PLACEMENT BROCHURE

2014-2015

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
270 BAY STATE ROAD
BOSTON, MA 02215
USA

http://www.bu.edu/econ

PhD Placement Director: Randall P. Ellis
Professor of Economics
E-mail: ellisrp@bu.edu
Phone: 617-353-2741

PhD Administrator: Andrew Campolieto
E-mail: acamp@bu.edu
Phone: 617-353-4454
Dear colleague:

Attached please find the CVs and abstracts of the twenty Ph.D. students on the job market from the Boston University Department of Economics. This is a strong cohort, and I encourage you to consider them carefully for any job openings that you may have.

As you may be aware, our department has grown significantly in quality and stature and is now one of the top-rated economics departments in North America and the world. This change in quality has been mirrored in the quality of our graduate students. In the last five years, our doctoral candidates have taken tenure-track jobs at Brown, Harvard Business School, London School of Economics, Purdue, Vanderbilt, Warwick, National University of Singapore, Yale-National University of Singapore, Tufts, UNSW, Tulane, Renmin, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Oregon, Missouri, Sydney, Pittsburgh, Michigan State, Indiana, and other fine universities and colleges. Our students have also found research positions at Harvard, The World Bank, IMF, and Federal Reserve; post-doc positions at Harvard, EUI, and Oxford; and jobs at many top consulting companies, research institutes, banks, and central banks.

Reflecting a continuing increase in the quality of our entering graduate students and our stringent standards for remaining in the Ph.D. program, we have an excellent group of job market candidates this year. I urge you to closely study the summaries of these candidates and to be in touch with the candidates, their advisors, or me if you need any further information.

This full booklet, as well as job market candidate web pages and research papers, are available on our website at http://www.bu.edu/econ/gradprgms/phd/phdcandidates/.

You can contact me at ellisp@bu.edu, by phone at (617) 353-2741 or by FAX at (617) 353-4449. I will be happy to talk with you about any of the candidates, but in particular about the micro and econometric students, since these are my areas of expertise. My colleague Professor Simon Gilchrist (sgilchri@bu.edu, 617-353-6824) is also helping with job placement and is a better choice if you wish to discuss the macroeconomics and international economics candidates more fully. If you have difficulty reaching a candidate, please feel free to contact me or the Ph.D. program administrator Andrew Campolieto by email (acamp@bu.edu) or phone at 617-353-4454.

I hope the enclosed packet will be useful in your recruiting efforts.

Sincerely yours,

Randall P. Ellis
Professor of Economics
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Job Market Paper</th>
<th>Fields</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amrit Amirapu</td>
<td><a href="mailto:aamirapu@bu.edu">aamirapu@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Indian Labor Regulations and the Cost of Corruption: Evidence from the Firm Size Distribution</td>
<td>Development Economics, Applied Microeconomics</td>
<td>Dilip Mookherjee, Kehinde F. Ajayi, Arvind Subramanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anindya Chakrabarti</td>
<td><a href="mailto:anindya@bu.edu">anindya@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Globalization of Volatility</td>
<td>Macroeconomics</td>
<td>Alisdair McKay, Adam Zawadowski, Samuel Bazzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atanu Bandyopadhyay</td>
<td><a href="mailto:atanub1@bu.edu">atanub1@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Social Learning with Payoff Externality: Why Some Learn While Others Do Not</td>
<td>Microeconomic Theory</td>
<td>Christophe Chamley, Sambuddha Ghosh, Andrew F. Newman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tszkin Julian Chan</td>
<td><a href="mailto:cjulian@bu.edu">cjulian@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Additive Model with Endogenous Network</td>
<td>Econometrics, Labor Economics</td>
<td>Ivan Fernandez-Val, Pierre Perron, Daniele Paserman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mingli Chen</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mlchen@bu.eu">mlchen@bu.eu</a></td>
<td>Estimation of Nonlinear Panel Models with Multiple Unobserved Effects</td>
<td>Econometrics, Time Series Econometrics, Financial Econometrics, Industrial Organization</td>
<td>Pierre Perron, Ivan Fernandez-Val, Marc Rysman, Victor Chernozhukov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aparna Dutta</td>
<td><a href="mailto:apdutta@bu.edu">apdutta@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Estimation and Testing for a Structural Break in a Spatial Panel Model</td>
<td>Econometrics, Computational Economics, Regional Economics</td>
<td>Pierre Perron, Zhonhjin Qu, Hiroaki Kaido</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Gechter</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mgechter@bu.edu">mgechter@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Generalizing the Results from Social Experiments: Theory and Evidence from Two Experiments in Mexico and India</td>
<td>Development Economics, Econometrics</td>
<td>Dilip Mookherjee, Hiroaki Kaido, Kevin Lang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deborah Goldschmidt</td>
<td><a href="mailto:dgold11@bu.edu">dgold11@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>You’re In Then You’re Out: The Incidence and Effects of Being Outsourced</td>
<td>Labor Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Economics of the Family</td>
<td>Claudia Olivetti, Johannes Schmieder, Daniele Paserman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jasmina Hasanhodzic</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jah@bu.edu">jah@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Using Soft Borrowing Constraints to Produce Large Equity Premiums in Standard OLG Models</td>
<td>Macroeconomics, Finance, Public Finance, Computational Economics</td>
<td>Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Kenneth Judd, Kent Smetters, Andrew W. Lo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyungseok Joo</td>
<td><a href="mailto:joohs214@bu.edu">joohs214@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Fiscal Policy and Sovereign Default Risk with News Shock</td>
<td>International Economics, Macroeconomics</td>
<td>Simon Gilchrist, Francois Gourio, Alisdair McKay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ying Lei</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ylei@bu.edu">ylei@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Advertising, Customer Reviews and Brand Loyalty</td>
<td>Industrial Organization, Applied Game Theory, Microeconomics</td>
<td>Ching-To Albert Ma, Marc Rysman, Juan Ortner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anusha Nath</td>
<td><a href="mailto:anushan@bu.edu">anushan@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Bureaucrats and Politicians: How Does Electoral Competition Affect Bureaucratic Performance?</td>
<td>Development Economics, Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics</td>
<td>Dilip Mookherjee, Andrew F. Newman, Daniele Paserman, Claudia Olivetti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangshin Park</td>
<td><a href="mailto:yaspark@bu.edu">yaspark@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Bank Merger Incentives and Market Competition: Two-sided Matching Model with Externalities</td>
<td>Industrial Organization, Financial Economics, Applied Econometrics</td>
<td>Marc Rysman, Jordi Jaumandreu, Francesco Decarolis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alejandro Rivera</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Arivera1@bu.edu">Arivera1@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Dynamic Moral Hazard, Risk-Shifting, and Optimal Capital Structure</td>
<td>Corporate Finance, Macroeconomics, Asset Pricing</td>
<td>Jianjun Miao, Francois Gourio, Berardino Palazio, Simon Gilchrist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasemin Satir</td>
<td><a href="mailto:yasemins@bu.edu">yasemins@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Ballots and Bullets as Complementary Tactics</td>
<td>Political Economy, Public Finance, Peace Economics, Macroeconomics</td>
<td>Laurent Bouton, Sambuddha Ghosh, Randall P. Ellis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Seymour</td>
<td><a href="mailto:dtseymou@bu.edu">dtseymou@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>A Regulatory Exchange Market for Taxi Regulation</td>
<td>Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics Theory</td>
<td>Dilip Mookherjee, Juan Ortner, Michael Manove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shunan Wu</td>
<td><a href="mailto:shunanwu@bu.edu">shunanwu@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>College Expansion and Educational Attainment: A Study in China</td>
<td>Development Economics, Labor Economics, Applied Microeconomics</td>
<td>Kehinde F. Ajayi, Dilip Mookherjee, Kevin Lang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathaniel Young</td>
<td><a href="mailto:nvyoung@bu.edu">nvyoung@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Formal Banking and Economic Growth: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Analysis in India</td>
<td>Development, Industrial Organization, Empirical Microeconomics</td>
<td>Dilip Mookherjee, Marc Rysman, Samuel Bazzi, Francesco Decarolis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grace Wei Yu</td>
<td><a href="mailto:yuwei@bu.edu">yuwei@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Inference of Service with Limited Data -- Apple and China Unicom’s iPhone Exclusivity</td>
<td>Industrial Organization, Development Economics, Applied Econometrics</td>
<td>Marc Rysman, Francesco Decarolis, Hiroaki Kaido</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengxi Zhang</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mengxi@bu.edu">mengxi@bu.edu</a></td>
<td>Subjective Evaluations as an Optimal Feedback Mechanism</td>
<td>Microeconomic Theory, Organizational Economics, Behavioral Economics</td>
<td>Barton L. Lipman, Jawwad Noor, Dilip Mookherjee, Kevin Lang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2015 PhD Candidates Boston University Department of Economics

Sorted by Major Fields

Behavioral Economics
Mengxi Zhang

Computational Economics
Mingli Chen
Aparna Dutta
Jasmina Hasanhodzic

Development Economics
Amrit Amirapu
Michael Gechter
Anusha Nath
Shunan Wu
Nathaniel Young
Grace Wei Yu

Econometrics
TszKin Julian Chan
Mingli Chen
Aparna Dutta
Michael Gechter
Yangshin Park
Grace Wei Yu

Financial Economics
Mingli Chen
Jasmina Hasanhodzic
Yangshin Park
Alejandro Rivera

Industrial Organization
Mingli Chen
Ying Lei
Yangshin Park
David Seymour
Nathaniel Young
Grace Wei Yu

International Economics
Hyungseok Joo

Labor Economics
TszKin Julian Chan
Deborah Goldschmidt
Shunan Wu

Macroeconomics
Anindya Chakrabarti
Jasmina Hasanhodzic
Hyungseok Joo
Alejandro Rivera
Yasemin Satir

Microeconomics
Amrit Amirapu
Atanu Bandyopadhyay
Deborah Goldschmidt
Ying Lei
Anusha Nath
David Seymour
Nathaniel Young
Mengxi Zhang

Organizational Economics
Mengxi Zhang

Political Economy
Anusha Nath
Yasemin Satir

Public Finance
Jasmina Hasanhodzic
Yasemin Satir

Theory
Atanu Bandyopadhyay
Ying Lei
Mengxi Zhang

Urban/Regional Economics
Aparna Dutta
AMRIT AMIRAPU
Boston University, Department of Economics
270 Bay State Rd
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Cell: +1 (914) 960-1826
Email: aamirapu@bu.edu
Web site: http://sites.google.com/site/amritamirapu

EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
  Dissertation Title: Three Essays on Regulations, Institutions and Firms in India
  Main advisor: Dilip Mookherjee

  M.A., Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences, Columbia University, New York, NY, 2010

  B.A., Physics and Political Philosophy (Cum Laude), Amherst College, Amherst, MA, 2005

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Development Economics, Applied Microeconomics

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
  Selected to the Advanced Graduate Workshop on Poverty, Development and Globalization, Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia University and Azim Premji University, Bangalore, 2014
  Research Grant, Weiss Family Program Fund for Research in Development Economics, 2013
  Department Fellowship, Boston University Department of Economics, 2010-2014
  Funding for Research Assistant, RA Mentor Program, Boston University, Economics Dept, 2013-4
  Sterling P. Lamprecht Fellowship (for graduate study), Amherst College, 2008-9
  Forris Jewett Moore Fellowship (for graduate study), Amherst College, 2008-9
  Dean of Faculty Grant, Amherst College, 2004

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

  Awards:
  Gitner Prize for Outstanding Economics Teaching Fellow, Boston University, 2014
  College of Arts and Sciences Outstanding Teaching Fellow Award, Boston University, 2012

  As Instructor:
  Economics of Less Developed Regions, Boston University, Summer 2013
  Game Theory, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Summer 2012
  Market Structure and Economic Performance (IO), Boston University, Summer 2011 & 2014

  As Teaching Fellow:
  Development Strategies (Masters Level), Boston University, Spring 2013
  Economics of Less Developed Regions, Boston University, Spring 2013
  Game Theory, Boston University, Spring 2013
  Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Boston University (Fall 2010 - 2013 & Spring 2014)
  Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Boston University, Spring 2012
  Market Structure and Economic Performance, Boston University, Spring 2011
  Intro to Economic Reasoning, Barnard College, Columbia University, Fall 2008 & Spring 2009
PUBLICATIONS

WORKING PAPERS
“Manufacturing or Services? An Indian Illustration of a Development Dilemma,” (with Arvind Subramanian), October 2014.

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Contract Enforcement and the O-Ring Theory of Economic Development: Evidence from India”
“The Effect of Small Scale Reservation Policies on Scale Economies and Firm Production in India” (with Michael Gechter)
“Testing Dual Labor Market Theory in India Before and After the 1991 Reforms” (with Luis Huerta)
“Household Production, Matching Patterns in the Marriage Market, and the Returns to Education”

WORK EXPERIENCE
Short Term Consultant, The Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, 2014
Short Term Consultant, Development Economics Research Group, World Bank, DC, 2013
Research Assistant, Millennium Villages Project, Earth Institute at Columbia University, NY, 2009

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference, Boston, MA, 2014 (future)
Indian Statistical Institute, Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, Delhi, 2013
Conference of Empirical Legal Scholars, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, September 2008

LANGUAGES
English (native), Turkish (moderate proficiency), Spanish (moderate), Hindi (basic)

COMPUTER SKILLS
STATA, MATLAB, Mathematica, Microsoft Office

OTHER
Development Reading Group (co-coordinator), Boston University
The Indicator (editor-in-chief, fortnightly journal of social and political thought), Amherst College

CITIZENSHIP: United States

REFERENCES
Dilip Mookherjee
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-4392
Email: dilipm@bu.edu

Arvind Subramanian
Chief Economic Advisor to
the Government of India
Phone: +91 9884002582
Email: ASubramanian@piie.com

Kehinde Ajayi
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-4144
Email: kajayi@bu.edu
Indian Labor Regulations and the Cost of Corruption: Evidence from the Firm Size Distribution
(Job Market Paper) (with Michael Gechter)

This paper investigates the effects of an important but little-researched set of Indian labor and industrial regulations. We use a novel methodology to provide a) the first objective cost estimates of any Indian labor regulations and b) evidence of their impact on misallocation of resources between firms. Our methodology takes advantage of the fact that some regulations only apply to establishments that hire 10 or more employees. Using data from India’s 2005 Economic Census, we observe that the distribution of establishments by size closely follows a power law, but with a significant drop in the distribution for establishments with 10 or more workers. Guided by a model based on Garicano, LeLarge and Van Reenen (2013) - but augmented to allow for the possibility of misreporting - we use this drop to estimate the implied costs of the regulation. We find that there is substantial variation in our estimated costs across states, industries and ownership types, and that our costs are more robustly correlated with measures of corruption than with anything else, suggesting that improper state implementation may be more to blame for the high costs than the regulations themselves. We find further that higher costs are associated with lower rates of future employment growth in registered (but not unregistered) manufacturing, suggesting that these costs may play a role in encouraging informality.

Contract Enforcement and the O-Ring Theory of Economic Development: Evidence from India

One ubiquitous feature of developing countries is that they are plagued by slow and inefficient legal systems. In this paper we use theory from Kremer (1993) and Blanchard and Kremer (1997) to argue that slow courts may serve to hold back the development of complex, high value-added industries in developing countries. We then use data from an Indian court reform (first studied by Chemin, 2010) that provides plausibly exogenous changes to court speed over different States in India to test the hypothesis using factory-level panel data.

The Effect of Small Scale Reservation Policies on Scale Economies and Firm Production in India
(with Michael Gechter)

This paper investigates changes in the production of certain goods in India in response to the elimination of the Small Scale Industry Reservation policy. Small Scale Industry Reservation mandated that firms producing certain goods maintain less than a particular level of capital stock (about $1 million). Starting in 1997 and continuing gradually over the next decade and a half, nearly all reserved goods were de-reserved. Different goods were de-reserved in different years, allowing us to estimate the impact of de-reservation using a differences-in-differences approach. We investigate the effect of de-reservation on production of recently de-reserved products relative to never-reserved products and still-reserved products, focusing on the effects of scale economies on competition between small incumbent firms and large, formal entrants and on informality.

Manufacturing or Services? An Indian Illustration of a Development Dilemma (with Arvind Subramanian)

Guided by Rodrik (2013) and other recent work, we establish five important criteria that a sector must exhibit in order to lead an economy to rapid, sustained and inclusive development. We then compare the performance of manufacturing against specific service subsectors (as well as against services in aggregate) under these criteria, using India as a case in point.
EDUCATION
  Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
  Dissertation Title: Social Learning: Payoffs and Strategic Pricing
  Dissertation Committee: Christophe Chamley, Sambuddha Ghosh and Andrew F.
  Newman

  M.S., Quantitative Economics, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, 2007

  B.Sc. (Honours), Economics, Scottish Church College, Calcutta University, India, 2005

FIELDS OF INTEREST
  Information, Social Learning, Microeconomic Theory, Macroeconomic Theory

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
  Instructor, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston
  University, Summer 2012
  Instructor, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston
  University, Summer 2013
  Instructor, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Metropolitan College, Boston University,
  Fall 2013
  Teaching Fellow, Principles of Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston
  University, Fall 2010.
  Teaching Fellow, Principles of Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston
  University, Fall 2011.
  Teaching Fellow, Personal Life Cycle Economics, Department of Economics, Boston
  University, Spring 2011, Spring 2012

WORK EXPERIENCE
  Business Analyst, Risk and Information Management, American Express, Gurgaon, India,

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
  Award for highest aggregate grades, Scottish Church College, Kolkata, India, 2005
  Graduate Fellowship, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, 2005-2007
  Dean’s Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2008-present
  Research Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2012
WORKING PAPERS
“Social Learning with Payoff Externality: Why Some Learn While Others Do Not,”
September, 2013

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Price Rigidity and Quality Signaling in Customer Markets ”

“Competition and Herding” (joint with Jacopo Bizzotto)

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
Microeconomic Theory Workshop, Boston University, Fall 2012, Spring 2013, Fall 2013

LANGUAGES
Fluent in English, Bengali, Hindi, functional in Gujarati

COMPUTER SKILLS: SAS, MATLAB, Latex, Microsoft Office
OTHER: Squash, Swimming, Biking, Movies
CITIZENSHIP/VisA: India/F1

REFERENCES

Professor Christophe Chamley
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-4250
Email: chamley@bu.edu

Professor Sambuddha Ghosh
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-4031
Email: sghosh@bu.edu

Professor Andrew F. Newman
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-4354
Email: afnewman@bu.edu

August 2015
ATANU BANDYOPADHYAY

Social Learning with Payoff Externality: Why Some Learn While Others Do Not
(Job Market Paper)

This paper studies a model of social learning with externalities and possibly with limited observability of past actions. Bayesian agents sequentially choose an action each, after observing the actions of a subset of preceding agents. These actions and a private signal, conditionally independent across agents, supply information about the common state of the world. Each agent’s payoff depends on the state and the actions of the subset of preceding agents (neighbors). With complete observability of past actions, I show that social learning occurs even in the presence of externality. Social learning also occurs with limited observability but in the absence of externality. However with both limited observability of the history of actions and action externalities, social learning is bounded away from full information. When different agents have randomly determined observability, even a small chance of having limited observability can hamper social learning. These results stand in contrast to the existing literature on herding and social learning. I also show that when agents know the extent of observability of previous agents, agents with better observability learn while the rest do not.

Price Rigidity and Quality Signaling in Customer Markets

I consider a simple dynamic customer market model where price is a signal for the quality of the product. I show that such a signaling process can lead to price rigidity. A relatively high price charged by the firm can lead to loss of customers while a relatively low price can indicate inferior quality of the product. This process makes firms reluctant to change prices as a response to cost changes.

Competition and Herding
(with Jacopo Bizzotto)

This paper studies the pricing strategies of two competing firms. The market is characterized by buyers with heterogeneous preferences and private information about the quality of the products. Buyers purchase sequentially and observe the history of purchasing decisions and prices. The literature on markets with dispersed information, pioneered by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992), has almost exclusively focused on the learning process of buyers, keeping product prices fixed over time. We allow our firms to readjust their prices in every period, as we are interested in the interaction between social learning and competitive pricing strategies. In particular, we study the conditions under which price competition prevents herding among buyers.

August 2015
ANINDYA S. CHAKRABARTI
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Boston University
270 Bay State Road
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Website: https://sites.google.com/site/homepageasc/home

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
  Dissertation Title: Essays on macroeconomic networks, volatility and labor allocation.
  Dissertation Committee: Alisdair McKay, Adam Zawadowski and Samuel Bazzi.

M.S., Quantitative Economics, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, 2010

B.Sc. (Honours), Economics, Presidency College, Calcutta University, India, 2007

FIELD OF INTEREST

Macroeconomics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Principles of Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2011, Fall 2012, Fall 2013, Fall 2014
Teaching Assistant, Principles of Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2012, Spring 2013
Instructor, Principles of Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2013

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, Boston, USA, Spring 2014
Dean’s Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2010-present
Visitor, Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, India, summer 2012 and 13
Graduate Fellowship, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, 2008-2010
National Merit Scholarship, Government of India, 2004

WORKING PAPERS

“Globalization of volatility,” October, 2014 (Job market paper).
WORK IN PROGRESS

“Wage dynamics in a multi-sector economy with directed technological change.”

PUBLICATIONS/Submitted


CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

School of Management, Boston University, Boston, USA, (scheduled) 2014
Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, India, July 2013

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE


LANGUAGES: English and Bengali (proficient), Hindi (limited verbal communication).

COMPUTER SKILLS: MATLAB, Latex, Microsoft Office, Stata, C.

OTHER INTERESTS: Biking, Trekking, Movies.

CITIZENSHIP/Visa: India/F1

REFERENCES

Professor Alisdair McKay
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-6324
Email: amckay@bu.edu

Professor Adam Zawadowski
School of Management
Boston University
Phone: (617) 358-6174
Email: zawa@bu.edu

Professor Samuel Bazzi
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-6150
Email: sbazzi@bu.edu

October 2014
Globalization of volatility
(Job Market Paper)

I show that the countries occupying more central positions in a trade network exhibit lower macroeconomic volatility. I study a multi-country, multi-sector model subject to idiosyncratic productivity and liquidity shocks, and fully characterize the trade network generated in equilibrium. When the trade network shows skewness in terms of trade linkages between different countries, similar liquidity shocks generate different levels of repercussions across the network. First, the conventional effect of diversification that countries with better diversified portfolio fluctuate less compared to its counterparts, holds true. Second, I show that a more central country holds more liquidity and hence it is more robust to exogenous shocks. These two effects combined together dominate the opposite effect arising from the fact that a more central country is also more exposed to shocks which contributes positively to volatility. I calibrate the model to generate the negative relationship between centrality of European countries in the intra-Europe trade network and macroeconomic volatility of the corresponding countries. The model explains a large fraction of the empirical observation. The theoretical model is then extended to capture the possibilities of sparseness and stochastic weights in the trade networks.

Economic incentives and social frictions: Dynamics of cross-country migration with A. Dutta

In this paper we devise a theory of cross-country migration in the form of labor mobility based on regional and sectoral productivity shocks in a multi-country, multi-sector setting. Country-specific sociological and institutional factors induce a friction on such labor reallocation process driven by economic incentives. We use country level data to show how country to country migration can be determined by industrial composition in the countries, shocks in factor productivity in the regionally concentrated sectors and spatial dispersion of these shocks. The model explains both the nominal and relative flow of workers across U.S. well, which is taken as the frictionless benchmark case. On the other hand, when applied to Europe the model explains the relative flow network well, but predicts a higher nominal flow than is seen in the data. This missing mass of migrants is explained by socio-cultural-political barriers. We use dyad regression to analyze the effects of institutional and cultural `distance' between countries to explain the frictions. Taken together, the economic mechanism along with the institutional factors explains the `European immobility puzzle'.

October 2014
TSZKin Julian Chan
Department of Economics
Boston University
270 Bay State Road
Boston MA 02215 USA
Cell: +1-608-886-3740
Email: cjulian@bu.edu
Web site: https://sites.google.com/site/ctszkin

EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, 2015 (expected)
  Dissertation Title: Three Essays in Social Networks and Peer Effects
  Dissertation Committee: Ivan Fernandez-Val, Pierre Perron, M. Daniele Paserman

M.A., Economics, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2008

B.Soc.Sc., Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2006

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Econometrics, Labor Economics, Social Networks

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Lecturer, Modeling Business Decisions, School of Management, Boston University, fall 2013, fall 2014
Teaching Fellow, Advanced Econometrics I (PhD), Department of Economics, Boston University, spring 2012, spring 2013
Teaching Fellow, Advanced Econometrics II (PhD), Department of Economics, Boston University, fall 2011, fall 2012

WORK EXPERIENCE
Visiting Graduate Fellow, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2012-2014
Research Assistant to Zhongjun Qu, Department of Economics, Boston University, spring 2011
Research Assistant to Pierre Perron, Department of Economics, Boston University, fall 2010

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Summer Research Grant, Boston University, 2010 and 2012
IED Travel Grant, Boston University, 2010
Graduate Scholarship, 2009-2014
Dean’s Honors List, University of Hong Kong 2007

WORKING PAPERS
“Additive Model with Endogenous Network” (Job Market Paper), Oct-2014
“Type of Peers Matters: A Study of Peer Effects of Friends, Studymates and Seatmates on Academic Performance” (Joint with ChungSang Tom Lam), Oct-2014
“Snowball Sampling and Sample Selection in Social Network”, Oct-2014
“Endogenous Organizational Structure and Internal Allocation of Capital in Banking” (Joint with Vladimir Yankov), Sep-2014

October 2014
PACKAGE DEVELOPED IN R
   ezsim (published in CRAN), Jun-2014
   Jmisc (published in CRAN), Mar-2014
   simmen (available in GitHub)
   SESHK2011 (available in GitHub)
   SocIntModel (available in GitHub)

DATA PROJECT
   Secondary Education Survey of Hong Kong 2011

WORK IN PROGRESS
   “Social Interaction Model and Variables Dependent Peer Effects”
   “Effects of Mortality Decline on Life-Cycle Variables: A State Dependent Approach” (Joint
      with S.-H. P, Lau)
   “The Importance of User Rating of Apps: Evidence from apps market of China” (joint with
      Pucheng Liu and Yanfei Wang)

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
   Econometrics seminar, Department of Economics, Boston University, Mar-2013, Oct-2013, Sep-2014
   Boston University/Boston College Econometrics Conference, Nov-2013, Nov-2014
   Microeconomics Graduate Lunch Workshop Nov-2011, Mar-2013
   Empirical Microeconomics Lunch Workshop Mar-2013
   UseR’2012, Vanderbilt University, Jun-2012
   CAEC’11, Harvard University, Nov-2011

LANGUAGES
   Native in Cantonese, Fluent in English

COMPUTER SKILLS: R, C/C++, STATA, MATLAB, SAS, AMPL, CPLEX, GUROBI, SQL

CITIZENSHIP/Visa: Hong Kong/F1

REFERENCES

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Professor Daniele Paserman
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Additive Model with Endogenous Network (Job Market Paper)

This paper uses control variables to identify and estimate additive model with variables depend on an endogenous symmetric network matrix. Without imposing any parametric assumptions, I show that the Eigenvectors of the network matrix are the control variables. The Eigenvectors happen to be the estimates of orthogonal polynomial of latent factors in the network matrix. In other words, the network linkage between observations $i$ and $j$ is determined by the latent factors of $i$ and $j$. The model can be non-parametrically identified and estimated easily by including the Eigenvectors as control variables. This identification strategy requires the model is invariant to permutation of observation, which is satisfied in most empirical applications. Also, it requires only some Eigenvectors are control variables. This restricts the dimension of the latent factors is low and the network matrix can be well approximated by the orthogonal polynomial of the latent factors. The dimension of latent factors and the order of the polynomial can increase at a slower rate than the sample size. To select the Eigenvectors, I derive the information criteria which base on the corresponding Eigenvalues. An alternative method is the double selection procedure with Lasso proposed by Belloni et al. (2014a). I apply the method proposed in this paper to a social interaction model and a unique social network data I collected (Chan and Lam 2014). After controlling for self-selection problem of friends’ and studymates’ networks, I estimate how the academic achievement of a student is affected by the effect of personality traits and cognitive abilities of her friends and studymates.

Type of Peers Matters: A Study of Peer Effects of Friends, Studymates and Seatmates on Academic Performance

(Joint with ChungSang Tom Lam)

This paper studies how personality traits and cognitive ability of students and their peers affect their academic achievement. We consider three types of peers: friends, studymates, and seatmates. We generate the information of peers from various social networks of the students, which came from a unique data set based on a survey we conducted in three high schools in Hong Kong. We estimate the effect of peers with the Social Interaction Model which also accounts for self-selected peers. Our results show that smart studymates and conscientious friends positively affect a student’s mathematics exam score, while conscientious studymates and smart friends do not produce such an effect. A student benefits more from smart studymates if she is smarter, and she benefits more from conscientious friends if she is more conscientious. Moreover, the effects are enhanced if the conscientious friends are smart, or the smart studymates are agreeable. Students are less affected by smart studymates if they have elder siblings, but we didn’t find such effect from conscientious friends. These results suggest that different type of peers affect students in different ways and they are not always substitutable. Since the type of peers are likely to be positively correlated, estimating peers effect of one particular type of peers could be diluted with the effect of other correlated peers.

Snowball Sampling and Sample Selection in Social Network

Snowball sampling is a common network sampling design which preserve the information of the network structure. It is an iterative procedure of collecting vertices’ information that are linked with vertices collected in the previous iteration. The snowball samples are subjected to sample selection problem because people are more likely to associate with others like them (homophily principle). In this paper, I propose a new estimation method that use the relationship between the samples in different iterations to correct for the sample selection problem. The object of interest is the distribution of $Y$. Without loss of generality the dimension of $Y$ is 1, since it can be the Cartesian product of several variables. The estimator is the Eigenvector with Eigenvalue 0 of the conditional distribution of $Y_t$, given $Y_{t-1}$, where $t$ is the index for iteration. The identification requires the conditional probability matrix has one and only one Eigenvalue with value 0. I apply the method to a Facebook snowball sample I collected to estimate the distribution of political spectrum of Facebook users in Hong Kong.

October 2014
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Research Related to High Dimensional Econometrics*
Dissertation Committee: Pierre Perron, Iván Fernández-Val, Marc Rysman, Victor
Chernozhukov (MIT)

B.A., Information and Computing Science, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China, July 2009

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Econometrics, Time Series Econometrics, Financial Econometrics, Empirical IO

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Assistant, Statistics for Business and Economics, Department of Economics,
Boston University, Spring 2011
Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Econometrics, Department of Economics, Boston
University, Spring 2011

ACADEMIC WORK EXPERIENCE
Visiting Graduate Fellow, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, August 2013 – present
Research Assistant, Professor Pierre Perron, Department of Economics, Boston University,
Fall 2010, Spring 2014, Fall 2014
Research Assistant, Professor Iván Fernández-Val, Department of Economics, Boston
University, Summer 2011-Spring 2012, Spring 2013- Fall 2013
Research Assistant, Professor Marc Rysman, Department of Economics, Boston University,
Fall 2011, Spring 2012, Summer 2012, Fall 2012
Research Assistant, Professor Joshua Lustig, Department of Economics, Boston University,
Summer 2011

FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS AND AWARDS
Travel Grant, Department of Economics, Boston University, June 2013
Dean’s Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2009–Spring 2011
Teaching Fellowship, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2009, Spring 2010
Research Grant, Shanghai Government, China, Fall 2008 - Spring 2009
Academic Scholarship, Shanghai University, 2005-2009
Outstanding Graduate, Shanghai University, 2009
2nd prize, China Undergraduate Mathematical Contest in Modeling, October 2008
MINGLI CHEN

WORKING PAPERS
“Estimation of Nonlinear Panel Models with Multiple Unobserved Effects”, October 2014
“Dating Structural Breaks using Lasso-Type Estimators” (with Pierre Perron), October 2013
“Interactive Fixed Effects in Nonlinear Panel Data Models with Large N, T” (with Iván Fernández-Val and Martin Weidner), May 2013
“Quantile Graph Estimation and Conditional Independence with Applications to Financial Risk Management” (with Alexandre Belloni and Victor Chernozhukov), July 2014

R-PACKAGES
“Rearrangement” (with Wesley Graybill, Victor Chernozhukov, Iván Fernández-Val and Alfred Galichon), published on the Comprehensive R Archive Network
“Counterfactual” (with Victor Chernozhukov, Iván Fernández-Val and Blaise Melly)

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Consumer Payment Choice: Heterogeneity in Transaction-Level Data” (with Marc Rysman)
“Bayesian Inference for Nonlinear Panel Data Models with Interactive Fixed Effects”

REFEREE EXPERIENCE

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
International Symposium on the Analysis of Panel Data, Xiamen University, June 2013
Boston University/Boston College Green Line Econometrics Meeting, Boston, MA, November 2013

LANGUAGES: English (fluent), Chinese (native)

COMPUTER SKILLS: R, Matlab, STATA, GAUSS, EViews, SPSS, SAS, Mathematica, Maple, AMPL, Lindo, Lingo, C, C++, AutoCAD, LaTeX, Microsoft Office

CITIZENSHIP/VISA: P.R. China/F1

REFERENCES

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Professor Marc Rysman
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October 1, 2014
Estimation of Nonlinear Panel Models with Multiple Unobserved Effects (Job Market Paper)
I propose a fixed effects expectation-maximization (EM) estimator that can be applied to a class of nonlinear panel data models with latent heterogeneity, which is modeled as individual effects and/or time effects. Of particular interest is the case of interactive effects, i.e. when the latent heterogeneity is modeled as a factor analytical structure. The estimator is obtained through an iterative two-step procedure, where the two steps have closed form solution. I show that EM-estimator is consistent in large panels and derive the asymptotic distribution for the case of the probit with interactive effects. I develop analytical bias corrections to deal with the incidental parameter problem. Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate that the proposed estimator has good finite-sample properties. I illustrate the use of proposed model and estimator with an application to international trade networks.

Dating Structural Breaks using Lasso-type Estimators (with Pierre Perron)
We propose using Lasso-type estimators to estimate both the number and timing of structural breaks simultaneously. In order to so, we translate the issue of estimating structural changes into one of consistent model-variable selection. We deal with the estimation of structural changes occurring at unknown dates both in the conditional mean and the conditional quantile functions, labelling the method as $\ell_1$-QR for the latter. We derive the error bound and convergence rate for Lasso-type estimator under various combinations of weakly dependent and long memory regressors and errors. We also consider trend-stationary regressors. We show that as long as the break size is larger than the estimation error of the penalized estimator, Lasso and $\ell_1$-QR can consistently estimate the various parameters with probability one as the sample size T increases. The method allows pure or partial structural change models as well as the case with breaks in some regressors with the number of regressors available potentially larger than T. The simulation results show that Lasso-type estimators work well in terms of correctly dating structural breaks under different data and error specifications. We provide an application to model level shifts in proxies for the volatility of S&P 500 and NASDAQ stock returns. Once the estimated level shifts are accounted for the evidence for the presence of long-memory disappears.

Interactive Fixed Effects in Nonlinear Panel Models with Large N, T (with Iván Fernández-Val and Martin Weidner)
Fixed effects estimator of nonlinear panel data models can be severely biased because of the well-known incidental parameter problem. We develop analytical and jackknife bias corrections for nonlinear models with unobservable interactive individual and time effects, which may be correlated with the regressors. The basis for the corrections are general asymptotic expansions of fixed effects estimators with incidental parameters in multiple dimensions under asymptotic sequences where both dimensions of the panel grow with the sample size. We apply the expansions to M-estimators with concave objective functions for panel models with interactive individual and time effects. These estimators cover fixed effects estimators of the most popular limited dependent variable models such as logit, probit, ordered probit, Tobit and Poisson models.

Quantile Graph Estimation and Conditional Independence with Applications to Financial Risk Management (with Alexandre Belloni and Victor Chernozhukov)
We propose using Quantile Graphical Models (QGMs) to characterize the interdependence of a set of random variables, even when the number of variables is large –possibly larger than the number of observations. In sharp contrast to the methods based on conditional mean, the approach is able to capture independence as well quantify dependence across variables in the non-Gaussian settings, which are ubiquitous in real applications. We estimate QGMs through a large collection of continuums of $\ell_1$-penalized quantile regressions. We provide a theoretically valid choice of the penalty parameter, and establish rates of convergence. With the additional assumptions that coefficients are well-separated from zero, we can estimate consistently the graph associated with the conditional independence structure using hard thresholding. When focused on just the tail quantile indices, the QGM can be used to represent the tail interdependence of the variables. We show that the associated tail risk network can be used for measuring systemic risk contributions. We also illustrate the properties of our method through simulated and real examples, such as the study of financial contagion and hedging under a market downturn.
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EDUCATION  
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)  
Dissertation Title: *Structural Change, Convergence and Networks: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses*  
Dissertation Committee: Pierre Perron, Zhongjun Qu and Hiroaki Kaido  
M.S., Quantitative Economics, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, 2007  
B.Sc. (*Honours*), Economics, St. Xavier’s College, Calcutta University, India, 2005

FIELDS OF INTEREST  
Econometrics, Computational Economics, Regional Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE  
Teaching Assistant, Advanced Statistics for Economists (Ph. D. course), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2013  
Teaching Fellow, Principles of Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2014, Spring 2013  
Teaching Fellow, Principles of Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2012, Spring 2011, Fall 2010

WORK EXPERIENCE  
Summer Analyst, Science Team, AIG, New York City, NY, Summer 2014  
Actuarial Analyst, Auto Strategic Research Team, Liberty Mutual Insurance, Boston, MA, 2011-2012  
Summer Intern, Analytics and Research Team – Personal Market, Travelers Insurance, Hartford, CT, Summer 2010  

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS  
Dean’s Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2008-present  
Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2014  
Graduate Fellowship, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, 2005-2007  
Ranked 1st in the M.S. Quantitative Economics program 2005-2007  
Ranked 3rd in the B.Sc. (*Honours*) program in Calcutta University
WORKING PAPERS
“Estimation and Testing for a Structural Break in a Spatial Panel Model”
“Economic Incentives and Social Frictions: Dynamics of Cross-Country Migration” (joint
with Anindya S. Chakrabarti)
“Falling Behind or Catching Up - Structural Break Story of Africa's Convergence” (joint with
Fan Zhou)

WORK IN PROGRESS

PRESENTATIONS
Econometrics Seminar, Boston University, November 2014 (Upcoming)

LANGUAGES
Fluent in English, Bengali, Hindi

COMPUTER SKILLS: R, SAS, MATLAB, STATA, VBA, Latex, Microsoft Office

CITIZENSHIP/Visa: India/F1

REFERENCES
Professor Pierre Perron
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Professor Hiroaki Kaido
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APARNA DUTTA

Estimation and Testing for a Structural Break in a Spatial Panel Model

This paper studies the instability in the spatial dependence parameter over time. Even with the inherent endogeneity, the paper gives an ordinary least squares estimation procedure for the break date and provides the consistency result for the estimate. This paper then provides a structural change likelihood ratio test for spatial panel data model where the break affects all cross-sectional units. The test amounts to computing and comparing pre and post break sample statistics. Under common break date (and each unit having a break) the paper derives asymptotic distribution for test statistic under large N and large T case. The test is illustrated in three situations - dynamics of housing prices in US states, change in cigarette sales in US and firm network of input-output.

Economic Incentives and Social Frictions: Dynamics of Cross-Country Migration (with Anindya S. Chakrabarti)

In this paper we devise a theory of cross-country migration in the form of labor mobility based on regional and sectoral productivity shocks in a multi-country, multi-sector setting. Country-specific sociological and institutional factors induce a friction on such labor reallocation process driven by economic incentives. We use country level data to show how country to country migration can be determined by industrial composition in the countries, shocks in factor productivity in the regionally concentrated sectors and spatial dispersion of these shocks. The model explains both the nominal and relative flow of workers across U.S. well, which is taken as the frictionless benchmark case. On the other hand, when applied to Europe the model explains the relative flow network well, but predicts a higher nominal flow than is seen in the data. This missing mass of migrants is explained by socio-cultural-political barriers. We use dyadic regression to analyze the effects of institutional and cultural ‘distance’ between countries to explain the frictions. Taken together, the economic mechanism along with the institutional factors explains the ‘European immobility puzzle’.

Falling Behind or Catching Up - Structural Break Story of Africa's Convergence (with Fan Zhou)

In this empirical paper we show that the "iron-law" of convergence (2%) stills holds for the world. We detect a break in Africa's convergence rate and argue that Africa was not really converging before 2000. The world convergence rate before 2000 was mostly driven by Asian and Latin American countries. We show that with recent institutional and infrastructural development, the African countries are on the path of "catching up". We use Sparse Group LASSO to select the variables and use the double selection method to estimate the treatment effect in the partially linear model. We compare LASSO variable selections with GBM and Random Forest variable selections.
Michael Gechter
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Education
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
Dissertation Title: Three Essays in Applied Policy Evaluation in Developing Countries
Dissertation Committee: Dilip Mookherjee (co-chair), Hiroaki Kaido (co-chair) and Kevin Lang
M.A., Political Economy, Boston University, Boston MA, 2012
B.A., Economics (Magna Cum Laude), Pomona College, Claremont CA, 2005

Fields of Interest
Development Economics, Econometrics

Fellowships and Awards
Funded Participant, Western Economic Association International Graduate Student Workshop, 2014
Funding for Research Assistant, Boston University Department of Economics RA Mentor Program, 2013-2014
Research Grant, Weiss Family Program Fund for Research in Development Economics, 2013
Summer Research Grant, Boston University Department of Economics, 2013
Department Fellowship, Boston University Department of Economics, 2011 - 2014
Morris B. Pendleton Prize, Pomona College Department of Economics, 2005
Phi Beta Kappa, Pomona College, 2005
Leland M. Backstrand Memorial Award, Pomona College Department of Economics, 2004
Student Undergraduate Research Grant, Pomona College, 2004

Work Experience
Research Assistant for Hiroaki Kaido, Boston University, 2011 - Present
Principal and Co-Founder, Idealistics, Inc., 2005 - 2013
Research Assistant for Tahir Andrabi, Pomona College, 2003 - 2005

Working Papers
“Generalizing the Results from Social Experiments: Theory and Evidence from Two Experiments in Mexico and India” (Job Market Paper), October 2014.
**Work in Progress**

“The Effect of Small Scale Reservation Policies on Scale Economies and Firm Production in India”  
(with Amrit Amirapu)  
“Measuring Slum Evolution Using Remote Sensing” (with Nathaniel Young)

**Conference Presentations**

Northeast Universities Development Consortium (NEUDC) Conference, Boston, 2014  
Western Economic Association International Graduate Student Workshop, Denver, 2014  
Annual Meeting of the Eastern Economic Association, Boston, 2014  
International Workshop on Official Data organized by Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, Central Statistics Office, India and International Growth Centre, Kolkata, 2013

**Invited Seminars**

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), 2013

**Teaching Experience**

Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Boston University Department of Economics, Spring 2011  
Overall instructor rating: 4.1/5.0

**Referee Experience**

The Singapore Economic Review

**Languages**

Fluent in English, French and Spanish. Basic Dutch and Hindi.

**Computer Skills:** Stata, R, MATLAB, FORTRAN, Java, Python, SQL, \LaTeX

**Other:** Development Reading Group coordinator

**Citizenship:** USA, Belgium

**References**

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**Professor Kevin Lang**  
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October 2014
Generalizing the Results from Social Experiments: Theory and Evidence from Two Experiments in Mexico and India (Job Market Paper)

To what extent are causal effects estimated in one region or time period informative about another region or time? This paper provides a formal answer by developing methods to quantify the assumptions on heterogeneity in individual-specific causal effects that are required for causal effects estimated in one population to allow researchers to reject hypotheses about causal effects in a population of interest. For example, the method delivers the assumptions required to reject a zero causal effect or an average cost per unit of improvement deemed excessive by policymakers. I empirically investigate what assumptions are required for experimental results on the return to cash transfers to male microentrepreneurs in one Mexican city in 2006 to speak to the returns among male microentrepreneurs in urban Mexico in 2012. The experimental results yield narrow bounds on the average causal effect for entrepreneurs in urban Mexico in 2012 under a wide variety of assumptions on heterogeneity. Using data from a pair of remedial education experiments carried out in urban India, I show that the methods suggested in this paper are able to recover average causal effects in one city using results from the other where standard methods are unsuccessful.

Indian Labor Regulations and the Cost of Corruption: Evidence from the Firm Size Distribution (with Amrit Amirapu)

This paper investigates the effects of an important but little-researched set of Indian labor and industrial regulations. We use a novel methodology to provide the first objective cost estimates of any Indian labor regulations. Our methodology takes advantage of the fact that some regulations only apply to establishments which hire 10 or more employees. Using data from India’s 2005 Economic Census, we observe that the distribution of establishments by size closely follows a power law, but with a significant drop in the distribution for establishments with 10 or more workers. Guided by a model based on Garicano, LeLarge and Van Reenen (2013) - but augmented to allow for the possibility of misreporting - we use this drop to estimate the implied costs of the regulation. We find that there is substantial variation in our estimated costs across states, industries and ownership types, and that our costs are more robustly correlated with measures of corruption than with anything else, suggesting that poor state implementation may be more to blame for the high costs than the regulations themselves. We find further that higher costs are associated with lower rates of future employment growth in registered (but not unregistered) manufacturing, suggesting that these costs may play a role in encouraging informality.

The Effect of Small Scale Reservation Policies on Scale Economies and Firm Production in India (with Amrit Amirapu)

This paper investigates the changes in the production of certain goods in India in response to the elimination of the Small Scale Industry Reservation policy. Small Scale Industry Reservation mandated that firms producing certain goods maintain less than a particular level of capital stock (about $1 million). Starting in 1997 and continuing gradually over the next decade and a half, nearly all reserved goods were de-reserved. Different goods were de-reserved in different years, allowing us to estimate the impact of de-reservation using a differences-in-differences approach. We investigate the effect of de-reservation on production of recently de-reserved products relative to never-reserved products and still-reserved products, focusing on the effects of scale economies on competition between small incumbent firms and large, formal entrants and on informality.
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
Dissertation Title: Three Essays in Labor Economics
Dissertation Committee: Claudia Olivetti, Johannes Schmieder, Daniele Paserman

M.A., Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, 2008

B.A., Mathematics, minor in Computer Science (Summa Cum Laude), University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 2002

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Labor Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Economics of the Family

ACADEMIC WORK EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant to Johannes Schmieder, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2011-2014
Research Assistant to Claudia Olivetti, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2013-2014
Research Assistant to Andrew Newman and Claudia Olivetti, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2011-2012
Research Assistant to Fernanda Estevan and Andrew Newman, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2011
Research Assistant to Bart Lipman, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2010-2011

NON-ACADEMIC WORK EXPERIENCE
People Capital, Research Assistant, New York, NY, 2008-2009
Under the supervision of an economics professor, built a proprietary credit rating model for analyzing education loans and predicting future earnings
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Actuarial Consultant, Health Care Practice, New York, NY, 2002-2005

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Rosenstein-Rodan prize for Best Paper, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 2013
Funded Participant, Western Economic Association International Graduate Student Workshop, 2013
Special Research Fellowship, Boston University Department of Economics, Spring 2013
Funded Participant, Summer School on Socioeconomic Inequality, University of Chicago, 2012
Funding for a Research Assistant, RA Mentor Program, Boston University, Department of Economics, Summer 2011, Spring 2014
Dean’s Fellowship, Boston University, 2009-2014

WORKING PAPERS
“You’re In Then You’re Out: The Incidence and Effects of Being Outsourced,” (with Johannes Schmieder), September 2014. (Job Market Paper)
“Identifying Couples in Administrative Data,” (with Wolfram Klosterhuber and Johannes Schmieder), September 2014.
WORK IN PROGRESS
“Relative Income within Households: Another Look” (with Wolfram Klosterhuber and Johannes Schmieder)
“The Added Worker Effect in Germany: New Evidence Using Administrative Data” (with Johannes Schmieder)
“Covenant Marriage and Marriage Contracts”

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Facilitator, Jobs, Wages, and the Global Economy, Boston University Metropolitan College, Spring 2014
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2012

REFEREE EXPERIENCE
Labour

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
European Association of Labour Economics, Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 2014
Eastern Economic Association Conference, Boston, MA, March 2014
Empirical Microeconomics Seminar, Boston University, Boston, MA, April 2014
Western Economic Association International Conference, Seattle, WA, June 2013
Micro Dissertation Seminar, Boston University, Boston, MA, November 2012

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, MATLAB, LaTeX, Lyx, Microsoft Office

OTHER: Graduate Economics Association co-president

LANGUAGES
Native English speaker; conversational in Spanish

CITIZENSHIP: United States

REFERENCES
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Professor Daniele Paserman
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Boston University
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Email: paserman@bu.edu
You’re In Then You’re Out: The Incidence and Effects of Being Outsourced (Job Market Paper) (with Johannes Schmieder)

The nature of the relationship between employers and employees has been changing over the last few decades, with firms increasingly relying on contractors, temp agencies and franchises rather than hiring employees directly. We investigate the impact of this transformation on the wage structure by following jobs that are being moved outside of the boundary of lead employers to contracting firms. For this end we develop a new method for identifying outsourcing of janitorial, security and food services using the universe of social security data from Germany. Using this method, along with two complementary measures of outsourcing, we document a dramatic growth of outsourcing in Germany over the last three decades. We then use event-study analysis joint with propensity score matching to show that wages of outsourced jobs fall by approximately 10-15% relative to similar jobs that are not outsourced. Finally, we test the hypothesis that these wage losses are associated with a loss of firm rents. We find that outsourced workers face a decline in employer characteristics typically associated with wage rents, such as firm size or the establishment fixed effect estimated from a worker-firm fixed effect decomposition. In addition, wage losses are particularly high for outsourced workers coming from outsourcing firms that are large, have high average wages, or high establishment fixed effects. Furthermore, high-rent firms are associated with a higher propensity to outsource. These results all point to substantial losses in firm rents as the most likely explanation for wage losses, as well as suggesting that labor cost savings are at least one reason why firms contract out labor services.

Family Structure and Abortion Law

As states enact an increasing number of laws restricting abortion access, it is important to understand the different ways that these laws affect people living in these states. This study examines the relationship between abortion regulations and changes in the living circumstances of children. These regulations effectively increase the cost of abortion, making them likely to have a disproportionate impact on the poor. I collected data on 15 years of abortion laws across the 50 states, and linked this information to individual-level data on children and their family structures. I find evidence that low-income children born under restrictive abortion regimes are less likely to live with married parents and more likely to live with single mothers or in multi-generational households. Incorporating information on nullified and enforced laws allows me to identify an arguably causal effect of abortion laws on the living circumstances of poor children and children of mothers with low educational attainment. This research helps add to the understanding of the determinants of family structure; in addition, it could serve as a first stage in providing a causal link between family structure and children’s outcomes.

The Added Worker Effect in Germany: New Evidence Using Administrative Data (with Johannes Schmieder)

The full consequences of job loss are still being understood, with researchers studying the short- and long-term impacts on the wages, earnings, job stability, and health of the displaced worker. Because many workers are part of a larger collective – the household – displacement also affects the decisions and behavior of other members of the household. In this paper, we focus on the impact of displacement on the labor supply decisions and outcomes of the spouse. While there is a large literature on this topic, known as the Added Worker Effect, this work has typically been hindered by a lack of good data, with researchers relying on cross-sectional data, self-reported surveys, or short panels. Our data – the universe of social security records in Germany – alleviates many of the problems of earlier research. We develop a novel way to identify married couples in administrative data that lacks a household identifier using geo-coded locations, last names, and ages. Once these couples are identified, we use their full work histories to examine whether the unexpected displacement of one partner – from a plant closing or mass layoff – has any effect on the work patterns of their spouse. Our large sample size and detailed variables allow us to examine the effect by a number of worker, spouse, and industry characteristics. Initial results indicate that heterogeneity matters greatly, with effects primarily for younger couples and for husbands and wives working in the same industry.
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
Dissertation Title: Life-Cycle Economics with Macroeconomic Shocks
Dissertation Committee: Laurence Kotlikoff, Kenneth Judd (Hoover, Stanford), and Kent Smetters (Wharton)

Ph.D., Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (GPA: 5.0/5.0), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge MA, January 2007

B.S., Applied Mathematics and Electrical Engineering (Summa Cum Laude), Yale University, New Haven CT, May 2002

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Macroeconomics, Finance, Public Finance, Computational Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Assistant, Finance Theory I, MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge MA
Held bi-weekly recitations, class size: 150
Overall teaching effectiveness: 4.2/5.0

INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE
Research Scientist and Vice President, AlphaSimplex Group, Cambridge MA, 2007-2011
Consultant, Credit Suisse Quantitative Equity Research, New York NY, 2007-2011
Work on the CS 130/30 Index paper, the winner of the Bernstein Fabozzi/Jacobs Levy Award for an Outstanding Article

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
NBER/Sloan Pre-Doctoral Fellowship on the Economics of an Aging Workforce, 2013-2015
RAND Summer Institute on Aging Scholarship, 2012
Boston University Women’s Guild Award, 2011
Boston University Fellowship, 2010
Sigma Xi Scientific Research Society Full Member, 2007
MIT Presidential Fellowship, 2002

PAPERS (available on SSRN, latest drafts on my home page)

October 2014
“What Do Humans Perceive in Asset Returns?” (with Andrew W. Lo and Emanuele Viola), March 2014, revise and resubmit at Management Science.
“Black’s Leverage Effect Is Not Due to Leverage” (with Andrew W. Lo), January 2013, revise and resubmit at the Quarterly Journal of Finance.

WORK IN PROGRESS
“How Much Debt Is Too Much Debt?”
“Optimal Government Debt in an OLG Model with Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk” (with Kent Smetters)

BOOKS
Translated into German, Norwegian translation forthcoming
“The Heretics of Finance: Conversations with Leading Practitioners of Technical Analysis” (with Andrew W. Lo), Bloomberg Press, 2009.

RECENT PRESENTATIONS
“Using Soft Borrowing Constraints to Produce Large Equity Premiums in Standard OLG Models”
Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Summer Workshop, Stanford CA, 2014
Boston University/Boston College Green Line Macro Meeting, Boston MA, 2014
“Generational Risk and the Equity Premium in Life-Cycle Models”
NBER Summer Institute, Cambridge MA, 2014
Society for Economic Dynamics Meeting, Toronto, Canada, 2014
Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting, Minneapolis MN, 2014
“Generational Risk—Is It a Big Deal?”
American Economic Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia PA, 2014
Initiative for Computational Economics, Hoover Institution, Stanford CA, 2013
“What Do Humans Perceive in Asset Returns?”
Yale Whitebox Conference, Yale School of Management, New Haven CT, 2012

In addition, gave twenty-five invited talks and panels, such as at Bloomberg, the Society of Quantitative Analysts, and the American Association of Individual Investors.

CITIZENSHIP: Bosnia/U.S. Permanent Resident

REFERENCES

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<th>Kenneth Judd</th>
<th>Kent Smetters</th>
<th>Andrew W. Lo</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

October 2014
Using Soft Borrowing Constraints to Produce Large Equity Premiums in Standard OLG Models (Job Market Paper)

This paper shows that soft, but rapidly rising borrowing costs, imbedded in an otherwise standard OLG model can produce a sizeable equity premium. Its model features ten periods, isoelastic preferences with modest risk aversion, Cobb-Douglas production, realistic shocks, and reasonable fiscal policy. Absent borrowing costs, the model's equity premium is extremely small. Adding the costs readily produces large equity premiums. These results echo, but also differ from those of Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002). In their model, hard borrowing constraints on the young can produce large equity premiums. Here soft, but rising borrowing costs on all generations are needed.

Generational Risk—Is It a Big Deal? Simulating an 80-Period OLG Model With Aggregate Shocks (with Laurence Kotlikoff)

The theoretical literature on generational risk assumes that this risk is large and that the government can effectively share it. To assess these assumptions, this paper calibrates and simulates 80-period, 40-period, and 20-period overlapping generations life-cycle models with aggregate productivity shocks. Previous solution methods could not handle large-scale models such as ours. We employ and extend a recent algorithm by Judd, Maliar, and Maliar. We find that intrinsic generational risk is quite small and that government policies can produce generational risk. We also show that a bond market can mitigate risk-inducing government policy.

Valuing Government Obligations When Markets Are Incomplete (with Laurence Kotlikoff)

Valuing future government spending commitments and tax receipts, whether they are sure or risky, is critical to assessing the sustainability of fiscal policy. But how one should value these potentially state-contingent flows or, equivalently, discount their expected values is subject to much debate. We posit and simulate a ten-period overlapping generations model and use it to do fiscal gap accounting under uncertainty. Specifically, we determine what immediate payments current and future generations would require in order to forego promised government net payments. We find that discount rates for policies involving payments each period to the elderly aren't uniform over time or agents of different cohorts. They also depend on the size of the payments, the riskiness of the policy, and attendant general equilibrium effects. For government obligations that don't entail implicit promises of a new general equilibrium, the proper rates for discounting promises of safe long-term future payments are remarkably close to the economy's prevailing short-term safe rate of return.

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EDUCATION
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Main advisor: Simon Gilchrist
Dissertation Committee: Simon Gilchrist, Francois Gourio and Alisdair Mckay

M.A., Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, 2007

B.A., Economics, Yonsei University, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 2004

FIELDS OF INTEREST
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomics, Boston University, Spring 2013
Teaching Assistant, Macroeconomic Theory, Boston University, Fall 2012, Spring 2012, Fall 2011, Spring 2011
Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Macroeconomics, Boston University, Fall 2010, Spring 2010
Teaching Assistant, Elementary Mathematical Economics, Boston University, Fall 2009

WORK EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant, Simon Gilchrist, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2014
Research Assistant, Kevin Gallagher, Department of International Relations, Boston University, Fall 2013, Spring 2014
Research Fellow, Global Economic Governance Initiative (GEGI), The Frederick S. Pardee Center
Research Analyst, Korea Institute of Public Finance, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 2007
Research Assistant, Youngse Kim, Department of Economics, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea 2003-2005

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Research Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2014
INET project fellowship, Boston University, Summer 2013–Fall 2013
Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2009 – Spring 2013
Summer Research Grant, Boston University, Summer 2012
WORKING PAPER
“Can News Shock Help to Explain Difference in Fiscal Policy Cyclicality Between Developing and Developed Countries?,” October 2014.
“Sovereign Default Risk, Fiscal Adjustment, and Debt Renegotiation ,” May 2014.

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Political Risk and Sovereign Debt Restructuring Resolution,” (with Tamon Asonuma and Christoph Trebesch)
“Sovereign Debt, Risk Sharing, and Creditor Coordination,” (with Kevin Gallagher)
“Uncertainty Shock, Financial Frictions, and International Trade”

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
BU Macroeconomics Workshop, Bank of Canada, Bank of Korea

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HYUNGSEOK JOO

Can News Shock Help to Explain Difference in Fiscal Policy Cyclicality between Developing and Developed Countries?

Government expenditure and taxes are procyclical in developing countries but countercyclical or acyclical in advanced economies. I provide a possible explanation for this stylized fact by introducing news about future productivity and endogenous fiscal policy in to an otherwise-standard small open economy model of sovereign default risk as in Arellano (2008). News tends to be more precise in developed countries, which relaxes credit constraints on foreign borrowing and makes developed countries less reliant on tax revenues. This dampens and potentially reverses the high correlation between output and government expenditure/taxes one sees in developed countries, which is a standard feature of models with TFP shocks but not news shocks. A calibration shows that this channel can quantitatively explain the difference in fiscal policy cyclicality between developing and developed countries. Adding news shocks and endogenous fiscal policy also improves the quantitative performance of open-economy models with sovereign default in explaining consumption and output volatility and the cyclicality of trade balance.

Sovereign Default Risk, Fiscal Adjustment, and Debt Renegotiation

This paper studies the effects of government capital accumulation on sovereign debt default risk and debt restructuring renegotiation outcomes when government has limited ability to extract revenues from households. We develop a quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of sovereign default, debt renegotiation, and fiscal policies, where government chooses between the fiscal instruments of government consumption and government investment. Government capital provides an additional means of adjustment in the face of a bad productivity shock. It also affects government’s incentive to re-access the international credit market when a country chooses to default. We implement fiscal policies and rules that restrict foreign debt, especially focusing on how fiscal rules affect government spending dynamics. The model delivers three key predictions. (1) A higher level of government capital implies less risky sovereign debt and higher recovery rates when the government chooses to default. (2) A high debt to output ratio is possible with a sufficient level of government capital. (3) Fiscal adjustment that reduces public investment may be self-defeating.

Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Risk-Averse Investors (with Tamon Asonuma)

The paper proposes a new explanation of delay in sovereign debt renegotiations. Debt renegotiations are often postponed and protracted when not only sovereigns’, but also creditors’ economic conditions worsen. We find empirical links between durations of renegotiation and creditors’ business cycle together with sovereigns’. Why do not sovereigns succeed in completing renegotiations during creditors’ bad times? To answer this question, we present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that embeds multi-round debt renegotiation between a risk-averse sovereign and risk-averse creditors. The quantitative analysis shows that delay is due to not only sovereign’s recovery in output but equally importantly creditors’ risk appetite. When creditors are in bad time and liquidity shortage, they demand higher recovery rates than in good time complicating the settlement and resulting in postponing the completion of negotiation to next period.

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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
Dissertation Title: Advertising, Customer Reviews and Brand Loyalty
Main Advisor: Albert Ma
Dissertation Committee: Albert Ma, Marc Rysman and Juan Ortner

M.A., Economics, New York University, New York NY, 2010

B.A., Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China, 2008

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Industrial Organization, Applied Game Theory, Microeconomics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Department of Economics, Boston University
Teaching Assistant, Economics of Information, Spring 2014, Fall 2011
Teaching Assistant, Behavioral Economics, Spring 2014, Fall 2011
Teaching Assistant, Game Theory, Spring 2012

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Teaching Fellow, Microeconomics, Spring 2010

WORK EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant, Department of Economics, Boston University, Professor Daniele Paserman, Fall 2012-Spring 2013

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2013, Fall 2014
Summer Research Grant, Boston University, Summer 2014
Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, 2011-2015
Excellent Student Award, Renmin University of China, 2006-2008

October, 2014
WORKING PAPER

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Dynamic Benefit of Advertising”
“Delay in Platform Adoption” (joint with Marc Rysman)
“Quality Disclosure in Response to Customer Reviews” (joint with Jacopo Bizzotto)

REFEREE EXPERIENCE
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

LANGUAGES
Fluent in English, Native in Chinese (Mandarin)

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, MATLAB, Mathematica, LaTex, Lyx, Microsoft Office

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Online consumer product reviews have become very popular. Arguably, consumers’ purchase decisions may be more influenced by reviews than traditional firms’ advertising. How do reviews affect a firm's incentive to advertise? I study how competing firms choose advertising and prices, when customer reviews are available and when firms may build up loyal customer bases. There are multiple equilibria when firms’ reviews differ little, and in this case advertising is a strategic substitute. When firms’ reviews differ significantly, the firm with better reviews is the only one advertising. I also recast the model into one in which an entrant and an incumbent interact. If the incumbent and the entrant both have advertised, the entrant earns an expected profit equal to one as if the incumbent did not manage to sell to new customers. However, an incumbent with many good reviews can successfully deter entry.

Dynamic Benefit of Advertising

I study the long-term benefit of a monopolist’s advertising strategy. The long-term benefit is in the form of customers’ repeat purchase. In a dynamic setting, the monopolist’s return to advertising depends on its current customer base. When the base is large, further advertising may no longer be profitable. The opposite is true when the base is small. A monopolist may initially advertise to build up a customer base even if such advertising yields an immediate loss of profit. Optimal advertising decisions are monotone: if a firm does not advertise in a period, it will never advertise again. A firm's optimal dynamic advertising strategy can be analyzed as an optimal stopping problem.

Delay in Platform Adoption
(with Marc Rysman)

In the market of the 56K modem, there were two major technologies, K56flex and X2. The adoption rate of either technology by Internet Service Providers and consumers had been low until standardization took place in 1998. In this paper, we aim at explaining the adoption phenomenon by exhibiting a delayed-adopt equilibrium in a dynamic two-sided adoption game. Consumers are allowed to wait instead of adopting immediately. The uncertainty about which technology will become dominant makes a consumer wait. Consumers implement adoption decisions as the uncertainty resolves.
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
Dissertation Title: Political Competition, Public Goods Provision and Project Implementation
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M.A., Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, Delhi, India, 2007
B.A., Economics (Honors), Lady Shri Ram College, Delhi University, Delhi, India, 2004

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Development Economics, Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2013
Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics, College of Arts and Sciences, Boston University, Summer 2011
Instructor, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Metropolitan College, Boston University, Fall 2010, Spring 2011
Lecturer, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, 2008-09
Lecturer, Department of Economics, St. Stephen’s College, Delhi University, 2007-08

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant to Dilip Mookherjee, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2011-2013
Research Assistant to Michael Walton, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, 2008-2009
Summer Intern, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), Summer 2006

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Rosenstein-Rodan Prize for Best Original Research, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 2014
Special Research Fellow, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2014
Weiss Family Program Fund for Research in Development Economics, Harvard University, 2013-2014
Summer Research Grant, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2013, Summer 2012
Funding for a Research Assistant, RA Mentor Program, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2013-2014
Delhi School of Economics Merit Scholarship, Delhi University, 2005-2007
Nominated for Lady Shri Ram College Faculty Prize, Delhi University, 2003-2004
Patron-in-Chief Medal (Valedictorian), Jawaharlal Nehru School, Bhopal, India, 2001
Outstanding Student Award, International School Manila, Philippines, 1997
**Publications**


**Working Papers**


**Other Writings**

“Indian Growth: Pro-business or Pro-market?” (with Ashoka Mody and Michael Walton) *voxeu*, Nov 2011.

**Work in Progress**

“Decentralized Decision-Making and Elite Capture.”
“Dynamic Clientelism” (with Pranab Bardhan, Sandip Mitra and Dilip Mookherjee).
“Information or Convenience? Role of Social Networks in Premarital Cohabitation Choices” (with Marric Buessing).

**Conferences and Presentations**

Northeast Universities Development Consortium (NEUDC), *Scheduled*, Nov 2014
Empirical Micro Lunch Seminar, Boston University, April 2013, April 2014, Oct. 2014

**Languages:** Fluent in English and Hindi
**Computer Skills:** STATA, MATLAB, Scientific WorkPlace, LaTeX, Microsoft Office
**Citizenship/Visa:** Indian/F1

**References**

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Bureaucrats and Politicians: How Does Electoral Competition Affect Bureaucratic Performance? (Job Market Paper)

This paper examines the relationship between electoral competition and the performance of bureaucrats in executing policies chosen by politicians. We construct a unique dataset from India by matching details of bureaucrat's background and work histories with individual local public good projects under the Member of Parliament Local Area Development scheme for the period 1999-2009. This allows us to directly observe how long each bureaucrat takes to approve each project. Moreover, we exploit the fact that administrative boundaries do not perfectly overlap with the electoral constituencies to compare the performance of the same bureaucrat across multiple politicians. This allows us to control for unobserved ability of bureaucrats. Our main results show that in constituencies with party strongholds, projects are approved 11% faster. However, as the probability of winning jumps to zero due to an exogenous information shock, the average time taken to approve a project increases by 13%. Taken together, these two results reject the hypothesis that re-election concern is the dominant channel through which political competition affects bureaucratic performance. Instead, the results are consistent with the following mechanism: the politicians in low competition constituencies have longer tenures and therefore have access to dynamic contracts that provide better incentives to bureaucrats. This in turn improves bureaucratic performance. However, if probability of winning goes to zero, the promises of future rewards are no longer credible and hence bureaucrats shirk.

Political Competition and Elite Capture of Local Public Goods

This paper examines the role of re-election concerns in provision of local public goods. Using a household survey data from India, we first analyze how differences in wealth affect the type of projects demanded by the households. We then construct a project-level dataset for local public goods provided under the Member of Parliament Local Area Development scheme in order to compare allocation decisions of politicians. Our identification strategy takes advantage of an information shock that occurred as a result of electoral redistricting in India. In 2007, it was announced that the reservation status of some of the electoral constituencies would change in 2009. This change in reservation status completely shut down the re-election concerns for some incumbents. We exploit this event to use difference-in-differences to compare the changes in the public good choices of the incumbents who were affected by this shock with those who were not. Our results confirm the elite capture hypothesis: in absence of electoral pressures, politicians are more likely to spend on projects that are desired by the rich.


This paper uses two successive rounds of voter surveys in rural West Bengal in a household panel to find reasons for the recent decline in the Left Front's political popularity. It does not find evidence of any significant role of changes in voter age distribution, media exposure, private benefits received from development and welfare programmes administered by local governments, or the vote-generating effectiveness of such programmes. A more important role was played by voter dissatisfaction with local leaders on corruption and lack of involvement in the provision of education services, and with non-local leaders on attitudes towards women, the poor, and local communities.

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Education
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  Dissertation Title: Three Essays in Bank Mergers and Market Structure
  Dissertation Committee: Marc Rysman, Jordi Jaumandreu, Francesco Decarolis
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Fields of Interest
Industrial Organization, Financial Economics, Applied Econometrics

Teaching Experience
  Teaching Fellow, Econometrics (M.A. course), Boston University, Fall 2009, Spring 2010
  Teaching Fellow, Microeconomic Theory (M.A. course), Boston University, Fall 2008
  Teaching Fellow, Statistics (M.A. course), Boston University, Fall 2010
  Teaching Fellow, Mathematical Economics (M.A. course), Boston University, Spring 2010
  Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2009
  Teaching Assistant, Economic Statistics (Undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2007, Spring 2008
  Teaching Assistant, Macroeconomics (M.A. course), Department of Economics, Seoul National University, 2005

Work Experience
  Research Assistant to Changyong Rhee, Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Fall 2005-Spring 2006
  Research Assistant, Korea Fixed Income Research Institute, 2004-2005

Fellowships and Awards
  Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2007-Spring 2012
  BK21(Brain Korea 21) Fellowship, Seoul National University, 2005-2006
  Teaching Fellowship, Seoul National University, 2004-2006
  Academic Excellence University Scholarship, Seoul National University
WORKING PAPERS
“Bank Merger Incentives and Market Competition: Two-sided Matching Model with Externalities,”
October 2014. (Job Market Paper)

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Market Structure and Merger Simulation in Banking Industry”
“Investigating the Entry of Store-brands on the Demand and Price Changes”

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
Microeconomics Graduate Lunch Workshop, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2014

COMPUTER SKILLS: Matlab, Stata, Mathematica, R, Microsoft Office, and LATEX

LANGUAGES: Native in Korean, Fluent in English

CITIZENSHIP/VISA: Republic of Korea / F-1 visa

REFERENCES

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Bank Merger Incentives and Market Competition: Two-sided Matching Model with Externalities
(Job Market Paper)

The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) enabled banks to expand their geographic markets across states in United States. The nationwide branching from IBBEA became effective on June 1st, 1997 and allowed banks to consolidate interstate banking subsidiaries into a single bank. In particular, branch network under competitive market structure plays an important role in bank merger analysis. In this paper, using commercial banks’ branch-level location data in Texas from 1994 to 2004, I analyze what determines the bank mergers and which bank intends to merge with other banks. I estimate a two-sided matching model of merging and target banks with transferable utilities. To estimate the match value function, I apply the maximum score estimator developed by Fox (2007). Post merger value function from a matching depends on various factors, for example, bank specific characteristics, match specific characteristics, and market competition. Market competition and rival banks’ merger activities are regarded as externalities in the analysis. Moreover, the fraction of geographic market-overlap between the merging bank and the target bank is crucial in determining the relative importance of market power and cost efficiency. I find some interesting features based on the empirical analysis. First, as the market overlap is greater, merging banks have higher post-merger value. Second, market competition induces negative externalities. Third, rival banks’ merger activity has opposite externalities on both merging and unmatched banks.

Estimation of Business Stealing and Cannibalization Effect in Banking Industry

Considerable consolidations during late 1990’s brought the decrease of the number of banking institutions while the deregulation of branching almost doubled the number of bank branches and fortified market competition. With entry, exit and M&A information, rich branch-level deposit data, and geocoding of locations, I can examine the within-market and within-product effects of new entry of branches. When new branches enter, the market deposit expansion is commonly observed with the business stealing from rival banks and cannibalization from other branches operated by the own bank. I find that this competition impact is localized and cannibalization effects are rather reversed at remote distances.

Merger Simulation and Market Structure in Banking Industry

This paper develops the structural model of merger simulations to predict post-merger price and characteristic changes. Traditional simulation method cannot account for the discrepancy between simulated merger changes and actual changes. Using pre- and post-merger bank characteristic data, I incorporate the changes in marginal cost or firm behavior in supply. I apply this methodology to compare post-merger changes with observation.
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
   Dissertation Title: Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance
   Dissertation Committee: Simon Gilchrist, Francois Gourio, Jianjun Miao (Chair),
   Berardino Palazzo

BSc, Mathematics and Economics (First Class Honors), Simon Fraser University,
   Vancouver BC, 2008

Exchange Student, Mathematics, University of Bath,

International Baccalaureate (Higher level Mathematics, Physics, Economics, Theatre), Lester
   B. Pearson College UWC, Victoria BC, 2004

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Corporate Finance, Macroeconomics, Asset Pricing

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
   Instructor, PhD Math Camp, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2009,
   Summer 2010, Summer 2011, Summer 2012, Summer 2013
   Instructor, Money and Banking, Boston University, Summer 2012
   Instructor, Economía Matemática, Universidad del Rosario, Spring 2010
   Teaching Fellow, Mathematical Economics (PhD Level), Department of Economics,
   Boston University, Fall 2009, Fall 2010, Fall 2011, Fall 2012
   Teaching Fellow, Introduction to Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University,
   Spring 2011, Spring 2013

WORK EXPERIENCE
   Research Fellow, American Institute for Economic Research, Great Barrington, MA, Summer 2011
   Summer Fellow, American Institute for Economic Research, Great Barrington, MA, Summer 2009
   Research Assistant, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC, Summer 2007

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
   Dean’s Fellowship for the PhD program in Economics, Boston University, 2008-2014
   Ranked top 350 in North American Putnam Mathematical Competition, 2007
   W. Ronald Heath International Entrance Scholarship, Simon Fraser University, 2004-2008
   Lester B. Pearson United World College, Full Scholarship, 2002-2004
   Highest University Entrance Exam in the State (Cauca), 2002
WORKING PAPERS
“Robust Contracts in Continuous Time,” (with Jianjun Miao), January 2013, under revision for resubmission to *Econometrica.*

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Long-term vs short-term incentives” (with Tak-Yuen Wong)

SEMINARS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
Simon Fraser University Brown Bag Seminar (November 2014 scheduled)
Boston University School of Management Brown Bag Seminar (September 2014)
Istanbul Conference of Economics and Finance (September 2014)
Princeton EconCon (August 2014)
Bank of Colombia (July 2014)
American Institute for Economic Research (July 2011)

LANGUAGES
English (Fluent), Spanish (Native), French (Conversational)

COMPUTER SKILLS
MATLAB, Dynare, Java, Python, Maple, STATA, Latex, Scientific WorkPlace

CITIZENSHIP/Visa: Colombia/F1

REFERENCES

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**Professor Berardino Palazzo**
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Dynamic Moral Hazard, Risk-Shifting, and Optimal Capital Structure (Job Market Paper)

We develop an analytically tractable model integrating the risk-shifting problem between bondholders and shareholders with the moral hazard problem between shareholders and the manager. The presence of managerial moral hazard exacerbates the risk-shifting problem. The flexibility of the optimal contract allows shareholders to relax financial constraints precisely when it is most valuable to do so, thus increasing shareholder appetite for risk-shifting. In fact, the model predicts a non-monotonic relation between risk-shifting and financial distress, thereby reconciling seemingly contradictory empirical evidence. Moreover, firms with greater concern for moral hazard issue less debt and choose lower leverage. The model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the survival of firms. Implications for business cycles are also considered.

Robust Contracts in Continuous Time (with Jianjun Miao)

We study two types of robust contracting problem under hidden action in continuous time. In type I problem, the principal is ambiguous about the project cash flows, while he is ambiguous about the agent's beliefs in type II problem. The principal designs a robust contract that maximizes his utility under the worst-case scenario subject to the agent's incentive and participation constraints. We implement the optimal contract by cash reserves, debt and equity. In addition to receiving ordinary dividends when cash reserves reach a threshold, outside equity holders also receive special dividends or inject cash in the cash reserves to cope with model misspecification. Ambiguity aversion lowers outside securities value and raises the credit yield spread. It generates equity premium for type I problem, but not for type II problem. The equity premium and the credit yield spread are state dependent and high for distressed firms with low cash reserves.

Accounting Frictions: Implications for the Business Cycle

Credit constraints have been shown to be a powerful mechanism by which small shocks to productivity are amplified and propagated through the economy. This paper explores the consequences of incorporating accounting frictions into the traditional models that generate business cycles through credit constraints. Borrowers and lenders don't mark their assets to market on a regular basis, instead they are often reluctant to write down the value of their assets after the market price goes down. The interaction of this accounting friction with the credit constraints has important implications for the amplification and propagation of shocks, as well as for the cyclicality induced in the economy.
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Ballots vs. Bullets: Three Essays in Voting and Conflict Studies*
Main advisor: Laurent Bouton
Dissertation Committee: Laurent Bouton, Sambuddha Ghosh, Randall P. Ellis, Daniele Paserman

M.A., Political Economy, Boston University, Boston, MA, 2012

B.A., Economics *(with highest honor)*, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, 2009

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Political Economy, Public Finance, Peace Economics, Macroeconomics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Instructor, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Metropolitan College, Boston University, Fall 2014
Instructor, Intermediate Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2014
Instructor, Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Sabancı University, Summer 2012
Instructor, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2012
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2010, Spring 2011, Fall 2011, Spring 2012, Fall 2013, Spring 2014

WORK EXPERIENCE
Intern, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey), July 2014 - Present
Research Assistant to Laurent Bouton, Boston University, September 2012 - May 2013

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
GRS Graduate Scholarship, Boston University, Fall 2014
Dean's Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2009 - Summer 2014
Opportunity Grant, The Fulbright Commission, 2009
Highest Honor at Graduation, Bilkent University, Department of Economics, 2009
High Honor List, Bilkent University Department of Economics, Fall 2005 - Spring 2009
Basic Science Scholarship, The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey, 2005 - 2009
Full Fellowship, Bilkent University, Fall 2005 - Spring 2009
WORKING PAPERS
“Ballots and Bullets as Complementary Tactics,” September 2014.

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Electoral Terrorists: A Case Study on the Kurdish Politics and the PKK’s Violence”
“The Swing Voter’s Curse in Runoff Elections: An Empirical Analysis of the High
Abstention Rate in Turkey’s First Presidential Election in 2014”
“Turkey’s 4+4+4 Education System and its Effects on School Dropout Rate”

LANGUAGES
Native in Turkish, Fluent in English and Basic in German

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, MATLAB, Microsoft Office, EViews

OTHER: Web and blog writer, Officer of the BU Graduate Economics Association

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YASEMIN SATIR

Ballots and Bullets as Complementary Tactics (Job Market Paper)

Many separatist-terrorists have adopted electoral strategies at different stages of their struggles. This paper develops a new perspective on the politico-military contest between an incumbent government, a terrorist organization and the political elites of these terrorists. I model a two-period game where at the first stage a central government and an insurgent group wage both military and political (concessional) campaigns while there is a local electoral competition between the political elites of the terrorists and the local authorities of the incumbent in the second stage. The political campaign strategy of each side serves to mobilize the citizens in the conflict area before the incoming elections. The military campaigns are both to win the ongoing contest outright and to affect the popularity of the cause among the population that terrorists claim to represent. Hence, by capturing the electoral pressure on each party involved, this paper allows us to study the impact of the government's concessional campaigns on terrorists' violent strategies.

Communicative Voting in Runoff Elections

This paper analyzes the equilibrium properties of runoff elections when in the first round voters trade-off two different motives to decide for whom to vote: they care about decision making, but also they care about communicating their views in favor of their most-preferred candidate so as to influence others’ opinion or party positioning in the second round. My results are twofold: First, communication strengthens the existence of sincere equilibrium in which all voters vote strategically. Second, Duverger’s equilibrium, where voters coordinate on two parties, still exists. The former is resulted by sincere voting being used as a communication device to tackle with imperfect information. The latter is explained by voters not caring about communicating their beliefs to influence others’ votes in the second round; but caring to prevent the upset victory of the least preferred candidate by coordinating on a stronger one. Existence of Duverger’s equilibrium is also important to rebut the existence belief that a runoff election is strictly more efficient than a first-past-the-post system when communicative motive of voting is taken into account.

Electoral Terrorists: A Case Study on the Kurdish Politics and the PKK’s Violence

There are numerous terrorist organizations that have turned to party politics in order to achieve their goals either wholly, or in part. The voting behavior of those individuals that terrorists claim to represent and seek for support is usually a neglected research area. This article is a preliminary empirical study of the influence of attack frequency and target selection on electoral competition. It uses data referred to the case of the Kurdish terrorist group PKK and its attached political movements in Turkey starting from 1991 and shows the impact of the PKK’s action on the vote share of Kurdish parties.
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
  Dissertation Title: Essays in the Regulation of Industries with Search Frictions
  Main advisor: Dilip Mookherjee

M.A.P.E., Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA, 2013

B.A., Economics (first class honors), University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada, 2008

B.Sc., Pure Mathematics (first class honors), University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada, 2008

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomic Theory

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Lecturer, Economic Analysis of Legal Issues, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2014
Lecturer, Intermediate Microeconomics Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2012, Fall 2013
Lecturer, Economics of Corporate Organization, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2012, Fall 2013
Instructor, Environmental Economics, Summer Term, Boston University, Summer 2011, Summer 2012
Instructor, Market Structure and Economic Performance, Summer Term, Boston University, Summer 2012
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston, Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2010, Fall 2011, Spring 2012

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Boston University Deans Fellowship, Boston University, 2008 – 2013
Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, Spring 2011

WORKING PAPERS
“A Regulatory Exchange Market for Taxi Regulation in Metropolitan Areas” (Job Market Paper) October 2014.
“Comparing Local Exclusive Cruising and Metropolitan-Level Taxi Regulation” October 2014.
WORK IN PROGRESS
“Competition in Platforms for Marriage Markets”

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
Microeconomic Theory Workshop, Boston University, Fall 2010, Spring 2013, Spring 2014

COMPUTER SKILLS: MATLAB, LaTeX, STATA, Microsoft Office

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Professor Michael Manove
Department of Economics
Boston University
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A Regulatory Exchange Market for Taxicab Regulation in Metropolitan Areas (Job Market Paper)

In metropolitan areas, taxicab regulation often has local exclusivity, regulations that prevent taxis that are affiliated with one city from picking up passengers in another city. When there are multiple cities in close proximity, the empty return trips that occur after taxis drive passengers from one city to another results in inefficiency. This inefficiency cannot be eliminated by creating a single metropolitan-level affiliation and letting all affiliated taxis pick up passengers in any city. We develop a regulatory exchange market that maintains the separate affiliations, but allows taxi drivers the ability to exchange the right to pick up passengers in each others’ affiliated location. The regulatory exchange market will be preferred to both local exclusive cruising regulation and metropolitan-level regulation. Further, the regulatory exchange market achieves the first best in a large class of situations.

Comparing Local Exclusive Cruising and Metropolitan-Level Taxi Regulation

In metropolitan areas with multiple cities in close proximity, conventional wisdom suggests regulation should be carried out through a metropolitan-level regulator rather than having each city operate local exclusive cruising regulation (Flores-Guri, 2005). Local exclusive cruising regulation prevents drivers that drive a passenger from one city to another from picking up passengers in the other city, resulting in duplicate return trips. Under metropolitan-level regulation, however, driver search behavior limits the ability for the regulator to implement the desired prices and vacancy rates. We develop a network model that takes into account the drivers’ search behavior. Differences between cities, such as differences in externalities, differences in regulatory preferences over driver profit, or differences in demand structures, can cause local exclusive cruising regulation to be preferred to metropolitan-level regulation. When the characteristics of cities are the same, metropolitan-level regulation will be preferred to local exclusive cruising regulation.
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
  Dissertation Title: Three Essays on Development in China
  Dissertation Committee: Kehinde Ajayi, Dilip Mookherjee and Kevin Lang

M.Phil., Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2009
  Dissertation Title: Collective Labor Supply and Intra-household Allocation among Chinese Households
  Main advisor: Dennis T. Yang

B.A., Economics, Peking University, Beijing, China, 2007

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Development Economics, Labor Economics, Applied Microeconomics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
  Teaching Fellow, Microeconomic Theory (M.A. course), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2013
  Teaching Assistant, Mathematical Economics (M.A. course), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2013 and Fall 2010
  Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2013
  Teaching Assistant, Monetary and Banking Theory, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2013 and Fall 2012
  Teaching Assistant, Economics and Law, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2013 and Fall 2012
  Teaching Assistant, Game Theory, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2011
  Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Fall 2007 and Spring 2008

WORK EXPERIENCE
  Research Assistant for Sambuddho Ghosh, Boston University, 2011-2012

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
  Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2010-Spring 2014
  Postgraduate Studentship, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Fall 2007-Spring 2009
  Mary Kay Scholarship, Peking University, Fall 2004
  Freshman Scholarship, Peking University, Fall 2003
WORKING PAPERS

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Long-term Consequences of China’s Great Famine 1959-1961”

LANGUAGES
English (fluent), Mandarin (native), Cantonese (conversational), French (beginner)

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, MATLAB, Scientific WorkPlace, LaTeX, Microsoft Office

CITIZENSHIP/Visa: China/F1

REFERENCES

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SHUNAN WU

College Expansion and Educational Attainment: A Study in China (Job Market Paper)

In standard human capital theory educational attainment is determined to maximize the net expected value of one’s life-time earnings. It implicitly assumes that there are no constraints on the highest educational level people can get, which is not always the case in reality. Limited access to school is prevalent in developing countries, and it is reasonable to believe that removing such constraints can change people’s behavior. This paper studies the impact of China’s massive college enrollment expansion from 1999 on educational attainment at high school level. With a difference-in-differences method, I find that overall the expansion has increased the probabilities of enrolling in and completing high school by 17%. The probability of completing high school is increased more than that of enrolling in high school. Female students and urban residents benefit more, while parental education does not have big effects except when the mother has a high school degree.

Fertility and Women’s Labor Supply and Earnings

The relationship between fertility and female labor supply has been revisited a lot. Empirical studies have found negative correlation between the two but the causality remains unclear because of endogeneity of fertility. Most previous studies tackle this issue by instrumenting for fertility. This paper uses a plausible exogenous change, the relaxation of China’s One Child Policy, as an IV for family size to study the effects of childbearing on women's labor supply and earnings. The preliminary results show that having more children decreases both women’s labor force participation and earnings significantly. Studies on mechanisms suggest that women with mother or mother-in-law alive are less affected by fertility. It also shows that women with more children tend to work in positions with more mobility and lower pay.

Long-term Consequences of China's Great Famine 1959-1961

Plenty of papers have investigated the cause of China’s Great Famine from 1959 to 1961, while few empirical studies have been done about the long-term consequences of the famine. This paper adds knowledge to existing literature in several aspects: (a) it studies a bigger set of health outcomes that has not been examined before; (b) it uses children’s biomarkers as control variables to address the selection problem; (c) it uses arm and leg lengths to control for possible height shrinkage at an older age for a more accurate estimate. It also explores inter-generational transfer of the impact of the famine.
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
  Dissertation Title: Formal Banking and Economic Outcomes in Developing Economies
  Dissertation Committee: Dilip Mookherjee, Marc Rysman, Samuel Bazzi and Francesco
  Decarolis
M.A., Economics, University of California, Davis CA, 2007
B.A., Economics and English Literature (Magna Cum Laude), Western Washington
  University, Bellingham WA, 2006

FIELDS OF INTEREST
  Development Economics, Industrial Organization, Empirical Microeconomics

WORK EXPERIENCE
  Research Assistant for Francesco Decarolis, Boston University, 2012 - Present
  Research Assistant for Daniele Paserman, Boston University, Spring 2012
  Research Assistant for Marc Rysman, Boston University, Fall 2011
  Economist, Compass-Lexecon, San Francisco, 2009

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
  Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston
  University, Spring 2011
  Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston
  University, Fall 2010

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
  Rosenstein-Rodan Prize, Institute for Economic Development, 2014
  Research Grant, Center for Finance, Law and Policy, 2014
  Scholarship, Bank of Credit and Common School, and IED, 2013
  Summer Research Grant, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2011
  Presidential Scholar from the College of Business and Economics, Western Washington
  University, 2006
  Outstanding Graduate from the Economics Department, Western Washington University,
  2006
  Best Senior Project Proposal, with Research Grant, Western Washington University Honors
  Program, 2005
WORKING PAPERS

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Commercial Banking in Agricultural Areas: Smoothing Spatially Distributed Productivity Shocks Across Branch Networks”
“NREGA and Responses in Lending by Public Sector Banks”
“Measuring Slum Evolution with Remote Sensing,” (with Mike Gechter)

REFEREE EXPERIENCE
Indian Growth and Development Review

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference, Boston University, 2014 (future)
EconCon, Princeton University, 2014
IGIDR Seminar, Mumbai, Maharashtra, 2013

COMPUTER SKILLS
STATA, MATLAB, ArcGIS, MS Office, C

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REFERENCES

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Professor Francesco Decarolis
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Formal Banking and Economic Growth: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Analysis in India (Job Market Paper)

This paper investigates the effects of formal banking expansion on economic growth. I exploit a previously unstudied reform to bank branching policy in India, which led to a large expansion in private credit to financially underserved areas. Using a regression discontinuity design at the district level, I trace the exogenous expansion of banking services through time and estimate their effect on agricultural and industrial growth. I am able to address concerns raised in other studies of policy driven banking expansion by accounting for the incentives generated by the reform in the context of India’s unique banking environment. I show first that the expansion of financial services led to significant growth in agricultural productivity and output of cotton, wheat, and other important revenue-generating crops. I then show that enterprises in states most affected by the reform experience faster growth in their total investments and capital labor ratios. Finally, I confirm the aggregate effect on local GDP growth by showing that areas with expanding banking services experienced higher rates of growth in nighttime light intensity in the years following the reform. The estimates imply that each additional private bank branch led to a 0.3% increase in local GDP. Overall, these findings offer strong causal evidence that the expansion of the financial system facilitates growth across productive sectors and encourages economic development.

Commercial Banking in Agricultural Areas: Smoothing Spatially Distributed Productivity Shocks Across Branch Networks

This paper examines how the size of a bank’s network of branches may affect its behavior in markets experiencing local economic shocks. The connection to multiple geographically separated markets can help insure a bank against local shocks that might otherwise affect its cost of funds and ability to lend credit. A recent branching policy reform in India led to a large expansion of private bank branches creating variation in branch networks over time. Using detailed geographic data on the location of bank branches and rainfall levels to identify productivity shocks to agriculture, I investigate whether districts served by banks with smaller branch networks in other districts show greater exposure to local shocks in terms of credit amounts and agricultural productivity.

Estimating a Sequential Search Model with Bayesian Learning: A Case of Online Search for Differentiated Goods (with Sergei Koulayev)

In this paper we extend a two period model of sequential search for non-durable differentiated goods by relaxing the standard assumption of rational expectations over future options. In reality, agents likely enter search with imperfect knowledge of the product market, which they refine as they search. By introducing Bayesian learning into agents’ beliefs, the two period model can accommodate return to previously viewed results and could be further extended to a multiple period model allowing selection from previously viewed products without exhausting the potential search set. Applying the model to an application in which agents search for hotel rooms using a popular internet site, we estimate a slightly lower median search cost in the model with Bayesian learning as compared to a similar model that forms expectations from the empirical distribution. We conduct counterfactuals to estimate the change in demand resulting from placing the most popular hotel choices on the first page of results and find an increase in the number of successful searches ending with agents selecting hotels.

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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Empirical Analysis of Dynamics in Demand, Pricing and Productivity*
Main advisor: Marc Rysman

M.S., Finance, Renmin University, Beijing, P.R.China, 2010

B.A., Finance, Xiamen University, Xiamen, P.R.China, 2008

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Industrial Organization, Development Economics, Applied Econometrics

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, Spring 2014, Fall 2014
Summer Research Grants, Boston University, 2012 and 2014
Research Fellowship, Boston University, 2013
Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, 2011-2013
Graduate School Scholarship, Renmin University, 2009-2010
China Construction Bank Scholarship, 2008
University Scholarship, Xiamen University, 2005-2008

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2013
Teaching Assistant, Economic Courses, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2011-Fall 2012
Courses: Environmental Economics, Economics of Public Sector, Law and Economics, Public Control of Business (Master Level)

WORK EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant, Professor Marc Rysman, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2013
Research Assistant (Intern), Bank of China Liaoning Province Branch, Dalian, China, 2008
Research Assistant, Center for Industrial and Business Organization, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics (DUFU), Dalian, China, 2004-2008

WORKING PAPERS
“Inference of Service with Limited Data – Apple and China Unicom’s iPhone Exclusivity”, August 2014
WORK IN PROGRESS
The Role of Privatization in Productivity Increase – Evidence from China, with Haoyu Zhou, Marc Rysman and Yanfei Wang

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Referee for Economic Inquiry

PUBLICATIONS

RESEARCH PROJECTS
“Vertical Relationships between Coal and Electricity Firms in China”, National Natural Sciences Fund Project, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, China, 2008
“Legislation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law”, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, China, 2004-2005

CONFERENCES
North East Universities Development Consortium, Harvard University 2013
The 11th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, Boston 2013
The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, Chicago 2014

LANGUAGES: Native in Chinese, Fluent in English

COMPUTER SKILLS: LaTex, Mathematica, MATLAB, R, Stata

CITIZENSHIP/Visa: P.R.China/F-1

REFERENCES
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Inference of Service with Limited Data – Apple and China Unicom’s iPhone Exclusivity
(Job Market Paper)

This paper provides a framework for evaluating retailers’ service even when service is not observed. The identification of service comes from the variation in manufacturer's wholesale prices, in the sense that retailer's optimization over service enters the manufacturer's first order condition and thus alters its price setting. Using new data containing wholesale prices from China Unicom, China’s second largest wireless carrier, I construct and estimate a dynamic structural demand model of consumers with persistent heterogeneous tastes. The demand estimates are then used in the structural supply model to estimate service parameters. I find that service has a significantly positive effect on expanding market demand; however, its impact subsides over time. I argue that this pattern in service provides a potential explanation for Apple's initial exclusive contract with China Unicom and subsequent contract arrangements.

Computing Price-Cost Margins in A Durable Good Environment (with Gautam Gowrisankaran and Marc Rysman)

This paper develops and executes a new method for calculating price-cost margins in a durable goods environment. We study the industry of digital camcorders from 2000 to 2006. We analyze how margins differ across products, firms and time. We are particularly interested in the extent to which falling marginal costs explain falling prices, as opposed to alternative explanations such as intertemporal price discrimination or increased competition. Using demand estimates and the new method, we generate non-parametric distribution of marginal costs that each firm expects for each product. We show that marginal cost falls dramatically, from an average of $500 to approximately $200. The price-cost margin is strongly correlated with quality, and is substantially larger for Sony than other firms. We also find that market share is an important driver for the dynamic considerations in our model.
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EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
  Dissertation Title: Optimal Information Disclosure and Optimal Learning
  Main Advisor: Barton L. Lipman

M.A., Political Economy, Boston University, Boston, MA, 2012

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FIELDS OF INTEREST
  Primary: Microeconomic Theory, Organizational Economics
  Secondary: Behavioral Economics

ACADEMIC WORK EXPERIENCE
  Research Assistant, Professor Keith N. Hylton, Department of Law, Boston University,
    Summer 2014–present
  Research Assistant, Jian Gao, China Development Bank (Vice-Governor), Summer 2014
  Research Assistant, Professor Jawwad Noor, Department of Economics, Boston University,
    Spring 2013
  Research Assistant, Professor Sambuddha Ghosh, Department of Economics, Boston
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  Research Assistant, Professor Laurent Bouton, Department of Economics, Boston University,
    Fall 2011
  Research Intern, Census and Statistic Department, Hong Kong, Summer 2008
  Research Assistant, Professor Bryan S. Turner, Asia Research Institute, National University of
    Singapore, Singapore, Summer 2007

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
  Teaching Fellow, Principles of Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston
    University, Spring 2014
  Teaching Assistant, Game Theory (Graduate Level), Department of Economics, Boston
    University, Fall 2013, Fall 2010
  Teaching Assistant, Behavioral Economics, Department of Economics, Boston University,
    Fall 2013
  Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston
    University, Spring 2011, Fall 2010
  Teaching Assistant, Government, Business and Labor, Department of Economics, Boston
    University, Spring 2011
  Teaching Assistant, Industrial Organization (Graduate Level), Department of Economics,
    Boston University, Fall 2010

October 2014
Mengxi Zhang

WORKING PAPERS

WORK IN PROGRESS
“Optimal Dynamic Feedback by an Informed Principal”
“Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement” (joint with Keith N. Hylton)

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Travel Grant, IED, Boston University, Fall 2014, Spring 2014
Travel Grant, CIREQ, Spring 2014
Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, Spring 2012
Distinction in Macro Qualifying Exam, Boston University, Spring 2010
Dean’s Fellow, Boston University, Fall 2009-Spring 2014
Graduate Student Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2009–present
Yasumoto International Exchange Scholarship, Fall 2007
Full Ride Scholarship, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005-2009

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS
Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, November 2014 (scheduled)
CIREQ, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada, May 2014

LANGUAGES
English (fluent), Mandarin (native), Cantonese (basic)

COMPUTER SKILLS: Mathematica, MATLAB, LyX

CITIZENSHIP/VisA: China/F1

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Subjective Evaluations as an Optimal Feedback Mechanism (Job Market Paper)

It is puzzling to observe that many firms conduct subjective evaluations of their employees and yet assign very coarse ratings to them, particularly when the evaluations are linked with payments. More specifically, most firms have the tendency to assign one or two central ratings to the vast majority of workers, which is commonly referred to as “centrality bias.” This paper argues that firms' use of coarse subjective evaluations can be interpreted as optimal information disclosure by an informed principal. When the firm has some private and unverifiable information about its employee's ability, it can design a subjective evaluation mechanism, in which payments are tied to evaluations, to convey information to the employee. Sharing information always increases expected productivity by allowing a better allocation of effort, but may not be cost-effective for the firm when the employee is protected by limited liability. I characterize the firm's optimal disclosure policy as a function of the agent's ability distribution and give an algorithm to compute it. I then show that with some reasonable restrictions on the ability distribution, the firm's optimal strategy is always to fire a worker if his ability is sufficiently low, reveal information if his ability is sufficiently high, and withhold information otherwise. Further, the optimal disclosure policy exhibits “centrality bias” for a wide range of parameters. I also illustrate how a dynamic version of the current model can be used to explain some other well-documented phenomena in the labor literature.

Optimal Dynamic Feedback by an Informed Principal

This paper extends my previous work “Subjective Evaluations as an Optimal Feedback Mechanism” to a dynamic context. To be specific, I investigate an informed principal’s optimal feedback strategy when she interacts with an uninformed agent repeatedly. I first consider the case where the principal has complete knowledge about the agent’s ability. In this case, if the principal ever wants to reveal any information, she will do so at the earliest possible stage. Moreover, the optimal disclosure policy can be characterized in the same way as in the static case. However, when the information is revealed gradually to the principal, she may remain silent until her belief about the agent’s ability becomes precise enough. By incorporating firms’ need to promote and/or to retain workers, this model can be used to explain wage dynamics within/across job levels.

Throw Good Money after Bad: Regret-Driven Rational Self-Deception

This paper investigates why people react to their past actions beyond the actions’ direct impact on economic costs and benefits -- e.g., the sunk cost fallacy, preference for consistency, and escalating commitment. People often suffer from regret when they realize that given the ex post information, their previous choices are suboptimal. As a result, in a dynamic setting where information is revealed gradually, people may be tempted to deny new negative information in order to avoid the feeling of regret. At the same time, the decision maker may also be aware of the economic cost of such belief distortion. I model a “rational” decision maker who optimally trades off these two concerns, and chooses his own belief accordingly. This tradeoff makes the past matter in the decision maker's current decision making and helps explain the cited phenomena. In addition, when the decision maker’s ability to manipulate his own belief is limited, he may have a preference for inaction to avoid information.