Genre and the New Rhetoric

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Chapter 2

Genre as Social Action*

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Although rhetorical criticism has recently provided a profusion of claims that certain discourses constitute a distinctive class, or genre, rhetorical theory has not provided firm guidance on what constitutes a genre. For example, rhetorical genres have been defined by similarities in strategies or forms in the discourses (Black [1965] 1978a; Hart 1971; Campbell 1973; Raum and Measell 1974), by similarities in audience (Mohrmann and Leff 1974), by similarities in modes of thinking (Gronbeck 1978; Rodgers 1982), by similarities in rhetorical situations (Windt 1972; Ware and Linkugel 1973; Halloran 1978). The diversity among these definitions presents both theorists and critics with a problem.

While this problem is created by rhetoricians who have done work in genre theory or criticism, another problem is raised by some who do not believe rhetoricians should do such work at all. Patton (1976) and Conley (1979) have argued that genre criticism requires too much critical distance between the text and the reader and thus leads to assessments that are not fully responsible. Genre criticism, they contend, invites reductionism, rules, formalism. Patton believes that such analysis results in "critical determinism of the worst sort" (1976: 5), and Conley that it leads to 'tiresome and useless taxonomies' (1979: 53).

The urge to classify is fundamental, and although it involves the difficulties that Patton and Conley point out, classification is necessary to language and learning. The variety of critical approaches referred to above indicates the many ways one might classify discourse, but if the term 'genre' is to mean anything theoretically or critically useful, it cannot refer to just any category or kind of discourse. One concern in rhetorical theory, then, is to make of rhetorical genre a stable classifying concept; another is to ensure that the concept is rhetorically sound.

In this essay, I will address both of these concerns, the first by developing a perspective on genre that relies on areas of agreement in previous work and connects those areas to corroborating material; the second concern I will address by proposing how an understanding of genre can help account for the way we encounter, interpret, react to, and create particular texts. My effort will elaborate the approach taken by Campbell and Jamieson (1978) and support their position that genre study is valuable.

not because it might permit the creation of some kind of taxonomy, but because it emphasizes some social and historical aspects of rhetoric that other perspectives do not. I will be arguing that a theoretically sound definition of genre must be centred not on the substance or the form of discourse but on the action it is used to accomplish. To do so, I will examine the connection between genre and recurrent situation and the way in which genre can be said to represent typified rhetorical action. My analysis will also show how hierarchical models of communication can help illuminate the nature and structure of such rhetorical action.

Classifying Discourse

A collection of discourses may be sorted into classes in more than one way, as Harrell and Linkugel (1978) note in their discussion of genre. Because a classification sorts items on the basis of some set of similarities, the principle used for selecting similarities can tell us much about the classification. A classification of discourse will be rhetorically sound if it contributes to an understanding of how discourse works—that is, if it reflects the rhetorical experience of the people who create and interpret the discourse. As Frye remarks, 'The study of genres has to be founded on the study of convention' ([1957] 1971: 96). A useful principle of classification for discourse, then, should have some basis in the conventions of rhetorical practice, including the ways actual rhetors and audiences have of comprehending the discourse they use.

The semiotic framework provides a way to characterize the principles used to classify discourse, according to whether the defining principle is based in rhetorical substance (semantics), form (syntactics), or the rhetorical action the discourse performs (pragmatics). A classifying principle based in rhetorical action seems most clearly to reflect rhetorical practice (especially since, as I will suggest later, action encompasses both substance and form). And if genre represents action, it must involve situation and motive, because human action, whether symbolic or otherwise, is interpretative only against a context of situation and through the attributing of motives. 'Motive' and 'situation' are Burke's terms, of course, and Campbell and Jamieson's discussion of genre leans on them implicitly, particularly the latter: 'A genre', they write, 'does not consist merely of a series of acts in which certain rhetorical forms recur... Instead, a genre is composed of a constellation of recognizable forms bound together by an internal dynamic' (1978: 21). The dynamic 'fuses' substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics. The fusion has the character of a rhetorical 'response' to situational 'demands' perceived by the rhetor. This definition, they maintain, 'reflects Burke's view of rhetorical acts as strategies to encompass situations' (Jamieson and Campbell, 1982: 146).

Their explanation of genre also reflects Bitzer's (1968) formulation of the relationship between situation and discourse, perhaps more than it does Burke's. In Bitzer's definition of rhetorical situation as a 'complex of persons, events, objects, and relations' presenting an 'exigence' that can be allayed through the mediation of discourse, he establishes the demand–response vocabulary that Campbell and Jamieson adopt. Furthermore, he essentially points the way to genre study, although he does not use the term himself, in observing that situations recur: 'From day to day, year to year, comparable situations occur, prompting comparable responses'. The comparable responses, or recurring forms, become a tradition which then 'tends to function as a constraint upon any new response in the form' (Bitzer 1968: 13). Thus, inaugurals, eulogies, courtroom speeches, and the like have conventional forms because they arise in situations with similar structures and elements and because rhetors respond in similar ways, having learned from precedent what is appropriate and what effects their actions are likely to have on other people.

Campbell and Jamieson's approach to genre is also fundamentally Aristotelian. In each of three kinds of rhetoric Aristotle described—deliberative, forensic and epideictic—we find a situation-based fusion of form and substance. Each has its characteristic substance: the elements (exhortation and dissuasion, accusation and defence, praise and blame) and aims (expedience, justice, honour). Each has its appropriate forms (time or tense, proofs and style). These fusions of substance and form are grounded in the specific situations calling for extended discourse in ancient Greece, including the audiences that were qualified to participate and the types of judgments they were called upon to make. The three kinds of rhetoric seem to be quite distinct, the various aspects of each to be part of a rational whole. It is likely that an internal 'dynamic' of the sort Campbell and Jamieson postulate was at the centre of each of these three original genres. (I will comment later on the current status of the Aristotelian genres.)

Two features of this approach are of interest at this point. First, Campbell and Jamieson's discussion yields a method of classification that meets the requirement of relevance to rhetorical practice. Since 'rhetorical forms that establish genres are stylistic and substantive responses to perceived situational demands' (1978: 19), a genre becomes a complex of formal and substantive features that create a particular effect in a given situation. Genre, in this way, becomes more than a formal entity; it becomes pragmatic, fully rhetorical, a point of connection between intention and effect, an aspect of social action. This approach is different in an important way from those of Frye and Edwin Black, to which it is indebted. Although both begin by tying genre to situation, Frye ([1957] 1971: 247) with the 'radical of presentation' (a kind of schematic rhetorical situation) and Black ([1965] 1978a: 134) with the rhetorical 'transaction' (emphasizing audience effects), they base their critical analyses on form: strategies, diction, linguistic elements. For them, situation serves primarily to locate a genre; it does not contribute to its character as rhetorical action.

The second feature of interest in Campbell and Jamieson's method is that they proceed inductively, as critics. They do not attempt to provide a framework that will predict or limit the genres that might be identified. Their interest is less in providing a taxonomic system than in explaining certain aspects of the way social reality evolves: 'The critic who classifies a rhetorical artifact as generically akin to a class of similar artifacts has identified an undercurrent of history rather than comprehended an act isolated in time' (1978: 26). The result is that the set of genres is an open class, with new members evolving, old ones decaying. In contrast to Campbell and Jamieson's approach is that of Harrell and Linkugel (1978), who proceed deductively, as theorists. Their discussion illustrates one of
The content of the page seems to be a discussion on the effectiveness of various procedures and the role of perception in information processing. There are references to experimental results and the potential implications for cognitive science. The text appears to be part of a larger research paper or a scientific article.
In common usage, this is possible in so far as we use the concept of "knowledge" as a measure of our understanding of a subject. Knowledge is the accumulation of facts or information about a particular topic. However, there is a more nuanced perspective on the nature of knowledge, especially in the context of social action.

For example, in the context of social action, knowledge is not just the accumulation of facts, but rather a process of action and reflection. It involves understanding the social context in which one operates and the implications of one's actions. This understanding can be gained through experience, education, and interaction with others.

In the context of social action, knowledge is not just a passive accumulation of facts, but an active process of engagement with the world. It involves not just understanding, but also the ability to act on that understanding to effect change.

This understanding is not just important in the context of social action, but also in the context of education and learning. In education, knowledge is not just the accumulation of facts, but also the development of critical thinking skills, problem-solving abilities, and the ability to engage with complex ideas.

In summary, knowledge is not just a passive accumulation of facts, but an active process of engagement with the world. It involves understanding, action, and reflection, and is essential in both social action and education.

[Reference to C. Wright Mills' work on the role of the "power elite" in society, and the importance of understanding the power structures that govern social action.]

Casting the New Frontier

The problems that remain in defining intellect and knowledge are somewhat more complex, but also more interesting, when we consider it from a different perspective. It is in the process of resolving these problems that we can better understand the nature of knowledge and its role in society.
bution of different possible situations and outcomes.

Types:

The Influent M.A. F. Hilliard provides a contextual perspective on situation, progression, and outcome.
The description suggests that context is a higher hierarchical level to meaning.

Explain the figure of the social action.

Diagram 2.1 Hierarchical relationships of substance, form, and meaning acquisition. The combination of form and substance at one level becomes an action (has meaning) at a higher level, until that combination itself acquires form. Each action is interpretable in understanding the meaningfulness of substance, form, and interpretation of action.
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fused, the substantive and formal components can acquire meaning in context. A complex hierarchy of such relationships is necessary for constructing meaning.

Two recent communication models instantiate this hierarchical principle in remarkably similar ways; together, they suggest a connection between rhetorical genre and the hierarchical fusion of form and substance. One model, developed by Frenz and Farrell (1976), is grounded specifically in action theory and makes explicit use of the rules approach to communication. The 'paradigm' they propose consists of three 'hierarchically structured constructs': context, episodes and symbolic acts. Context specifies the criteria for interpreting both the meaningfulness and propriety of any communicative event (1976: 334). It consists of two hierarchical levels - form of life and encounters. 'Form of life', Wittgenstein's term, is used by Frenz and Farrell to refer to the cultural patterns, both linguistic and non-linguistic, that give significance to actions, both linguistic and non-linguistic. Encounters, the second level of context, 'particularize form of life through rules of propriety' (1976: 335); they are 'points of contact' in concrete locations, providing the specific situational dimension to context. The second level of the hierarchy is the episode, a 'rule-conforming sequence of symbolic acts generated by two or more actors who are collectively oriented toward emergent goals' (1976: 336). And the third and lowest level of the model is the symbolic act, the 'component' of the episode. Symbolic acts are 'verbal and/or nonverbal utterances which express intentionality' (1976: 340), characterized in much the way Searle describes speech acts.

Another hierarchical model of communication, proposed by Pearce and Conklin (1979), addresses the problem of interpreting non-literal meanings in conversation. Pearce's earlier work found that conversational coherence requires 'coordinated management of meaning' among participants and that such coordination is accomplished through rules. In the 1979 model, each level of meaning provides a context for constituents at lower levels by means of rule-governed relationships. The model consists of five levels in all: archetypes, episodes, speech acts, propositions (grammatical utterances), and the stream of behaviour that must be interpreted. Archetypes are 'those fundamental logical operations or symbolic reasoning procedures which persons use to detect or generate patterns in the sequence of events'. These are based on the common physiology that human beings share and in the common physical properties of the world they live in (1979: 78). Episodes are 'sequences of messages which have a starting and a stopping point and an internal structure'; these patterned sequences provide the context for speech acts. The hierarchical levels are connected by sets of rules that coordinate cognitive movement between them. Between the top levels are rules of symbolic identification; between the second two are rules of association; between the third and fourth are rules of communication; and between the last two, rules of information processing.

These two hierarchical schemes are persuasive, in part because of their comprehensiveness, in part because of their similarities, and in part because of their consistency with other social and psychological theory. Although neither one has anything explicit to say about rhetorical genre, they provide a background for understanding genre as meaningful action that is rule governed (which is to say interpretable by means of conventions).

A rule-based explication of genre that is consistent with these two schemes has been presented by Downey (1982); she defines genre as 'a classification of rhetorical discourses whose recurrent constitutive and regulative rules are similar in distinction and pattern'. In the terms I have been using, her explanation maintains that it is constitutive rules that tell us how to fuse form and substance to make meaningful and regulative rules that tell us how the fusion itself is to be interpreted within its context, like religion or public affairs. Seen this way, the rhetorical genre is clearly analogous to the levels of meaning of the two communication models.

Figure 2.2 proposes a hierarchy similar to these models but including genre. Genre appears at a level of complete discourse types based on recurrent situations; genres are provided interpretive context by form-of-life patterns and are constituted by intermediate forms or strategies, analogous to the dialogic episode. Because communication must rest on experience, the lowest level must be that in which symbolizing takes place. Beyond symbols, experience is idiosyncratic and incommunicable. At the other extreme, we can envision universal experience, or the biological-psychological nature of the human species, Burke's 'universal' rhetorical situation (1950: 1969b: 146). Burke, in fact, offers a range of motives that spans both extremes of the hierarchy:

Each man's (sic) motivation is unique, since his situation is unique, which is particularly obvious when you recall that his situation also reflects the unique sequence of his past. However, for all this uniqueness of the individual, there are motives and relationships generic to all mankind - and these are intrinsic to human agents as a class. (1945: 1969a: 103–4)

At the level of the locution or speech act, idiosyncratic motives (or what I earlier called intentions) predominate. At the level of human nature (or archetypes) motives of the sort that Fisher (1970) describes have their force. But at the level of the genre, motive becomes a conventionalized social purpose, or exigence, within the recurrent

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Figure 2.2 Proposed hierarchy of meaning, incorporating genre, compared with those of Frenz and Farrell and of Pearce and Conklin. Note the relationship of the four lowest levels in the proposed hierarchy to Figure 2.1: the higher levels would extend that figure beyond three levels of action.
situation. In constructing discourse, we deal with purposes at several levels, not just one. We learn to adopt social motives as ways of satisfying private intentions through rhetorical action. This is how recurring situations seem to 'invite' discourse of a particular type.

The exact number of hierarchical levels of meaning may not be determinable with any precision, and it may be that different kinds of communication emphasize different levels. Because monologue and dialogue pose different problems, for example, they probably operate with differing hierarchical structures. In dialogue, because the audience tends to be small and constraints managed through interactive coordination, personal intentions manifest themselves more easily. Such interaction requires elaboration of the rule structure at the lower levels of the hierarchy, to guide turn-taking, implicature and management of multiple intentions. In monologue, personal intentions must be accommodated to public exigences - because the audience is larger, the opportunity for complex statement is greater, and constraints are less easily managed; more elaborate rule structures at the upper end of the hierarchy, at the level of whole discourses, are therefore necessary for both formulation and interpretation.

As Simons observed, one of the most important problems raised by recent genre theory is that 'genres 'exist' at various levels of abstraction, from the very broad to the very specific' (1978: 37). Indeed, the classifications of Fisher (1980) and of Harrell and Linkugel (1978) illustrate this problem. But if we define genre by its association with recurrent rhetorical situations, the exact hierarchical level at which the abstraction called genre occurs will be determined by our sense of recurrence of rhetorical situations; this will vary from culture to culture, according to the typifications available. Thus, the term 'genre' might under differing circumstances be applied to the class of all public addresses in a society, to the class of all inaugural speeches, or to the class of all American presidential inaugural.

It is worth noting, in addition, that there are two kinds of hierarchies to which genre may be seen to belong, and it is helpful to keep them distinct. One kind arranges single discourses into classes and the classes into broader classes; this is the kind to which Simons refers. The other arranges constituents into units and units into larger wholes (words, sentences, speech acts, texts, etc.), in the manner of the hierarchies in Figure 2.2.16 Genre is hierarchical in both senses, but the second has more to do with its rhetorical significance, that is, the way it works as a source of meaning.

Implications

The understanding of rhetorical genre that I am advocating is based in rhetorical practice, in the conventions of discourse that a society establishes as ways of 'acting together'. It does not lend itself to taxonomy, for genres change, evolve and decay; the number of genres current in a society is indeterminate and depends upon the complexity and diversity of the society. The particular features of this understanding of genre are these:

1 Genre refers to a conventional category of discourse based in large scale typification of rhetorical action; as action, it acquires meaning from situation and from the social context in which that situation arose.
2 As meaningful action, genre is interpretable by means of rules; genre rules occur at a relatively high level on a hierarchy of rules for symbolic interaction.
3 Genre is distinct from form: form is the more general term used at all levels of the hierarchy. Genre is a form at one particular level that is a fusion of lower level forms and characteristic substance.
4 Genre serves as the substance of forms at higher levels; as recurrent patterns of language use, genres help constitute the substance of our cultural life.
5 A genre is a rhetorical means for mediating private intentions and social exigence; it motivates by connecting the private with the public, the singular with the recurrent.

Although this perspective on genre is not precise enough to permit quantification of formal features or elucidation of a complete hierarchy of rules, it can provide guidance in the evaluation of genre claims. Specifically, it suggests that a collection of discourses (or a potential collection) may fail to constitute a genre in three major ways. First, there may fail to be significant substantive or formal similarities at the lower levels of the hierarchy. Genre claims are rarely made without this kind of first-line evidence, however. Second, there may be inadequate consideration of all the elements in recurrent rhetorical situations. A genre claim may be based on similarities only in exigence or only in audience, etc. This type of claim is sometimes made about particularly novel or subtle combinations of forms by which a rhetor addresses a situation. In such a case, however, the rhetorical situation will be differently construed by rhetor and audience. The discourse constitutes an adaption of form and substance to a private purpose, not a public exigence; the particular fusion achieved is based not on all the recurrent aspects of situation but on the unique ones. Carpenter's study of the historical jeremiad makes such a claim, based on the evidence that three works 'share salient formal characteristics' (1978: 113). But these works rather adapt the genre of historical essay to personal goals; they do not constitute another genre, because the motive that makes the discourse a social action is shared only for the historical essay, not for the jeremiad.

Another more general failure of this second sort is the attempt to use the Aristotelian types to identify contemporary genres. Although developed from recurrent situations in ancient Greece, these original genres do not describe complete situation types that recur today - they are too general. Halloran (1978) has suggested, for instance, that the public proceeding is a specialized and elaborated descendant of the epideictic genre; his analysis shows the public proceeding to be based in a recurrent situation (with several variants) and to involve elements of all three Aristotelian genres. For us, epideictic serves not as a single genre but as a form of life - a celebratory (or reaffirmative) arena of social life in which situation types develop. The original genres also persist as constituent strategies of contemporary genres. Jamieson and Campbell's (1982) discussion of the rhetorical hybrid develops this point by noting the ways critics have found the three original genres permeating
each other in practice and by offering an extended critique of several hybrids in contemporary American political rhetoric. The hybrid – a transient combination of forms based in a non-recurrent (or not yet recurrent) situation – is itself not a genre but the adaption of a genre to ‘the idiosyncratic needs of a particular situation, institution, and rhetor’ (1982: 157). In their analysis of the deliberative eulogy, it is clear that hybridization occurs not between genres but between subforms, on the level of what I have called strategies: in their examples of the eulogies of Robert Kennedy, ‘eulogistic [generic] requirements predominate...’ (1982: 150).

The third way a genre claim may fail is if there is no pragmatic component, no way to understand the genre as a social action. In a study of Environmental Impact Statements during their first five years, I concluded that this clearly defined class of documents did not constitute a rhetorical genre because it did not achieve a rational fusion of elements – in spite of obvious similarities in form and substance, and in spite of a recurring rhetorical situation that was, in fact, defined by law (Miller 1980).

These documents had no coherent pragmatic force: first, the cultural forms in which they were embedded provided conflicting interpretive contexts; and second, there was no satisfactory fusion of substance and form that could serve as substance to higher level forms and contexts. For example, the probabilistic judgments that are the substance of environmental science conflicted with the formal requirements of objectivity and quantification; further, the patterns of thinking in the context of administrative bureaucracies created a set of values at variance with the environmental values invoked by the legislation requiring impact statements. Overall, the imperfect fusion of scientific, legal and administrative elements prevented interpretation of the documents as meaningful rhetorical action. This conclusion was, of course, substantiated by the legal and administrative problems the early impact statements created and their frequent criticism in industry, government and the environmental movement.

What are the implications of the absence of a genre on the meaning hierarchy? To say that a genre does not exist is not to imply that there are no interpretive rules at that level on the hierarchy. It means that the rules do not form a normative whole that we can consider a cultural artefact, that is, a representation of reasoning and purposes characteristic of the culture. The class of discourses is just a class of discourses; the set of rules is just a set of rules. But further, the absence of a normative whole at that level poses problems of certain kinds. It means that the interpreter must have a strong understanding of forms at both higher and lower levels in order to bridge the gap at the level of genre. Similarly, in reading written discourse, we must base inferences about probable speech acts on strongly delineated propositions, at the level below, and strategies or episodes, at the level above.

The perspective on genres proposed here has implications not only for criticism and theory, but also for rhetorical education. It suggests that what we learn when we learn a genre is not just a pattern of forms or even a method of achieving our own ends. We learn, more importantly, what ends we may have: we learn that we may eulogize, apologize, recommend one person to another, instruct customers on behalf of a manufacturer, take on an official role, account for progress in achieving goals. We learn to understand better the situations in which we find ourselves and the potential for failure and success in acting together. As a recurrent, significant action, a genre embodies an aspect of cultural rationality. For the critic, genres can serve both as an index to cultural patterns and as tools for exploring the achievements of particular speakers and writers; for the student, genres serve as keys to understanding how to participate in the actions of a community.

Notes
1 See also Conley’s review of Campbell and Jamieson (1978) in Conley (1978).
2 Harrell and Linkugel’s essay, like this one, is motivated by the belief that rhetorical criticism suffers from the lack of a good theory of genres.
3 It should be noted that this type of induction is different from that advocated by Simons (1978). Although Simons defines a genre as a ‘distinctive and recurring pattern of similarly constrained rhetorical practices’ (1978: 42), a definition similar to that of Campbell and Jamieson, the method he advocates leads to quite different results. He recommends a factor-analytic examination of large numbers of texts to identify the distinctive and recurring patterns. Campbell and Jamieson, on the other hand, emphasize close examination of a single text or a small number of texts to identify the fusion of forms responsive to situation. For Simons, then, the genre is just the collection of texts; for Campbell and Jamieson, the genre is the fusion of forms exemplified by a text or texts; the genre represents ‘not only...what has recurred but...what may recur’ (1978: 24).
4 This system is adapted from George Campbell’s classification of the ends of speaking; see Connors (1981).
5 For example, Kinneavy says, ‘The language process seems to be capable of focusing attention on one of its own components as primary in a given situation’ (1971: 59). The fundamental problem in Kinneavy’s system is the confusion of ‘aim’ with ‘use’. See Beale (1977) for a more complete critique of Kinneavy’s work.
7 In an earlier statement, Bitzer seemed aware of the problem into which this example of the drinking water leads him. In the 1980 ‘Forum’ in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, he wrote, ‘exigences are not “objective” in the sense of being simply factual; nor are exigences wholly independent of human apprehension’ (p. 90). Scott points out that ‘Bitzer’s insistence throughout on reality and not sociality is no accident in the fashion of terms’ (1980: 57). He suggests a reevaluation of the situational theory to recognize the intentionalities of beings who act within a social reality.
8 Materialism is not an exhaustive characterization of Bitzer’s discussion of situation. In Bitzer (1980), especially, there are strong elements of pragmatism, which Burke characterizes as the featuring of agency, and to the extent that Bitzer features the capacity of the rhetorical act to effect change, his work illustrates what Burke calls realism. In contrast, Vatz’s (1973) emphasis on the creative power of the rhetor corresponds to the featuring of agent, which Burke characterizes as idealism.
9 See also Cox (1981).
10 As Gronebeck has observed, in a theory of communication based on social facts, ‘the idea of “cause” almost disappears’ (1981: 253).
11 Fisher’s (1970) discussion of motives builds upon this same theme in Burke’s work.
12 Recent literary theory similarly emphasizes the impossibility of interpreting a work outside of a context or framework of expectations (Culler 1975: 113–39; Fish 1978; Michaels 1979).
13 Van Dijk, for example, says that the tasks involved in language, perception, complex planning, and action 'cannot possibly be accounted for at the level of linear processing of micro-information, but... hierarchical rules and categories and the formation of macro-structures are necessary' (1977: 159).

14 A likely reason for this failure to connect is that the hierarchical models and the study of genres come from different research traditions. Genre has been useful in discussions of literary art, written rhetoric, and public address, all of which are forms of monologue. The hierarchical models draw from work in interpersonal communication, which relies on dialogue. It seems reasonable to suppose that monologue and dialogue do not 'mean' in different ways and that a hierarchy of rules and interpretive contexts might be as applicable to monologue as to dialogue. The constituents of each model do not preclude such an assumption, being for the most part terms common to rhetorical analysis.

15 An important difference between Downey (1982) and my discussion here is that she does not distinguish between form and action.

16 In this type of hierarchy, one can deal either with instances or with types. Searle (1975) has proposed a classification of speech act types, but these types could not be further clustered into text types - that would mix the two kinds of hierarchies.

References


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