1.
One indication of the rate of growth of constructivist research in
education is the proliferation of its perspectives and positions. Apparently, it is
already found wanting to distinguish between different themes, accents, evaluations.
Instead, one speaks of contrasting ‘paradigms’. Thus, Steffe & Gale
distinguish in a reader entitled Constructivism in education six different
"core paradigms", viz "social constructivism, radical
constructivism, social constructionism, information-processing constructivism, cybernetic
systems, and sociocultural approaches to mediated action" (1995, p.xiii). All of
these so-called paradigms reject traditional epistemological claims about knowledge as an
objective representation of ‘reality’. Their arguments are, however, only rarely
directed against inherited traditional conceptions. Rather, it are the newly formulated
alternatives which serve as points of reference. Constructivist ‘paradigms’ are
most of all elaborated in debate with fellow-alternatives.
The most outspoken pioneer of a constructivist approach to teaching has
been Ernst von Glasersfeld, whose ‘radical constructivism’ still is at the
center of the debate. Elaborating on the works of Jean Piaget, von Glasersfeld has
particularly focussed on individual self-regulation and the building of conceptual
structures through reflection and abstraction. According to von Glasersfeld,
‘authentic’ learning depends on seeing a problem as ‘one’s own
problem’, as an obstacle that obstructs one’s progress toward a goal. The
farthest removed from this individualistic focus seems to be the sociocultural approach
that originated with Ljev Vygotskij in Russia. It stresses the socially and culturally
situated nature of mental activities, and defines learning as getting acquainted with
cultural practices, their particular exigencies, limits and possibilities. Actually, both
contrasting positions are able to present research outcomes underlying their particular
point of view, and for a long time each perspective remained apparently immune to the
criticism being raised by the other side. The impasse resembled what Kuhn has called the
‘incommensurability of paradigms’.
Contrary to what more detailed classifications seem to imply, it has
been the tension between an individualistic (subjective) and a sociocultural
(intersubjective) focus that has structured the field. The unsettled paradigmatic conflict
has enabled, on the one hand, the opportunistic use of theory within research, invoking,
for example, at point a of the argumentation radical constructivist elements and at point
b sociocultural arguments, without much thought about the reconcilability of the
underlying perspectives. On the other hand, however, it has recently also stimulated
deliberate attempts at integrating (parts of) these different positions. Thus, Cobb made
an influential case for coordinating sociocultural and cognitive constructivist
perspectives, proposing "that the adoption of one perspective or another should be
justified in terms of its potential to address issues whose resolution might contribute to
the improvement of students’ education" (1994, p.18). How helpful this device
might be to coordinate research interests, from a theoretical and epistemological point of
view it is not very challenging. In fact, it indicates once more that fundamental issues
have virtually disappeared from view in this discussion. Why is constructivism a new
epistemology? What is its position vis-à-vis the scientific and philosophical
tradition?
To point out the relevance and the consequences of a constructivist
theory of knowledge, one should first of all clarify its basic intuition. In our view, the
hard core of constructivism concerns the reconcilability of, on the one hand, plurality
of knowledge and, on the other, its reference to reality. If knowledge is no
representation of reality but construction, how does it have a hold in reality? How is, in
other words, the existence of plural realities to be accounted for? To be sure (and
against often raised objections in philosophical discussions), constructivism does not
entail a relativist, anti-realist position. Neither does it recur to the sceptic or
‘solipsistic’ doubt about whether there is any external world. In a way, the
multitude of empirical research based on a constructivist perspective should already be
convincing evidence for its realism. The objections do obtain, however, a certain
persuasiveness against the background of a long-standing philosophical and epistemological
tradition. In fact, it appears to be particularly difficult to make the case of
constructivism, because its arguments get almost always caught within an old
epistemological framework, which constructivism precisely tries to abandon.
2.
An author who has been for a lifetime engaged in elaborating a
constructivist theory of knowledge is John Dewey (1859-1952). As Toulmin argues, in his
introduction to Dewey’s The quest for certainty, Dewey’s work contains a
"radical dismantling of the epistemological tradition" displaying
"farsightedness, perception and originality of a kind that could hardly be recognized
[at the time it appeared]". Moreover, "Dewey’s critique was not intended to
be merely destructive. It offered also, in outline, a positive view about ‘the
relation of knowledge to action’ ...; and this view too has only been reinforced by
subsequent developments within the natural sciences themselves" (Toulmin, 1984,
p.ix-x; cf. e.g. Rorty, 1982). In our view, Dewey’s argumentation enables to take
both the subjective (individual) and intersubjective (sociocultural) dimensions of the
construction of knowledge into account within the same constructivist framework. In the
last paragraph, we want to show that this Deweyan approach also entails a critique of and
an alternatieve approach to the constructivist ‘paradigms’ to teaching, which
were mentioned before.
A leitmotiv throughout Dewey’s work is an attempt to reconsider
the relationship of organism and environment. Already in his famous article of 1896, The
Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology, Dewey criticized contemporary psychology for
treating organisms as detached from their environment. "It is the motor response of
attention which constitutes that, which finally becomes the stimulus to another act"
(1896, EW5, p.101-102).(1)Consequently, Dewey stressed the
continuous, intrinsic connection of organism and world on the level of action, and
introduced the notions of transaction and experience. Reflection is a secondary phenomenon
related to the level of action. It has to ensure the continuity of action. According to
Dewey, "reflection arises because of the appearance of incompatible factors within
the empirical situation... Then opposed responses are provoked which cannot be taken
simultaneously in overt action" (1916, MW10, p.326). Knowing is no process of
registration or representation, but one of intervention. Knowledge does not refer to an
external, independent and objective reality, but always participates in the action.
Deweys argument about the function of knowledge and reflection—to
ensure the continuity of action—brings the crucial role of time to the fore.
"Knowing consists of operations that give experienced objects a form in which the
relations, upon which the onward course of events depends, are securely experienced"
(1929, LW4, p.235). Knowledge is not concerned with experienced objects as such, but with
future experiences which might ensue from the present situation. To make inferences from
present situations creates at the same time uncercainty. "Inference brings ... truth
and falsity in the world" as Dewey underlined (1915, MW8, p.70). Thus, truth does not
refer to the correspondence between statement and reality at the same moment, but to the
correspondence of expected and realized meaning, to coherence in the course of time. This
‘temporalization’ of the concept of truth results from Deweys alternative
conceptualization of the relation of organism and environment. Transaction does not
consist of a subject who deals with an external universe. Every organism participates
entirely in his lifeworld. There is no reality without experience. And there is no reality
which is not affected by this experience. Every act (also an act of knowing) creates a new
reality.
To explain why human beings nevertheless live in a ‘common
world’, Dewey’s constructivism has neither to recur to an objective world nor
postulate an apriori equipment of subjects with appropriate structures of knowing. Social
interaction enables (and forces) everyone involved in it to pay attention to the
contribution made by the other participants. To be able to continue the social
interaction, one has to observe and reckon with the objects and inferences which others
construct. It is in this way that something is "literally made in common in at least
two different centres of behavior" (1925, LW1, p.141). To understand, Dewey adds,
"is to anticipate together, it is to make a cross-reference which, when acted upon
brings about a partaking in a common, inclusive undertaking. (...) To fail to understand
it to fail to come into agreement in action" (1925, LW1, p.141).
Given this account of human interaction, it is not too difficult to see
that the existence of subjective realities poses no real threat to the possibility of
mutual understanding. Understanding one another means "that objects, including
sounds, have the same value for both with respect to carrying on a common pursuit"
(1916, MW9, p.19). Dewey not only argues that in order to accomplish "agreement in
action" it is necessary to "come to likeness of attitude, or to agreement as to
proper diversity of attitude" (1911, MW6, p.17). He also holds that it is precisely
as a result of the process in which agreement in action is aimed at, that individual
realities are transformed in such a way that objects get the same value for both with
respect to carrying on a common pursuit. It is important to note, that although agreement
in action requires a sufficient coordination of individual perspectives, it does in no way
require that these perspectives become identical. People remain to 'live' in their own
reality, although this reality has now been sufficiently transformed to make agreement in
action possible.
3.
Dewey’s work is, on the one hand, directed against traditional
epistemological positions, of idealist and realist origins alike. Dewey focusses on a
critique of their common foundations, viz the split between object and subject,
reality and knowledge, world and consciousness. His work lays, on the other hand, the
foundations of a constructivist epistemological program, which starts from the relation of
knowledge to action. These foundations have proven to be secure, as recent neopragmatic
research also testifies. Moreover, they enable an evaluation of the arguments brought to
the fore in discussions between radical constructivist and socio-cultural approaches to
teaching. Dewey’s transactional theory of knowledge makes clear that the discussions
in the educational realm continue to live on the split of reality and knowledge. To
a large extent, constructivist ‘paradigms’ to teaching are still tied to a
traditional, dualistic framework.
Dewey’s work leads us, first, to a constructivist critique of
‘radical constructivism’. In our view, radical constructivist theories of
knowledge fall short of explaining the existence of plural worlds. In discussing the
relation of knowledge and reality, it does not suffice—as is often done—to adopt
an attitude of naïveté and reiterate once more that the correspondence between reality
and knowledge cannot be proved. Neither does it suffice to acknowledge in general terms
the existence of an external world, but take an agnostic position regarding the question
what this world further looks like.(2) Even if concepts such
as ‘viability’ or ‘compatibility’ are put to use, it should be pointed
out in what respect there is no correspondence, in what respect there are no external
‘objects’ out there. This endeavor has to be based on a detailed analysis of the
process of knowing itself. For this project of a ‘naturalized epistemology’
(Quine), Dewey’s transactionalism certainly laid the foundations. The detailed
account of the relation of knowledge to action enables an explanation of the existence of
plural worlds, not of plural perspectives on the world.
In this respect, and this is our second Deweyan remark, the work of
Vygotskij is not of much help. It does not offer an alternative, but rather a complement
to idealistic and radical constructivist accounts of knowledge, embedded in the same
dualistic tradition. Vygotskij’s work took shape at a time the social deficit of
Cartesian and Kantian epistemology—which focussed on self-analysis of an individual
consciousness—became the target of much critique. The analyses of Karl Marx and
Sigmund Freud gave rise to several attempts to incorporate the social dimension in
epistemological theories. Vygotskij’s cultural-historical theory of psychological
development focusses on the role of the intersubjective dimension in processes of
knowledge acquisition. According to Vygotskij, knowledge acquisition is equal to
internalization of the environment.(3) Social constructivist
approaches of this kind have, for sure, difficulty to incorporate individual differences
and to account for processes of deviance. Moreover, the environment remains an objective
infrastructure, external and independent of the processes of interiorization. What, one
can also ask, makes up for the emergence and development of social practices, which
individuals have to interiorize?
Against this unsatisfactory background, it should come as no surprise
that ‘balanced’ programs receive much attention, which aiming to coordinate
radical constructivist and sociocultural approaches. This ‘theoretical
pragmatism’ is, however, mainly based on the defects of the respective paradigms, not
on their accomplishments. It is an attempt to weigh out the negative aspects. And it is
only within a dualistic framework, contrasting knowledge and reality, subject and object,
that these negative aspects seemingly neutralize each other, and that a coordination of
cognitive constructivist and sociocultural approaches seems to catch it all. It has to be
repeated once more that so-called constructivist approaches to teaching need to take a
more vigorous approach to theoretical problems.
One starting point could be a renewed analysis of the problems of an
educational ‘technology’. In families and schools, parents and teachers daily
try to influence and change their children or pupils. Education, however, lacks a
technical culture, a set of laws or rules on which educators could base their efforts to
produce desired changes in their pupils. Education is, in other words, confronted with a
technological deficit. This deficit has, nevertheless, almost never been analyzed
theoretically. Educational theory has opted against analyzing this problem. It favored a
position which did not allow technological relations between human beings. Backed up by
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, ‘not being able to’ got translated into a
‘not willing to’. Of course, this strategy did not resolve the empirical problem
of teachers and parents. But how can it be brought to the fore? At this point, a
constructivist theory might prove its fruitfulness, especially because reality and
variety, subjectivity and intersubjectivity are obvious factors in the game.(4)
A genuine constructivist treatment should be able to elaborate concepts which allow an
analysis along these lines. It can prove that nothing is as practical as a good
constructivist theory.
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