The government of the United States needs intelligence both to act against threats to its national security (national security being a very subjective term) and to understand international developments. A fundamental problem in intelligence collection is an inability to discern which potential problems are likely to develop into a threat (even defining threat is essential) or otherwise require official attention. Many of the new issues of intelligence interest are transnational in nature. Terrorism and proliferation are not issues for any one country, nor can they necessarily be handled through traditional bilateral state channels. This is also true of rogue and failed states – not only may they connect directly to transnational threats of terrorism, human and drug trafficking, and proliferation but they also may lead to human catastrophes to which the United States and its allies may need to respond. Effective intelligence is key to anticipating and, if possible, preventing or alleviating such tragedies.

This course will emphasize the intelligence element required to confront transnational issues of terrorism, proliferation, counterintelligence and rogue states and how intelligence can be collected against these transnational targets. Concurrently, the class will focus on traditional intelligence issues and why they are important in the present. Finally, the class will look decades forward to future issues of intelligence issues both on a transnational basis, for instance, the environment and to both new and old power players on a national, regional basis.

**COURSE REQUIREMENTS:** Students will organize into groups to study future transnational and national/regional issues in order for each student to prepare a paper defining the intelligence issue and why it is or will be of national importance. These papers will be due on the discussion dates for the topics presented beginning March 20 and ending May 1. We will take as a given that the government of the United States has undergone a metamorphosis in the sense that it no longer concentrates solely on an immediate crisis but rather looks ahead not only to counter long-term threats but also to understand a world--and thereby survive and prosper--constantly changing and ironically constantly remaining the same. The papers are due at the same time as the presentations. I will provide weekly study sheets with benchmark questions to aid in understanding the issues dealing with transnational issues.

**BOOKS REQUIRED FOR PURCHASE:**

Coll, Steve; *Ghost Wars* (Penguin Books) 2004

Benjamin, Daniel and Simon, Steven; *The Age of Sacred Terror* (Random House) 2002

Atwan, Abdel Bari; *The Secret History of Al Qaeda* (University of California Press) 2006

Schroen, Gary; *In First* (Ballantine Books) 2006

Corera, Gordon; *Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of A.Q. Khan* (Oxford University Press) 2006

**BOOKS ON RESERVE:**

Sims, Jennifer E. and Gerber, Burton, Editors; *Transforming U.S. Intelligence* (Georgetown University Press) 2005

Kinzer, Stephen; *All the Shah’s Men* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2003


Scheuer, Michael; *Imperial Hubris* (Potomac Books, Inc.) 2004


Williams, Phil, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” pp. 61-97

“*Mapping the Global Future,*” Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, Based on Consultations with Nongovernmental Experts Around the World

**GRADING:** Students will be graded on the basis of written work, class participation and examinations. The mid-term examination, the paper, and class discussion/attendance will each count for 20 percent, and the final examination will count for 40 percent of the final grade. Students are expected to attend all classes. Papers should be properly annotated. Students who, for whatever reason, are forced to miss class should advise me and arrange to acquire lecture notes. My officer hours will be Mondays and Wednesdays from 1:30-4:30 p.m. and whenever we can meet.

**NOTE:** The last day to drop the course without a W is February 23. The last day to drop the course with a W is March 1.
ACADEMIC CONDUCT: Students are responsible for understanding and following
the provisions of the CAS Academic Conduct Code. Copies of the Code are available on
the CAS website. Cases of misconduct must be reported to the Dean’s office. All class
members are expected to maintain high standards of academic honesty and integrity.
You are expected to provide citations in papers for all quotations, paraphrases, and ideas
taken from any source other than your own original thoughts. Boston University has very
strict standards for intellectual integrity, and punishment for plagiarism is severe, and can
include permanent expulsion from the university.

23 Jan: Introduction to the Course/ Modern Antecedents of Terrorism. Description
of the course. The transnational issues of terrorism, proliferation, organized crime.
Counterintelligence, rogue states, failed states as additional issues of national security
concern. Organization of the class to consider and analyze major issues in the future.
Terrorism in the Modern Period of Western History. How did governments counter
terrorism when it arose in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? What
government measures alleviated terrorist activity and what government measures made
terrorism worse? Covert Action is a major component in the government’s arsenal
against terrorism. What is covert action, who does covert action, what are the laws
governing covert action?

READINGS: Carr, pp 1-73.

25/30 Jan: Post World War II Terrorism/The Beginnings of Islamic Terrorism: A
description of Covert Action is continued. The causes of terrorism after World War II in
Europe. The beginnings of terrorism by religiously inspired Islamic groups. What
political measures were undertaken to deter terrorism. What security and intelligence
measures were undertaken to counter this terrorism. Hijackings, the PLO, Black
September, and other mainly Palestinian groups stage attacks against the West. What
cased the resort to violence by these groups? How did governments react to it? How
was security improved? How did intelligence agencies and law enforcement groups
penetrate these groups?
READINGS: Carr, pp. 77-290.

01 Feb/6 Feb: The Intellectual foundations of Islamic Extremism/Usama bin-Ladin
and Al-Qaeda: Where do the ideas for Islamic extremism originate? How can we
expect to understand the motivation on a philosophical level? How can governments
through intelligence agencies counter and/or deal with these ideas? How was Al-Qaeda
formed? What were UBL’s motivations and life experiences turning him to violent
extremism? What ideas did UBL borrow to justify his political position? The events
taking place which influenced UBL’s thinking. How does intelligence learn what
motivates actions by terrorists.


08/13 Feb: The Aftermath of Afghanistan, the Mujahadin, the Pakistanis, the
Saudis, the United States and the Soviet Union/Richard Clarke and the CIA sound
the alarm on Al-Qaeda. The Causes of Islamic Extremism/The 9/11 Attack on the World Trade Center and Presidential Executive Orders to the Intelligence Community: The focus of Al-Qaeda turns against the United States. The victory of U.S. and coalition forces in the First Gulf War result in a stronger U.S. presence in the Middle East. The U.S. now becomes the enemy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, significant cuts in intelligence collection capabilities are made. Recognizing and analyzing signals of terrorist activity is an art form, listening to them seemingly impossible. There is growing concern in Washington about terrorist capabilities. Resources are made available to CIA to penetrate Al-Qaeda and authorities given to remove Usama bin-Ladin. General consciousness of the terrorist threat is still lacking. The reasons for Islamic extremism. How did UBL exploit the resentments of Moslems against their governments. Why is UBL popular in many Islamic countries. Which countries have played a major role in Islamic extremism. What can be done to counter this trend or what are the limitations of what can be done? The attack results in a counterattack against the terrorist safe haven in Afghanistan. CIA is ordered to engage the Northern Alliance to support it against the Taliban. This order was successfully accomplished by trained personnel with limited but potent capabilities.


15/21 Feb: JAWBREAKER enters Afghanistan and prepares the way for U.S. military forces/Hezbollah, Hamas, ETA et. al versus Al-Qaeda. Intelligence training gives Gary Schroen the tools the U.S. government needs to take on the Taliban government and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. CIA and other intelligence agencies prepare officers for situations like Afghanistan in which their skills are required. The global versus the specific terrorist organization limited to specific areas. The state sponsors of terrorist organizations and the collection of intelligence on organization, structure and aid to terrorist organizations. The momentum for and against turning a terrorist organization into a political organization. What does history show when governments are confronted by terrorist organizations supporting a cause.

READINGS: Schroen, pp. 86-244, Carr, 58-108.

22/27 Feb: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The A.Q. Khan Network. How A.Q. Khan initiated his program of proliferation of weapons throughout the Islamic world and why he was successful in doing so. The Khan Network expands to North Korean and Libya

READINGS: Corera, pp. 1-126.

1 Mar: MID-TERM EXAMINATION

13/15 Mar: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction/Transnational Organized Crime. U.S. and other intelligence agencies begin to accumulate information on the A.Q. Khan network. The determination is made to shut the network down. It takes intelligence and coordination with the policymaker to bring the process to completion. It
is only a partial victory. Narcotics and Eastern European Crime syndicates grow with globalization and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Intelligence and law enforcement begin to cooperate to counter organized crime. The formation of networks to enhance the security of the organized crime entity.

READINGS: Corera, pp. 129-251.

20/22 Mar: Future Intelligence Issues: Climate Change/Water/Energy/Demographics/Terrorism/Proliferation/Food. A 20 year look ahead perspective on energy, water resources, terrorism, proliferation, foot, demographics etc. as issues that are transnational and will affect the United States. Policymakers will need to know and understand these dynamics.


27/29Mar: Future Intelligence Issues: EU, Russia, Ukraine. A 20 year look ahead perspective on the maturation of the European Union, the European/Global role of Russia and the political development of Ukraine. EU membership for Turkey is decided one way or another. Or Turkey determines to play a new and very active role in the Middle East on behalf of democracy and Islamic influence against Syria and Iran. Turkey downgrades its relationship with Israel. The future of the EURO: a failure, a competitor to the dollar, a disguise for the Deutschmark? Germany and Turkey have a new status based on wealth. What will their influence be?. Europe, a backburner issue, is front and center on economics; if they go down, the U.S. will follow.

READINGS: “Mapping the Global Future” and “2030 Workshop: Russia” in www.dni.gov/.../global trends. Group presentations of research papers on these issues, noting developments in the relationships by European nations and the EU with the U.S. and other nations.

03/05 Apr: Future Intelligence Issues: Middle East and Central Asia. A 20 year perspective on developments in the Middle East. Settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, energy production, Islamic religious developments, political stability, Iran. Economic development separated from energy production. Power relationships within the Middle East. The development of the “Arab Spring” in Egypt, in Tunisia, in Syria. How will Middle Eastern countries develop? Can it continue and how should the U.S. react? Relations with Europe, Asia and North America.

READINGS: “Mapping the Global Future” and “Middle East in 2030 Workshop” in www.dni.gov/.../global trends. Group preparations of research papers on these issues, noting developments in this area of the world and how a process of normalization will either occur or be frustrated.
10/12 Apr: **Future Intelligence Issues: Africa.** A 20 year perspective on developments in Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Sudan as major countries in Africa and as major suppliers of raw materials. The problem of failed states.

READINGS: “Mapping the Global Future” and “Africa in 2030 Workshop” in [www.dni.gov/.../global](http://www.dni.gov/.../global) trends. Group preparations of research papers on these issues of what the U.S. policymaker needs to know about these regions and continents.

19/24 Apr: **Future Intelligence Issues: Central and South America.** Mexico and Brazil as major regional powers demanding recognition and respect from the U.S. Efforts to break out of dependence on relations with the U.S. Other Latin America countries seeking a voice in regional affairs.

READINGS: “Mapping the Global Future” “Latin America 2030 Seminar” in [www.dni.gov/.../global](http://www.dni.gov/.../global) trends. Group preparations of research papers on these issues of what the U.S. policymaker needs to know about these regions and continents.

26 Apr/01 May: **Future Intelligence Issues: Eastern Asia China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan, Japan, Korea.** A 20 year perspective on the increasing importance of China and India. The development of these two populous nations will need to cross many barriers to achieve normalcy. A perspective on Indonesia, the most populous country in the Islamic world. Developments in Pakistan as to problems and possibilities. Coalitions created to limit the power of China.

READINGS: “Mapping the Global Future” and “Asia in 2030 Workshop” and “Seminar on Asian Responses to US” in [www.dni.gov/.../global](http://www.dni.gov/.../global) trends. Group presentations of research papers on these issues, noting developments in shifting world power relationships. Looking at the trends both positively and negatively.

03 May: **Intelligence Collection Methods: Humint, Sigint, Imint, Analysis.** The methods used in intelligence collection for presentation to the policy maker.