HEIDEGGER’S TRANSCENDENTALISM

by

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to marshall some of the evidence of the transcendental character of Heidegger’s later thinking, despite his repudiation of any form of transcendental thinking, including that of his own earlier project of fundamental ontology. The transcendental significance of that early project is first outlined through comparison and contrast with the diverse transcendental turns in the philosophies of Kant and Husserl. The paper then turns to Heidegger’s account of the historical source of the notion of transcendence in Plato’s thinking, its legacy in various forms of transcendental philosophy, and his reasons for attempting to think in a post-transcendental way. The paper concludes by identifying four vestiges of the transcendental turn in Heidegger’s later thinking.

Wie steht es vor allem mit der Bestimmung des Seins als Grund?1

The title of this paper is problematic in several respects. In the first place, the term ‘transcendentalism’ in an American context is linked to the movement, at once philosophical, religious, and literary, that took shape in the writings of early-nineteenth-century–New England thinkers like Emerson, Thoreau, Fuller, and Parker. Though Heidegger’s thinking bears some deep and intriguing affinities with this movement, American transcendentalism does not appear to figure in any direct way in his development.2 Heidegger seems to identify American thinking largely with pragmatism and capitalist apologetics. He shares with Weber and others at the time the view that Germany has a unique mission in Europe, given its precarious position, caught in the “pinchers” between Soviet Russia and America.3

But even in the German context in the early part of the twentieth century, talk of transcendentalism in Heidegger’s case is problematic. German writers at the time used the term as a moniker for Neo-Kantian philosophy in contrast to positivism and that philosophical newcomer to which Heidegger initially attaches his star, namely, the
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. What distinguishes the Neo-
Kantian approach from that of positivists and phenomenologists alike
is an attempt to root all epistemic or alethic valence in conceptual
activity. Someone can see a patch of red but it is only epistemically
relevant, i.e., relevant to determinations of truth, when she self-con-
sciously conceives and judges it to be red. By contrast, what linked
positivists and phenomenologists was a commitment to what, in their
different ways, they regarded as the raw givenness of truths—albeit in
suitably constrained or purified observations, perceptions, and intu-
itons. The fire engine is red not simply because I have learned to use
the term or employ the concept ‘red’, but because the fire engine pre-
sents itself to me as red.

In this debate between transcendentalists and phenomenologists,
Heidegger, for all his di-

fferences from Husserl, clearly falls on the side
of his erstwhile mentor. Yet it bears adding that the debate itself was
possible at all because both sides acknowledged the need to articulate
the distinctively alethic role of the self-cognizant human subject and
the inability of empirical psychology to do so. Moreover, in this con-
nection both Husserl and Heidegger attempted in their respective ways
to appropriate or, perhaps more accurately, to snatch from Neo-Kantian
thought the mantle of transcendental philosophy—suitably redefined,
of course. These attempts constitute the transcendental turns in their
thought. Husserl’s transcendental turn begins around 1906 and lasts
in one form or another for the remainder of his creative activity as a
philosopher. In this connection the following passage from Husserl
where he sums up the theme of the investigations in the second half
of Ideas I is particularly pertinent.

The result for us, thanks to the phenomenological reduction, is the realm
of transcendental consciousness as the realm of being that is in a definite
sense ‘absolute’. It is the primal category of being in general ... in which
all other regions of being are rooted. ... The doctrine of categories must
proceed from this most radical of all distinctions of being—being as con-
sciousness and being as ‘making itself known’ in consciousness, ‘transcendent’
being—I, a distinction which, as one sees, can be gathered and appreci-
ated in its purity only by means of the method of the phenomenologi-
cal reduction. In the essential connection between transcendental and
transcendent being are grounded the connections between phenomenology
and all other sciences, connections in the sense of which it is inherent
that the dominion of phenomenology extends in a certain remarkable
manner over all the other sciences that it nevertheless suspends.₃
This quote, a launching pad for some of Heidegger’s most strident criticisms of Husserl, is valuable not only for its unabashed identification of transcendental consciousness with being in a primal sense but also for its clear identification of transcendent being with what makes itself known or simply gives notice of itself (sich bekundendes) in consciousness. At one level transcendence for Husserl can be said to designate whatever in some sense is not inherently immanent (reell-immanent) to consciousness in the way that sensations of colors and sounds are, even though that transcendence constitutes itself in a consciousness or cogitatio. Thus, the colors and sounds that are immanent parts of the perception of an inherently transcendent (reell transcendent) thing are not parts of that thing, i.e., are not to be identified with the colored or noisy parts of the thing. So, too, something inherently transcendent is always transcendent relative to and within a potential consciousness of it without becoming a part of that consciousness in the way that the sensation of a color or sound is.

However, at another level, there is also a more decisive way to speak of transcendence and transcendental for Husserl in terms of evidence. Thus, the essence of something can be evident in the sense of being immanent “in an absolute sense” to the transcendentally, i.e., phenomenologically reduced consciousness, i.e., evident as an “absolute and clear givenness,” and this manner of being immanent contrasts with the transcendence of anything that is not given in this evident, directly discernible way. Husserl has, of course, a much longer story to tell in this connection since even the durational spread of a sound (the elapsing and imminent tones as well as resonances, reverberations, and echoes) transcends the momentary consciousness of the sound. As he puts it in the summer semester of 1907, “the cogitationes that as simple data we regard as nothing mysterious at all conceal all sorts of transcendences.” Yet despite these important qualifications and complications, the common theme is that transcendences are ultimately transcendences in immanence; they make themselves known not simply to but in consciousness.

Despite Heidegger’s serious misgivings with Husserl’s “pre-hermeneutic phenomenology,” an analogous structure is evident in his project of fundamental ontology. To be sure, the shift in focus from consciousness to being-here and all that it entails can scarcely be overstated. Nevertheless, Heidegger explicitly styles his philosophical thinking transcendental in Sein und Zeit as well as in other venues in the years
immediately following its publication. During this time (1926–1929), Heidegger remains unmistakably a transcendental philosopher.

Yet, in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger loses his enthusiasm for transcendental philosophy, even on his own terms. By the latter half of the 1930s he is sharply critical of his transcendental ways, particularly as in Sein und Zeit. There is perhaps no clearer indication of the extent of the older Heidegger’s desire to break with transcendental philosophy than his construal—one might even say, “indictment”—of the very inauguration of transcendental method in philosophy by Kant. By grounding the being of beings exclusively in their objectivity for rational subjects in general, Kant’s transcendental method gives wings, Heidegger claims, to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, “whose claim to power unleashes the universal and total miscalculation of everything as something computable.” The transcendental method is said to usher in an era without precedent since the proper approach to every matter has been decided and any further questioning closed off. As a result, “the most extreme sort of withdrawal of being begins, insofar as the essential origin of being cannot even come into view as a question and one deserving to be asked.”

Nor have Heidegger’s most able interpreters failed to appreciate the scope and force of this renunciation of transcendence and transcendental thinking. Charles Scott, for example, considers it a mark of the success of Heidegger’s later thinking that he is able to reorient thinking without invoking transcendence. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann stresses how the turn in Heidegger’s philosophy is “a crossing from the transcendental-horizonal perspective into the enowning-historical perspective” or, as Daniela Vallega-Neu puts it, “the leap over transcendence” and into the temporal horizon of being, a leap that cancels the very notion of horizon.

Censuring the transcendental turn in philosophy forms, indeed, a constant refrain of Heidegger’s later works. They also provide the most salient objection to talk of “Heidegger’s transcendentalism.” It is objectionable because it is at odds with Heidegger’s own unequivocal repudiation of transcendental philosophy.

In the following observations I want to focus on this repudiation. Doing so helps us bring Heidegger’s mature thinking about truth and being into view against the backdrop of transcendental thinking. But it also allows us to question the motivation and extent of his disavowals of transcendental turns in philosophy. Why does Heidegger reject all philosophical talk of transcendence and the transcendental? What does
he find so objectionable, in particular, about his own version of transcendental philosophy in *Sein und Zeit* and other lectures and publications in the late 1920s? What is the basis of this objection and what is its force? Do Heidegger’s mature “contributions to philosophy” betray an ongoing fealty to a form of transcendentalism? And if some of the familiar tropes of transcendental discourse are still discernible in his attempt to make way for a turn from thinking being transcendentally to thinking being historically and post-metaphysically, what precisely are we to make of them?

In the space of the following observations, answers to these questions can only be insinuated. My aim is not to determine the accuracy of Heidegger’s assessment of his earlier work or to search for inconsistencies, verbal or otherwise, in his mature thinking but to try to think what he thought and perhaps left unthought, to make it clearer, and if possible, to place it in question.13

1. Heidegger’s Early Transcendentalism

In my opening remarks, I stated that Heidegger in the late 1920s was very much a transcendental philosopher. But before turning to his self-criticisms in this regard, it is important that we try to be clear about what the label does and does not mean in his case. Heidegger himself introduces the term ‘transcendental’ at the outset of *Sein und Zeit* in the course of sketching its distinctive theme and method. As far as the theme is concerned, he argues for the primacy of the question of being (ontology), the fundamental task of which is a “sufficient clarification” of the sense of being, which in turn entails an investigation of the manner of being for whom being is in question and thus in some sense understood (the existential analysis of *Da-sein* as the source of a fundamental ontology).14 He then elaborates the sense in which phenomenology is the method of ontology in general and a hermeneutic phenomenology the method of fundamental ontology, “through which the sense of being and the basic structures of its own being are made known [gegeben] to the understanding of being that is proper to *Da-sein.*”15 Heidegger then sums up this introduction to the “object and type of treatment” of his project with the dense observation:

Being as the basic theme of philosophy is no genus of some entities and yet it concerns each entity. Its ‘universal’ is to be sought on a higher
plane. Being and the structure of being lie beyond each entity and beyond every possible determination of the entity as such. Being is the transcendens simply. The transcendence of the being of Dasein is an exceptional [transcendence] insofar as the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation resides in it. Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis.¹⁶

This telling quotation reveals how Heidegger conceives the project of Sein und Zeit in terms that combine the medieval concept of ‘transcendence’ with the modern (Kantian and Husserlian) concept of the ‘transcendental’. He begins with the general statement about the universality of being that transcends every genus (praedicamentum or category). The universality, higher than that of any genus, corresponds to that of a transcendental in the medieval sense, but Heidegger applies the notion to a specific sort of being. Instead of speaking in a global sense of being’s transcendence, he concentrates on “the transcendence of the being of being-here.” The troublesome double genitives in this phrase allow for various interpretations, but I take them to be successive possessive genitives. On this reading, Heidegger is referring to the kind of transcendence constitutive of the very manner of being that pertains to being-here or, in other words, constitutive of the sort of being with a self-defining understanding of being. Heidegger then invokes the modern notion of transcendental, in a way analogous to Kant’s usage, namely, as a descriptor of a kind of a priori knowledge.¹⁷

It should not be overlooked, however, that Heidegger characterizes the object of this kind of knowledge with at least one eye on the Scholastic notion, i.e., the kind of knowledge that we have when we know being insofar as it transcends. The being in question is, to be sure, that of being-here and so the transcendental knowledge characteristic of fundamental ontology is precisely the disclosure of its transcendence or, more precisely, the transcendence that, coinciding with its understanding of being, makes up its manner of being.¹⁸ But transcendence here does not only characterize, as it typically does for Husserl (at least circa 1913), what lies in some sense beyond the subject (even if always also immanent or potentially immanent to it). Instead, the transcendence that makes up the very being of being-here encompasses a relation to oneself as well as a correlative relatedness to the world at large. Heidegger attempts to capture this distinctive transcendence with the metonym, “being-in-the-world.”¹⁹ Thus, it is the very essence of being-here to transcend (range over and charac-
terize) itself and the world, others, and any other entities and modes of being that it encounters within the world. It does so thanks to a disposed understanding of being. In other words, an understanding of being as mattering to it existentially constitutes and discloses “the transcendence of the being of being-here.” Analysis of existence, this self-disclosive constitution of being-here, yields the transcendental knowledge that makes up fundamental ontology.

Earlier I noted differences between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s use of the term ‘transcendence’. Yet the differences should not obscure some basic homologies. Echoing the cognate central function of transcendental subjectivity in Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger emphasizes that for the problem of being in general as for the problem of transcendence “the subjectivity of the subject itself” is the central question. Heidegger also follows Husserl here and elsewhere in adopting Kant’s talk of a transcendental sphere providing “conditions of the possibility” for some other, subordinate level. In a similar vein he argues that grounding in general necessarily has a transcendental meaning because it is rooted in Da-sein’s transcendence.

Indeed, in this last respect there are patent, albeit easily misleading, parallels among the three philosophers. Thus, in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kant elaborates the transcendental principles that make empirical judgments possible and how transcendental idealism at once takes leave of and ensures commonsense realism; in Ideen I Husserl outlines the phenomenological or transcendental reductions that yield transcendental phenomena capable of explaining transcendence in the very natural attitude that they suspend; and in Sein und Zeit Heidegger demonstrates how what ontologically enables the encounter of inner-worldly entities, namely, the transcendence of the world, is grounded in “the horizontal unity of ecstatic temporality,” itself the ontological sense of being-here as its original illumination or clearing. While Kant uses the term ‘transcendence’ to signify a principle that oversteps the limits of what can be experienced and Husserl uses it to signify experiences directed beyond themselves, they both sharply distinguish the respective scope of the term from that which they, again in different ways, reserve for ‘transcendental’. Given their different uses of ‘transcendence’, we might capture the divergent roles assigned to transcendental subjectivity in this regard by Kant and Husserl respectively, as follows. While one of the aims of Kant’s critical analysis of transcendental subjectivity is to demonstrate the insignificance of transcendental claims, Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of transcendental
subjectivity is meant to explain its transcendence (a transcendence always perspectivally limited in the case of perceptions of sensory objects). By contrast, Heidegger retrieves and recasts the medieval sense of ‘transcendence’ by applying it to Da-sein’s being, while applying the term ‘transcendental’ to the disclosure (truth) of that transcendence.

Despite these significant variations, there is one final aspect of Heidegger’s link with his transcendental predecessors that deserves note, particularly in view of the way that Heidegger subsequently views all philosophies of transcendence within the shadows of Plato’s interpretation of being and what Heidegger takes to be its “idealist” legacy. Both Kant and Husserl style their philosophies as transcendental idealisms, precisely to capture the irreducibility of knowledge (and, for that matter, certain other values) to empirical or naturalistic descriptions of human behavior or organisms. Herein lies the basic insight driving Neo-Kantian thinkers, as noted at the outset, but also Heidegger’s lifelong refrain that “‘there is’ being only as long as Dasein is.” In this context, it is telling that Heidegger already in Sein und Zeit explicitly links transcendentalism with idealism and even seems willing, under proper constraints, to allow for a certain understanding of the latter. To be sure, insofar as realism and idealism frame the traditional debate in epistemology, he rejects both alike as untenable and their very dichotomy as ungrounded.

Nonetheless, he lauds idealism as “the sole and legitimate possibility of philosophical problematic” insofar as it stands for the understanding “that being is never explicable through beings but is respectively already the ‘transcendental’ for every entity.” There is probably no passage that better displays Heidegger with one foot firmly in a tradition and another beyond it. But there is more than one way to interpret his position here. In a less generous moment, we can interpret it as mere fence-straddling or we can accept his own interpretation, namely, that one foot must be planted firmly in a tradition in order to be able to push off from it and make the leap to a new beginning with the other. In any event, the question presents itself: are the motives for the transcendental turn from empiricist and naturalistic thinking no longer at work in the new, allegedly postmetaphysical and posttranscendental beginning which Heidegger is attempting to prepare for?
2. Heidegger’s Criticisms of Transcendentalism

One key text signaling Heidegger’s repudiation of the notion of transcendence and the transcendental philosophy entailed by it is to be found towards the conclusion of Part Three, “The Pass” (Das Zuspiel) of the Beiträge. It is understandable that the critical discussion is to be found here, since the pass is meant to prepare the way for another beginning to thinking, precisely through an indispensable, detached, yet thoughtful exchange with the thinkers who define the history of the first beginning. Precisely in this pass, the task of thinking is to appropriate the first beginning in an original way, a way that is concealed from those thinkers themselves and allows us, indeed, even compels us to set foot in another (but presumably not opposite) beginning. This transpires, Heidegger maintains, in a transition from the guiding or leading question (what is the entity?) to the basic or ground question (what is being? what is its truth?) or, as he also puts it, from thinking precipitated—Vorg riff—by human beings (in the form of the correctness of assertions and the objectivity of objects) to thinking that grounds being human and completely transforms our relations to beings. Since the leading question is the definitive question of metaphysics, the pass amounts to overturning or, better, twisting free of metaphysics, a way of thinking that “scales over beings to beingness (idea).” Here, without explicitly invoking the term ‘transcendence’, Heidegger identifies the inherently transcendent character of metaphysics, the sort of philosophy that makes up the history of thinking from its first inception.

Heidegger locates his “historical” lectures in the ambit of the task of the pass. In this context he provides an important clue to his assessment of his own transcendental moves. He speaks of retracing Kant’s major steps “and yet overturning the ‘transcendental’ departure point by means of Da-sein.” In the same brief section (§88) he adds that this was one path, among others, for showing that being, in order to prevail, requires the grounding of its truth, a grounding necessarily consummated as Da-sein, by means of which all idealism and metaphysics in general are overcome. Yet he ends by remarking that this effort, as “a necessary unfolding of the first beginning,” first stumbled into the dark, with the result that it is only from the standpoint of the other beginning that it can be conceived. In this way Heidegger characterizes his work in the late 1920s: though it falls short because of its heritage, it has the unmistakably “twofold transitional character of at once conceiving metaphysics more originally and thereby overturning
it.” The fact that it points the way to a question that cannot be posed by metaphysics and hence requires another beginning explains the torso of fundamental ontology—and perhaps some of Heidegger’s reasons for destroying the unpublished remainder of *Sein und Zeit.*

It is in the context of sketching the pervasive influence of the Platonic understanding of ἴδεα upon Western metaphysics that Heidegger provides perhaps his most revealing account of philosophies centering on a notion of transcendence, including his own earlier “transcendental” efforts. The immediate context is one of the concluding and lengthier sections of Part Three, namely, the section entitled “The ἴδεα, Platonism and Idealism.” Heidegger begins this section by recounting how ἴδεα—initially understood as the unifying look something presents as a constant, available presence and presents to a potential onlooker (and ultimately, perceiver or thinker)—came to be identified with the beingness of beings. Heidegger acknowledges, to be sure, that Plato’s awareness of being as something more, requiring a move beyond this beingness (ἦνα τὴς ὑπόσως), effectively brings the leading question of metaphysics up against its limits. But because his questioning is only directed at beings and their beingness, he can only determine that dimension beyond beings in terms of what characterizes beingness in relation to human beings, i.e., as something good or suitable to them. “Beingness [Seiendheit] is not conceived in [a] more primordial way any more, but instead is evaluated in such a way that the valuation itself is put forth as the highest point.”

Heidegger contends, further, that Plato’s formulation of the leading question of Western metaphysics and his answer to it provided the framework and paradigm for all subsequent Western interpretations of being.

After tracing the transformations in the notion of the idea that led to idealism (the equation of the beingness of beings with their being presented or represented), Heidegger notes how the influential notion of transcendence emerges from the Platonic interpretation of being. For Heidegger the core of that Platonic interpretation is once again the construal of entities in terms of the constant look—the ἴδεα—that they present over many different and changing circumstances. So construed, the beingness of a being is the ἴδεα or ἴδος that is common (κοινῶ) or generic (γενῆ). Insofar as the idea (the beingness of beings) is put forward as common to, and yet beyond, any particular beings, its separateness (χωρημός) from beings is also posited. This manner of representing being as separate from beings is, Heidegger maintains, “the origin of ‘transcendence’ in its various forms.”
With this brief introduction, Heidegger then identifies five kinds of transcendence in the following order: ontic, ontological, fundamental-ontological, epistemological, and metaphysical. With the exception of the last, all these labels are Heidegger’s own. Ontic transcendence is that of one entity over others, the paradigmatic instance of which is the Christian notion of the supreme being, the creator who reigns over and above all other entities. Ontological transcendence refers to the already mentioned Platonic notion of the separateness of being, conceived as ἵδαι, i.e., beingness as the generality “over” and “prior to” all entities (and, hence, a priori with respect to them). The relation and sort of distinction involved in this conception of transcendence remains, Heidegger adds, “completely unclear,” as people remain satisfied with ascertaining the generality and its consequences (think of the cognate difficulties with μὴ ἁθανάτι ἐστιν in and among the Platonic forms, participation in Aquinas’ metaphysics, or contemporary theories of reference). Simply passing over to the idea fails to take into account the fact that it is projected, as well as the fact that the entities passed over must already be given. So, too, both sides of the ontological difference must be given in advance and the problem is to attend to their unity.

The third sense of ‘transcendence’ is the fundamental-ontological transcendence elaborated in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger’s gloss of this third sense, to which I shall return in a moment, is at once circumspect (guarded) and critical. Epistemological transcendence is the sort of transcendence considered by epistemology where the issue, commencing with Descartes, is the defensibility or dubiousness of the relation of a subject to an object. The fifth sense of transcendence identified by Heidegger encompasses any exit or departure from familiar and reliable entities for the sake of passing beyond them, regardless of the orientation. Though he does not name this final, generic sense of transcendence, as he does the others, it may be aptly termed ‘metaphysical’ transcendence since he adds that it “remains caught up in the manner of question characteristic of the leading question, that is to say, in metaphysics.”

While Heidegger includes fundamental ontology on this list, he also engages in what might be considered a qualified revisionist interpretation of it. I am referring to Heidegger’s observation of how the sort of transcendence in question in fundamental ontology can be interpreted in a way that coincides with his attempt to think being-historically in the Beiträge. Thus, he relates that he conceived the notion of climbing over and surpassing (Übersteigerung) as a distinguishing mark...
of being-here (Da-sein) in order to indicate that it always already stands
in the open amidst entities. In addition, he observes that, if Da-sein’s
understanding is conceived as “thrown projection,” transcendence means
“standing in the truth of being,” the very standing that Heidegger in
the *Beiträge* identifies with the appropriating event, the *Ereignis*, the
enownment of and by being.

Yet the revisionist character of these remarks is qualified, since
Heidegger also maintains that the transcendental path is merely provi-
sional for the purpose of preparing the reversal in thinking, the run-up
to the leap into the basic or grounding question. After giving the
positive spin—mentioned above—on how the transcendence of Da-
sein discussed in *Sein und Zeit* might be construed as “standing in the
truth of being,” he is quick to add that he was not initially aware of
this aspect. However, he follows up this note with the observation that,
in any case, talk of ‘Da-sein’s transcendence’ is strictly speaking inap-
propriate, since being-here as such (i.e., its very being: Da-sein als Da-
sein) is that opening (the opening of the concealment). Later (in Part
Five), he adds that even the qualified sense of Da-sein’s transcendence
is misleading since transcendence presupposes levels and is in danger
of being misconstrued as an action of an ego and subject. Thus, in
the *Beiträge*, Heidegger concludes that, as far as Da-sein is concerned,
“the notion of ‘transcendence’ in every sense must disappear” and, with
it, as we learn from the introduction to the 1949 edition of “What is
Metaphysics?,” every ontology as well, “fundamental ontology” included.

Heidegger takes these pains to identify the various strands of philoso-
phies of transcendence and to locate fundamental ontology among
them as a means of purging his thinking of any trace of the notion
of transcendence and the transcendentalism he links to it. Why, then,
one might ask, was he so enthusiastic about the transcendental turn
in the first place? One intriguing part of the answer, suggested by
Heidegger himself in the *Beiträge* and iterated in *Zeit und Sein*, is his
attempt to exploit structural similarities between fundamental ontology
and Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and indeed, even to find a hear-
ing for his work at the time. Not that he has any mistaken notions
about the differences between the two projects, one aimed at subjective
conditions of possibility of the objectivity of objects, the other at
the self-disclosure of being in being-here. Indeed, Heidegger is clearly
annoyed with construals of his transcendental project in *Sein und Zeit*
as an “existentiell” or “modernized” Kantianism. Nevertheless, Heidegger
recognizes that he has himself to blame at least in part, since he invited
his contemporaries to look back to Kant’s project with him as a means of affording them a closer glimpse of the relation of being-here and being.43

What is problematic about this account is Heidegger’s repeated admission in the Beiträge of how inchoate the project announced in Sein und Zeit originally was to him. This lack of clarity may suggest that the Kantian framework was a necessary crutch and not merely a rhetorical device. But, in any case, Heidegger clearly identifies why cozying up to Kant’s transcendental project was a mistake. It was a mistake because its differentiation of levels, one supplying conditions of possibility of the other, reinforced a misleading conception of the ontological difference between being and beings. Heidegger initially insisted on the ontological difference in order to pose the question of the truth of being in a way that sets it off from all questions about this or that particular being. Yet the distinction has the effect of separating beingness from beings, precisely as an idea underlying them. In this connection Heidegger remarks how he undertook to rethink his initial approach to the question of being: “It accordingly became necessary to endeavor to free oneself from the ‘condition of the possibility’ as a merely ‘mathematical’ regression and to grasp the truth of being in the basis of its own prevailing (the event).”44

Heidegger accordingly links the promise and perils of thinking the ontological difference together with thinking in terms of transcendence. Attempting to think the difference helps us raise the question of being. Nevertheless, the difference is, in Heidegger’s words, “tortuous,” “discordant,” and “fatal,” because it springs from a line of questioning directed at beings as such, or in other words, a line of questioning aimed at the beingness that transcends them.45 Starting out from this sort of difference, we are precluded from inquiry into the unity of being and beings. “Hence, it is a matter,” he concludes, “not of passing beyond the entity (transcendence) but instead of jumping over this difference and with it, transcendence, and questioning from the outset from the standpoint of being and truth.”46

What it means to question in this way remains to be seen, but it is apparent from this account why Heidegger came to regard the transcendental perspective of fundamental ontology as a hindrance to his effort to raise the question of being. Echoing the ontological difference, the analyses in Sein und Zeit repeatedly move past the entities to respective conceptions of their being, the ontological and the existential, i.e., from ontic considerations of tools and objects to their ontological handiness
and onhandness (Zuhandenheit, Vorhandenheit) or from existentiell considerations of existence to considerations of their existential significance as a kind of timeliness (Zeitlichkeit). Moreover, Heidegger reinscribes the transcendental-phenomenological subject into the analysis inasmuch as he emphasizes how Da-sein’s disclosive projection, i.e., its understanding more than its thrownness, constitutes the original, transcendental truth that is the condition of possibility of any other truths.\textsuperscript{47} By Heidegger’s own retrospective account, his posing of the question of being in Sein und Zeit is transitional and provisional.

It may be worth recalling here once again Heidegger’s positive characterization of transcendence in his Beiträge gloss of fundamental-ontological transcendence. Before declaring that the representation of transcendence in every sense must disappear, he observes that transcendence could be interpreted as “standing in the truth of being,” insofar as Da-sein’s understanding of being is taken as “thrown projection.” This insistence on the proper construal of Seinsverständnis as a thrown projection, iterated in the Letter on Humanism, coincides with Heidegger’s crucial emphasis on the way in which being grounds, and thus requires, being-here and, indeed, does so in the time-space of its singular facticity. “Being needs the human being so that it might prevail and it is only by belonging to being that a human being achieves its consummate vocation as Da-sein.”\textsuperscript{48} This grounding in which being and being-here are alike implicated is a happening or event that is also the appropriation (the Er-eignis) of being-here by being—and the primary thing, Heidegger insists, that we have to consider.\textsuperscript{49} The truth of being, as opposed to transcendental truth, even the transcendental truth of Dasein’s disclosedness, is the event in which being prevails precisely by appropriating, by making being-here its own.

Paralleling this shift from the transcendental truth of being-here to the truth of being is a reconfiguration of the notion of a clearing, the synonym for the “disclosedness” of and by Dasein in Sein und Zeit. By linking the concept to its etymology and traditional metaphors of light (such as Descartes’ lumen naturale), Heidegger leaves the impression that the transcendental truth of Dasein is the medium in which things can present themselves and thus be said to be. The image has the distinct disadvantage, however, of reinforcing the mistaken notions that being is the mere presence of things or even the paradigmatic, constant presence by virtue of which they are present and that this medium is somehow the doing of Dasein. As Heidegger begins to attribute the clearing as the truth, not primarily to Dasein, but to being, he drops,
along with the descriptor 'transcendental', the association with light in favor of the normal use of the term for an open space in a forest. While shading off into the darkness, the clearing makes it possible for things to show themselves without showing itself in any comparable way and, indeed, precisely by keeping itself from view in the process. Heidegger construes being (Seyn) in just this sense—in contrast to beingness—as the time-space that appropriates human beings to itself, making them be here so that any entities, including human beings, may make themselves present but also ultimately absent themselves. The appropriating event itself, its time-space, remains the hidden presencing no less than absencing of beings.

Heidegger’s point here is not simply that entities do not wear their being (i.e., their eventfulness, in his special sense of the term) on their sleeves like their color or size or, in some cases, their relation to other things. This insight, underlying Kant’s claim that being is not a property or a “real” predicate as well as the difference that logicians make between open and closed sentences, between free and bounded variables, corresponds in some sense to the ontological difference but is only part of the story. It is only part of the story because being is not simply the presence but also the absence of an entity in all the senses of its time-space horizon, i.e., the different senses of its absence before, during, and after its presence. Being is hidden, but its hiddenness is the hiddenness of not only the presence but also the absences of entities. When Heidegger speaks of “the truth of being” as the clearing, he understands it as the clearing for its self-concealing in both senses of the term just addressed. Being conceals itself both as the presence of what is present and its absence. Moreover, as the conjunction of being present and absenting suggests, this clearing is anything but static; it is the happening or event of being’s unfolding or prevailing (wesen).50

Heidegger understands this focus on the truth of being or, in effect, how it prevails, as anything but a departure from beings or entities. Indeed, it is the mark of philosophies of transcendence, modern transcendental philosophies included, to overshoot entities, to pass beyond them to some overriding condition. Not coincidentally, answers to the leading question of Western metaphysics (what is the entity?) require looking away from the entity itself in just this transcendental fashion. When the immediate and most enduring question that comes to mind regarding any being is: What is it?, we are replaying the traditional move, ultimately oblivious to beings insofar as they are. Being is forgotten
or, better, conceals itself in favor of some conception of beings that actually diverts attention and concern from the entities themselves.

In stark contrast to this metaphysical tradition and with the prospect of not passing over the entities themselves, Heidegger in the *Beiträge* turns to the question: What is being? The turn seems paradoxical; indeed, in this connection John Sallis speaks of “one of the major tensions” running through the *Beiträge*. Thus, while indicting transcendental interpretations of the ontological difference for deflecting attention away from beings themselves in favor of some conception of being (beingness), Heidegger himself calls for an orientation to being itself in contrast to approaches based on what seems to be immediately in the offing from entities themselves. But the latter approach is precisely what sabotages the promise of the ontological difference. For what seems immediately in the offing from the entities themselves is itself the sediment of traditional ways of thinking about things (beings) that go hand in hand with long entrenched ways of dealing with them in general (nature and artifact, ourselves and one another). Hence, in order to be able to attend to the entities themselves insofar as they are, we have no recourse but to turn from them to the question of being itself.

Heidegger ventures to raise this question in the *Beiträge* and other mature works. The result is a way of “thinking being historically” that is allegedly neither transcendent nor transcendental in Kant’s sense. Nor can being, so understood, be said to be transcendent in any of the traditional senses of the word laid out by Heidegger and glossed above. Being is not something universally accessible or common, nor some cause or all-encompassing factor behind things, nor is it the most general, albeit yet-to-be-conceived determination of entities with which we are otherwise quite familiar. It is also not some universal principle or essence available to a transcendental subject enabling knowledge of objects or facts; but it differs, too, from the projective understanding by and of Dasein in terms of which entities are uncovered and their manners of being disclosed. Far from being separate from and passing over entities in any of these ways, being is precisely the historical event of their presencing and absencing, an event that prevails as the timely spacing and spacious timing of entities, an event that Heidegger also describes as the conflict of world and earth.
3. Transcending Transcendence and the Vestiges of Transcendentalism

In Heidegger's excerpt "From a Conversation about Language," he makes a remark that is particularly telling for the concerns of this paper. His interlocutor presses him with the observation that the very title of an early lecture embroils him in the subject-object framework that he aimed to put into question. After acknowledging that the criticism is right in a certain respect, Heidegger makes the following observation:

No one can perch himself beyond the reigning orbit of ideas in a single bound, especially when it concerns the long traveled courses of previous thinking that blend in among what is inconspicuous. Moreover, perching oneself in this way opposite what has gone before is itself already moderated by the fact that the seemingly revolutionary will is attempting, above all, to recover the looming past [Gewesene] in a more original way.54

The refrain here is a familiar one. The move beyond metaphysics, he observes in the Afterword to "What is Metaphysics?", demands that "within certain limits it must still speak the language of what it helps overturn."55 In these texts, as elsewhere,56 Heidegger puts his finger on the considerable challenges that his thinking faces. Transcending (!) the tradition in the appropriate respect where it has become so customary and second nature as to be inconspicuous requires repeated, self-critical efforts. The tendency simply to fall back on old habits of thinking is so enormous and understandable that the vigilance required to identify any metaphysical (transcendental) implications inhabiting them is never completely adequate. This task, moreover, is rendered all the more difficult by the fact that the tradition circumscribes the effort to give thinking a new start, indeed, makes it possible. Thinking being-historically is not a matter of dismissing or abandoning the history of Western thinking but recovering what, by concealing itself (to some degree) from the tradition, gave it wings. Heidegger makes this point with particular poignancy in Der Satz vom Grund as he pleads for taking the leap from inquiries about beings to the question of being (from the principle of sufficient reason as a basic principle governing beings to a way of saying being). In this connection Heidegger notes that the history of Western thinking only presents itself as the fate of being if we look back on it as a whole from the standpoint of the leap and preserve it as such. But it is equally necessary, he insists, that the preparation for taking the leap demands speaking “from the standpoint of the already fatefully experienced history of being.” Moreover, while the destination of the leap is the realm of what comes on the
scene as alone worthy of thinking, this arrival is “co-stamped by the features of the enduring past and only recognizable in it.”

If, with these challenging qualifications in mind, we turn to Heidegger’s relation to the transcendental tradition, his attitude towards his own transcendental phase becomes understandable. After acknowledging that a suitable understanding of being-here can, indeed, be characterized as transcendence, he is adamant that all talk of transcendence must vanish. The reason is that Da-sein is originally the opening of the concealment. In other words, insofar as to be-here is to be the opening for being’s self-concealment, any talk of it passing over or beyond itself is out of place, as is, presumably, any talk of levels with respect to being, the sort of levels detectable in the senses of transcendence outlined and criticized by Heidegger in the *Beiträge*.

Yet the question continues to nag: does Heidegger manage to “transcend” transcendence? Indeed, is it a mere equivocation to characterize his efforts in this seemingly self-defeating way (i.e., “transcending transcendence”)? How successfully does he manage to twist free of the meanings of transcendence that he enunciates and repudiates? If, as we might surmise from Heidegger’s own remarks reviewed above, vestiges of transcendental thinking inevitably recur in his deliberations about preparing for another sort of thinking, are these vestiges merely innocuous tropes or do they signal serious difficulties with his project?

For these questions to have any force, we must be able first to identify the tropes or turns of phrases in Heidegger’s thinking that might suggest a lingering transcendentalism. One place to look is “Zeit und Sein.” Heidegger concludes this 1962 lecture with an apology or excuse of sorts: speaking of the appropriating event in the manner of a lecture is hindered by the need to articulate these matters in the form of declarative sentences in the indicative mood, i.e., assertions. These qualifications have a bearing on the transcendental issue, since modern transcendental philosophies ape scientific prose and its corresponding commitment to something like the principle of sufficient reason that requires well-formed sentences in order to make sound inferences and present explanatory theories in a logically grounded, i.e., justified, way. Yet Heidegger is obviously well aware of this avenue and adamantly forecloses it. “Representational-inferentially-justificatory [vorstellend-begründend] thinking corresponds to the appropriating event as little as merely saying in the form of assertions does.” But note the qualification “representational-inferentially-justificatory,” a formulation that leaves the door open for justification of another sort. So, too, in the Introduction to *Zeit und Sein* Heidegger indicates his aim of saying something about
the attempt to think being without regard for a justification or establishment of being on the basis of beings. Here, too, the rejection of “justification” (*Begründung*) in some sense is not tout court but specifically qualified, a qualification to which Heidegger explicitly returns in the *Protocol*.\(^6^0\) So, too, in lectures during the 1941 summer semester, Heidegger employs *Be-gründung* with a hyphen (presumably to distinguish it from inferential justification or grounding): “What especially grounds everything and gives everything ground is itself the ground.”\(^6^1\)

These guarded statements about *Be-gründung* are not mere extensions of the *via negativa* that Heidegger otherwise professes when it comes to the function of sentences that take the form of assertions or combinations of them in an inferential pattern. Heidegger needs to make these guarded statements because his account of time and being is replete with the language of a philosophy of transcendence.

There is, first of all, the familiar designation of some constant underlying unity, in this case, the way that the present, the enduring past, and the future reach and bring about one another and, in the interplay of their distinctive presences and absences, continually affect or matter to us (*s*tet... den Menschen angehende*). Though Heidegger rightly takes precautions to avoid talk of simultaneity and ever-presence in regard to this unity, he has apparently no qualms about ascribing a distinctive presence (*Anwesen*) to each temporal dimension, one that each achieves by way of extending itself to the others in forming their unity. Moreover, they reach or extend nothing else but themselves to one another and that means, Heidegger adds, “the presence reached among them.” Finally, despite the talk of affecting us, Heidegger adds that their reach reaches us, but only because it is “in itself,” a note he echoes in *Der Satz vom Grund* with talk of the singularity of being.\(^6^2\) The constancy, the unity, the singularity and “in itself” status of time’s manner of being present are aspects of being that closely resemble those marks of transcendence that, on Heidegger’s own gloss, are the hallmark of the Greek metaphysical tradition.

To be sure, these features are not transcendental in the typically modern senses (Kant, Husserl) of the term. But Heidegger also seems to betray unmistakable vestiges of modern transcendentalism as well, especially when one considers the characteristic turn of modern transcendentalism from experience to the conditions of the possibility of experience. Despite the fact that Heidegger explicitly pans talk of the “conditions of the possibility” in the *Beiträge* in favor of a new relation to entities,\(^6^3\) there is no shortage of analogous designations for time-space in “Zeit und Sein.” Thus, he contends that time-space “alone”
provides the space familiar to us with a clearing for its “possible” expanse, in effect, granting and enabling it (as the term *einzäumen* here also indicates). Likewise, one-dimensional time not only draws on the representation of three-dimensional space but also rests upon the three- or four-dimensional reach of authentic time that first allows (*erste verstät-tel*) the representation and delimitation of a region of measurement. Furthermore, asking where this time-space might be is nonsense, Heidegger suggests, since its reach is “the pre-spatial locality by means of which alone there is a possible ‘where’.” In these passages, Heidegger speaks of time-space as a singular and ultimate enabling condition for the possibility of our more customary conceptions of space and time, language that bears the unmistakable marks of transcendentalism.

One might insist, however, that the truly defining mark of a transcendental philosopher in the modern sense is the identification of a transcendental subject together with the determination of transcendental conditions in terms of it. But in this regard, too, vestiges of transcendentalism can be discerned in Heidegger’s account. To be sure, time-space is not a form of sensibility or pure intuition that in some sense originates in the imagination of a transcendental subject (as time and space do for Kant). Nor, despite affinities, is it essentially the ground floor of the constitution of consciousness and its fundamental elements (as time is for Husserl). Yet, while Heidegger maintains that time is not the product of human beings or vice versa, he also contends that there is no such time without human beings and vice versa. “He is only a human being in that he maintains his equilibrium within the threefold reaching and endures the nearness determining it, a nearness that refuses and holds back.” Similarly, in the *Beiträge*, we find Heidegger repeatedly designating Dasein the “overturning of all subjectivity,” and yet he also insists that being only prevails as the appropriating event, the enownment, insofar as it appropriates or enowns Dasein, i.e., makes Dasein its own. “The projection of being can only be projected by being itself and for this a moment of what being as appropriating event appropriates must succeed, a moment of Da-sein.”

There is a final vestige of transcendentalism in Heidegger’s later thinking about being that merits consideration. As noted at the outset, what motivates Kant, Neo-Kantians, and Husserl to make the so-called “transcendental turn” is the awareness of a difference in valence or what is today popularly called normativity. The acknowledgment of such difference, by no means modern, runs throughout the history
of philosophy, taking different forms within various philosophical traditions. Versions of such a difference—to give merely a sampling—can be found in Greek differentiations of ὀδύν and νοῦς, modern differentiations of what is obscure or confused from what is clear and distinct, what is merely an impression from what is a belief, or a mere belief from a sufficiently justified and true belief or, failing that, at least a reliable one. Yet another permutation on this difference in the American setting of mid-twentieth century epistemology is the difference introduced by Wilfrid Sellars between the logical space of facts and that of reasons. Though transcendental philosophers come in many stripes, they share a conviction that empirical or naturalistic approaches fail to account adequately for such differences (or analogously, in Kant’s case, the difference between a mere perception and an objective experience; in Husserl’s case, the difference between a fact and an essence). In other words, for transcendental philosophers the differences in valence, such as those mentioned above, require some sort of qualitative distinction in the order of what we more or less consciously entertain, and these philosophers claim that there is no other resource for establishing this distinction than what human subjectivity itself brings to its experiences. Such philosophers accordingly insist on the necessity of making a transcendental turn, i.e., a turn to the a priori contribution of the subject, in order to explain how human beings are able to give an account of themselves as knowers, moral agents, and critics.

All these versions of differentiation in valence involve one or more of the senses of transcendence advanced by Heidegger. In each case they represent the poles of a transcendence, the coordinates of a span or move from a subordinate to a superordinate level that ideally specifies those coordinates itself. What Heidegger dubs the ontological difference can itself be viewed as a variation on this difference in valence, perhaps even a fundamental version of it. This way of regarding the ontological difference seems especially appropriate, given Heidegger’s remark that “Dasein’s transcendence is the condition of the possibility of the ontological difference.”

Note has already been made of Heidegger’s subsequent, if qualified, rebuke of the ontological difference and his unqualified rejection of talk of transcendence. He also insists that concepts like enowning, yielding, enabling presence, and the like with which he characterizes the relation of being and time to the appropriating event or enownment (Ereignis), do not represent steps that lead back to some more original ground, certainly not to something conceived as producing or making the rest. Hence, one might infer that he forecloses any possibility of
countenancing a version of the aforesaid differentiation in valence and thus any hint of normative thinking. But whether that inference is sound or not, Heidegger does plainly invoke something like the valence of being and thinking it historically, the Ereignis in which it appropriates our being-here to it, enabling our humanity (to come). This valence is evident in his talk of being as a ground, indeed, precisely given his insistence on the way it enables a differentiation from reasons, causes, explanations, principles, and the like. Thus, in Der Satz vom Grund, he insists that being has the character of a ground that is essentially a groundless grounding, a ground that grounds as an abyss. The fact that being is an abyss, itself ungrounded, by no means implies that it does not or cannot ground; to think otherwise, i.e., to think that any use of the term ‘ground’ implies grounding by beings alone, seems to betray a failure to make the leap in thinking that Heidegger calls for. Note has already been made of Heidegger’s attempt to invoke the sense of an intensified grounding, Be-gründung with a hyphen, while bracketing the normal, inferentially-justificatory sense of the term. In a similar way, he speaks of being as a hidden, fathomless fullness that provides a measure. The enownment or, equivalently, what conceals itself under the name ἀλήθεια, expresses “a binding character, that binds all thinking, provided that it submits to the command [Geheiß] of what is to be thought.” So, too, in Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens Heidegger observes that “without the foregoing experience of ἀλήθεια as the clearing, all talk of a binding and non-binding character of thinking is groundless.”

An argument could be mounted for insisting on remnants of this normative dimension of transcendentalism in other passages from the Beiträge and other works by Heidegger after he ceases to describe his work as transcendental. But, if we are to remain faithful to Heidegger’s own strictures, the valence in question has to be distinguished from the bivalence of propositional truths, from the compelling character of inferential reasoning, from the long shadow cast by the Platonic move ἐπερέσαι τις αὐσις, and from any sense of valuation in abstraction from thinking being-historically (such as Heidegger sees in Neo-Kantian versions of truth, goodness, and beauty). So in the confines of the present discussion, I have restricted myself to citing a few passages in which Heidegger explicitly adopts normative language to formulate his own version of a differentiation in valence.

By way of conclusion, please allow me to summarize what appear to be vestiges of transcendentalism in Heidegger’s later thinking about being. His characterization of being as the constant, underlying unity,
i.e., time-space, reinstates the ontological difference and thus bears an unmistakable likeness to ancient and medieval forms of transcendentalism where being is clearly distinguishable from the beings that it transcends. By distinguishing being in the form of time-space from subordinate phenomena that it enables, Heidegger retraces steps of ancient and modern transcendentalists. His contention that being and the human being (or, more precisely, being-here) mutually, if differently, ground one another, preserves a vestige of the transcendental grounding in transcendental subjectivity, diversely formulated by Kant and Husserl. Finally, Heidegger follows the transcendental practice of his predecessors by assigning a distinctive set of constraints (Verbindlichkeit) to being's grounding of being-here, constraints differentiated from, yet grounding, the sphere of beings' relations among themselves. For all these reasons, it seems legitimate to speak of Heidegger's transcendentalism. And if it is indeed legitimate, it invites the question of how these vestiges of transcendentalism are to be interpreted, how they should effect our interpretation of Heidegger's thinking. But that is a project for another day.

NOTES
7. Ibid., 10f.
8. Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 63 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1989), 189 (hereafter cited as *BE*).
11. Ibid., 150; for further commentary on Kant's transcendental method here, see ibid., 122–28, 137f., 149, 163f.

13. A word about terminology: For the purposes of this paper, I use the term ‘transcendentalism’ in a broad sense for any philosophy that identifies some transcendent or transcendental sphere. By doing so, I follow Heidegger’s strategy of cataloguing philosophies of transcendence together with those that style themselves ‘transcendental’. This broad use of the term can be traced in part to the decision by English and German translators to adopt the term ‘transcendental’ to translate the medieval use of ‘transcendens’. One might object that lumping these philosophers together does not do justice to the difference between the realist intentions of ancient and medieval philosophers (Plato, Scotus) concerned with transcendences and the idealist pretensions of modern “transcendental” philosophers (Kant, Husserl). The objection is well taken, especially since Kant and Husserl insist on a difference, relative to their respective approaches, between the concepts of transcendence and the transcendental. However, the objection supposes a difference between realism and idealism (or, equivalently, the transcendent and the transcendental), the ulti-
macy of which Heidegger aims to call into question. Emulating Heidegger’s attempt to exploit family resemblances among the various uses of these terms in different philosophical traditions, I intend to explore the extent to which analogous uses inform Heidegger’s allegedly post-transcendental thinking; hence, the title: “Heidegger’s Transcendentalism.” For helpful criticism of my strategy, I am grateful to Lillian Alweiss.


17. The parallel is inexact since the supposed a priori knowledge that is the object of transcendental knowledge in Kant’s case is that of theoretical geometry and theoretical physics; see Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Leipzig: Meiner, 1944), B25 (hereafter cited as *KrV*). By contrast, in Heidegger’s case the object of the transcendental knowledge (fundamental ontology) is the existential structure “always already” constitutive of being-here and disclosive of its being and that of other entities.

18. So Heidegger can later say that his notion of transcendence has nothing to do with the Scholastic notion; see Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, 6. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1973), 42 n. 59.

19. Ibid., 20. Heidegger continues this theme in his 1928 lectures, emphasizing the necessity of clarifying “the specific distinctiveness of the being of being-here,” the essence of which consists in having a transcendence-constituting understanding of being; see Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, ed. Klaus Held, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 26, (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978), 188f.; Heidegger distinguishes a vulgar, ontic sense of transcendence from “original transcendence” or the “primal transcendence that has therewith a relation to the understanding of being” (ibid., 194; see, too, 170, 177).

20. Ibid., 194; see also *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, 38f.


22. *SZ*, 365f.


24. *Br*, 208f.; Plato, Heidegger notes, was a realist, not an idealist, in the traditional philosophical sense of the term; see *Br*, 215.

25. *SZ*, 212.

27. Btr, 3f.; see the articles by Susan M. Schoenbohm and Alejandro Vallega, in Scott et al., op. cit., 17–20, 54.
30. Btr, 171, 184f.
32. Btr, 176; see, too, 253f.
35. Btr, 212.
36. Btr, 326.
37. Btr, 217f., 355.
38. Btr, 218.
39. Heidegger speaks of recovering the original sense of the term (Btr, 217) and later contrasts the construal of transcendence as “supersensible” (Über-sinnlich), presumably an aspect of the second sort of transcendence, with the construal of it as a “surpassing” (Überstieg); see Btr, 322; see also, 176, 252.
40. Btr, 34f., 239, 304; see Parvis Emad’s essay, in Scott et al., op. cit., 233. Heidegger gives a similarly qualified revisionist gloss in the Protocol to “Zeit und Sein.” After characterizing Sein und Zeit as an attempt to interpret being against the transcendental horizon of time, he adds that, what he means by ‘transcendental’ in this case is not the objectivity of objects, but the realm for the determination of being, insofar as it is “viewed from the clearing of being-here.” He also insists that the character of withdrawal, so central to his later thinking about being, can be found in Sein und Zeit. The basic experience steering the attempt in Sein und Zeit to identify “time as the transcendental horizon of being” is, he tells us, that of the forgottenness of being, in effect, its hiddenness and self-concealment—despite the fact that the first articulation of that basic experience “still has to speak the language of metaphysics in a certain sense in the transcendental inquiry”; see ZSD, 29, 31.
41. Btr, 228, 233f., 305.
43. Btr, 252ff., 93ff.; ZSD, 47f., 50.
44. Btr, 250.
45. Btr, 250f. Despite these criticisms, Heidegger does not seem to think that the ontological difference has completely outlived its usefulness; for a positive take on it, see Btr, 258, 287. Yet the link of transcendental thinking with the ontological difference is reiterated in ZSD, 36. See Scott et al., op. cit., 68.
46. Btr, 250f.; see also 32ff. The criticism of transcendental philosophies is not a passing fancy; see Martin Heidegger, *Was heißt Denken?*, 174f.; SeG, 133–37, 149; and ZSD, 50ff.
47. See Btr, 318 for Heidegger’s criticism of the misleading way that thrownness is characterized in Ñ. Here, too, lies one of the likely sources of pragmatist misreadings of the existential analysis of Ñ, namely, Heidegger’s construal of Verstehen as one basic existential among others (notably, Befindlichkeit), on the one hand, and his characterization of Seinsverständnis, in general, on the other. To conflate the two, Verstehen as Entwerfen with Seinsverständnis, invites a construal of fundamental ontology as a study of Da-sein coping with what is zahanden: a dualism of being-here and being-a-tool, the dynamics of which are governed by social practices.
48. Btr, 251; see, too, 254, 262.
49. Ibid.
51. See the remarks by John Sallis, in Scott et al., *op. cit.*, 187.
52. Ibid., 191: “And yet, a restoration of beings can come to pass only from out of a grounding of the truth of being.”
55. In the Introduction to *What is Metaphysics?*, he makes it clear that, while not satisfied with metaphysics, thinking the truth of being “tills the ground and plows the soil for this root,” with the prospect of transforming it (*Wegmarken*, 363; see, too, *ZSD*, 32). And in the concluding lines to *Zeit und Sein*, Heidegger observes that what he has been attempting to say is “not even something new but the most ancient of ancient [matters] in Western thinking” (*ZSD*, 25).
56. Martin Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, ed. Petra Jaeger, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 51, 2. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1991), 2: “Das, was alles be-gründet und allem den Grund gibt, ist selbst der Grund.” In my translation of Be-gründung (with a hyphen) as “especially grounds,” I have tried to convey the particularization and intensification, surplus, or fecundity that the prefix ‘be-’ often provides a verb.
57. *SvG*, 150.
59. *ZSD*, 24; Hempel’s covering law model of explanation seems a good fit for what Heidegger has in mind here.
60. *ZSD*, 2, 35f.
61. Here one might note three further analogies with Heidegger’s transcendental predecessors: first, the relation between the epochal transformations of being and its withdrawal has a kind of necessity that is not causal (*ZSD*, 35, 56); second, there is no experience opposite thinking that awakens from the oblivion of being and to the enownment [it is a *Sache des Denkens*; see *ZSD*, 32, 37f., 41, 56f.]; and third, by eschewing any talk of transcendence independent of the relation of being and being-here, Heidegger iterates transcendental philosophy’s self-restriction to the finitude and immanence of its subject matter and its disavowal of speculative metaphysical claims to transcendence (*ZSD*, 38; the operative terms: *Vorläufigkeit und Endlichkeit*).
62. *ZSD*, 14; *SvG*, 145.
63. *Btr*, 183.
64. *ZSD*, 15.
65. *ZSD*, 16, 40.
67. *Btr*, 447; see, too, 71, 252, 256, 303, 375.
68. *Btr*, 261f.; see, too, 341, and *SvG*, 155.
69. See Sallis’ remark about Heidegger’s use of Grund, “putting into play the old, used up word,” in Scott et al., *op. cit.*, 185.