Beyond the body/soul dichotomy

Augustine on Paul against the Manichees and the Pelagians

*In memoriam Paul Ramsey (1913-1988)*

Augustine, said Julian, was still a Manichee. His views on sexuality and on the Incarnation condemned him.

The unwary might think that simple ignorance of medical science had led Augustine to see human coitus as the means by which Original Sin was transmitted across generations. Augustine did not understand that his *concupiscit et carnalis* represented an unnecessary theologizing of the physiological *sine qua non* of conception, that heating through *voluptas* required for human procreation. Without this warming of human seed (both male and female) no conception could occur. And if the calor genitalis was required by Nature, it could not in and of itself be evil.

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Augustine could not think that the Creator had made human sexuality inherently sinful — that would be blatantly Manichaean. Had it only become sinful, as a result of Adam’s fall? Then whenever married couples sought to fulfill God’s command («Be fruitful and multiply»), they would actually sin of necessity. But man can sin only if he has the option not to, or else God would not be just in condemning sinners. Augustine himself, defending Paul and free will, had long ago argued exactly this case against the Manichees. Perhaps the root of his confused views on sexuality, then, really was ignorance, and not heresy.

But Augustine’s concept of sexually-transmitted Original Sin was revealed for what it really was when he attempted to discuss the person of Christ. Augustine maintained that Jesus was sinless because, conceived of a virgin without concupiscence, he had avoided inheriting Adam’s sin. Is sin then transmitted through the flesh? asked Julian. If so, and if Jesus really did assume flesh through Mary, then he would have contracted the sinfulness inhering there through the carnal concupiscence of her parents. Does the soul transmit sin — is it somehow inherited? Then parents regenerated through baptism should give birth to already-regenerated infants. This could work neither way. If for Augustine either the human body or the human soul were inherently sinful, then his Christ, since sinless, could not have been truly human. Thus even if Augustine did not begin with Manicheaism, said Julian, he ended there. Such a Christology is docetic; and docetism is Manicheaism.

We see in Julian’s polemic a configuration of issues that had confronted Augustine at earlier, and equally crucial, points in his life. The problem of evil, and the seductive resolution offered by dualism; Paul’s letters and the questions they posed on free will and predestination, grace and faith; the construction of God, man, and the universe presupposed by Graeco-Roman learned culture — as a young man in Carthage, a professor of rhetoric in Milan, and again, after many changes, reviewing his earlier life and especially his conversion once back in Africa, Augustine had wrestled with these. When Julian challenged him, he responded by pointing to the works that he had produced in these years, especially those that turned upon questions arising from Paul.

2. E.g., de duobus animabus c. Manichaeos 10, 13-15; de vera religione 14, 27; c. Fortunatum 15; 20; c. libro arbitrio I.1, 1.
3. c. Julianum II.8.4; V.54.15.
4. c. Iul. V.52.15. For further discussion of this problem — the theological status of Mary’s flesh — see Clark, «Seeds,» art. cit., 305f; P. Fredriksen, «Theological Biology and Virgin Mothers,» Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism. Studies in Christianity and Antiquity (Philadelphia, 1988), 401-407. Ultimately, because of this logical problem of infinite regress, the Church through the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception made Mary’s flesh the unique exception to the universal sinfulness of Adam’s progeny.
5. de peccatorum meritis II.39.25; cf. c. duas epistolae Pelagianorum I.13, 26ff.
6. c. Iul. V.55.15.
7. de praestatione sanctorum I.3,7; 4.8; de dono perseverantiae 20,52.

In part, Julian’s polemic forced this retrospection. Julian claimed, justly, to be using against Augustine the old bishop’s own earlier arguments against the Manichees; Augustine had to make the counter-argument. But, once allowances are made for his rhetorical excesses, Augustine’s claim to have long ago settled the questions Julian now raised, especially concerning the exegesis of Paul, is substantially legitimate — providing we go back only as far as 396. His stance against ‘Pelagianism’ was indeed a coherent development from positions he had taken earlier, but not until he had written the ad Simplicium and the Confessions.

Augustine’s views change more drastically between 394 and 396/8 that between 398 and 430. I would like to review his works on Paul in this earlier period in order, first, to explore both how and why Augustine came to understand especially Romans 7 and 9 in the ways he did; and, second, to trace out the continuities between and developments from his position against the Manichees and, later, against the Pelagians, especially as these touch on concepts of person — body/soul, free will, sexuality, and so on. As Augustine moved beyond the various dualisms of his opponents and his sources — Fortunatus and Faustus, Pelagius and Julian, Plotinus and Porphyry, and even Paul himself — he left behind the views on man and the cosmos that late Hellenism had bequeathed, variously, to them all.

1. Grace, Faith, and Will:
The early works on Paul

Whatever his early familiarity with the Pauline epistles during his years as a Manichaean «hearer» (373-385?), and whatever part these may have played in his conversion experience in Milan (386), Augustine concentrated his attention on the Pauline corpus only several years after his arrival back in Africa and induction into the clergy. His earlier attacks against the Manichees had focused on their moral determinism: he had framed his answer to their position on the problem of evil in terms of the freedom of the will, the philosopher’s defense of individual virtue. But in 392, before a watching crowd of Catholics and Donatists both, Fortunatus confronted Augustine publicly with the Manichaean interpretation of scripture, and especially of Paul. Though he lost the debate, Fortunatus apparently touched a nerve; from this point onwards, Augustine proceeds against the Manichaean Paul by arguing exegetically. In 394, then, after an interrupted attempt to interpret Genesis literally and a study of the Sermon on the Mount,
Augustine turned directly to the epistles in order to show that the Apostle « neither condemns the Law nor takes away man’s free will ». 

To this end — explicitly in his commentary, implicitly in the writings that follow — Augustine interpreted Romans through the rubric of four stages of salvation history: ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, and in pace. The four historical stages, which stretch from humanity before Israel to the second coming of Christ, are recapitulated in the spiritual development of the individual believer. 

« Prior to the Law, we pursue fleshly concupiscence; under the Law, we are pulled by it; under grace, we neither pursue nor are pulled by it; in peace, there is no concupiscence of the flesh... Thus [under grace] we still have desires but, by not obeying them, we do not allow sin to reign in us (Rom 6:12). These desires arise from the mortality of the flesh, which we bear from the first sin of the first man, whom we are born carnal (carnaliter). Thus they will not cease save at the resurrection of the body, when we will have merited that transformation promised to us. Then there will be perfect peace, when we are established in the fourth stage ». Exp. Prop. Rm. 13-18, 2, 10.

Scriptural history and the individual’s experience thus coincide at their shared extremes: birth in Adam, eschatological resurrection in Christ. Augustine here expands on the one biblical theme that he had sounded during his debate with Fortunatus, the consequences for all humanity of Adam’s sin (c. Fort. 22). As punishment for the first sin of the primal parent, man’s body is mortal, which involves man in change and weakness; and man’s nature is carnal, because Adam’s sin was a sin of humanity’s nature: natura nostra peccavit. The body itself remains a good created by God, but the Fall has affected the individual in such a way that the soul is now susceptible to the concupiscences of the flesh. Indeed, before the Law intervenes, the soul gives way without any hesitation. But, consistent with his earlier position that sin is an active moral failing of the mind, Augustine carefully distinguishes between caro and qualitas carnalis. The flesh is a material substratum. It is the qualitas carnalis, the result of the first sin, which is a negative value, and descriptive primarily of the soul. Man thus inherits from Adam not only mortal flesh but also his soul’s carnal quality whence he, by indulging it, lapses into sin. The agent in sinning is the soul.

Law at this point is introduced salubrously, so that the sinner might know how low he lies. He can neither fulfill the Law nor cease sinning: the best he can do is struggle and fail. This means, in fine, that man’s will after Adam is not as free as Adam’s once had been. All man can do now is « groan » (Rom 8:22) while he awaits redemption.

How then can he move from Stage 2 to Stage 3, from « under the Law » to « under grace »? « One must take care », cautions Augustine, « lest he think that by [Paul’s] words our free will is taken away, for this is not so » (Exp. Prop. Rm., 44,1). On the contrary: free will is the key to this transition. The sinner, realizing the depths of his sin and his helplessness, can turn in faith to Christ and beg divine assistance. Many by free will can believe in the Liberator and receive grace so that, with Christ freeing and giving aid, he does not sin » (Exp. Prop. Rm., 44,3).

13. Qu. 66-68 of the de 83 diversi quaestionibus (which, because of their more developed concept of the massa, I would place after the works on the epistles; see infra, p. 101): ad Simplicianum I.1 implicitly treats man in the first and second stages, sub lege and sub gratia; I.2, how man passes sub lege to sub gratia.

In his earlier work, De gen. c. Man, Augustine had divided human history into six periods, corresponding to the six days of creation, and to a traditional scheme of the six ages in the individual’s life (1,23, 35-24, 42; cf. de vera religione 26, 49; qu. 58, 2). The new four-stage scheme is hinted at in qu. 61, 7, where Augustine considers Gal 3: 28 and Mt 14: 16, and more fully developed, with reference to Romans, some time shortly thereafter in the Exp. Prop. Rm. But where, in the earlier scheme, the six ages corresponded to successive stages in God’s dealings with mankind, five relating to Old Testament history and the six to New Testament times, the four-stage scheme united history into one development. The Law of the Old Testament is the same as the law of Christ: the Christian sinner who serves the spirit of slavery is in the same moral position as the Jew (Exp. Prop. Rm., 52). This new interpretation binds together the history of redemption from the inception of Israel — and, indeed, from Creation itself — to the coming of Christ and the establishment of his church. As such, it was a radical defense of the Old Testament against the criticisms of the Manichees.

Tyconius’ exegesis — read and appreciated by Augustine in this period — took a very similar stand, without drawing on such periodizations: see infra, p. 100f.

Christ’s grace gives man the strength to resist the body’s troubling appetites, so that he can serve God mente — inwardly, with his mind. The soul, therefore, while still in this life can die to sin, on the analogy of the widow whose husband’s death freed her from his « law » (Rom 7 : 1ff.)²³.

But the Epistle to the Romans relates two Old Testament episodes notoriously difficult to reconcile with a strong view of man’s free will : 9 : 11-13, on Jacob and Esau²⁴, and 9 : 17, on the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart. The relatively simple picture that Augustine has sketched so far must accordingly grow more complicated in order to accommodate Paul’s discussion of God’s call, election, and predestination.

« Those whom he called, these also he justified » (Rom 8 : 30). But clearly, says Augustine, not everyone is elected, called to justification. But God makes no pre-selection. Grace is offered freely to all : « Many are called » (Mt 22 : 14 ; Exp. Prop. Rm. 55, 1-2). But it is equally clear that « few are chosen ». How are these relatively few chosen ? By God’s predestination and foreknowledge. God predestines individuals on the basis of his foreknowledge of their response to his vocatio²². God’s call is gracious ; it goes out to sinners²⁶. Man’s belief depends on God’s prior call ; but, once called, man can choose freely whether to respond with bona voluntas. If he does respond with good will, his faith will lead him to turn to Christ. This faith, in brief, is the free gift of God because it is necessarily preceded by his call ; but the source of the receptive « good will », foreknown to God, is man himself.

Thus God foreknew that Jacob would respond in faith to his call, which Esau would spurn. So also with Pharaoh : his heart was indeed hardened, but as the justly merited punishment for his infidelity, which God had foreknown. All three were called secundum propositionem Dei (Exp. Prop. Rm. 55, 2-5), as determined by God’s foreknowledge of their free response. Augustine goes on to say what his argument in any case implied : election is based on merit, the merit of faith. Non opera sed fides inchoat meriti. Through the merit of freely-willed faith, man moves from sub lege to sub gratia (Exp. Prop. Rm. 62, 9).

II. Memory, Love, and Will :
The works on conversion

Augustine continued this discussion of sin, grace and free will begun in the Pauline commentaries and questions 66-68 of the de 83 diversis quaestionibus in

²². Exp. Prop. Rm. 36 ; qu. 66,1-2.
²³. « which moves some people to think that the apostle Paul has done away with the freedom of the will », Exp. Prop. Rm. 60,2.
²⁴. Exp. Prop. Rm. 55,4-5 ; cf. epistolae ad Romanos inchoata expositio 9,3 : « ...vocantem deum non spreverunt ». By implication, some could choose to spurn God’s call ; also qu. 68,4-5.
²⁶. Exp. Prop. Rm. 61,2 ; qu. 68,5.

Book III of de libero arbitrio. Perhaps his decision to resume work on this essay — begun in 388, in very different circumstances, when he was still in Rome²⁷ — was prompted specifically by these preceding writings : in the course of his exegesis of Romans, he had had to insist repeatedly that neither he nor Paul was denying the freedom of the will²⁸. Having defended free choice in his commentaries only obliquely, Augustine could now apply himself directly to this issue by returning to this unfinished work²⁹.

Book I, a synopsis of views that Augustine had held at Cassiciacum, had been unbashfully optimistic about the effectiveness of man’s will. Man sins because he chooses to, else God would not be just in punishing sinners ; and man makes this bad choice because he turns from learning (disciplina). « Hence to do evil is nothing but to stray from education » (I,1, 2). But when man wills rightly, in accordance with divine law, he accrues merit (ut in voluntate meriti sit, I.14, 30), and ultimately attains the happy life. « For whoever wishes to live rightly and honorably », says Augustine, « and prefers that to all transient goods, attains his object with perfect ease. To reach it, he has only to will it » (I.13, 29).

Books II and III were written much later, perhaps as late as 396³⁰. There, toward the end of Book II, when Augustine attempts to consider the root cause of the will’s uncoerced deflection from the good, his optimism dims considerably. He draws a picture of man « on the road » in vita in this life, running the risk of wandering off the path, of becoming shrouded by darkness, because of his weakness³¹. This gloomy tone pervades Book III. Man sins because his loves are misordered ; his desires and affections elude his conscious control because they are affected by carnal custom, consuetudo³². The penal condition of ignorance and difficulty, merited by the sin of the primal parent, retards man’s progress³³. These punishments are « infections » from the flesh, not natural to the soul, and are not reckoned to the soul as guilt (reatus)³⁴. Guilt arises, rather, because the soul need not remain in this state, but chooses to³⁵. Man’s pride prevents his supplanting Christ³⁶.

Augustine had sounded these themes in his earlier Pauline commentaries, but there they had been woven into the essentially optimistic pattern of salvation

²⁷. Retr. I.9(8). « The work as a whole gives a stratigraphic record of the course of Augustine’s thought between 388 and 395 or 396 », TeSelle, Augustine, 135.
²⁸. E.G., Exp. Prop. Rm. 13-18,1 ; 44,1 ; 60,15 ; 62,1,3,13 ; cf. qu. 68,5.
²⁹. TeSelle, Augustine, 156.
³¹. de lib. arb. II,16,41.
³². de lib. arb. III,7,23 ; 18,52.
³³. de lib. arb. III,18,52.
³⁴. de lib. arb. III,20,57 ; 22,64 ; 23,70.
³⁵. de lib. arb. III,20,56.
³⁶. de lib. arb. III,24, 72-25,76.
history. Here, though Augustine again asserts that free will holds the key to man's redemption, he emphasizes the extremity of man's situation. Mortality and habit weigh man down; his own sins compound his ignorance and difficulty. He moves in a situation of acute danger, through an intense darkness, trying to keep his gaze riveted upon the bright, distant light of Christ while the night press in on all sides, and the Devil hovers near to hand. And if love of light does not hold him to the path, says Augustine, then man be held by fear. «If any suggestion springing from a desire for the inferior should deflect our purpose, the eternal damnation and torments of the Devil will recall us to the true path» (III.25, 76).

At some point shortly hereafter, in 396, Augustine received a request from Simplicianus, his old spiritual mentor in Milan 37. Simplicianus asked for clarification of several scriptural passages, among them Romans 7 : 7-25 and 9 : 10-29. Though Augustine had by this point written on these passages several times, he told Simplicianus that he still did not understand them. Shortly thereafter appeared the first book of Augustine's episcopacy, in answer to Simplicianus' questions.

The basic argument of this work — namely, that election is entirely unmerited — and its importance in the Augustinian canon are well known. I wish to review some of its particular details, however, in order to establish my explanation for its surprising and novel answers to the familiar Pauline questions. For in qua.2., considering once again the prenatal election of Jacob and rejection of Esau, Augustine repudiates precisely that exegesis of Romans 9 that he had so painstakingly worked out such a short time earlier. Jacob cannot have received election because God foresaw his faith, Augustine now argues. Paul had stressed that both Jacob and Esau were still in the womb precisely to avoid giving the impression that election was based on foreknowledge of any sort 39.

God showed mercy in Jacob's case by calling him so that he believed. «But then the chief difficulty remains: why did God's mercy fail in Esau's case?» (ad Simpl. I.2, 9). Departing from his earlier position, Augustine now says that Esau's rejection could not have been because he was (or was to be) unwilling to respond to God's call in faith 40. Were this so, then Jacob would have had faith because he willed it. «But then God did not give him faith as a free gift (cf. I Cor 4 : 7), but Jacob gave it to himself» (I.2, 10).

Paul points to the answer in Philippians, Augustine says. «God works in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure» (Phil 2 : 13; ad Simpl. I.2, 12). Paul thus clearly shows that the bona voluntas itself is the work of God in man. Previously, Augustine had expressed a very similar idea, also with reference to Romans 9: «It depends not on man's willing or running, but on God who has mercy» (Rom 9 : 15; Exp. Prop. Rm., 62). In the Propositions, he had argued that man is able to will unless called; and when after the call he has willed, this will is insufficient unless «God gives strength to our running and leads where he calls». But the «will» that Augustine intended in the Propositions was man's ability to will to fulfill the Law: sub lege, man could only long to fulfill the Law, but he could not until he was strengthened sub gratia. Man's bona voluntas, however, had preceded God's call. Good will was man's, by means of which he initiated the merit of faith; will power, efficacious will, came subsequently, and by the grace of God. So too qu. 68,5: parum est enim velle, nisi Deus miseretur; sed Deus non misereetur qui ad pacem vocat, nisi [bona] voluntas praecesserit...

But in the ad Simplicianum, Augustine deliberately conflates the two wills: the will God aids is the good will itself.

«For the good will does not precede the calling, but the calling precedes the good will. The fact that we have a good will is rightly attributed to God who calls us... So the sentence, 'It is not him who wills nor him who runs but God who has mercy' cannot be taken simply to mean that we cannot attain what we wish without the aid of God; but rather that, without his calling, we cannot even will» (1.2, 12).

Augustine had come to this conclusion through a reassessment of man's moral autonomy with respect to God's call. Puzzling over Mt 22 : 14 («Many are called but few are chosen»), he had earlier held that man was free to accept God's call or reject it. God, foreseeing a rejection, would call men in such a way that they would not follow, according to his purpose of election 41. Now, Augustine sees such moral autonomy as compromising divine omnipotence. «If not everyone who is called obeys the call, but has it in the power of his will not to obey, it could be said correctly that it is not of God who has mercy, but man who wills and runs, because God's mercy would not be sufficient without the obedience of the man who was called». But this is unacceptable: «The effectiveness of God's mercy cannot be in the power of man to frustrate» (I.2, 13). Having excluded faith as a grounds of merit, having attributed man's good will itself to God's action, having indeed excluded any form of merit whatsoever as grounds for election, Augustine moves to redefine the only variable left in his equation — the nature of God's call 42.

God does not call all men the same way. Those whom he elects he calls congruenter, «effectively» or «appropriately», so that they will follow. Those whom he rejects he does not so call, so that they do not follow. The proof is tautological: if God had chosen these people, he would have called them effectively, so that they would have followed; since they did not follow, although they must have been called, God must have called them, but not congruenter. Thus

37. On Simplicianus, see Conf. VIII.2,3-5,10.
38. Ep. 37, acknowledging receipt of Simplicianus' letter.
39. ad Simpl. I.2,5; cf. Exp. Prop. Rm. 60,3-4; 62,9; qu. 68,4.
40. ad Simpl. I.2,10; cf. In Q 9,3.
41. Exp. Prop. Rm. 55, «vocatio secundum propositum dei».
42. ad Simpl. I.2,13; so also LOHRER, Glaubensbegriff, 259-61.
divine omnipotence is preserved, because the initiative of salvation rests solely with
God's will, not man's; and «God has mercy on no man in vain» (I.2, 13).

So why does God call some congregator and others not? Why was Esau rejected? Why was Pharaoh's heart hardened? One suspects, says Augustine, that such an aversion or hardening comes about as the result of some divine penalty.

God's unwillingness to be merciful is entirely his own decision, absolutely
unaffected by any predisposition or merit on man's part. But there cannot be any
unrighteousness with God. How, then, is his selectivity to be accounted for? At
this point, Augustine invokes the massa peccati.

Augustine had used massa earlier, in the Propositions, as a synonym for
conspresto, the reading his text had for Romans 9:21. It described man's
condition sub lege, when he could not of his own will avoid sin. Is this too harsh?
Augustine had queried then. O homo tu quis es? Who was man to say? Sub lege,
man is a lump of clay, a conspresto or massa luti, out of which the divine potter
can mold different vessels as he pleases (Exp. Prop. Rm. 62). Until man ceases
to live «according to this lump» (secundum hanc consprestonem), he is carnal.
Only when he puts away the prudencia carnalis, his carnal self, the «man of clay»
(homo luti) can he investigate spiritual things. Until then, he should hold his
tongue (Exp. Prop. Rm. 62, 17-23). Shortly thereafter, in qu. 68, the metaphor of
the massa luti gives way to a more literal massa peccati, a condition visited upon
humankind specifically because of its origin in Adam, through whose sin natura
nostra peccavit (qu. 68,3). Still, in both these earlier writings, man is morally
autonomous to the degree that he can freely choose to greet God's call with good
will.

Not so in the ad Simplicianum. Here all mankind, born de traduce peccati et
de poena mortalitatis43, is bound by the inherited mortal condition into one sinful
mass. All men, in other words, because they share in the mortal condition which
arose because of Adam's sin, likewise share in Adam's offense against God. All,
accordingly, must pay the debt of punishment owed to the supreme divine justice
(ad Simpl. I.2, 16-20). Man's penal state has changed from a condition imposed
by God for man's correction to the sufficient grounds for his condemnation44.

Therefore, argues Augustine, if man is condemned there is no unrighteousness

43. ad Simpl. I.2,20. This is the first time that Augustine uses the term tradux peccati; it does
not yet have the value that he will give it in his anti-Pelagian writings. For the evolution of this
and other related terms, see esp. A. Sage, «Péché original. La naissance d'un dogme», Revue
des Études augustiniennes 13 (1967), 211-48; E. Tierselle, «Ruines the Syrian, Caelestius,
Pelagius: Explorations in the prehistory of the Pelagian Controversy», Augustinian Studies 3
(1972), 61-96; A. Vanneste, «S. Paul et la doctrine augustiniennne du péché originel»,
Studium Paulinum Congress II (1961), 513-22.

44. Cf. de lib. arb. III.19,53, where Augustine had said just the opposite. On the novelty of
Augustine's conclusion to the ad Simplicianum in the particular context of Latin theology, J.

with God, since God by leaving man condemned simply exacts the payment of a
penalty justly imposed. He does not thereby make man any worse; he only
decides to make him better (I.2, 15-18).

The question becomes, rather, why does God redeem any sinner? Why give
Jacob grace? Turning to Paul's image of the potter and his lump of clay, Augustine
says that God is free to shape some vessels of honor and some of dishonor because
he's the potter. His decision is inscrutable, and if man does not like this, Augustine
answers with Paul, «Tu quis es? Who are you, O man, to answer back to God?»
All man can rightly do is commend God's discipline, whereby God graciously
chooses to save some from the mass of the justly condemned (I.2, 18).

What then of man's free will? «It exists, indeed», says Augustine. «But of what
value is it in those who are sold under sin?» (I.2, 21). Man's will, as Paul says
in Galatians 5:17, is beyond his control. He cannot even motivate it unless
something presents itself to delight and stir his mind. But «that this should happen
is not in any man's power» (I.2, 22). Delight is not subject to conscious control.
Man cannot will to love.

«Who can believe unless he is reached by some calling, by some testimony borne to the
truth?... Who can welcome in his mind something which does not give him delight? Who
has it in his power to ensure that something that delights him will turn up? If those things
which delight us serve to turn us to God, this is not due to us but to him.» I.2, 21.

So crucial is delight to human motivation that God uses it as the psychological
mechanism of salvation: he redeems by enabling his elect to love correctly45. Man
cannot do this of himself: Resta ergo voluntates eligantur. The wills themselves,
Augustine concludes — to love rightly and, thus, even to believe — are elected (I.2,
22). The righteousness of God, which Augustine in 394 had argued was incomparable
to human justice because of God's great mercy46, he now says is incompre-

45. Augustine had considered the relation of delight and love to human motivation before,
for example, in de moribus ecclesiae I.21,39-22,40; de fide et symbolo 9,19; sermo 159,3,3;
exposito epistola ad Galatas 49, commenting on Gal 5:22f. God saves man by sending the
Holy Spirit who infuses caritas, thereby reorienting man's affects so that he will love
righteousness, and so fulfill the Law out of love, not fear, Exp. Prop. Rm. 44,3; 48,8-9; qu.
66. Increasingly, however, he came to emphasize the compulsive, uncontrolled aspect of human
affects, in which custom and habit play such a large role. In the de lib. arb., he had granted
that, while no man can control when an object will affect him once he perceives it (quo viso
tangatur nulla potestas ext. III.25,74); he can at least decide how to respond to the affective
object. But in the ad Simpl, Augustine emphasizes the lack of effectiveness that any such
decision has: man can no longer initiate control over his own response to these objects. See
further the discussion in J. Burnaby, Amor Dei (London, 1938), 223; W.S. Bascok, «Augustine and Tyconius. A study in the Latin appropriation of Paul», Studia Patristica XVIII,
pt. 3 (1982), 1210f.

46. This conviction had played a major role in his discussion of the sin of despair, Inh. Exp.
23,7.
hensible because of God's inexplicable decision to remit the just punishment of
 damnation to those few whom he so calls that 'their delight is the Lord.' All are
 justly bound into one sinful mass, and God's selection of some from this mass,
 man must believe, 'belongs to a certain hidden equity,' incomprehensible by any
 human standard. «Incrustable are his judgments, and his ways are past finding
 out» (Rom 11:33, cited I.2, 16) 47.

 Once, says Augustine, he had thought that he understood election by observing
 how some people were relatively free from sin, or possessed great abilities, or
 uttered great and profitable teachings. In such cases, that man seem worthy
 of election who had only the slightest sins, or a keen mind, or who was cultivated
 in the liberal arts. Augustine had judged by such standards at Cassiciacum 48.
 Now all that has changed. «If I set up this standard, 'he will laugh me to scorn'
 who has chosen the weak and the foolish to confound the strong and the wise» (1.2,
 22; a reference to I Cor 1:27).

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 How can we account for Augustine's changed understanding of the process
 of salvation? And how should we evaluate it?

 Scholars search, naturally, for sources, both literary and environmental. And
 some unanimity has been reached. All point to the wearing effects of Augustine's
 job, for example, on his general outlook. Within a very short time, he had moved
 from the quiet of learned lay piety as a servus dei to the rough-and-tumble world
 of North African ecclesiastical politics. No longer in a small community of
 like-minded scholarly ascetics, Augustine found himself confronted by the «com-
nulsive force of habit» in the behavior of his own congregation, whose addiction
to swearing, astrology, and raucous laetitia he tried to reform 49. And as he
wrestled with these African Christians, he likewise reentered the spirit of African
 piety: the Platonist who had sought to be a friend of God now stressed the
 salubrious merit of anxiety, fear, guilt, humility, repentance, confession 50.

 47. W.S. BARCOCK, «Augustine and Paul. The case of Romans IX», Studia Patristica XVI (1985), 473-9, reviews the exegitical steps by which Augustine arrived at this conclusion. See too Brown's comments on Augustine's analysis of «the psychology of delight», Augustine, 154-6.
 48. E.g., de ordine I.8,24; also, de utilitate credendi XII.27; de lib. orb. I.1.2.
 50. On the harshness of God's instruction (disciplina), Inch. Ex. I.1,4; I.10.1; I.18,15; I.19,8. On the benefit of fear, e.g., de lib. orb. III.19,53; 22,70; 25,76; ad Simp. I.1,2; 2,18. See also TeSelle, Augustine, 133; BROWN, Augustine, 33.

 THE BODY/SOUL DICHOTOMY: AUGUSTINE ON PAUL

 Social environment sets the stage, but it provides context, not content. How can
 we account for specific aspects of Augustine's exegesis? Here scholars turn to
 literary sources, and we encounter, most commonly, the names of Ambrosiaster,
 Tyconius, and Paul.

 Ambrosiaster, an anonymous Christian in Rome, had by the time Augustine
 wrote his own commentaries used massa to describe the situation of humanity
 after, and as a result of, Adam's fall. Considering Romans 5:12, Ambrosiaster
 says:

 «In quo, id est, in Adam omnes peccaverunt. Manifestum est itaque in Adam omnes
 peccasse quasi in massa; ipsa enim per peccatum corruptus quos genuit, omnes nati sunt
 sub peccato. Ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores quia ex eo ipso sumus omnes» 51.

 This notorious misunderstanding of Paul's épô, together with this particular
 interpretation of Romans 5:12, will later loom large in the Pelagian controversy.
 Augustine will then cite Ambrosiaster, who he thinks is Hilary 52. In 394/5,
 however, Augustine does not support his new argument with an appeal to Romans
 5:12 and Ambrosiaster's congenial interpretation of it. Massa, rather, comes into
 play through the conspersio of Romans 9:20, and Augustine's interpretation of
 it can easily be seen as a development internal to his new ideas on the nature
 of God's call 53.

 For these ideas the evidence suggests a surer source: Tyconius 54. We know that
 by 396 — the same year in which he wrote his answers to Simplicianus —
 Augustine had read and greatly appreciated the Donatist layman's handbook on
 exegesis, the Liber regularum: he sent a letter to his friend and fellow bishop,
 Aurelius of Carthage, impatiently requesting the latter's reaction to Tyconius' work,
 «sicut saepe iam scripsi» 55. What in the Liber would have excited Augustine's
 enthusiasm?

 52. c. duas eff. Pel. IV.7. For a reconstruction of Augustine's use of Ambrosiaster during this later controversy, see B. LEEING, «Augustine, Ambrosiaster, and the massa», Gregoria-
 num 11 (1930), 58-91.
 53. So too Vanneste, «S. Paul», art. cit., 514 n. 1; S. LYONNET, «Augustin et Rom 5,12
 avant la controverse Pélagienne», Nouvelle revue théologique 7(1967), 842-9; also «Rom 5,12
 758ff.; TeSelle, Augustine, 158.
 (Paris, 1920), 165-219. For discussion of his possible influence on Augustine in 396,
 Pincherle, Formazione, 185ff.; TeSelle, Augustine, 180-82; Barcock, «Augustine's inter-
 55. The full sentence reads, «Nam et ego quod iussisti non negliro et de Tyconii septem
 regulis vel clavibus, sicut saepe iam scripsi, cognoscere quid tibi videatur expecto» Ep. 41.2.
 Augustine presents a synopsis of the Liber in the de doctrina christiana III.30,42-37,56.
Tyconius too had labored over the question of grace, divine foreknowledge and God's call as it arose in the patriarchal narratives, the prophets, and Paul's letters; and he attempted in Rule III (« de promissis et lege ») to frame an answer. Man, says Tyconius, whether before or after the coming of Christ, was and is justified only by faith, and never by the Law. Justification comes only through faith, and not through the individual's efforts to fulfill the Law. Free will is preserved because God predestines his elect on the basis of his foreknowledge of their will. Faith thus is man's « work »; but the believer's subsequent justification and glorification come about only through the grace of God. « For we have nothing » says Tyconius, paraphrasing I Corinthians 4: 7, « that we did not receive ».

Tyconius' exegesis emphasized certain key Pauline passages — particularly the one from I Corinthians — that come to figure prominently in Augustine's own arguments. But his formulation in the Liber — that God predestines on the basis of his foreknowledge — corresponds most closely to the argument that Augustine himself had already presented in 394/5, in the Propositions, the Inchoata Expositio, and qu. 66-68 of the de 83 diversis quaestionibus, and subsequently, in the ad Simplicianum, rejected. Whence, then, the enthusiasm of Epistle 41?

We should perhaps attend less to the particulars of Tyconius' presentation than to the larger spirit of his enterprise. Tyconius' exegesis bound together all of biblical history, disowning any rupture between the Old Dispensation and the New, while speaking to the experience of the contemporary believer. The dynamics of salvation, he argued, whether for nations or for persons, for Jacob or for the generation of the Babylonian Captivity or for Paul or for the contemporary believer, had always been the same. And that salvation is worked out in history, foretold in prophecy and presented in scripture, the record of God's promises which are absolutely certain because based on invariant foreknowledge.

Further, Tyconius sought to understand this sacred record by formulating exegetical rules derived exclusively from the biblical text itself. No statement of divine impassibility or the prerogatives of the rational soul commences or controls his discussion. He seeks to make sense of scripture not philosophically but historically, to guide the reader « through the immense forest of prophecy », to understand, through scripture, how God works in human time.

It is from within this perspective that Tyconius interprets the Pauline epistles. Tyconius places Paul, in other words, within this historical, prophetic, narratively biblical framework. The old problem of free will and predestination, so acute when Paul is approached through classical paideia and its preoccupation with moral excellence and the practice of virtue, accordingly takes on a different cast. For no man, asserts Tyconius, can do any good of his own will because the ability to do good comes exclusively from God: man's « virtue » is the measure of the degree to which God works in him.

This concept of grace eviscerates classical notions of virtue, while insisting on the unity of biblical history and its immediate relevance for the contemporary individual. In this way, Tyconius can be seen as a bridge figure between Augustine's own earlier commentaries and the new solution of the ad Simplicianum. His enthusiasm for Tyconius, then, may have stemmed less from his agreement with Tyconius' answers as such than from his appreciation for the way that he presented them. In 396, Tyconius appeared to Augustine as a « conversation-partner who was considering the same problems he was considering...; and neither the problems nor the mode in which they were considered were particularly marked by the classical philosophical tradition ». Tyconius thus enriches Augustine's thought in the mid-390s by presenting a particular style of exegesis — one whose emphasis on prophecy and history, we might further note, and whose indifference to and independence from earlier (and especially Greek) exegetical traditions, mark it as peculiarly African of traditionally millennial scriptural passages. Both in the Liber and, apparently, in his now-lost commentary on the Apocalypse of John, Tyconius reinterpreted passages once seen as awaiting fulfillment at the End, or as indicating that the End was imminent, so that they seemed, rather, to be nonapocalyptic descriptions of the contemporary church. This reading « stabilized » such prophecy, which was at once rendered nonpolitical and completed. For further discussion, see P.F. Landes, « Tyconius and the End of the World », Revue des Études augustiniennes 18 (1982), 59-77; for Augustine's own shift away from millenarianism in this period, esp. G. Follet, « La typologie du sabbat chez S. Augustin. Son interprétation millénaire entre 389 et 400 », Revue des Études augustiniennes 2 (1956), 371-90.

62. « Omne opus nostrum fides est, quae quanta fuerit tantum Deus operatur nobiscum », Reg. III, p. 19, l. 1. 27f. Tyconius goes on to support his position by referring to Sapientia 8: 21, saying, « in hoc gloriatur Salomon, scisse se non ex homine sed ex dei dono esse continentiam. cum scivi, inquit, quoriam aliter non possum esse continentem nisi Deus dedit. » Cf. Augustine's similar argument, together with his reference to this same passage in Sap., when discussing his own difficulty achieving continence in Conf. VI.1.1.20.

63. W.S. Basscock, « Response to Paula Fredriksen », ms. p. 9. His response will be published in the volume Paul and the Legacies of Paul (Dallas, forthcoming 1989 by Southern Methodist University Press). The great contrast, of course, is Origen, whose exegesis of Paul and Genesis in the Πετροφωνos sought to square the biblical presentation of predestination with the principles of paideia.

64. On Tyconius himself in this regard, Burkitt, Book of Rules, op. cit., p. 1.
And, lastly, there is Paul. Historians will point to Augustine’s constant reading of the epistles in these years as an implicit explanation for Augustine’s radical new theology of grace, as if Paul’s augustinism were there all along, waiting for Augustine, finally, to perceive it.65 We can do better than this. Again, Augustine had read these back in Italy, and doubtlessly before then as a Manichee; Christian theologians had been reading them for centuries; and Latin commentators in particular, in this century in particular — Pelagius not least of all — turned frequently to Paul;66 but no one had ever formulated an interpretation like the one Augustine offered in 396. Nor, until 396, did Augustine. Yet his repeated and intensive rereading of Paul did precede the new solution of the ad Simplicium. How are we to understand this factor?

The final paragraph of the ad Simplicium points our way: we should have in mind not Paul, but Saul. The Paul whom Augustine would have been most familiar with and most interested in back in Milan, both as an ex-Manichee and as a philosophically-inclined Catholic, would have been the Paul of the epistles. And Augustine presents his conversion, at this time, in a manner reminiscent of Justin’s self-description in Trypho, as progress made in Philosophy, whose “shining face” the Apostle’s letters had revealed to him.67 But as he works through the Pauline corpus in the first half of the 390s, once back in Africa, Augustine is driven to consider the pre-Christian Paul as Paul presents himself in Galatians,68 and as tradition presents him in the deuto-Pauline epistles: the persecutor and blasphemer (1 Tim 1:13), the foolish, impious, and hateful man enslaved to various pleasures (Titus 3:3).69 And Augustine has before him, of course, Luke’s narrative in Acts.70

Hence Augustine’s conclusion to his exhausting exercise in scriptural exegesis and dialectical reasoning. Abruptly, dramatically, he closes the first book of his answers to Simplicianus by again invoking Paul — not his theology, but his biography:

“The only possible conclusion is that it is wills that are elected. But the will itself can have no motive unless something presents itself to delight and stir the mind. That this should happen is not in any man’s power. What did Saul will but to attack, seize, bind and slay Christians? What a fierce, savage, blind will was that! Yet he was thrown prostrate by one word from on high, and a vision came to him whereby his mind and will were turned from their fierceness and set on the right way towards faith so that, suddenly, from a marvelous persecutor of the Gospel a more marvelous preacher was made. What then shall we say? ‘Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid!’” — ad Simpl. I.2, 22.

The essentially classical model of self-improvement and moral freedom, even in the extremely attenuated form in which it survived into Augustine’s early Pauline commentaries, could not withstand Augustine’s repeated encounters with Paul the sinner and, most particularly, the persecutor. The zealous Paphian turned apostle obdurately defied any such model. For no tender conscience or spiritual despair had prompted Saul to call upon Christ so that he might move from sub lege to sub gratia. On the contrary, he had been sinning with a high hand and evidently enjoying himself. But God — mysteriously, ineluctably, even violently — had redeemed Saul from the errors of his past, without Saul’s having done the least thing to deserve it (indeed, he deserved condemnation); without Saul’s having the option to refuse (which, judging from his prior record, he would have). Saul had neither believed nor wanted to, yet God gave him faith—indeed, forced it upon him. What else could Paul do but humbly praise divine inscrutability? “For his judgments are unsearchable, and his ways past finding out” (Rom. 11:33, at the finale of the ad Simpl.)71.

Thus, Augustine concludes, not man’s will but solely the absolutely unmerited gift of God’s grace can orient man’s love toward the divine. Having made this case exegetically in the ad Simplicium, Augustine restates it, autobiographically, in the Confessions. From his new perspective on the dynamics of love, will, and

65. E.g., van der Meer: “The optimistic convert of the year 388 was soon transformed by his study of the Epistle to the Romans into a man broodingly contemplating the spectacle of sin and grace,” Augustine the Bishop, 577 (emphasis mine). Romans was the occasion, but not the cause, of this transformation; and other careful readers — such as, again, Origen — were not so transformed.

66. For these works, Souter, Late Latin Commentaries…; on this “generation of S. Paul” in the West, Brown, Augustine, 151.

67. c. Academicus II.2.6, written during the summer immediately following his conversion in 386. By “philosophy” here, Augustine intends not philosophy tout court but Christianity which, in this period, he identified as the highest form of philosophy. See Brown, Augustine, 101-27, esp. 112; more recently, R.J. O’Connell, St Augustine’s Platonism (Vatican, 1984).

68. exp. Gal. 7:9, on Gal 1:13.


71. Augustine’s Saul is not the “historical” Paul, who felt that “as to righteousness under the Law, I was blameless” (Phil 3:6), and whose activities as “persecutor” involved him in disciplinary floggings within his Diaspora Jewish community (cf. II Cor 11:24), not executions (Luke’s lurid portrait, Acts 9:1ff.; 22:4; 26:9). But Augustine’s understanding of Paul depended so intimately on Luke’s presentation, and has had such a profound effect on Western theology, that it continues to influence even modern criticism. New Testament scholarship on Paul. For a review of this historiographical problem, see Fredriksen, “Paul and Augustine”, art. cit.

grace, he reviews his own life. Nothing escapes his scrutiny; everything is seen in terms of the perversion of loves that marks every child of Adam. Ante legem, in childhood, he had spontaneously thrown himself into affective perversions—preferring fiction to grammar, weeping deliciously over Dido’s death and various dramatic tragedies, even once sinking so low that he had sinned for the sheer love of sinning, gratuitously pillaging a neighbor’s fruit tree73. And when in adulthood, sub lege, he had realized which way salvation lay—within the Church, which for Augustine entailed celibacy as well74—he found himself paralyzed by the memory of his former delights: those things that he had once loved, though he wanted to love them no longer, had forged a chain of habit in his soul, binding his will yet further to its own disorder. The man who, shortly after his conversion, had held that one could obtain the righteous life with “perfect ease” since it required only an act of will75 now saw his conversion in quite different terms.

“Many years had flowed by—a dozen or more—since the time when I was nineteen and had read Cicero’s Hortensius... and yet I was still postponing giving up this world’s happiness... I prayed in my great unworthiness, ‘O Lord, grant me chastity and continence, but not yet.’... I turned to Alypius and cried out, ‘What is wrong with us? The unlearned take heaven by storm, while we, with all our learning wallow in flesh and blood!’... I was frantic in mind, in a frenzy of indignation at myself for not going over to your law and your covenant, O my God, where all my bones cried out that I should be... The way was not by ship or chariot or foot; it was not as far as I had gone when I went from the house to the place where we now sat. For I had only but to will to go, in order not merely to go but to arrive; I had only to will to go—but powerfully and whole-heartedly, not turning and twisting a half-wounded will this way and that... Whence is this monstrousness? Where is its root? Might the answer not lie in the mysterious punishment that has come upon all men, the deep, hidden damage in the sons of Adam?”  Conf. VIII, 7.17-9.21.

The Confessions is a tremendously complicated book, and the temptation to see it primarily as autobiography should be resisted. It is, rather, Augustine’s doing theology in a new key, using his own past experiences as privileged evidence for his new theological propositions. Its true autobiographical status, in fact, may lie less in the particulars of its historical narrative76 than in the biographical fact to which it attests: in denying man’s ability to do anything toward his own salvation, Augustine broke completely with the idea of virtue so prominent in the classical tradition through which he had been reintroduced to Catholicism back in Milan. Enmeshed in ecclesiastical responsibilities, struggling almost as much with his own congregation as with schisms and heretics, aware, through his dream-life, of the deeper struggles continually going on within himself77—such an ideal, to Augustine, now seemed dangerous, ridiculous, puerile. He ruthlessly renounces it in the Confessions.

Augustine had come to this new estimation of Paul, himself, and all humankind in the process of exegetically extracting both Paul and the problem of evil from the moral determinism of the Manichees. Yet against Latin Christianity’s last public spokesman for the traditional view of man’s moral freedom, Julian of Eclanum, Augustine used many of these same arguments, and indeed drew particular attention to these last two writings of his early episcopacy. How did he do this, and why?

III. Body, Soul, and Person: The works against Julian

Julian challenged Augustine on a number of closely interrelated issues: God’s justice; the nature of Adam’s sin and the way its consequences were communicated to later generations; the freedom of the will; the theological status of sexuality, conception, and unbaptised babies; the origin of the soul. We may reduce these to one fundamental question: If sin is inherited, then how?

Classical anthropology, free of the constraints imposed by Genesis, inclined toward seeing the body, or more accurately the matter upon which it depended, as the reason for moral evil. This tendency held dangers: taken too far, it might reduce to irrelevance the question of the soul’s freedom. Plotinus, the great representative of the classical tradition in late Roman culture, had only with difficulty and mixed success avoided holding the body somehow particularly responsible for human error78.

73. Conf. I.13,20-22; II.4,9; cf. his ruminations on the theatre, III.2,2.
74. One of course need not be celibate to join the Church, and Augustine knew this (Conf VIII.1,2); but the fashion of celibacy was very strong among the elites of both pagan and Christian society, and in Milan Augustine moved on the edges of such circles. See Brown, Augustine, 106; for both popular and elite expressions of this sexual behavior, E.R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (New York, 1965), 1-36; more recently, R.L. Fox, Pagan and Christian (New York, 1987), 336-74.
76. By which I do not intend to say that Augustine created these narrative particulars in the late 390s. But his retrospection both occasioned a particular interpretation of his conversion experience that, evidently, he had not had at the time, and brought to the fore aspects of that experience which would have been inappropriate to his formal, and highly self-conscious, philosophical writings from Cassiciacum. So too Brown: «Augustine wrote [in 386] as one public figure to other public men... the classic scene in the garden in Milan is passed over in silence. Yet it is only in this scene that we can glimpse the depth of the reorientation which was taking place in Augustine», Augustine, 114. Additionally, there was a practical impediment to extreme factionalizing: Alypius, his friend and fellow bishop, was a witness to his conversion and alive when Augustine published his Confessions. On this last point, P. Fredriksen, «Augustine and his analyses: the possibility of a psychohistory», Soundings LVI (1978), 206-27, esp. pp. 211-12; cf. Ferrari, «Augustine on the road...», art. cit.
77. Conf. X.30,41.
78. Plotinus’ anthropology recapitulates in microcosm the problems he confronted when attempting to account for the One’s relation to the physical universe itself. See, e.g., Enneads I.8; II.4; III.6. Plotinus maintained both that human life was the way it was because Matter,
Nevertheless, this tug toward the sort of dualism condemned by both pagan Neoplatonists and their Catholic counterparts as "gnostic" was the inevitable consequence of an anthropology that identified what was most truly human with the soul itself. The body served, in essence, as the soul's inconvenient vehicle as it sojourned in the realm below the moon. Indeed, by virtue of its soul's embodiment, man expressed in his own constitution those tensions—ontological and, therefore, moral—that existed between divine and material reality in his mental picture of the cosmos. His "true self," the soul, was drawn to reason, virtue, and the higher spiritual realities, while the demeaning urges of his immediate material environment, the body, distracted the soul through its senses. Surely the body was not the soul's natural home. But man, the lonely sublunar outpost of the spirit, had to endure its importunings until, through mystical experience or finally death itself, it could be shed as a first step to the soul's ascent back toward the One.

For the man who would lead the virtuous life, then, the body was clearly a liability. But the freedom of the will, affirmed classical tradition, that attribute unique to and indeed definitive of the rational soul, offset the dangers inherent in itself deficient in Being, communicated its deficiency to the soul through the body, but also that the soul lived in the body as a result of a pre-incarnate fall. Why, then, does disembodiment fail? See Augustine's critique of Plato's inconsistencies on this score in de civitate Dei XIV.5. On the perceived dichotomy between self and body, Dodds, Pagan and Christian, 24-29; on pagan Neoplatonism's views on the body/soul problem, R.T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (New York, 1972), esp. 61-82; the essays by A.H. Armstrong in Cambridge History of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1970), 222-35; for Augustine's views, the essays by R.A. Markus, ibid., esp., 354-61.

79. Besides the works cited immediately above, see Hans Jonas, Gnosticism (Boston, 1963), 3-47; also, by the same author, "The soul in Gnosticism and Plotinus," Colloque international sur le néoplatonisme (Paris, 1971), 45-53.

80. This in a spatial as well as ontological sense. In the imagined architecture of the cosmos, the earth stood at the center of the heavenly spheres, where the heaviest matter had sunk; the more perfect entities were increasingly distant, in realms of increasing harmony and stability, as one went "up" past the seven planetary spheres to the realm of the fixed stars. For a contemporary statement, Salustius, Περί θεων και κόσμου ("On the Gods and the World"), ed. A.D. Nock (Cambridge, 1926); see also Martin P. Nilsson, "The New Conception of the Universe in Late Greek Paganism," Eranos XI (1946), 20-27; Jonas, Gnosticism, 43; Dodds, on the religious significance of the "physical picture of the cosmos which later antiquity inherited from Aristotle and the Hellenistic astronomers," Pagan and Christian, 43. Paul's own insistence that the resurrection would be spiritual, not physical (I Cor 15), and that the eschatologically redeemed Christian would dwell, uneffectfully, above the terrestrial sphere, "up in the air" (1 Thess 4:16), "in the heavens" (Phil 3:20), is the measure of the influence that this model of the universe exerted over his soteriology (on this point, my discussion in From Jesus to Christ (New Haven, 1988), 58f., 170-76; French translation, De Jésus aux Christ (forthcoming 1989, Éditions du Cerf), ch. 8. Augustine's position, based on his interpretation of these Pauline verses, is therefore, ironically, much more Pharisic and rabbinic in its insistence that the resurrection would be physical than Paul's had been.

bodily existence. Through the free exercise of his will man could train the eye of the soul toward the intelligible verities. The very difficulty of the soul's struggle was in fact the measure of its virtue. And by practicing virtue, man could overcome and subdue the obstacles that the body put in his path—could indeed overcome the "obstacle" of the body itself.

The Pelagian reformers stood within this classical tradition of man's moral perfections—as indeed, prior to 396, had Augustine. And though, to be sure, they defined humanity scripturally—the good God, as Genesis related, had created man both body and soul—the Pelagians assumed much of the anthropology that the classical tradition implied. Hence things bodily, and in particular things sexual, were "detachable," not essentially human in the way the soul was. And the soul in its freedom could choose continence and live chastely, overcoming the disadvantages of physical existence, many of which were the consequence of the flesh's mortality which was inherited, together with the flesh, from Adam. Failure to do so might be sin; but then attribute that sin, Julian urged, to the justly-punished failure of the individual's will, not to a universally inherited fatal disability.

Such a disability, he further charged, was incoherent theologically, philosophically, and scientifically. Theologically, it insulted God's justice by claiming that he condemned innocents, such as unbaptised babies, for the sin of a distant ancestor. Philosophically, it meant that man sinned of necessity, and thus that the will was not free. This too impugned God's justice, besides nullifying the concept of virtue. Scientifically, it misinterpreted the value-neutral role that the calor genitalis played in conception. And if Augustine, to avoid the charge of Manicheism, insisted that the seat of sin was in the soul, not the body—that is, that physical existence as such was not inherently evil—but he likewise insisted that not just mortality but Adam's sin itself was passed from generation to generation, then he said that the soul itself was the matrix peccati. But how could the soul be inherited?

Catholic theology had hardly settled the question of the origin of the soul. The North African tradition, as represented by Tertullian and Cyprian, supported the
traducianist answer: soul came from soul. Julian, and the Pelagians generally, were creationists: the body was inherited, the soul created afresh in every child. The third option that almost everyone would have preferred, and the one most natural to the Greek metaphysics that all but the most classically Stoic of these theologies presupposed, was pre-existence: souls lived before coming into the body. But the Origenist controversy had demolished this last as an option for orthodoxy, and theologians when pushed on the issue had either traducianism or creationism to choose from.

Augustine, when the storm he did so much to bring on finally broke, had not taken a firm position on this question. His previous discussions on the soul had focused on what we would call 'psychology' in the modern sense — what motivates the soul, how affects effects volition, and so on. And while his acuity in analyzing the quality of carnality drove him to genuinely original conclusions about the soul in the mid-390s, his views on the body continued to express — albeit, surely, in a Christian key — the mistrust and devaluation of physical existence traditional to Graeco-Roman learned culture. The body weighed on the soul; it was the source of the soul's miseries. (Prop. 13-18, 10; de lib. arb. III.20, 57) to love the body was to be estranged from the self (de Trinitate XLv, 9). Augustine closely considered the problem of the soul's origin, and came in turn to truly original opinions about the body, only late in his life, and mostly especially in the course of his controversy with Julian.

Against Pelagian creationism, Augustine counterposed a consideration of both scripture and church practice: the exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2 on the issue of Eve's soul, on the one hand, and the practice of infant baptism, on the other. Together, these inclined him to affirm the essence of the traducianist view: all souls, wrote Augustine, even Eve's, originated in Adam; the damage wrought in his soul by sin of disobedience was thereby transmitted, together with the flesh, to all his progeny. The genetics or mechanics of this transmission — how a soul, on the analogy of some material thing like a body, might be inherited — did not concern Augustine, and he specifically denounced the materialist traducianism of Tertullian. Rather, reasoning backwards from the universal necessity of salvation in Christ to the condemnation of all men — even infants — except baptism intervene, Augustine concluded that the reason for this condemnation proceeded from Adam, who passed it on, not to bodies, but to persons, and, thus, to souls as well.

He could, moreover, pinpoint the immediate agent of this damage: the carnal concupiscence necessarily present for human conception. This had entered human history at the moment of Adam's disobedience. Augustine was claiming neither that bodies in general nor sexuality and procreation in particular were evil; indeed, in his commentary on the literal interpretation of Genesis, he was willing to state that God had created Adam and Eve both body and soul specifically for the purpose of procreation, and thus with the capacity for the summa voluptas of orgasm necessary to achieve conception. What had changed with the Fall was not 'man's great purpose, the begetting of children, but rather the psychological

85. E.g., Tertullian, de anima 28.5-6; Cyprian, Ep. 64.5. Augustine invoked this tradition esp. in his anti-Donastist essay de baptismo, written c. 400.


87. Markus notes that this statement in de Trin. is one of only three 'singled out by Augustine for criticism' in the Rer. (II.15.2), Cambridge History... 392.

88. He brings both these issues together in Book X of de genesi ad litteram. On the chronology of this work's composition — which may have been spread over as much as sixteen years — see P. AGAASE and A. SOLIGNAC, La Genèse au sens littéral I-VII, B.A. X (Paris, 1972), 25-31. The editors speculate that Books I-IX were composed before 410, and perhaps Book X around 412, and the final two books sometime before 416 or so. Augustine's 'anti-Pelagian' period begins in the winter of 411.

89. de anima primiti hominis facta, de cibus propugnate omnes hominum animae crearentur, de gen. ad litt. X.3.4.
means by which this could be accomplished. Prior to the Fall, man's capacity for pleasure was coordinated with his will; after, the connection between the two was sundered. Hence, immediately after eating the fruit, Adam and Eve perceived that they were naked, and were ashamed: they had experienced, for the first time, the « stirrings of lust »: involuntary, and hence shame-producing, sexual appetite. 

As a result of the Fall, the relation of body and soul was doubly-disjointed. Lust, that great motivator which man could neither will to have nor will not to have, necessarily attended conception; and the soul, although created to embrace the body as marriage-partners had been created to embrace one another, was inevitably wrenched, unwilling, from the body at death. Both sexual activity and death thus bespoke the abiding effects of the Fall; neither, as now constituted, could be considered « natural », native to man as created. And sexuality in particular was only the most extreme instance of the disjuncture between will and affect that marked man's every erotic attachment. For this reason in Romans Paul had lamented, « Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? » Even though the Apostle delighted in the law of God in his inmost self, he nonetheless saw another law at work in his members, « making me captive to the law of sin » (Rom 7: 22-24).

Hence Augustine directs his enemies' attention to the ad Simplicianum and the Confessions. Augustine recognized in these two earlier works a watershed in his understanding of grace — and, thus, of Paul. But even in these, he now maintained, he had not gone far enough. For originally he had thought that Paul in Romans 7 spoke rhetoricly, as the man sub lege who yearns to live sub gratia. But no man not yet under grace, Augustine now argues, could possibly rejoice in God's law, even if only secondum interiorem hominem. The man who so rejoices must already be sub gratia. In fact, Augustine now concludes, the « I » of Romans 7 could only be the great saint himself, lamenting the tensions that inescapably

101. de praed. sanct. I.4,8 ; because the Pelagians missed Paul's « autobiographical » reference in Rom 7, they misread the entire text, c. duas opp. Pet. I.8,13,11,24; cf. 10,22, where he refers to his own earlier « erroneously » understanding of this passage.
102. c. duas opp. Pet. I.11,24 on apostolic concupiscence; in Iohannis evangelium CXXIII.5, on Paul and Peter's fear of death. Cf. his breezy assertion in de mor. eccles. I.22,40, written c.388, that when the soul has turned from the sensible world to God it will long to be released from the body « and even desire death ».
103. Augustine had first formulated this understanding of « spirit » and « flesh » during his intensive study of Paul in the mid-390's: see Prop. 13,18,10; 46,7; qu. 66,6, where he distinguishes between caro and qualitas carnalis; cf. de gen. ad litt. X.12,20, where he explains that by « flesh » Paul intends, not « body » but those impulses arising from both body and soul that separate man from God: « Thus, the cause of carnal concupiscence is not the soul alone, much less the flesh alone. It comes from both. »
104. For precisely this reason, Augustine attributes the origin of Christ's soul not to Adam, but to the origin of Adam's soul, namely God, de gen. ad litt. X.18,33-20,36.
likewise free both to love and to act not carnaliter, but spiritualiter. Through his
real Incarnation, Christ revealed to man both how he should have been — but after
the Fall no longer could be — and how, after the resurrection, he would be: sinlessly
and harmoniously united both body and soul.

Augustine's efforts against Julian led to his formulating a definition of what it
meant to be human that went well beyond the ancient view of a soul occupying
a body. And precisely by so focusing on sexuality, and insisting that as now
constituted it was the symptom of the Fall par excellence, Augustine, curiously,
dignified it, making it an essential, not detachable, aspect of human existence;
elevating it from the realm of the purely biological to the conflicted, compulsive,
indeed uniquely human world of the psychological. Sex to Julian is reproductive
biology 104; sex to Augustine is eroticism. This is a more complex (not to mention
more interesting) phenomenon. And for Augustine it is the measure of a theologial
problem more complex, and a human situation more desperate, than the
Pelagians with all their healthy-minded talk of medical science and philosophical
freedom could or would acknowledge.

Further, in Augustine's view, Julian's naive insistence that the will was free and
therefore man morally perfectible, that the sexual drive was morally neutral and
certainly, through the free exercise of the will, controllable, and that flesh alone
was inherited, tended too strongly toward that assumption, common to Manichees
and pagan philosophers both, that what was most truly human was the soul. He
saw in Julian's anthropology that physical/spiritual dualism implicit in the classically-informed moral perfectionism that the Pelagians championed and which he
himself, in considering his own life, had come to reject. Their explanation of sin
as the unhappy effect of the carnal body on the pure, newly-created soul suggested,
to Augustine, an anthropology as dangerously dualistic as that of the Manichees.
To argue thus called into question the unity of human nature which, Augustine
urged, on the basis of creation as described in Genesis and redemption as
described in Paul had to consist of both body and soul together.

Augustine's insistence on the unity of human nature, however, was purchased
at the price of man's moral freedom. The conflict between desire and will, whether
in the sexual act or in the process of conversion, could be resolved in this life, and
then only tenuously, solely by the unmerited grace of God. And by abandoning
the traditional understanding of man's moral independence and the traditional
anthropology that defined person primarily as soul, Augustine likewise abandoned
the educational ideology of classical paideia, the liberal arts. Education or lack of
education matters not at all: God chooses whom he will. Perhaps for this reason
Augustine resumed and completed, in the late 420s, another treatise that he had
begun in the late 390s, the de doctrina Christiana. Only scripture, Augustine
maintains, can reveal the face of God; only scripture, therefore, can serve as the
basis of Christian culture. The ad Simplicianum's theological renunciation of the
assumptions of classical paideia, continued into the personal renunciation ren-
dered in the Confessions, culminates in the de doctrina Christiana with a cultural
renunciation as well 105.

But Augustine's anthropology took him even further beyond classical dualism.
As he left man's freedom, the soul's integrity, and traditional education behind,
he also left behind the cosmic architecture of the late Hellenistic universe, and the
resonances that that culture had established between God's relation to the physical
universe and the soul's relation to the body. No longer, for Augustine, was the
human being a miniature map of the cosmos. That world, with its hairline fractures
between orders of being and its twin major fault-lines dividing the universe just
below the moon and man, neatly, between body and soul 106, could not speak to the
infinitely more complicated man of Augustinian anthropology: the man through
whose soul ran the ancient fault-line arising from the sin of Adam.

Augustine's coolness to Paul's vision of cosmic redemption (Rom 8: 19ff.), for
which he has been chided by thoughtful critics from Fortunatus to Henri
Marrou 108, may thus be due to something more in character than prudence in the
face of Manichaean cosmic fantasy 109. The cosmos, simply, did not motivate his
interest, because it did not speak to his construction of the problem of evil and the
nature of man. The exterior world was irrelevant to the question that haunted him:
not, Why is there evil? but, Why does man do evil? 110 What mattered — what was
crucially, terrifyingly relevant — was the interior world, man's loves, man's
will. Ideologically free of late antiquity's map of the cosmos, Augustine's concept
of person could survive Galileo's revolution and so endure, meaningfully, to our
day.

105. For Julian's social and biological interpretation of sexuality, see Brown, «Sexuality and
Society», art. cit.

106. The techniques of paideia were admissible, provided they were applied to the study of
the Bible and not to the products of classical culture. See the remarks of G. Combes and J.
Farges, Le Magistère chrétien, B.A. 11.151-63; Brown, Augustine, 266-9 and 411f.; and the
magisterial study by Henri Marrou, S. Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris, 1958), esp.
331-413. Augustine was repudiating something he assumed would continue to exist; by 428,
however, the year in which he finishes this book, the days of classical education in the West as
he had known it were numbered.

107. Dodds, Pagan and Christian, pp. 6-8, 12-21, 23-35.

108. c. Fort, 21, where Fortunatus supports his contention that «apart from our bodies, evil
things dwell in the whole world» with numerous references to Paul, against Augustine's
androcentric argument; cf. Henri Marrou on the «disappointing» narrowness of Augustine's
interpretation of Rom 8: 8-24, St. Augustine and his influence through the Ages (New York,
1957), 72. For Augustine, the creature who groaned for redemption was man himself, Exp.
Prop. Rm. 53.4.


110. E.g., his discussion in Conf. VII. See also Barco, «Augustine and Paul: the case of
Romans IX», art. cit., 475f.
Augustine explored this inner world — scrupulously, sensitively, unceasingly — in part because he understood Paul to compel him there. And it is through his reading of Paul, finally, that the young Manichee gripped by the mystery of evil\textsuperscript{111}, the driven young professor of rhetoric seizing the \textit{libri Platonici}\textsuperscript{112}, the churchman making his way in the jungle of North African ecclesiastical politics, and the aged bishop affirming his God's justice in the face of the sufferings of tiny babies\textsuperscript{113}, come together to present, to the West, the first modern man: affirming embodied existence; psychologically complicated; turned toward history rather than eternity, and himself rather than the cosmos, for an answer to the question of the problem of evil.

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\textsuperscript{111} E.g., \textit{de lib. arb.} I.2,4; his portrait of his undergraduate years in Carthage, \textit{Conf.} III; \textit{Brown, Augustine}, 46-68.

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Conf.} VII.9,13.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{c. Iul. imperf.} III.22.