THE TWO SOULS AND THE DIVIDED WILL

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I. THE MANICHÉES AND THE TWO SOULS

“Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust.”

Goethe, Faust I.

Since they say that every living being has two souls, one of the race of light, the other of the race of darkness, is it the case that the good soul leaves at death, while the bad soul remains?1

Thus Augustine in his Contra Faustum. This is not the only reference to this strange doctrine in his writings. On various other occasions, Augustine polemizes against the Manichaean belief in the two souls and lampoons its absurd implications.2 In the Confessions, for instance, he says:

Let them no more say, therefore, that since they perceive two wills to be contrary one to another in one man, that there be two contrary souls, made of two contrary substances, one good, the other bad, contending with one another.3

According to this text, the serious problem which the Manichaean doctrine of the two souls attempts to solve is that of two opposing wills in man—a problem which, as is well known, remained a serious preoccupation of Augustine’s throughout his adult life.

But Augustine did not satisfy himself with a few references to this Manichaean doctrine. He also devotes an entire treatise to its refutation, de duabus animabus, written in or around 391.4 There is no such thing as an evil soul, Augustine contends there, since all souls come from God, and Manichaean doctrine thus directly goes against common sense. It is because of our will, and not the nature of our soul, that we sin.

It is beyond dispute that Augustine knew Manichaean doctrine well: he had been an auditor in the sect for about ten years. Yet, puzzlingly, he is our only direct source for the existence of such a doctrine: Manichaean documents are themselves silent on the idea of the two souls. Hence various scholars from Ferdinand Christian Baur to Henri-Charles Puech have often reiterated that Augustine was mistaken when speaking of two souls. The Manichees, they maintain, spoke only of two “natures” but, by implication, only one (good) soul. But Isaac de Beauobvre, the father of modern Manichaean studies, asserted in the seventeenth century, followed by Mosheim and Alfaric in the eighteenth, that the Manichees believed in two souls.5 Most unfortunately, their perspective seems to have been ignored in more recent scholarship. Puech states: “En réalité, pour les manicheens, il n’y a pas deux âmes, il y a une seule âme qui ne peut être que bonne en soi et par nature....”6 For Puech, then, Manichaean cosmological dualism is reflected in anthropology through the radical duality of the soul, which belongs to the realm of good, light, and Spirit, and of the body, which belongs to that of evil, darkness, and matter. Twelve years ago, the same view was reiterated by R. Ferwerda, in what seems to be the last treatment of the topic.7

For Puech, and to some extent for Ferwerda in his footsteps, Augustine mixed up the idea of the two souls, which does in fact exist elsewhere in ancient thought, with similar but not identical arguments in the Manichaean doctrine about the two natures. Both cite various traditions, mainly from Greek philosophical texts, which allude to the same doctrine. Following Puech, Ferwerda cites as the first of these traditions a passage from Xenophon, according to which

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1 “Deinde cum duas animas esse in uno animatis corpore adfirmant, unus bonum de gente lucis, alteram malam de gente tenebrarum, numquid, cum occiditur animal, bona anima fugit et mala remanet?” c. Faustum VI.6 (Zycha 297-98).

2 See for instance de vera religione IX.16; de haeresibus 46; opus imperfectum, c. Lul. III.172.

3 “iam ergo non dicant, cum duas voluntates in homine uno adversari sub sen- tuent, duas contrarias mentes, de duas contrarias substantiae, et de duobus contrariis principiis contendere, unus bonum, alteram malam,” Conf. VII.10,22.

4 See J. Jolivet and M. Jourjon’s introduction to the text in Six traités anti-manichéens (Bibliothèque d’Augustinienne 17; Paris: Desclee de Brouwer 1961), 41; also the extended analysis in J. Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge: The University Press 1992), 90-98.


7 “Two Souls: Origen’s and Augustine’s Attitude toward the Two Souls Doctrine. Its Place in Greek and Christian Philosophy,” Vigiles Christianae 37 (1983) 360-78. I wish to thank Dr. Ferwerda for having first called my attention to this topic in 1982.
the Persian sage Arapas argues, in conversation with Cyrus, that man is endowed with two souls:

...but it is obvious that there are two souls, and when the good one prevails, what is right is done; but when the bad one gains the ascendancy, what is wrong is attempted.8

This doctrine, Iranian in origin, would then have infiltrated Greek philosophy, as this reappears not only in Plato's Laws,9 but also in such late representatives of the Platonic tradition as the fragments of Numenius or the Chaldean Oracles.10 As is well known, and as was most recently emphasized by Shaul Shaked, the concept of multiple souls is indeed "typical of the Zoroastrian mode of thinking."11 Shaked's study, which points out the existence of different schools of thought on this issue in Sasanian Iran, does not refer to a duality of the human soul in Sasanian theology.12 Shaked himself, however, has elsewhere analyzed some notions, such as aee or akv (or okv, okh), which appear in particular at the beginning of Denkard VI, and which point to a division of the human soul into two camps, ruled by two impulses, one toward the good, the other, evil.13 Moreover, as Carsten Colpe has suggested, Zoroastrian Magians in the Hellenistic world possibly conceived the soul as reflecting cosmic dualism.14

Ferwerda seeks to offer an interpretation of what he considers (with Puech) Augustine's odd mistake. According to him, Augustine mistook for Manichaean doctrine a teaching widespread not among them, but among the Gnostics. Ferwerda cites in support Plotinus, who accused the Gnostics of being "senseless" for introducing a sec-

8 "alla delon hoti duo eston psukhai, kata hotan he agathè kratei, ta ku to prostatetai, hotan de ponera, ta aixara epixeireitai," Xenophon, Cyropaedia VI.1.41 (II.140-143 LCl). This text is in fact quoted already in Baur, Religionssystem, 175.2
9 Laws X, 896 dc-e: there are at least two souls, one doing good, and the other its opposite.
10 Numenius, frag. 44 (93 Des Places), speaks of two souls, one rational (logikèn), the other irrational (alogon).
11 For the latest treatment of Zoroastrian and, in particular, Sasanian anthropology, see S. Shaked, Dualism in Transformation: Varieties of Religion in Sasanian Iran (Jordan Lectures, 1991; London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1994) 58. Shaked points out that this Zoroastrian concept was borrowed by Mani (p. 57). See also Appendices B and C.
12 See esp. ibid., 56-59.
13 S. Shaked, "Some Terms Relating to Man," Mémoire de Jean de Menasse. I thank Professor Shaked for discussing this question with me.
15 Plotinus, Enneads II.9.5.16; cf. IV.3.27.1-6.
16 Stromaticus II.20.113.3.
17 E.g., de Principiis III.4.1.
18 Cf. Enneads II.20.113.3.
19 Quasten in Ex. 1.23 (32-34 LCl). Here again, the remarkable intuitions of de Beausobre should be noted. More clearly than many scholars after him, he was able to perceive the fundamental importance of Jewish pseudographical literature for understanding the background of Mani's thought (such as the Book of Giants). On this see J.C. Reeves, Jewish Lore in Manichaean Cosmology: Studies in the Book of Giants Traditions (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College 1992).
20 "Va-yasem le shet ha-sefto leshahilekh bahem, ruach ha-emet ve-ra'ah ha-avod," Community Rule III.18ff.
This well-known text remains, however, rather mysterious, as it is not quite clear whether every man shares in both spirits, although this is certainly a possibility. Indeed, the two spirits, which are engaged in constant struggle, seem to live within every man, and not to rule each upon a separate category of man. An Iranian influence upon such an anthropology is more than plausible. In the careful words of Shaked, who made a case for such influence, mainly on structural grounds, “It may be imagined that contacts between Jews and Iranians helped in formulating a Jewish theology which, though continuing traditional Jewish motifs, came to resemble fairly closely the Iranian view of the world.”

As is well known, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs are in their present form early Christian texts which reflect the dualism found in texts from Qumran. The Testament of Judah reads:

So understand, my children, that two spirits await an opportunity with humanity: the spirit of truth and the spirit of error. In between is the conscience of the mind which inclines as it will. The things of truth and the things of error are written in the affections of man, each one of whom the Lord knows.

In the Testament of Asher we read:

God has granted two ways to the sons of men, two mind-sets, two lives of action, two models, and two goals....The two ways are good and evil; concerning them are two dispositions within our breasts that choose between them.

Although some terminological uncertainty remains, the juxtaposition of these two texts shows clearly that the two spirits are located in everybody. In the words of Albrecht Diéle, “Man finds himself placed between two spirits, a good and an evil one. These are spoken of either as faculties and inhabitants of the human soul or as cosmic powers. They are called instinct, impulse, spirit, intention, angel and the like....The human intellect chooses—namely the object of action—and turns itself—namely to one of the two angels or spirits.”

A similar duality of the soul is reflected in the rabbinic idea of the two instincts, good and evil, in man’s soul (yetzer ha-ra and yetzer ha-tov). It also reappears in various early Christian texts, which all seem to show in some way or other a relationship to the Jewish and Jewish-Christian conceptions. The most representative of these texts should be at least briefly reviewed here.

The Shepherd of Hermas offers the clearest parallel in Apostolic literature to the two spirits from Qumran: “For if you are courageous the Holy Spirit which dwells in you will be pure, not obscured by another evil spirit....” The presence of both spirits in the same person is made quite specific further: “If therefore both spirits dwell in the same place, it is unprofitable and evil for that man in whom they dwell.” To be sure, this is not an ideal, or even a necessary, state of affairs:

For when these spirits dwell in one vessel, where also the Holy Spirit dwells, there is no room in that vessel, but it is overcrowded. Therefore, the delicate spirit which is unaccustomed to dwell with an evil spirit, or with hardness, departs from such a man and seeks to dwell with gentleness and quietness.

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22 “Qumran and Iran: Further Considerations,” Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972) 432-446.


26 See e.g. b. Yoma 69b, b. Baba Bathra 16a, Gen Rabba 9.9; further discussion in E.E. Urbach, The Sages (Jerusalem: Magnes 1967) 415-27 (Hebrew).

27 See O.J.F. Seitz, “Antecedents and Signification of the Term ‘Hud-Net preferos,” Journal of Biblical Literature 66 (1947) 211-19. Seitz states that “it becomes highly probable that the real antecedent of the notion expressed by the Greek term ‘Hud-Net preferos, which James, I and II Clement, and Hermas appear to have derived from a single source, is to be found in the rabbinic conception of a double heart or two hearts, which is generally related to the idea of the ‘tau ‘evosgum.” (214). This article was written, of course, before the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls.

28 For a series of Jewish and early Christian texts on the two spirits in man, see also Diéle, Theory of Will, 100 n. 42.

29 hetro pneumanos pneumanos. Mandates 5.2. On the parallels with Qumran, see e.g. P. Luis-Font, “Sources de la doctrine d’Hermas sur les deux esprits,” Revue d’Archéologie et de Mythologie 93 (1963) 83-89, who states that this doctrine comes from Essenic theology. Referring to the (misleading) patterns of thought developed by Jean Danielou, he concludes on the “outillage mental surtout sémithique” of early Christianity (96).

30 See further J. Paramelle, P. Aznés, “Hermas,” Dictionnaire de Spiritualité 7 (1969) 315-334, esp. 322, who point out the parallels with the Didache and present the angel of iniquity as a supporter or emanation of the Devil.

31 amphiatera om ta pneumanata eg to auto katoikous, amphiatera om ta pneumanata eg to auto katoikous, en hhi katoikous. Mandates 5.4.

32 Ibid., 6.5-6.
The clearest testimony from Hermas, however, relates specifically that two angels dwell within man. (Note the fluidity of the terminology: *aggeloi* seem identical to *pneumata*). “Hear now, he said, concerning the faith. There are two angels within man, one of righteousness and one of wickedness.”

The Epistle of Barnabas has often been referred to in the same context. This last text, however, presents a rather different kind of dualism, identical to that of the Didache: the two ways of teaching and power (of Light and of Darkness), as well as their angelic agents, remain distinct and separate.

And there is a great difference between the two ways. For over the one are set light-bringing angels of God (*photagogoi aggeloi tou theou*), but over the other, angels of Satan (*aggeloi tou satanai*).

A different conception, one which posits a hierarchy of two souls, one above the other, rather than two opposing souls, is presented in the first half of the second century by Tatian, the encratite Apologist “from the land of the Assyrians.” As we shall see, Tatian’s Eastern origin is of some significance, since similar conceptions appear later, also of Eastern provenance. As has often been pointed out, moreover, Tatian’s thought seems to reflect early or “archaic” Jewish-Christian conceptions. On the soul, Tatian says:

> We have knowledge of two different kinds of spirits, one of which is called the soul, but the other is greater than the soul: it is the image and likeness of God. The first men were endowed with both, so that they might be part of the material world, and at the same time above it. This is how things are.

A view closer to the one which we have sought to trace until now, and which speaks about two opposing powers in the soul, is preserved by Origen in his *Homilies on Luke*:

> Everyone is assisted by two angels, one of justice and one of iniquity. If good thoughts dwell in our heart, and if justice brings forth many fruits in us, there is no doubt that it is the angel of the Lord which speaks to us. But if an evil thought agitates our heart, then it is the angel of the devil which speaks.

It should not come as a surprise that this view is quite similar to that proposed by Hermas. Indeed, in the *Peri Archon*, Origen expresses his gratitude to Hermas (PA III.2.4). The opposition of the two angels within man reflects the stakes of the spiritual fight between darkness and light. Therefore, discerning between the two spirits is an important task, as Origen emphasized in the *Peri Archon*.  

This idea, which reappears in Cassian, was picked up in turn by Gregory of Nyssa:

> The Divine providence...has placed next to each of us, in order to help him in life, an angel, incorporeal in nature, while the “corruptor of our race,” seeking to hurt man, used the same procedure through means of an evil and evil-doing demon.

As mentioned above, the two souls theory is propounded also by various dualist and gnostic texts. From our scarce evidence it seems that the two souls mentioned by the Gnostics are not two opposite souls, one good and one evil. Rather, they seem to be hierarchically ordered, one higher than the other, one “more divine and heavenly and the other inferior.” As we have seen, such a conception, far from being exclusive to the Gnostics, seems to have been fairly widespread, since we find it also expressed by various early Christian authors such as Tatian. It should be noted that this conception is different from the one which posits two opposing spirits, or else two forces, instincts, or angels fighting within the soul.

We must acknowledge that in our cursory review of the evidence, we have encountered no clear reference to *two souls* in ancient Jewish or Christian texts. Philo mentions two *dunamis* in the soul, Tatian speaks of two *pneumata*, as does the *Testament of Judah* and *Hermas*. All these texts reflect a basic concept which we find most clearly expressed in the *Manual of Discipline*. Moreover, authors such as Bar-
nabas, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa, who mention two angels fighting within the human soul, seem to adhere to the same pattern of thought.\textsuperscript{40}

Although Augustine remains rather vague when he objects to the Manichean doctrine of the two souls, he seems clearly to refer to an anthropology in which two opposing forces are contesting within man, and not to a hierarchy of two souls. He speaks, for example, of “duas animas, vel duas mentes, unam bonam, alteram malam.” Elsewhere he writes: “Duas simul animas in uno homine esse delirant, unam malam, alteram bonam, de suis principiis emanantes.”\textsuperscript{41} Titus of Bostra expresses the same view in his adversus Manichaeos: the Manichees, he states, believe that two opposite natures (duo phasaeis enantias) dwell within man, one good, one evil.\textsuperscript{42} No other sources, however, speak of two opposite souls within man. Shaharastani’s testimony indeed refers to the soul of the kingdom of light, which is “good, noble, wise, acting the good and knowledgeable,” while the soul of darkness is “evil, low, stupid, evildoing and ignorant,” but these souls are cosmic, not human.\textsuperscript{43} The evidence produced until now does not allow us to show clearly the evidence of the two souls doctrine in Manichaeism. The circumstantial evidence, however, does point to a long tradition, from Qumran on, of a duality of opposing forces within man. We have seen, moreover, the existence of another idea, represented by Tatian in the East, of a hierarchy of souls.

What scholars seem not to have noticed, however, is another Manichean concept of the duality of the soul, one that is well attested in many sources, the Cologne Mani Codex in particular. I refer to Mani’s belief that he had a heavenly double, his Twin (tauma). A divine alter-ego of sorts, this heavenly twin, who as Mani’s guardian angel brought him the Revelation, also functioned as the Para-

clete, the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{44} Now it has been pointed out long ago, in particular by Erik Peterson, that this concept of the Twin seems close to that of Tatian, for whom the soul forms a couple, or suzugia, with the Spirit, which leads her to heaven. According to Gilles Quispel, Mani’s Heavenly Twin marks a transformation of the “Jewish-Christian concepts of the Angel of the Spirit” which appears, for example, in the Shepherd of Hermas and in the Ascension of Isaiah.\textsuperscript{45} In a sense, then, the Twin can be considered as identical to the heavenly, superior soul. The same conception, already known in Iran,\textsuperscript{46} clearly reflects shamanistic patterns of thought, according to which the soul, in certain conditions, can go out of the individual. It reappears in some Gnostic texts, such as the Pistis Sophia: “This man is I and I am this man.”\textsuperscript{47} Logion 108 of the Gospel of Thomas should probably also be understood in the same light:

Jesus said: “He who will drink from my mouth will become like Me. I myself shall become he, and the things that are hidden will be revealed to him.”\textsuperscript{48}

The concept of the suzugia expressed here is rather different from that well known from the pseudo-Clementine literature, where the members of the pairs appear in chronological succession, a false prophet (for example) preceding a true one. “God has appointed for this world certain pairs; and he who comes first of the pairs is of evil; he who comes second, of good.”\textsuperscript{49} We must conclude that two different


\textsuperscript{41} De haeredibus 46; opus imperf. c. Iul. III.172 (this last text quoted by Baur, Religions-system, 165).

\textsuperscript{42} ad loc. II.6 (PG 18, 1144B). On Titus’s anti-Manichean polemics, see G. Stroumsa, Saisir et Sebut (Paris: le Cerf 1992) 329-40.

\textsuperscript{43} This is developed further, in particular, by G. Quispel, “Genius and Spirit,” in M. Krause, ed., Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in Honor of P. L. T. Labb (NHS 6; Leiden: Brill 1975) 155-69, esp. 166.


\textsuperscript{45} Pistis Sophia II.96 (231 Schmidt, McDermott. NHS 9; Leiden: Brill 1978).

\textsuperscript{46} See discussion in H.-C. Puech, En que de la gnaise II (Paris: Gallimard 1978) 210 ff.

conceptions of the duality of the soul coexisted in Manichaeism from its earliest stages, the one horizontal, as it were (a good versus and evil soul), and the other vertical (the soul and its heavenly counterpart). Even if the nomenclature did not always speak about “souls,” it would seem that Augustine’s references to “two souls” most probably reflect a known reality.

This is not all, however. There seems to have been another conflation of terms in antiquity, this time between a Jewish and a pagan conception. As Robert Schilling has shown, osmosis occurred at some point between the Greek idea of daimon and the Jewish concept of angel. Schilling referred in particular to the dualist theory of a daimon agathos and a daimon kakos (considered as well in Greek literature as a sort of guardian angel): this idea would have conflated with the Jewish theory of a guardian angel, a conflation already clearly visible in Philo and reflected later in the doctrines of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa on the two angels assisting every man.

To conclude: the belief in the two souls, which in all probability originates in Iran, reappears in various Jewish garbs, and also in pagan contexts as well as in Platonic teaching. From this multiple background, two different ideas of the two souls—“horizontal” and “vertical”—appear in early Christian literature, including Jewish Christian and Gnostic texts. This forms the proximate channel through which these ideas reached Manichaeism, and were reinterpreted and radicalized in light of Manichaean dualist cosmology. Augustine, therefore, knew what he was speaking about when he refuted the Manichees on their two-soul anthropology. But though he rejected their solution as unphilosophical, Augustine continued to be preoccupied by the problem of the divided will. Indeed, recognition of the will’s conflict was not Paul’s unique privilege. “Video meliora proboque,” testified Ovid, “deteriora sequor” (Metamorphoses VII.21). But no one analyzed the divided will so well as did Augustine. We should now consider how he dealt with the matter.

Guy G. Stroumsa

II. AUGUSTINE AND THE DIVIDED WILL

“Domine, da mihi castitatem...sed noli modo.”
Augustine, Confessiones 8.7,17

Moral confusion and intellectual precocity had combined to lead Augustine “into the snares of the Manichees” during his first year of study at Carthage (Conf. 3.6,10). Decades later, reviewing this period in Book 3 of his Confessions, Augustine claims not to have subscribed particularly to the Manichaean myths (“manducabam, non avide quidem”), and he chides them for their reading of Scripture (“Does God have fingernails and hair?”) and their speculative preoccupations (“Where does evil come from?”). On the basis of his mocking review in Book 3, we would have no reason to suppose that Augustine would remain an involved and publicly identified devotee of the sect for nine years.

Their answers came to seem, to him, impious and ignorant; their questions never left him. He and they both looked to Paul for the premier statement of spiritual conflict in the seat of the self: “For I do not do the good I want, but the evil that I do not want is what I do” (Romans 7:19). Augustine repeatedly dismissed the Manichaean solution to the problem of evil, namely, that two souls, one good, one wicked, battled within the individual, who was identified uniquely with the good soul. Yet his own solution, as we shall see, relied equally on an idea of spiritual doubleness: not two souls, but a divided soul, split along a fault line running right through its will and, hence, its loves. And again like his dualist opponents, he sees the source of this spiritual two-ness lying beyond the individual: for the Manichees, in the structure of the cosmos; for Augustine, in the history of the species.

Augustine’s emphasis on the historical dimension of the split soul, an idea that he begins to develop in the mid-390s, echoes in turn a new way of reading Scripture that he comes to subsequently. This, too, was emphatically historical—and innovative for his day, when intellectual taste ran to allegory or typology. The traditional option to

35 See the elegant reconstruction of the Paul whom the Manichee Augustine would have known in C.P. Bammel, “Pauline Exegetics, Manicheism, and Philosophy in the Early Augustine,” Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity, ed. Lionel R. Wickham and C.P. Bammel (Leiden 1993) 1-25.
allegory was interpretation *kata sarka* or *seconndum carnem*, the dismally literal reading of the Bible that Christians polemically and regularly associated with Jews. Manichees, too, read the Old Testament literally—hence God’s fingernails and hair—and for this reason Augustine routinely associated their hermeneutics with “Jewish error”.

Yet he himself pioneered a new reading both of Genesis and of Paul that idiosyncratically blended typology with an insistently historical hermeneutic, creating a new option: *interpretatio ad litteram*.

Historical time thus figures prominently in Augustine’s formulation, against the Manichees, of the psychic sources of evil and of the correct way to interpret Scripture. His growing appreciation of the importance of the historical dimension to human reality eventually affected his assessment both of the soul and even, finally, of the body. The point at which these issues and answers came together for him for the first time was in the course of a public debate with a former colleague on the origin and nature of evil. We have the transcript of their encounter in the *contra Fortunatum* (28 and 29 August 392).

Only a separate and independent malevolent force, Fortunatus insisted, sufficiently protected God from implication in the problem of evil. Consequently, moral evil was best understood as a battle between two contrary natures within man, one from God, one opposed. Augustine responded that only the uncoerced movement of a single will sufficiently accounted for sin, since if sin were not voluntary, God would not be just in punishing sinners. Augustine argued deductively, from God’s nature to the relation of will to merit; Fortunatus, through a near-continuous appeal to Scripture: John, Matthew, and especially the letters of Paul.

Not until the second day of the debate, buffeted by a sudden fusillade of Matthean and Pauline texts, did Augustine change his tack. He again invoked human will, but this time he complicated the concept by tying the will’s operation into two earlier moments: Adam’s sin, and the preceding sins of the individual agent. Adam’s sin affected all subsequent humanity, and the individual’s sin, through the creation of habit, affects all subsequent action.

I say that there was the free exercise of the will in that man who was first formed...But after he freely sinned, who descend from his stock were plunged into necessity....For today in our actions, before we are implicated by any habit, we have free choice...But when by that liberty we have done something [evil]...and the pleasure of that deed has taken hold on the mind, the mind by its own habit is so implicated that it cannot afterwards conquer what it has fashioned for itself. (c. Fort. 22) Augustine thus linked moral choice to Adam’s fall and to the individual’s psychological and moral development: these two historical events—one distant, one proximate—necessarily impinged. How so?

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53 E.g.: “God gave man’s rational soul free will. For merit is possible only if we do good voluntarily, not necessarily,” c. Fort. 15, to which Fortunatus responds by quoting Eph. 2:1-18, Rom. 11:1 and Rom. 1:1-4 (c. Fort. 16 and 17).

54 Phil. in c. Fort. 3; Eph., in 17. Fortunatus inadvertently brought the debate to a close when he concluded his citations with 1 Cor 15:50: “caro et sanguis regnum dei non possidebat, neque corruptio incorporetam possidetur.” At this point the crowd vociferously intervened, and then broke into various small discussions (19: I think that they objected strongly to Fortunatus’ adducing Pauline support against the possibility of both Incarnation and fleshly resurrection). When they reconvened the following day and took up the question why man sins, Fortunatus effortlessly added more scriptural (and esp. Pauline) support for his position: Mt 15:13 and 3:10; Rom 8:7; Gal 5:17; Rom 7:23-25; Gal 5:14 (c. Fort. 21).

55 Liberal voluntatis arbitrium in illo homine fuisset dico, qui primus formatus est...Postquam autem ipse libera voluntate pecuvavit, nos in necessitatem praepitati sumus, qui ab eis stripe descendimus...Hodie namque in nostris actionibus antequam consuetudine aliqua implicemur, liberalus habemus arbitrium faciendi aliquid, vel non faciendi...Cum autem ista libertate fecerimus aliquid, et facta ipsius tenuerit animam perniciosos dulcendo et voluptas, eadem ipsa sua consequeretur sic implicatur, ut postea vincere non possit, quod sit ipsa peccando fabricata est.

Flesh is now mortal in consequence of Adam's sin: mortality is inherited together with flesh itself. The soul's liaison with this sort of flesh—labile, distracted—inclines it to habitual actions formed in the soul: *habemus necessitatem consuetudinis nostrae*, habits which each individual freely acquires for himself when and by sinning. This compulsive emotional memory, facilitated by the soul's bond with mortal flesh, thus impinges on free choice, whose difficulties attest not to two contrary natures, but to a single conflicted will.

Note two points here. The first is that Augustine has set up a double historical context for moral difficulty: the sin of Adam, which stands in causal relationship to current sinning; and the person's own past. Secondly—and for my purposes, more importantly—through his attention to the individual's emotional past, Augustine came to shift the spiritual arena of faulty decision-making. Choice is less a function of what man knows (his earlier formulation in the late 380s) than of how man feels: habit—feelings with a past—exerts a gravitational pull on moral choice. In essence, both because of his species-history and because of his personal history, man now functions, morally, with diminished volitional capacity.

In the writings on Paul in the mid-390s that follow from this debate, Augustine worked out a four-fold periodization of history and of individual spiritual development that frames and shapes his vision of man's will. The four stages are *ante legem*, *sub lege*, *sub gratia*, and *in pace*. They structure universal time from Adam to the Parousia and individual time from unselfconscious sinning to eschatological 

resurrection. For both the individual life and the public history it encompasses, this model places at dead center the crucial moment of conversion, the movement between Stage 2 and Stage 3. How does one move from under the Law to under grace—the moment Augustine understands Paul to describe in chapter 7 of Romans?

The more seriously Augustine attends to the emotional dissonance, the tale of two wills, that he hears in Romans 7, the less place for moral autonomy he is prepared to grant in explaining the transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3. In the Romans commentaries of 394/5, man has only enough moral freedom to appeal to Christ for aid as he struggles *sub lege*. Within eighteen months, even this tiny island of autonomy is gone. Making his case exegetically, again through Romans, in the *ad Simplificianum*, and autobiographically, through the story of his own past in the *Confessions*, Augustine comes to insist that God chooses whom he will aid without consideration of any input, positive or negative, from the individual. God chooses justly, but mysteriously; his reasons are *occultissima*.

Interestingly, it is exactly through that most deranged part of the soul, the emotions, that God works his choice. Recall for the moment what we have seen of Augustine's interpretation of feeling. Emotions were the site for the onset of "habit", and the means through which the soul hewed too close to the body's appetites. In Augustine's new formulation, they become the means for divine renewal and healing. How so? Because God works through man's feelings. He reorients the individual's loves by causing him to take delight in what is right.
Who can believe unless he is reached by some calling, by some testimony borne to the truth?...Who can welcome in his mind something which does not give him delight? Who has it in his power to ensure that something that delights him will occur? If those things which delight us serve to turn us to God, this is due not to us but to him.

*ad Simplicianum* 1.2.21.67

For Augustine, it is this compulsive quality of emotional life—whether negatively through carnal habit, or positively through delight in the good—that gives the true measure of the will’s freedom. No exterior evil force, representing an evil cosmic power, acts upon the will: in this sense, Augustine stands firmly against dualistic Manichaean moral determinism. But the will acts upon itself, through its own disordered loves. Thus the single Augustinian soul, fractured through the sin of Adam, functions much as do the two Manichaean souls to explain the difficulty and struggle of man’s moral existence. But whereas the two Manichaean souls correspond to a cosmic struggle and structure, the single Augustinian soul does not. Compulsive, labile, conflicted, this soul’s divisions are historical and psychological, not cosmic, and therefore uniquely human.

The quality of human affection, the way that the soul adheres to the body, also affects Augustine’s assessment of human experience both *sub gratia* (Stage 3) and *in pace* (Stage 4). Even once God has aided man to move from Stage 2 to Stage 3, *sub lege* to *sub gratia*, says Augustine, the flesh still remains flesh; it continues to troublingly solicit man with the the anxieties and cares of this life, so that even those *sub gratia* “groan inwardly while we await adoption, the redemption of our bodies,” (Romans 8:23). The greatest saints are still the children of Adam. Thus eventually, against the Pelagians, Augustine came to insist that even the apostles had “groaned because of the concupiscence of the flesh,” even Peter and Paul had looked on death with dread and fear.68 Full peace is not possible as long as man lives in “this body of death” (Rom 7:24), the flesh as now constituted.

67 “quis potest credere, nisi aliquia vocazione, hoc est aliquia rerum testificatione tangatur? Quis habet in potestate tali viso attingi mentem suam, quo eius voluntas moveatur ad idem? Quis autem animo amplificant aliqul quod eum non delectat? aut quis habet in potestate ut vel occurrat quod eum delectare possit, vel delectet cum occurrerit? Cum ergo nos eas delectant quisus proficiamus ad Deum, inspiratur hoc et praebetur gratia Dei...”

68 c. 2 *epf. Pelagiorum* 1.11.24, apostolic concupiscence; in *Ioannis evangelium* 123.5, Paul and Peter’s fear of death. Cf. his assertion, when still in Italy, that when the soul has turned from the sensible world to God it will long to be released from the body “and even desire death,” *de moribus ecclesiae* 1.22.40.

But the soul’s appetite for the body also provided a key idea for Augustine’s historical interpretation of Scripture, and for his depiction of eschatological life *in pace*. Reading *Genesis ad litteram* in the decade that followed his intensive work on Paul, Augustine came to insist that God had created Adam (and Eve) both soul and fleshly body together.69 Such an interpretation argued that the begetting of children had been part of God’s plan for humanity from the beginning, and that nothing intrinsically sinful clouded human sexual intercourse.70 But all this changed with the Fall. Whereas prior to sin, sexual intercourse might have been effected as an act of will, after, sin sundered the coordination between soul and body. Thereafter, procreation depended on an act of lust—compulsive and, since beyond control, shameful—to be achieved.71 And whereas prior to the Fall the soul and body, created together, should have remained together, after the Fall the soul was to be wrenched, traumatized and unwilling, from the body at death.72

Death traumatizes because the soul loves the body, and was created to love the body. And this love is what triumphs at the resurrection of the flesh. Again we see the psychological emphasis of Augustine’s understanding, and his singular focus on the human, to the exclusion of the cosmic, in his construction of the problem of evil and its resolution.73 From the 390s on, he had insisted that flesh, and not just bodies, would be raised on the last day. This flesh would be morally reconstituted, no longer subject to death or carnal appetite: it would be, in this sense, “spiritual,” not “carnal.”74 But by the time he wrote his great Genesis commentary, Augustine had worked out yet...
another reason why flesh itself must rise: God made the soul to love the body, so that the soul could not find peace unless and until the two were again together. Not soul, but soul and body, together define the human being; redemption comes not to souls, but to persons: ⁷³

The soul possesses a kind of natural appetite for managing the body. By reason of this appetite it is somehow hindered from going on with all its force to the highest heaven, so long as it is not joined to the body, for it is in managing the body that this appetite is satisfied... And when the soul... again receives this body [transformed]... it will have the perfect measure of its being; obeying and commanding, vivified and vivifying with such wonderful ease that what was once its burden will be its glory.  
*de Gen. ad litt.* 12.35⁴

But redemption comes solely to humans. Eschewing earlier traditions of Christian apocalyptic hope, Augustine insisted that the Kingdom of God would not come on a transformed earth. The heavenly Jerusalem, God’s city, remains “above,” supramundane; and it is to this celestial and immaterial place that the saints in their raised fleshly bodies will ascend—the dazzlingly paradoxical vision that closes the *City of God.* Emphatically, once for all, Augustine severed any connection between anthropology and cosmology: in terms of salvation, man is the measure of all things.

What then, finally, of the Manichaeans ideas on two souls, one type ‘horizontal’ (the good soul versus the bad soul), the other ‘vertical’ (the mundane soul and its heavenly counterpart)? We have seen a similar duality, *mutatis mutandis,* in Augustine. His ‘horizontal soul’, synchronic and individual, is the Pauline introspective self of Romans 7, the soul whose will is divided. And this coexists with a vertical soul, diachronic and, in some sense, transpersonal: not the upper soul of Mani’s guardian daimon, but the ‘historical’ soul through which humans share, mysteriously, in the sin of Adam, through whom we are born a *traduce mortalitatis* or a *tradux peccati.* ⁷⁷ This argument for historical and psychological doubleness in Augustine’s thought both re-

⁷³ For further discussion, with notes, “Body/Soul,” 105-14.

⁷⁴ “…quia inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi: quo appetitus retardatur quodammodo, ne tota intentione peragit in illud summum caelum, quam-diu non subest corpus, cuius administratione appetitus ille conquiescat... Proinde, cum hoc corpus iam non animale sed per futuram commutationem spiritualiter receperit angelis aedequata, perfectum habebit naturae suae modum obediens et imperans, vivificata et vivificans tam ineffabilis facitate, ut et ei gloriae quod sanctae fuit.”

⁷⁷ See esp. on man’s ‘double nature’ and the historical dimension of the soul ‘in Adam,’ Rist, *Augustine,* 121-47.