this new sense of metaphysics begins to take shape via phenomenological investigations of Christian religious experience, shaped by readings of Paul, Augustine, Luther, Kierkegaard, and Schleiermacher (Heidegger 1920–21/2004). In his early Freiburg lectures (1919–23) Heidegger also begins to reform phenomenology in ways that significantly depart from Husserlian phenomenology. A pre-theoretical hermeneutics of – and rooted in – the historicity and facticity of the experience of living the faith takes the place of detached observations in the service of theory. The path to the matter itself is given only in interpretation that is never without presuppositions. Particularly in his early lectures at Marburg (where he teaches from 1923 to 1928), he takes pains to explain his reasons for breaking with Husserl’s phenomenology (Heidegger 1923/2004, 1925/1992, 1925–26/2010).

In the early 1920s, a lifetime of intensive engagement with Aristotle’s texts commences. Indeed, the text of Heidegger’s 1927 magnum opus, Being and Time (hereafter BT), originates from an attempt to develop the appropriate (non-Scholastic) categories for a planned commentary on Aristotle (Kisiel 1993: 227–308). The aim of BT is to reawaken the forgotten question of the meaning of being through analysis of its meaning in the case of the particular being – Dasein (as a title for our manner of existence) – with an understanding of being (see below). A projected but unpublished second part was supposed to dismantle the history of ontology, particularly with a view to exposing a presumably self-evident but ultimately myopic equation of being with presence. While BT is clearly Heidegger’s most influential work, Heidegger publishes only the first two divisions of the first part and, as he later reveals, eventually destroys the rest of the manuscript.

One reason for destroying the manuscript was its failure to reawaken the question of being, as Heidegger intended it. Instead, the existential analysis was interpreted as a version of existentialism, an interpretation that takes Dasein for a transcendental subject. Despite protestations that his philosophy is not an existentialism (where
subjectivity enjoys a certain primacy), Heidegger acknowledges these shortcomings and attributes them to the metaphysical language in which he couched the project (Heidegger 1947/1993: 231–33). Notably, as the language of transcendence, metaphysics includes transcendental phenomenology. Accordingly, Heidegger also explicitly comes to eschew this way of characterizing his later work (Heidegger 1954/1993: 14–15; 1959b/1982: 9, 29). In the 1930s, the center of gravity gradually shifts away from Dasein and metaphysical themes to the historical relation between being and Dasein. Heidegger’s insistence, already in BT, on thinking via critical analysis of the history of philosophy is no less true of shifts in his thinking, following the publication of BT. In the period from 1928 to 1932, spurred on by an attempt to rethink critically the meanings of metaphysics and truth, he gives highly original and controversial readings of Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel (Heidegger 1929a/1993, 1929b/1990, 1930–31/1988, 1991/1995, 1931–32/2002, 1943/1993).

On May 1, 1933, following his election as Rector at Freiburg, Heidegger becomes a member of the National Socialist Party. As Rector, he is an enthusiastic spokesman for the National Socialist regime and faithfully implements at least some of its anti-Semitic policies. Though Heidegger resigns as Rector in less than a year, he remains a member of the party until its disbanding in 1945. Despite entreaties from former students, he refuses to apologize for his membership in the party or for the atrocities unleashed by it. In his controversial Rectoral Address and numerous writings, particularly from 1933 to 1935, Heidegger comfortably combines his philosophical terminology with that of National Socialism, inviting the much-discussed question of his politics’ relation to his philosophy (Heidegger 1933/1985, 1933–34/2010; Farias 1989; Faye 2009). The question is thoroughly legitimate, not only because BT attempts to analyze existence as a phenomenon that underlies both theory and practice, but also because he acknowledges that his ontological interpretation of existence is based upon a specific conception of authentic existence, “a factual ideal of Dasein,” that he leaves unelaborated (Heidegger 1927/1962: 358).

Heidegger’s essay, Origin of the Work of Art (based upon his first public lectures after resigning as rector), marks a key transition in his thinking. On the one hand, as he attests, the essay is motivated by the same question of being that motivated BT. Moreover, a central theme, namely, that the artwork is the happening of truth as the unhiddenness of beings (thus, supposing hiddenness), reprises but also revises his BT account of Dasein as the primordial “place” – the “clearing” – of truth. His rejection of expressionistic and aesthetic approaches to artworks – approaches that engender “intentional” and “affective” fallacies (Wimsatt 1954) – continues his assault on modernity’s privileging of subjectivity. But the study also introduces new themes that concern him in the ensuing decades, e.g. the meaning of things (in contrast to works or tools), the strife of the world with the earth that withdraws from every attempt to grasp it, the significance of art as a techne that – in contrast to modern technology – “allows the earth to be earth,” and, not least, opens human beings up to a dimension in which they can be addressed by the divine (Heidegger 1935/1993). Also crucial to Heidegger’s development of these themes are his lectures on Holderlin in 1934/35 and his 1936 address Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry (Heidegger 1944/2000).
In the period from 1936 to 1940 Heidegger completes his second major work, the posthumously published *Contributions to Philosophy*, and gives his influential lectures on Nietzsche, later published as *Nietzsche I–II* in 1961 (1961a, 1961b). In the *Contributions* Heidegger criticizes *BT* and introduces a project of preparing for another, post-metaphysical way of thinking (see below). He interprets Nietzsche's doctrines of the eternal return and the will to power as the penultimate culmination of Western metaphysics. Shortly before the war begins, in private notes (albeit first published in 1997), Heidegger is highly critical of Hitler (Heidegger 1938–39/2006). After the war commences, he returns to studies of Hölderlin and the Presocratics.

In 1945 an allied tribunal forbids Heidegger to teach and, in January 1946, he suffers a nervous breakdown, requiring hospitalization. In 1950/51 he is permitted to lecture and he becomes an emeritus professor the following year. During the immediate post-war period, Heidegger settles accounts with existentialism (Heidegger 1947/1993) and, in the face of the challenging, all-enframing character of modern technology, he contemplates a way of dwelling and relating to things in terms of an innovative concept of “the fourfold” (Heidegger 1949–50/1977, 1954/1993). He also further develops the contrast between meditative, poetic, thankful thinking and representational, calculative thinking (Heidegger 1951/2004, 1954/1993, 1957b/1991, 1959a/1966). During this period Heidegger also argues that metaphysics derives from a difference more basic than the identity of being and thus from a ground that can no longer be thought from the perspective of metaphysics (Heidegger 1957b/1991). At the end of the decade he compiles his various studies of language over three decades (Heidegger 1959b/1982). Also noteworthy are seminars in Switzerland from 1959 to 1969 to a group of psychiatrists and medical students (Heidegger 1987/2001).

In 1970 Heidegger suffers a stroke and, as he recovers, he begins arrangements for the complete edition of his works. Heidegger has been roundly criticized for not arranging to have his works published in a critical edition, prompting suspicions about the posthumously published volumes. The first volume – the 1927 lectures, *Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* – appears in 1975 and Heidegger dies a year later, on 26 May.

**Being and Time**

The aim of the *BT* is to renew the forgotten question of the sense of being, as the foundation for ontology. Thus, Heidegger deems *BT* a work of fundamental ontology. While other (“ontic”) sciences investigate particular entities, assuming some sense in which they can be said to be, ontology investigates being itself. Heidegger employs the term “Dasein” to designate the particular being with an understanding of being or, equivalently, the particular being who exists as a clearing for the disclosure of various manners of being, including its own. Dasein, so construed, is unmistakably meant to take the place of the traditional subject of modern philosophy. Heidegger reserves the terms “existence” and “existential” for Dasein’s manner of being. Accordingly, to say that Dasein exists is to say that being matters to it and, in this sense, has an understanding of being, prior to any theory or practice. Since being is always the being of this or that being, fundamental ontology must take its
bearings from the investigation of what it means for a particular sort of being to be. Precisely because Dasein, of all beings, has an understanding of being, fundamental ontology must take the form of an analysis of existence. Indeed, Heidegger contends not only that an existential understanding of being distinguishes Dasein, but also that being—in contrast to beings—is only in that understanding (Heidegger 1927/1962: 228, 255, 272). Since the object of the existential analysis is nothing less than “we ourselves,” it amounts to a “self-interpretation” (1927/1962: 359–60). Being and Time’s considerable success can be traced in no small measure to Heidegger’s ability to fuse in this way the systematic-historical issue (fundamental ontology) with concrete self-interpretation (existential analysis).

Heidegger manages this feat by crafting language that, while technical, resonates with ordinary usage and departs from standard philosophical nomenclature. Thus, Heidegger cautions his readers not to equate “Dasein” with “human being”, a term overloaded with traditional prejudices that foreclose or are oblivious to the very question that motivates the existential analysis. So, too, he distinguishes existential analysis from familiar studies of human beings (anthropology, psychology, biology).

Heidegger also takes pains to distinguish Dasein from consciousness (Bewußt-sein), the thematic center of Husserl’s phenomenology. Thus, while phenomenology is for Heidegger the method of fundamental ontology, it is phenomenology in a new sense. Husserl takes his bearings principally from intentionality in the form of cognitive consciousness, with a view to providing a phenomenological grounding of the perceptions (not least the categorical and eidetic intuitions) that supposedly underlie all science. Heidegger criticizes this starting point for its failure to call into question the sense of being that is presupposed by this analysis, both with regard to the objects (essences, states of affairs) of that consciousness and with regard to consciousness itself. One of the central motivations for phenomenology is to bracket preconceptions, particularly those that seem most self-evident, in an effort to return to the things themselves. By accepting both the traditional, Greek sense of being as presence and the modern, Cartesian subjective starting point with its aim of grounding a mathematical science of nature, Husserl betrays the ontological promise of phenomenology, in Heidegger’s eyes.

By calling attention to the historical presuppositions of Husserl’s conception of phenomenology, Heidegger has no pretense of arriving at a presuppositionless starting point, an intuition into a timeless essence, structure, or state of affairs. Instead Heidegger develops a “hermeneutic phenomenology” rooted not in intuition but in a historically mediated, circle-of-understanding that is constitutive of existence. This hermeneutic circle is thus not a vicious form of begging the question but the very foresource of existence. What is decisive, Heidegger (1927/1962: 195) famously remarks, is not getting out of the circle but coming into it in the right way.

Symptomatic of the modern tradition (and here again Husserl is no exception) is a tendency to skip over the world (in favor of nature), to neglect our facticity, including who—not what—we are in that world, interacting with others and manipulating implements, and the manner of being of the entities that are ready-to-hand within the world (Heidegger 1927/1962: 93–94, 128, 272). In the first section of BT Heidegger addresses all these themes, as he introduces the notion of Dasein’s
being-in-the-world. The hyphenated phrase is meant to cancel any presumption of a subject independent of a world and all that the world encompasses. In a celebrated analysis of the experience of tools in use and in a breakdown, Heidegger revitalizes the question of the meaning of being by demonstrating the irreducibility of Dasein (the user of the tool) to being-ready-to-hand (the \Zuhanden-sein\ of the tool in use) or present-at-hand (the \Vorhanden-sein\ of unused nature or tools). In use, tools are ready-to-hand, that is to say, they are inconspicuous, even absent in a certain sense (think of the use of a well-working accelerator pedal while driving). However, the moment a tool breaks, not only is the tool then conspicuously, at times even obtrusively present-at-hand (think of the same accelerator pedal getting stuck), but the breakdown also reveals the entire purposive network of such tools (the accelerator’s relation to the gas pump, to the motor, the highway, the destination, and so on) that forms the world and thus the very being of Dasein (being-in-the-world) itself. Also distinctive of Dasein is the irreducibility of its being-with (\Mit-sein\) others in the way that two things ready-to-hand or present-at-hand are next-to-one-another. Again, what is phenomenologically decisive for the existential analysis is who Dasein is in its everyday existence, not what it might be as something already given in nature. Heidegger makes a noun of the German pronoun \man\ (usually translated “one” or “they”) to characterize this everyday existence in which Dasein is not authentically itself, but instead loses itself, acting as a more or less anonymous self, fulfilling a socially acceptable role and doing what is expected.

Given the irreducibility of Dasein to other modes of being, Heidegger speaks of existentials instead of categories (universal concepts of being) to characterize the manners of being that are peculiar to Dasein. Since the root meaning of Dasein is to be the clearing (the existential truth) in which entities and their manners of being disclose themselves, the existentials can be described as Dasein’s distinctive ways of existing-and-disclosing. Towards the end of the first part of \BT\, Heidegger identifies three basic existentials – disposition, understanding, fallenness – that together constitute Dasein. We are always disposed, finding ourselves in the world in a certain way, via revealing moods and emotions (e.g. fear). Yet at the same time we are always projecting possibilities and, in view of these projections, we understand what things are for and how they work. In addition, we are all the while absorbed in the things and tasks at hand within-the-world.

Heidegger insists that these three basic dimensions are joined at the hip, forming a unity that he designates as “care.” Dasein is always at once ahead of itself (projecting, understanding) yet already in the world (thrown, disposed) and concerned with the entities encountered within it (factual, fallen). Or, in other words, never simply on hand, Dasein is always in motion, existing in the form of possibilities that it is always already projecting, albeit in a way shaped by the world into which it has been thrown. To be authentically myself is to take responsibility for the possibilities that I project. To be sure, in its everyday conformist existence, Dasein is preoccupied with what is at hand, but this alienating plunge into inauthenticity is a flight from Dasein’s “authentic potential-to-be-itself.”

The experience of \Angst\ (an existential version of anxiety) opens Dasein up to that potential, Heidegger contends. In contrast to fear, \Angst\ is not directed at anything within-the-world but at being-in-the-world as such, throwing Dasein back upon itself.
alone. As the experience of the insignificance of everything within the world and every interpretation provided by anyone else, Angst is the experience of “not being at home” in the world. Angst is a fundamental disposition, but a disposition that discloses our facticity (how we have fallen prey to the world) and our capacity to exist (to understand and become ourselves) authentically. In this way, Heidegger contends that analysis of Angst provides the phenomenological basis for his claim that Dasein’s being is the unified existence that he calls “care.” (This existence is unified in the sense that the basic existentials are all inherently related to one another and thus equally basic or, as Heidegger puts it, “equiprimordial” to the existence of Dasein, summed up in caring.)

The orientation of the existential analysis in Division One of BT, while necessary to make up for traditional neglect, is not without cost. For in its orientation to everyday existence, it fails to treat Dasein as completely and fundamentally as the phenomenon of existence requires. Only when the analysis takes into account Dasein’s finitude, its death, and an existence that understands and projects itself in light of this fundamental possibility, does analysis manage to disclose Dasein as it authentically is or, better, can be. In Division Two of BT, Heidegger turns to the themes of death (Dasein’s ownmost possibility), conscience (the call to anticipate death), and resoluteness (the authentic response to conscience’s call) in an attempt to complete the analysis of authentic existence.

But this analysis is still only a prelude to the task of determining the sense of authentic existence, i.e. the horizon against which the result of this analysis of authentic existence, i.e. authentic care, is meaningful. BT culminates in an argument that this meaning is to be found in time – not the universalized time of clocks or scientific measurements, but the time of Dasein’s projection, authentically or inauthentically, of the possibility that it always is already, i.e. its death. Just as Heidegger distinguishes time in the most basic and authentic sense from time-measurements, so, too, he distinguishes history (Geschichte) in the original sense as the happening of Dasein from historical narratives of the past (Historie). Dasein’s historicality (Geschichtlichkeit), its care-ridden passage from birth to death, existentially grounds those narratives, and, in its authentic historicality, Dasein frees itself for its fate and the destiny that it shares with others, i.e. with a people (Volk) (Heidegger 1927/1962: 436).

**Contributions to philosophy**

Less than a decade after the publication of BT, Heidegger no longer pursues fundamental ontology or the existential analyses required by it. Heidegger comes to see that ontology, as a science, cannot avoid the pretension of objectifying being, a pretension that is fatal to thinking the meaning of being since it suggests that being is a presence and, indeed, a presence that presents itself as an object to a subject (Dasein). In the place of ontology, he proposes a way of thinking the history of “beyng”. The expression “history of being” (Seynsgeschichte) is meant to continue the contrast between history (Geschichte) and a narrative of the past (Historie). However, Heidegger now centers the happening, not so much in Dasein as such, as in its
relation to being. Moreover, as the odd spelling of “being” is meant to signal, Heidegger now has his sights on a different, ultimately post-metaphysical question. From the beginnings of Western thinking, the leading, metaphysical question has been “What is being?” In place of this question, Heidegger proposes a new beginning that poses the fundamental question (Grundfrage): “What is the ground of being?” Heidegger employs the old German spelling Seyn, here translated as “being”, as a synonym for this ground of being (Sein). Since being – in contrast to beings – only is in relation to Dasein, the fundamental question is equivalent to the question of the ground of the relation between being and Dasein.

It is necessary to think beyng, i.e. this grounding, historically since the relation grounded by it is precisely the history of Dasein’s understanding of being. To be sure, this understanding is not of Dasein’s making, as though the sense of being were nothing more than a human projection. The projection is a thrown projection and the projection is always against a horizon that Dasein can at best intimate. Nevertheless, as noted above, Heidegger chastises himself for not stressing sufficiently the thrownness of Dasein’s projection and attributes this shortcoming to the metaphysical language of BT (Heidegger 1936–38/1999, 1947/1993).

Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy is his most sustained attempt to make up for these shortcomings by rethinking being historically, i.e. by thinking how Dasein’s understanding of being is historically grounded. Heidegger takes his readers through the history of beyng from its first beginning to its late modern transformations, in an attempt to show not only that the various understandings of being are neither self-evident nor inevitable but, more importantly, that a new beginning is possible.

Traditional metaphysics is onto-theological, i.e. concerned with determining what entities are insofar as they are exist (ontology) and doing so in terms of what primarily is (theology). In the 1930s Heidegger attempts to think the history of these determinations in terms of a ground that is, necessarily, no longer metaphysical, i.e. neither ontological nor theological (Heidegger 1930–31/1988: 126; 1936–38/1999: 307, 328).

Given Heidegger’s attempt to outflank traditional ontology, it is perhaps not surprising to find a shift in his attitude toward the ontological difference. “Ontological difference” refers generally to any difference among manners or types of being, for example, the difference between being-ready-to-hand (Zuhanden-sein) and being-here (Dasein). However, in Heidegger’s early work “ontological difference” chiefly designates the difference between being (Sein) and a being, an entity (Seiendes). When we say, for example, “there is something shiny,” we typically invoke the expression “there is” to affirm the being of an entity, “something” to designate the entity, while “shiny” begins to approximate what the entity is. In BT the ontological difference coincides with Dasein’s understanding of being (Sein), an understanding that is at least implicit in any interaction with a being (Seiendem). In the Contributions Heidegger cautions against overreliance upon this distinction, particularly given the traditional tendency to identify the being of beings with their presence. Moreover, the ontological difference is itself historically grounded in the relation of being to Dasein.

As noted above, Heidegger employs the old German spelling Seyn to designate this grounding relation. Heidegger distinguishes the ground relation here from a causal relation where the relata are temporally distinct or at least logically distinguishable (describable without reference to the other relatum). This ground is ultimate in the
sense that it is groundless, a kind of abyss, the groundless ground of history (genitivus apposivus).

_Ereignis_, translated as the “appropriating event,” “enownment,” or “appropriation,” is Heidegger’s term for the unfolding or truth of beyng as that grounding relation (Heidegger 1936–38/1999: 5–6, 22, 330–31). _Ereignis_ is a common German word for event (birthday cards celebrate the happy _Ereignis_), but Heidegger employs it in concert with the verbal construction of appropriating or making one’s own (literally, “appropriating to itself,” _sich ereignen_). So construed, _Ereignis_ designates the grounding relation whereby being appropriates Dasein to itself and Dasein comes to itself by owning up to this appropriation (Heidegger 1936–38/1999: 7, 75, 224).

Technology, things, and the fourfold

Heidegger’s later thinking thus revolves around the sense of the _Ereignis_ as a groundless grounding of our relation to being, a grounding to which we have to correspond (Heidegger 1957a/2002, 1969/2002: 41). Metaphysics and, with it, the conception of human beings as rational animals must be, not overturned, but gotten over, like the loss of a love or a serious illness (1957a/2002, 1969/2002: 24). Yet getting over metaphysics is no easy matter, since it culminates, not simply in the philosophical thought of Hegel and Nietzsche, but in modern technology. Heidegger attempts to understand modern technology on the basis of the sort of human relation to it that lets the world be. Things, insofar as we let them be, open and assemble relations to the earth, the heavens, the human, and the divine – what Heidegger deems the “fourfold” (Heidegger 1949–50/1977; Mitchell 2010). Heidegger’s account of the fourfold complements the existential analysis of _BT_ inasmuch the thing is no less “ecstatic” – outside itself – than Dasein as being-in-the-world. The encounter with things, constituted by the fourfold, stands in stark contrast to the uncovering of things that is determined by their availability for human manipulation, as part of the standing reserve (_Bestand_) peculiar to modern technology.

Yet the fourfold and the hegemony of technology’s enframing of things are not opposed; they cannot be since both are characteristic of the finitude of human existence or, equivalently, they are together formative of the history of being’s appropriation of Dasein to itself. They both declare our neediness and, if we appreciate this, Heidegger submits, we are ready “to live as mortals on earth,” letting things be, cultivating nature and yet building our dwellings on earth appropriately (Heidegger 1954/1993). The measures of living come not from technical reckoning or computation but from mindfulness of what surpasses us as human beings, indeed, with our import. Language, letting it speak to us, rather than trying to have control over it as so much information, is exemplary here (see below).

Constancies

Despite Heidegger’s criticisms of _BT_ and the change in _Contributions to Philosophy_ and later works, there are unmistakable constancies in his thinking, early and late. Six such constancies may serve as a truncated summary of his achievements.
(1) Though the older analysis of the time of Dasein gives way to an account of the time-space of beyng, Heidegger never relents from locating the meaning of being in time in some sense and thereby challenging the traditional equation of being with presence (Heidegger 1936–38/1999: 375; 1969/2002: 17).

(2) Heidegger constantly upholds the derivativeness of propositional truth from a more basic truth, analyzable in terms of the interplay of presence and absence, concealment and unconcealment. This constancy is evident despite the fact that talk of the truth of Dasein gives way to the truth of beyng, where truth is no longer simply the clearing but the clearing for beyng’s self-concealing (Heidegger 1936–38/1999: 242–47; 1969/2002: 70).

(3) From beginning to end, Heidegger’s thought retains a sense of thinking’s distinctively historical character and how human possibilities (quite literally, our future) come to us necessarily by way of “authentic historical knowledge” (Heidegger 1936–38/1999: 278, 306).

(4) Heidegger continues to uphold the centrality of particular moods for the work of thinking at hand. The basic disposition of Angst in BT gives way to the grounding moods (Grundstimmungen) of shock, reticence, and shyness in Contributions to Philosophy, but signaling in both contexts an openness and exposedness necessary for thinking (Heidegger 1936–38/1999: 11, 277).

(5) Already in BT, Heidegger stressed the existential, i.e. truth-disclosing dimension of language, irreducible to human intention or to something simply on hand in nature. (While there is no truth without us, truth is not of our making.) With his observations that language is the very “house of being” and that language itself speaks (die Sprache spricht), Heidegger reprises this insight that language, as fundamentally disclosive, is not to be confused with the use and referentiality of words as tools (Heidegger 1959b/1982).

(6) A phenomenologist to the end, Heidegger never ceases to think the interrelatedness of being (Sein) and Dasein, in which meaning historically takes shape. As noted, Heidegger’s attention in the 1930s shifts precisely to the question of the ground of this relation and, after the war, the fourfoldness of things at times expands the focus of this relatedness. Yet the question of how being or things come to mean something to Dasein (or, conversely, the openness and exposedness of Dasein to them and vice versa) is a constant of his thinking.

We always say too little when, in speaking of being, we leave out its presence to human being and thereby fail to recognize that human being itself co-constitutes being. We also say too little of human being when in saying being (not human being) we posit human being for itself and only later bring it, as already posited, into a relation with being.

(Heidegger 1955/1998: 308)

See also Truth (Chapter 14); The subject and the self (Chapter 15); Time (Chapter 17); Space (Chapter 18); The world (Chapter 19); History (Chapter 21); Methods in phenomenology after Husserl (Chapter 25); Art and aesthetics (Chapter 26); The meaning of being (Chapter 28); Dasein (Chapter 29); Philosophy of mind (Chapter
36); Philosophy of language (Chapter 37); Political philosophy (Chapter 39); Logic (Chapter 40); Philosophy of science (Chapter 42); Philosophy of religion and theology (Chapter 43); Existentialism (Chapter 44); Hermeneutics (Chapter 45); Analytic philosophy (Chapter 51); Psychoanalysis (Chapter 54); Nursing and medicine (Chapter 56); The social sciences (Chapter 57); Literary criticism (Chapter 58).

References

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Further reading