Category: Regulatory Enforcement

Volume 36: Fall 2016

March 12th, 2017 in Corporate, Financial Crisis, Legislative Developments, Real Estate, Regulatory Enforcement


Introduction and Table of Contents


Development Articles Table of Contents

Kuhu Parasrampuria, SEC’s New Money Market Rules, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 2 (2016).

Daniel Mello, Anti-Inversion Rules, the Pfizer-Allergan Merger, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Challenge, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 16 (2016).

Alyssa Marchetti, Stricter Anti-Money Laundering Rules for Financial Institutions, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 30 (2016).

Roseanna Loring, Brexit: Economic Impact, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 40 (2016).

Julia Merton, Payday Lending and Its Regulation, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 52 (2016).

Matthew Zolnierz, Dual-Listed IPOs, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 65 (2016).

Harold Primm, Regulating the Blockchain Revolution: A Financial Industry Transformation, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 75 (2016).

Erica Santos, Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac: Release from Conservatorship, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 92 (2016).

Danielle Simard, Developments in Internal Scrutiny of Data Security as Illustrated by Goldman Sachs’s Unauthorized Use of Confidential Supervisory Information, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 102 (2016).

Jennifer Villyard, New Department of Labor Final Fiduciary Rule’s Impact on the Securities Market, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 114 (2016).

Max Perricone, Circuit Split on the Interpretation of the Elements of Tipper/Tippee Liability in Insider Trading Cases, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 131 (2016).

Natalie Witter, Insider Trading and Newman Applied: Goldman Sachs, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 144 (2016).

Lauren Troeller, Bitcoin and Money Laundering, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 159 (2016).

Shaida Mirmazaheri, How FinTech Firms Provide a New Path to Regulatory Relief for Banks, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 175 (2016).

Jessica Park, CFTC Proposes Amendments to Registration Exemptions for Foreign Persons, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 195 (2016).


Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Corporate Wrongdoing: Interactions of Legal Mandates and Corporate Culture, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 207 (2016).

Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence: Evidence from 1995 to 2015, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 257 (2016).

Dr. Xiaoling Ang & Thomas J. Kearney, Building the CFPB’s Arbitration Archive: A Commentary on Design, Implementation, and Privacy, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 315 (2016).


William Simpson, Note, Above Reproach: How the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Escapes Constitutional Checks & Balances, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 343 (2016).

Mark Lipschultz, Note, Merging the Public and Private: The LIHTC Program and A Formula for More Affordable Housing, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 379 (2016).

Time to Break up the Big Banks?

March 27th, 2013 in Regulatory Enforcement

Harvey Rosenblum, Executive Vice President & Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, visited BU Law School this week. Dr. Rosenblum delivered a lecture on 21st Century Financial Crises along with a few comments about his recent WSJ piece on shrinking the too-big-to-fail banks, co-authored with Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher.

As financial blogger Barry Ritholtz points out in a post this week on The Big Picture, Rosenblum is one among many distinguished financial experts, bankers, and economists who believe that the big banks should be broken up. Be sure to take a look at Ritholtz’s list with links to individual comments and proposals.

In the words of financial expert John Mauldin from his discussion of Cyprus and TBTF in this week’s Thoughts From the Frontline,

“The problem we have been discussing is not just a problem in Europe. In a general sense, it is the problem of banks that are too big to be allowed to fail. It is time to rein in the size of large banks before the next crisis. BAC and C are not just too big to fail, they are too big to effectively manage. If banks want to get larger, they should pay more deposit insurance to offset the implicit guarantees they get from taxpayers to cover losses beyond the ability of an FDIC to underwrite. I would go so far as to increase the capital requirements of banks as they increase in size, giving an incentive for management to break them up into smaller (and more manageable) pieces.”