CHANGING and UNCHANGING VALUES
IN THE WORLD of the FUTURE

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CHANGING and UNCHANGING VALUES
IN THE WORLD of the FUTURE

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Organized by

David Fromkin, Director

Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future

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SESSION ONE

A view that goes back to fifth-century Greece is that government should be the teacher and that citizens should serve the state. An opposite Founding Fathers concept is that the state and government should provide a matrix of security within which each individual can pursue his/her goals. Now civil society advocates argue for a third term: some sort of devotion by the individual to finding self-fulfillment by combining with others, in non-governmental organizations and institutions. Which way does/should the future go?

Amitai Etzioni

The Centrality of Society

It is important to specify the historical context in which we live so that our analyses and new ideas can serve as correctives to previous biases built into the social system. For example, the endless debate whether the United States is a Lockean country with room for both civil and Republican virtues assumes that there is a tension between the two. Arguing for a reduction in community values today would be a different undertaking than in the markedly different circumstances of colonial America. Many of my colleagues who write about civil society, individual freedom, and such, haven’t really discovered the twenty-first century. In many ways they are still looking backwards as they quote Isaiah Berlin. Berlin, obsessed with twentieth-century totalitarianism, was concerned with limiting the power of society so that individuals could have as many choices as possible. Historical circumstances change sometimes because of the moral vacuum that has been created by the successful attack on existing values and traditions.

Liberal and communitarian thinking divides on the question of whether ideas of social good should result from shared formulations. Fundamentalism in all its forms attempts to provide meaning to life in immoderate, illiberal ways. A fault line separates modernity and fundamentalism since no third body of ethics bridges the gap. We need a moderate ethic that is tolerant, inclusive, and based on moral dialogue, not coercion. Debate, no longer confined to intra-social conversation, but ranging over all of global society, will bring divisions to the surface that are not consensus-driven and lack an ethical standpoint.
Modern relativism was a historical reaction to a philosophy that claimed the authority of a superior white, European civilization. While this was a useful correction, we have gone too far in the other direction and must now search for new, shared ethical foundations. The old Tocquevillean argument that the state should protect individuals from itself is a thin, contentless notion and is no longer sufficient. A good society must have some notion of what is good, which should be based on moral dialogue rather than imposition by force.

In certain ways moral dialogue contrasts with the liberal notion of reason and cool deliberation based on facts and the rules of logical discussion. It allows us to come to that place of fear we need to occupy if we are to engage genuinely in normative conflicts. We also need to reconsider the ideal of keeping values confined to the private sphere. On the contrary, moral dialogue requires us to engage our deepest values and bring them to the table. The simplistic distinction between private and public morality can no longer serve us in a world where people care deeply about things that happen in private.

On the other hand, such dialogue does not necessarily lead to cultural wars. There are many national and international examples of successfully resolved moral dialogues. Initial disagreement can be emotional and impassioned, but after a few years the dust settles and a new shared understanding and formulation of the good arises as people changed their own understanding and commitments without government interference. This is the case in changed public support of environmentalist ideals. Shared values resulting from moral dialogue have the advantage of being largely self-enforcing. They require a great deal of preparation for their evolution. On the other hand, laws that are enacted without moral dialogue preceding them will be met with resistance and require constant policing and enforcement.

Moral dialogue keeps us involved in a good community by keeping things simple. Most of the time we do not need theocracy, morality squads, and policing to make us do what is right. Men and women are social animals, profoundly dependent on the approval of their fellow human beings. Communitarian ideals encourage us to be nobler than we otherwise would be. The internal sense of community frowns on people who don't live up to their obligations and applauds
them when they do. This is what we mean by a social fabric. It is a measure of community and can lead to a fairly high level of social order without the necessity of extensive state intervention and coercion.

Robert Jackson

Response

Professor Etzioni, who is a sociologist, thinks about these problems from the point of view of society. I tend to look at the world domestically and internationally, from the point of view of political and legal thought. Professor Etzioni adopts a communitarian point of view, in which the group has the prominent place in society. More than a voluntary association of free individuals, the group is also a moral order in which the individual cannot be as free as he is in traditional liberal theory. I have considerable sympathy for this point of view, which was shared by Edmund Burke, who extolled the virtues of the little platoon over the big battalions and insisted on the positive value of tradition. He conceived of the state as a partnership of the living, the dead, and those yet to be born whose values are transmitted over generations. Professor Etzioni’s paper criticizes the classical liberal view that attempts to preserve the rights of the individual by reducing the social constrictions of communities and institutions. In his view, it is dangerous when these institutions weaken, because then neither the state nor the market can function properly.

I have some questions about this position. First: are there other perspectives we can adopt to deal with these questions? For example, can we conceive of a stable, orderly, and safe society without an overarching system of authority? Conservative thinkers like Burke, Locke, and Hobbes deny this possibility, and, on the whole, I agree with them. Second: although moral conduct and notions of right and wrong are surely learned in a social context, can society itself be understood coherently as a moral agent? Only individuals and corporate persons have responsibilities. Societies as such do not. Is it not more profitable to understand society as a sphere of human relations, where individuals engage in mutual relations under the protection of a state operating under the rule of law? Third: virtue is a disposition learned primarily in societies to engage in conduct
with good consequences. But because vicious people live among the virtuous, we surrender some of our freedom to the state. Moreover, the state can play an important role in inculcating some virtues that are appropriate to citizenship, as is the case of the military. Fourth: law in a good society is an extension of morality which applies to all members. Insofar as it creates a space for people to enter into social relations with each other, law is above society. Fifth: although the political has historically been undergirt by the social, it may be possible to have a society without a state under which it exists and flourishes.

Two final general comments. First: the communitarian vision de-emphasizes and blurs the distinction between public and private. The clarity of this distinction in legal and political thought, however, is an achievement over previous medieval thinking when authority was multiple, ambiguous, and overlapping. The modern state is a solution to this problem. In overlooking this achievement, much contemporary communitarianism is regressive. Second: I have had considerable experience in Africa, where the notion of the state has largely failed. People seek what refuge they can find in little enclaves, although they can find little security there compared to that offered by more enduring states.

Reply by Amitai Etzioni:
In these matters we always deal with state and society. The primary question is what we should do when the state becomes too powerful. In Iran virtue is enforced by state power rather than by moral discussion and persuasion. When there is deviation from community norms, we have a choice of calling the police or trying to stimulate the moral juice of a community. We need both resources, but we always have to decide which is the first and the second line of defense against lawlessness. Society can be an agent in these processes, not in the sense that it is a free-acting, freethinking individual, but insofar as it can exercise an independent force.

On the other hand, the community cannot always be the ultimate arbiter of what is right. Communities can act malignantly and destructively. Some consensus can be horrible, even when it has arisen out of moral dialogue. We therefore have to think about what criteria such consensus should be based on. The Constitution of the United States or the UN Declaration of Human
Rights rests on criteria that we can bring to bear even against those semi-sacred documents. There are some absolute values out there, which we can talk about freely. Self-evident truths can sometimes be hidden, but they emerge when we engage in free conversations.
SESSION TWO

In the past, as realists have taught, countries have by and large pursued their own particular interests in international relations: their own independence, their own security, their own prosperity, and the like. Now science and technology have enlarged the scale on which things happen, so that many interests are shared by two or more countries in common, or by whole regions or the entire globe. Will the ambit of common interests continue to expand at the expense of the narrow and selfish national ones? In the longer-range future, will the teachings of realism become obsolete?

David Fromkin

Roosevelt’s Vision: Values in International Relations: Past and Future

Writing my paper after September 11 while preparing a course on world history, I came to the fall of the Roman Empire, of Constantinople and the barbarians at the gate, which recalled something that we all know but often forget: in history nothing is inevitable. Globalization, trends towards higher levels of technology, and more sophisticated communication will probably continue into the future. My subject, foreign policy goals, is changing. The very ways we look at international relations may have to change.

International relations is an infant study. The first widely used textbook by Schumann came out in the thirties. In the forties and fifties, classes in international relations were offered, and now we have whole departments devoted to the study. Nevertheless it is still a relatively new subject. Quarrels that began at its origins between the two schools of idealists and realists, such as how states should act as opposed to how they in fact do act, have not been resolved or superseded.

Many realists claim international affairs make sense because states are motivated by the same considerations, principally by power. The idealist school, which takes its inspiration from Woodrow Wilson, argues that the actions of countries can be affected by debate, argumentation and, above all, public opinion. Robert Cecil, chief British protagonist for the League of Nations, told the House of Commons that the Covenant of the League was based on the ability of public opinion to affect the behavior of nations. He said if we’re wrong about
that, we’re wrong about everything. Realists like myself have come to agree with him. He was wrong about everything.

Idealists believe that a public morality can be debated and that countries can be persuaded to accept it as a guide for conduct. Realists like Hans Morgenthau, on the other hand, believe that countries are intent on pursuing their own national interests as defined by power relationships. His analysis, by adhering to one standard, allows us to discuss international relations systematically. Idealists, on the other hand, argue that we make progress in international relations through teaching people that there are no real clashes of interest or irreconcilable differences between nations. Realists disagree and insist on the real motivational differences. For them, the answer involves the recognition of the integrity of one’s opponents’ interests, even though they differ from one’s own.

The international situation has been changed by a major new category of debate about interests that are common to all nations. The clearest relate to the environment and are bigger than those of any particular state. Pursuing such goals requires an internationalist, globalist outlook and the willingness to make decisions on a wider scale than existing state systems. The crucial distinction is no longer between national interests, but between them and larger, global, common interests. The great problem is how we are to deal with those problems without having a world state.

James Chace

Response

I question the adequacy of idealism for understanding international affairs. I also agree with Professor Fromkin’s warning that America is neither strong enough nor wise enough to provide political direction for people of other cultures. I would like to have heard him further discuss whether an ethical dimension can be linked to the realist paradigm.

For Roosevelt, the Common Interest was a future with certain goals like compulsory education, immunization against disease, and universal birth control. Now, fifty years later, we are witnessing a new emphasis on moral dimensions in international politics. This may result in a sense of shared values among
the most powerful countries and a united effort to impose a peaceful settlement on unruly regions of the world, as was the case in Europe in the forty years that followed the Congress of Vienna. This agreement of purpose occurred even though the two most liberal powers, England and France, had serious ideological differences with the autocratic powers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

Could the US, working with the EU, Russia, and China, find the common ground needed to prevent conflict among nations, especially in instances where violence does not arise from the ambitions of an individual state but from terrorist activities that cross national borders? The eradication of terrorism could be viewed as part of the national interest of a wide range of powers. There are already treaties that support an international criminal court, a mechanism for cleaning up the environment, as well as those that forbid atomic testing or curb biological warfare. As long as countries remain independent, they will make their own decisions. The US has been foremost in insisting on its national sovereignty. Were we to link our national interest to common international interests, we might shape a different world in the twenty-first century. But unless this shift in attitude is formulated in a way that seems to support our national interests, it is unlikely to come into being.

The consensus after 1815 saw stability and moderation as consistent with national interests, but such an agreement also linked the balance of power to a moral consensus. Hamilton warned against “idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exception from the imperfection, weaknesses and evils incident to society of every shape.” He also reminded us that “we as well as the other inhabitants of the globe are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue.”
Reply by David Fromkin:

In most clashes with the common interest, the national interest tends to prevail. In an ideal world, where world community has its own form, that tendency might be overcome by what Professor Etzioni calls a hierarchy of loyalties. But we are a long way from that ideal. Our primary loyalty is presently to the US, not to the human race.

The possibility of all great powers working together is difficult to imagine because only a few countries share broad commonalities with us. Consequently their willingness to act with the US is quite limited. We probably will have to work with overlapping alliances rather than with one sort of grand alliance of the major powers.

The closest analogy to the problem of terrorism I can think of is the historical problem of piracy, which had almost universally been considered a crime against all nations. Nevertheless, piracy was exterminated almost always by one nation acting unilaterally rather than in an alliance. It would be wonderful if a broad alliance emerged out of our war against terrorism, but I doubt that it will happen.
SESSION THREE

Will our classics be classics in the future as values continue to evolve? The open society described in Pericles’ Funeral Oration, and the examples of the ancient Greek and Roman democracies, inspired the Founding Fathers and the British, American, and French revolutions; but they are questioned even today, and not only by non-Western countries. Will the old Mediterranean classics speak to the condition of the year 2100 or 2200? What if nobody at that time reads Greek or Latin? To what extent will an evolved Christianity provide alternatives to pagan classical values?

Roger Kimball
Does Pericles Point the Way?

We study the past not only for antiquarian interests, but to inform ourselves about future alternatives. We learn how tyranny masquerades as virtue and inhumanity cloaks itself in righteousness. Teaching us about our current situation, the past tells us how to deal with the future. I would like to focus on two issues. The first is the issue of novelty in history. The second is whether Pericles does provide a guide for the future.

I am struck by the amount of optimism that language intrudes into our scholarly efforts. A center dedicated to the study of the longer-range future is necessarily an institution conceived in hope and dedicated to a relatively cheerful view of mankind’s destiny. Such hope insinuates itself into our plans and projects. What a nugget of optimism is contained in “the foreseeable future.” We often forget how even the most prudent ways of conducting our life require stupendous acts of faith. Had I been asked on September 10 if the Twin Towers would continue standing for “the foreseeable future,” I would have answered yes. Foresight cannot accommodate that most pedestrian of eventualities, an event. We continue to make plans and lay contingencies, but find ourselves constantly surprised by historical events. On September 10 it seemed unlikely that a band of murderous fanatics could fundamentally alter the political landscape of the world.

In endowing the unlikely with a pedigree of explanation, we attempt to neutralize novelty and extract the unexpected from what actually did occur. Today we are now finding the events of September 11 almost inevitable. We had plausi-
ble explanations and warnings then, but they lacked the traction that events give to hindsight. We did not consider them part of the foreseeable future until the future overtook us. Will our classics continue to function as classics even as our values continue to evolve?

If classics cease to be classics, we will have changed for the worse beyond recognition. In my view, however, values do not change in themselves so much as they change keys. Our underlying humanity, with its needs and aspirations, remains constant. Before we ask whether Pericles points the way, we first need to know what Pericles stood for. His deservedly famous speech commemorating those who fell in the first of 27 years of the Peloponnesian War celebrates Athenian democracy, which was not merely a political arrangement, but a way of life. It required two keystones—both freedom and tolerance, and responsible behavior and attention to duties.

Pericles said, "We Athenians are free and tolerant in our private lives, but in our public affairs we keep to the law... including those unwritten laws... of taste, manners and morals, which it is an acknowledged shame to break." A society where manners continue to be central and important is healthier than one in which manners have broken down and which requires the intervention of the law to preserve order. From the perspective of modern America, democracy in Athens seems limited and imperfect in the way it excluded women from citizenship and maintained a large slave class, but Athens did formulate an ideal of equality before the law, where membership in a particular class did not matter as much as men's actual abilities.

Life in Athens was free and full. Pericles often stresses the importance of sound judgment and moral balance. Culture and the life of the mind were the ennoblements of life, not an escape from its burdens or a mere decadent pastime. The common stake that all citizens had in the commonwealth of the city brought responsibilities with it as well as privileges.

When everyone is clamoring for his or her rights, it is worth remembering that every right carries a corresponding duty. Today, the word democracy is often used as a synonym for mediocrity. For Pericles, democracy did not necessarily entangle people in mediocrity. Athenian freedom was, above all, the freedom to
excel, a view of society and the individual, which, though rooted in tradition, was oriented toward the future.

Athenian ideals of freedom and tolerance were not inevitable developments, but the results of choice. They have proven peculiarly powerful in the West when they were absorbed by Christendom in the eighteenth century and helped to inform the democratic principles that undergird British and American democracy. We must, however, remember that alternative visions are capable of inspiring allegiance. September 11 was an attack on the idea of a liberal, democratic society. Many illusions were shattered, including the fantasies of academic multiculturalists. Pericles, a dead, white male if ever there was one, embodied in his life and aspirations an ideal of humanity completely at odds with academic multiculturalists, who insist that all cultures are of equal worth.

Another illusion that was shattered is the feeling that the world is basically a benevolent, freedom-loving place, if only people had enough education, safe sex, and National Public Radio. This utopian vision was encouraged by America’s fortunate geographical position and our extraordinary growth of wealth and military power. But increased international mobility and the dissemination of technological know-how have conspired to neutralize these advantages. We now have enemies we cannot hide from, placate, or negotiate with.

A third shattered illusion concerns the morality of power. Trendy academics, CNN commentators, and other armchair utopians pretend that the exercise of power by the powerful is evil by definition, while violence on the part of anyone else is attributed to the frustration and rage directed against the unjust exercise of power. We learned in Somalia and in attacks on the US throughout the Middle East that power unsupported by resolution will be perceived as weakness, and that weakness will provoke a challenge.

All this changed with September 11, but we are already hearing voices not of caution, but of weariness, impatience, and insularity. These voices must be resisted if freedom is to continue to thrive. A liberal democratic polity is based on the force provided by economic might and military prowess. Bagehot wrote that “History is strewn with the wrecks of nations which have gained a little progressiveness at the cost of a great deal of hard manliness, and have thus prepared
themselves for destruction as soon as the movements of the world give a chance for it.” This sounds like Pericles, who does point the way into the future. The question is whether we will follow him.

Mark Danner

Response

Many of today’s arguments raged in the eighties and nineties. We have a long way to go before we will understand exactly what happened on September 11. I do not believe that it was an attack on the idea of America as a liberal society. The people who carried out this attack had very specific goals in mind. They see the American presence in the Gulf as propping up regimes with whom they have strong cultural, ideological, and political quarrels. They subsequently located weaknesses in these regimes and American society. The historical overview offered in some of the papers today gives a remarkably selective view of that period’s history. The present crisis does not begin with Somalia, but with Lebanon in 1983, or the famous retreat from the rooftop of the Saigon embassy. Saddam Hussein famously said that Americans are not willing to lose ten thousand dead in combat. The remark sounded ridiculous then, but it does not any longer. Why have the historical accounts we have heard today not begun that far back?

Today’s discussion is not merely an argument among intellectuals, but says something profound about American society and its willingness to act in the world. It involves the ability and willingness of American leaders to use political capital to build up, support, and take military action in countries when they believe the situation requires it. That is a deeply rooted historical and political issue that involves both political parties. When bin Laden and his type try to persuade the American people that it is too expensive to stay in the Gulf and support certain regimes, they perceive in us a lack of forbearance.

The problems we must confront are deeper than most people suggest. The illusions that were supposedly shattered by September 11 were in many ways mere wishful thinking. The problem here is not with Susan Sontag or Edward Said and other commentators from the left. The main attacks on American policy in the Gulf so far have come from the right. There is no dialogue with the left.
The government itself fears that it will not have the strength, forbearance, and will to make the electorate understand what the war is about and to support protracted and large losses. Dead white European males and multiculturalism are provocative, but they do not have much to do with September 11.

In his account of Periclean Athens, Thucydides stressed moderation and the risks of overextension, showing how certain domestic values contradict themselves when they are applied in an imperium. This has been a problem in the US, especially since the Truman Doctrine of 1947. Thinking about Pericles lets us see the contradictions of a democracy acting like an empire. We see this in Saudi Arabia, where the stakes are very high.

The playwright David Mamet is interested in con games, especially in the moment when the mark realizes he is being taken. He turns for help to the authorities, but finds that they have been part of the con all along. Since September 11, the country has been laboring under the illusion that it is reacting appropriately. But as the war continues, risks in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia point to contradictions in our own political culture. Pericles would have recognized them, but his message would have been different from what we are hearing today.

Reply by Roger Kimball:
These problems go back further than September 11. We should have responded more strongly to the first attacks on American installations, but the past few administrations did not undertake a response. I agree that the multiculturalist claim that all cultures are equal is a pernicious idea that has been shaken by September 11. The conviction that the world is a benevolent place is also an illusion, but of a different order.

Mark Danner:
There was no recent political support for staying in Somalia, Haiti, or Rwanda. All important voices ridiculed the idea as a desperate attempt on the part of Clinton to stay in office after the details of the Lewinsky scandal became public. The political constellation that urges the use of force has changed dramatically. The far left has been marginalized.
Session Four

Huntington’s “civilizations” that (he predicts) will clash are almost all religions. Will scientific modernism prove to be a civilization of its own, perhaps at odds with religion, and therefore breaking cleanly with the past? For science, all truth is provisional, and the role of humans is to ask questions; for religion, the answers are known and humans should not question but instead should have faith. Will the future see a conflict between science and all religions? Is there room for both?

John Silber, Presider

Introduction

Issues of collectivization and homogeneity rise whenever we consider global capitalism. In only a few years the US, by means of the free market economy, has managed to collectivize its farms more thoroughly than Lenin and Stalin could ever have. Similar trends in retail trade and mass entertainment in France and Germany suggest that this is a result of American cultural hegemony. We wonder what consequences follow these developments.

Ambassador Charles Stith

Moral Values and Market Values in an Era of Global Capitalism

The globalization of capitalism is a fact of life and will continue to define our reality for the foreseeable future. In light of September 11, it is especially important to humanize capitalism if we are to mitigate the despair and discontent that give rise to terrorist fanaticism. To accomplish that task we need to determine what values are needed to sustain our economic and common life in an era of global capitalism.

My thinking about this issue was stimulated by George Soros’s The Crisis of Global Capitalism. His central point is twofold: (i) any country that wishes to develop its economy has to kowtow to Western capital markets or be relegated to the dregs of the world marketplace; and (ii) despite the universality of capitalism, we still have not developed a universal set of values, reconcilable with market values, that can sustain our common life in this global economy.

One of my primary interests as director of the African Presidential Archives and Research Center is looking at policies that will encourage the economies of
countries that are trying to reorganize their economies along free market lines. I also dealt with the same issues when I was Ambassador to Tanzania. In both capacities we considered how integrating Africa into the global economy represented good market policy as well as good moral policy. If African nations are to buy into the global economy and their populations are to support this development, globalization will need to affect the economic potential of the poor and raise their standard of living. To do this, a set of moral values must be developed that will inform market values.

Have moral values had a lessening impact on market values? What sound policies relate to moral and market values? The transactional nature of economic life requires cooperation between the parties of economic transactions. Cooperation by definition involves fairness and trust, which are clear moral values. There are, of course, cases where people pursue economic ends by means of immoral and illegal means, as in the case of the slave trade. So although moral values are not necessarily inherent in market values, we must have moral moorings if our economic life is to hold together.

The effect of moral values on market values is diminishing for historical and contemporary reasons. Notwithstanding the Protestant church’s historical commitment to the work ethic, market values such as competition, self-interest, market dominance, or transactional transparency have not translated well into the moral sphere. Among the most egregious failures of the church have been its unwillingness to develop a moral taxonomy of competition or self-interest and its ambiguity toward wealth creation. In the past, the church thought it “harder for a rich man to get into heaven than for a camel to get through the eye of a needle.” Consequently the church has missed an important opportunity and has fallen into the trap of viewing economic activity as a zero-sum game instead of seeing its potential to enhance the commonwealth for everybody’s benefit. This limited view has kept it from giving authoritative direction to economic development. In addition, technology has expanded the economic universe beyond the ethical reach of any single entity. Former Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan observed that new technologies that move and manage capital “have challenged the ability of inward-looking and protectionist economies to main-
tain effective barriers," and have strained human evaluation capacities. The result has been a market discipline that has become more draconian over the past 30 years.

How can we reconnect market values to moral values? Market and private enterprise, if unchecked, degenerate into a force that stifles progress, opportunity, and growth. A free market needs to be moored to moral values if it is to remain free, vibrant, and progressive. Market values without moral values make for an unfair or precarious state of affairs. Developing countries are now experiencing some of the structural moral problems that more advanced societies had to confront and solve earlier. They should expect to receive similar benefits for this effort.

When I was Ambassador to Tanzania, the Clinton administration tried to integrate Africa into the global economy. In addition to specific programs for economic and political reform in Africa, all US embassies were given implicit instructions to be more aggressive in engaging African countries in issues of trade and investment instead of focusing solely on aid. The Bush administration is continuing to see Africa as the world’s last major potential emerging market and an important aspect of overall US economic prosperity.

The US will develop a competitive advantage if Africa decides that doing business with the US lies in their best interest in terms of rate of return, economic growth, and a rise in the standard of living. In other words, our competitive advantage is secured by being “fair” in our economic engagements. “Fairness” is a fundamental moral value.

Melding market values to moral values will make us more attractive to Africa. I do not suggest we develop a list of moral values to juxtapose with market principles, but a principle of fairness must underlie our economic involvement with developing countries. It will have to work for them as well as it does for us. In order to deal with the discontent and despair that incubates the fanaticism we are presently trying to defeat, we must find the proper mixture of moral values and market values.
Elizabeth Prodromou  
*Response*

Can religion help correct a fundamental failure of the market to resolve the tension between growth and equity? The problem of social justice grows extremely urgent in an increasingly globalized marketplace. Can religions offer support and constructive suggestions in this larger debate?

One answer is to be found in a narrow reading of the Huntingtonian civilizational model, which claims that only Protestantism and Catholicism can help moralize the marketplace. Ambassador Stith claims to the contrary that many religious traditions can address inequalities of the global marketplace. Alfred Stepan argues that religions can play an important role in broadening and deepening the moral discourse relating democratic values to the marketplace. We need, however, to think about religions in the plural and to consider them all as potentially multi-vocal.

Ambassador Stith’s distinction between moral values and market values is somewhat problematic in distinguishing between the two, rather than assuming a dialogue between them. Religion has become part of the global marketplace in discursive and operational terms. When religious leaders now talk about the competitive religious marketplace, they reveal the role they have assumed in domestic and international public life. Religions have also begun to see how they can act as effective agents in the marketplace. They now use mechanisms such as mass media technologies, financial mechanisms to accumulate and redistribute wealth, etc., that were once associated with the marketplace.

Since the separation between the economic and the moral marketplace has collapsed, we wonder if religion has been compromised, or, to the contrary, leaders now find themselves more in the know. How can they use their new knowledge and expertise to resolve the tension between growth, equity, and the problems of social justice? This overlapping is already appearing in literature on Islamic economies, liberation theory, and, more recently, on how US foreign policy links economic assistance to human rights and freedom of conscience.

Agreements between the moral marketplace and the economic marketplace can produce advances in equity, but they do not always do so. That leads us to
consider regulatory structures to ensure or optimize improvement in equity and justice. Structures that emphasize accountability and transparency, that penalize corruption and the excesses of parasystemic or paralegal activity, allow plenty of room for dialogue and for policy cooperation between the moral marketplace and the economic marketplace.

Reply by Charles Stith:
I do not claim the church has had nothing to say about economic life, but that all too often the church has not said the right things. The church played a critical role in the US civil rights movement of the 1960s and liberation movements in Africa and South and Central America. Both movements effected changes that had profound economic implications. But, since then, it has stumbled. The most recent initiative of significant consequence has been pushing banks to serve and invest in marginalized communities. The $700 billion this initiative helped make available to low- and moderate-income communities resulted in an exponential growth of the middle class of this country. The church in America was conspicuously marginal in this “movement.” On another front, while the African church was in the vanguard relative to the continent’s liberation struggle, it has been a backbencher in offering insight or challenges to governments and NGOs about how to contour the new playing field and allow people to claim their stake in their developing economies.
SESSION FIVE

Constitutionalism and the US Constitution. Values in the US Constitution remain valid more than 200 years later; but which of them, if any, will remain valid 200 years from now? What of constitutionalism itself—liberalism, as it then was—the belief that the main goal of politics is to limit power. Will the problems and opportunities of the longer-range future lead us to want to augment rather than limit power?

Fareed Zakaria
*The Rise of Illiberal Democracy*

Globalism and global capitalism have been around for a longer time, but democracy, a new development, is the most important feature of the modern age and colors all aspects of our age. It involves the breakdown of authority and the movement away from large banks, trading firms, and other institutions, in favor of empowering individuals and small groups of individuals. Evidence of this trend is everywhere, including the democratization of technology fundamental to the terrorism we are seeing today. On the other hand, the notion of a general movement towards democracy includes too much. There used to be five democracies in the world with an election every year or so. Now there are 120 with 25 to 30 national elections and 200–300 local ones. Democratic ideology has become the only basis for legitimate authority throughout the world. It has assumed formal dominance as a political system and an informal dominance which permeates every aspect of social organization.

I applaud this development, but would like to point out that pure democracy untempered by anything else can be dangerous. Traditional Aristotelian concepts of democracy blend with other forms of authority and institutions, but modern democracy, to the contrary, is the sole, unchallenged occupant of political and social space, having gone from being merely a form of government to a way of life. Problems with this formal dominance of democracy lie at the heart of liberal democracy.

Some believe that once you hold elections you have established democracy. I wish to argue that substantial issues that will not go away relate to the preconditions and sequencing of that development. Let us distinguish between simple
democracy and liberal democracy. Few countries illustrate an automatic process of
democratic procedures leading to liberalism and constitutionalism. Mexico
had been liberalizing its institutions for years before it capped the process off
with a transition to democracy, imperfect though it still is. Countries that have
not gone through a period of liberalization do not consolidate as effectively as
others that have.

We can see a related issue in the problem of authority even in contemporary
America, the most advanced modern democracy, which is dealing with problems
that are likely to arise in other parts of the modern world. The US has seen a
noteworthy decline in trust and respect for politics, political institutions and
political authority, a process that has taken over thirty years and represents one
aspect of the radical political democratization.

As American politics became more democratized, institutions lost authority
and standing in the eyes of the American people and became less effective,
coherent, and legitimate. Political parties are perfect examples of Aristotelian
and Tocquevillan ideas of mixed democracy. We have elections, but within that
basic framework many undemocratic elements, like political parties, operate.
Parties offer people choices that have been arrived at undemocratically. Internal
dynamics and organization of a party therefore must be governed by political
and intellectual coherence. When in the sixties and seventies we moved to an
entirely different, radically more democratic system of primaries, which were
pre-election elections, we destroyed the traditional coherence, authority, and
raison d’être of political parties. The most important function of the party,
selecting candidates, was then transferred to the candidate who could command
the most telegenic image and financially enterprising machinery.

A similar process of democratization that occurred in the Congressional
committee system further radically empowered 535 people. Collaborative action
thus became very difficult, and large-scale action, particularly in peacetime,
almost impossible. A very high premium has been placed on short-term oppor-
tunism and a corresponding high cost on long-term policy. The most dramatic
radicalization of democratic politics has been the rise of the referendum.
California is the frightening model of the future of American politics, in which
referendums, financed by either millionaires or special interest groups, will make non-negotiable demands.

Politics is developing into a form that operates without the politicians, who are being deprived of power, judgment, and authority. This development represents the greatest challenge facing the Western world. How can we combine the need for an increasing degree of popular participation with the need for control and surveillance and for internal coherence? The West’s present, unsatisfactory solution is to delegate policy-making decisions to unelected bodies. The European Union, the principal agent for economic deregulation and economic growth, forces governments to adopt market-friendly rules when they prefer not to make these choices themselves. Elected US representatives who have been afraid to face difficult economic policies delegate power and initiative to the Federal Reserve, which is the single most important governmental institution, even though it is entirely unelected and accountable to no one. A similar delegation of power has occurred with military policy.

Some things have to be delegated. That is part of the Aristotelian conception of a mixed democratic system. But democrats have to participate actively in that process and be willing to espouse politically difficult positions. At the heart of America’s problems is the rise of special interests that mobilize the moment they see a measure that might threaten their interests. Madison was wrong to claim that factions cancel each other out.

Western democracies will have to figure out which issues can be dealt with by delegation of power and which have to be faced head-on whatever their electoral consequences. If not, the requirements of global capitalism and democratic development will become increasingly inimical.

My purpose here was not to bury democracy, but to save it.

Tony Smith

Response

Fareed Zakaria’s paper discusses the dangers of democratic governments gone wild and how leaders who emerge out of hyper-democracies usurp powers that should be reserved to other agencies of the government or to society itself. These
problems characterize many late democratizing nations. Zakaria’s remarks concentrate on the early democratizing world and its weaknesses rather than its strengths, emphasizing weaknesses that can arise when early democratizers become more democratic.

When Zakaria says that while constitutional liberalism leads to democracy, democracy does not always evince constitutional liberalism, he is pointing to sequences in countries like Great Britain and the US, which were liberal before they became democratic. In these terms, constitutional democracy is the weaving together of two distinct traditions—liberalism and democracy—which historically sometimes opposed each other but in the end led to constitutional democracy. Many NGOs who ask authoritarian governments to enact liberal measures are aware of this historical contradiction. Democracy and liberalism are different ideas. Democracy may come later, or it may not. In some cases, democracy eviscerates liberalism. But there is an affinity between the two. The classical sequence may still be with us.

Fareed Zakaria pointed out “the fallacy of electoralism.” I would like to emphasize the fallacy of the fallacy of electoralism. Electoralism means more than people turning out to vote. It involves freedom of speech and assembly, it allows various elements of civil society to bargain with one another through party structures, and it creates a kind of social contract that can help guide the government. We need to broaden our notion of elections from the simple use of the ballot to the entire process of articulating and encouraging interests through the party system. One of the best ways to limit the excesses of democracy in the late democratizing world is strengthening civil society and aligning various agents of civil society with political parties.

Multi-ethnic parties can tend to exacerbate ethnic conflicts. Nigeria has experimented with such measures to alleviate these tensions as assuring the representation of minorities in legislatures. Another danger is the development of neo-fascism, which involves a highly nationalistic and militaristic cult of the personality and one-man rule.

The US is not the most advanced democracy, compared with Germany, France, and the Scandinavian countries, that are not limited by an electoral
college. They publicly fund their campaigns, thus avoiding the excessive power of special interests. Their electoral system also encourages the formation and growth of small parties. The US has a low voter turnout and a general sense that popular will is not being represented. We need to look at more than the ballot itself and concentrate more broadly on the electoral process. Democracy is becoming weaker at the center, but we can reverse this trend.
CHANGING AND UNCHANGING VALUES

in the World of the Future

DIRECTOR’S SUMMARY

David Fromkin

The group agreed that today’s Western values are:

- Democracy
- Constitutionalism
- Liberalism
- Rule of law
- Open society
- Market economy.

We agreed that these were desirable, and that we would hope they would characterize the world of the longer-range future. Roger Kimball made the point that these are values under assault and that we can keep them only by defending them.

But are these values desirable in themselves? In which case, the question will be “how is the world of the future going to achieve or maintain them?” Or are these values desirable because they are the most effective approaches to dealing with the sorts of conditions, issues, and problems with which the world of the longer-range future may have to deal?

Fareed Zakaria seemed to lean rather more towards the former than the latter. For a variety of reasons that include the existence of pressure groups that distort parliamentary voting, and the human failings that characterize the electorate, the model for the future may be the European Community, in which faceless expert technocrats make the hard decisions that electorates are not emotionally and intellectually capable of making for themselves.

For the same reason—because legislatures and electorates cannot make the hard decisions—democracy (which is a desirable goal) comes last in the progression of values we desire. First a society (through taking what often are hard decisions) must find wealth and stability; only then can it achieve and maintain a democracy.

This suggests that our current values, though they fit with one another and are coherent, can be separated from one another. Freedom of inquiry is essential
to the science that underlies a growth economy; and rule of law is essential to attracting capital investment. Both bring wealth that (according to Dr. Zakaria) must be achieved before democracy can be achieved or maintained. I would add that a relatively widespread distribution of the wealth throughout society is, in my view, another pre-condition.

Dr. Zakaria’s pre-democratic government, even if authoritarian, must, we argue, pursue liberal economics. But can it do that if it does not pursue liberal politics as well? And since liberal politics involve the rule of law, how can they be pursued by a regime that is authoritarian, which, by definition, is not restrained by constitutions and law? These are issues that we were still discussing when, so to speak, the bell rang.

Sequence also was central to the paper submitted by Professor Etzioni, who moved away from the government-and-people model to focus on a third category: society. Instead of shaping the values of the longer-range future by moving from one kind of government and politics to another, the sequence he proposes would move through the processes of society before finding expression at the stage of government and politics. There was much valuable discussion.

Ambassador Stith moved the sequence along by adding to it one dimension more: that of morality. In his model, a moral code must move society, which then moves politics and government. Again, the focus was on both separability and sequence of values.

All participants seemed to be concerned with how to make liberal democratic politics work, not because they always work best (which, it was agreed, they do not) but because they best represent our values.

But what if the circumstances of the longer-range future render liberal democracies and open societies ineffective? Must we not curtail our liberties in order to deal with terrorism? “Yes, temporarily, but only until the threat is overcome,” was one reply; but what if the threat is not overcome? What if it becomes a permanent threat? In my book, *The Way of the World*, I point out that the long-range trend is for individuals and small groups to be able to do more and more harm. If continued, and if not countered by new technologies, it will mean that society will disintegrate as any fanatic with a mini-atom bomb will be able to
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destroy whole cities to prove a point. In other words, it may well be that our values, though valid in the sense that they remain desirable, will prove to be invalid in the longer-range future, in the sense that they may no longer be affordable or may not work at all. On the other hand what assurance do we have that any other type of government would work any better?

The second Pardee workshop-conference, which will focus on the changing political structure of the world (April 2002), is foreshadowed by my own paper on how the need for global governance in environmental and other matters can be met—if it can be met—in a world without global governance. I argue that the traditional American Wilsonian approach, with its emphasis on public opinion, persuasion, shared ideas, independence of nations, rights of small countries, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries except for humanitarian reasons, never worked and never will in dealing with matters that require government. My argument is that the closest we can get to governance in environmental and other global matters is by alliance with other countries based on interests: interests held in common.

Four key points to consider are:

(1) Our kinds of government and politics will be as desirable in a century or two as they are today, but they may not work as well then as they do now, and indeed may not work at all.

(2) A strategy to establish and maintain our political values in a century or two might have to proceed in sequence rather than all at once.

(3) Democracy may come last in that strategic sequence, and we should focus on how to achieve it or maintain it precisely because we believe in it so strongly and yet its future is so problematical.

(4) In considering what values to apply to the world as a whole, it is easier to answer the question “what should be done?” than the question “who can make and enforce the right decision as to what should be done?”
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James Chace was one of America’s leading foreign policy historians and analysts. After studying literature, French, and Italian at Harvard, he served as an Army translator in France, and developed an interest in foreign policy. Chace wrote for Esquire, East Europe, and Interplay, among others, and was an editor for several influential foreign policy journals, including Foreign Affairs and World Policy Journal. He was also a frequent contributor to the New York Review of Books. The author of nine books, he is best remembered for his biography of Dean Acheson, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (1998). He served as a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, and was awarded a Chevalier des Arts et Lettres from the French Government. He taught at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.
CHANGING AND UNCHANGING VALUES in the World of the Future

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Born and raised in Utica and in the Adirondack mountains, Danner graduated from Harvard College, magna cum laude, in June 1981. He joined The New Yorker’s staff in 1990, and in the 1990s was widely recognized for his reporting on Central America and the Balkans.

In 1998, Danner began teaching at the University of California at Berkeley as a visiting professor at the Graduate School of Journalism and Senior Research Fellow at the Human Rights Center. In 2000, Danner was named Professor on the faculty of the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley. He currently spends half his year at Berkeley, where he teaches courses on political violence, crisis management in international affairs, and writing about wars and politics. In fall 2002, he became founding director of Berkeley’s Goldman Forum on the Press and Foreign Affairs, leading a series of debates and discussions on foreign affairs, journalism, and politics. In 2002, Danner was named Henry R. Luce Professor of Human Rights and Journalism at Bard College in the Hudson Valley of New York State.

Danner’s work has been honored with a National Magazine Award, three Overseas Press Awards, and an Emmy. In June 1999, Danner was named a MacArthur Fellow. Mark Danner serves on the board of the World Affairs Council of Northern California and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Pacific Council on International Policy, and the Century Association, and is a fellow of the Institute of the Humanities at New York University. Danner divides his time between San Francisco and New York.
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Etzioni is the author of twenty-four books, including The Monochrome Society, The Limits of Privacy, The New Golden Rule, which received the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s 1997 Tolerance Book Award, The Spirit of Community, and The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics. His most recent books are My Brother’s Keeper: A Memoir and a Message, and From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations.

In 2001, Etzioni was named among the top 100 American intellectuals as measured by academic citations in Richard Posner’s book, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline. Also in 2001, Etzioni was awarded the John P. McGovern Award in Behavioral Sciences as well as the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. He was also the recipient of the seventh James Wilbur Award for Extraordinary Contributions to the Appreciation and Advancement of Human Values by the Conference on Value Inquiry, as well as the Sociological Practice Association’s Outstanding Contribution Award.
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in the World of the Future

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Professor Goldstein’s research interests include diplomacy, formulation of national diplomatic strategies, the origins and resolution of armed conflict, and negotiation. He has published in numerous journals. He is the author of Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916–1920; Wars and Peace Treaties; The First World War’s Peace Settlements: International Relations, 1918–1925; and Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865–1965. He has co-edited The End of the Cold War; The Washington Conference, 1921–1922: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability, and the Road to Pearl Harbor; The Munich Crisis: New Interpretations and the Road to World War II; and Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy. Professor Goldstein is also the founder-editor of the journal Diplomacy & Statecraft, and he serves on the editorial board of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies.

He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society of Britain and a member of the Advisory Board of the Centre for the Study of Diplomacy at the University of Leicester (UK). He was previously Professor of International History and Deputy Director for the Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy at the University of Birmingham (UK) and has held appointments as Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the Naval War College and as Visiting Scholar at the Centre for International Studies at the University of Cambridge. He is the President of Phi Beta Kappa, Epsilon of Massachusetts. He has been the recipient of numerous grants and accolades, including the Wardrop Fund Grant at the University of Oxford, a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Bane Fund Grant from Cambridge University, and a Hoover Presidential Library Fellowship.
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Buckley has described him as “one of the two or three best writers in America.” He is the author of two
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Professor Prodromou has published widely in academic and policy journals. She is currently working on a book on Orthodox Christianity in American Public Life: The Challenges and Opportunities of Religious Pluralism in the 21st Century, as well as a volume on Orthodox Christianity, Democracy and Markets in Post-Communist Russia. A regional expert on Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, Prodromou’s scholarship and policy work concentrate on religion and international relations, nationalism and conflict resolution, and non-traditional security threats. Dr. Prodromou has been an invited policy consultant at the U.S. State Department, the Foreign Affairs Training Center of the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Council, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and the Council on Foreign Relations. She has received numerous awards and grants, including research fellowships from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and Center for European Studies; New York University’s Center for European Studies; and Princeton University’s University Committee on Research in Humanities and Social Sciences. Prodromou was the founding Executive Director of the Cambridge Foundation for Peace, a nonprofit organization dedicated to sustainable peace building in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. She is active and has held elected positions in many professional organizations, and she is listed in Who’s Who of American Women, 21st Edition of Outstanding Women of North America.
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Among his current professional activities, Rosenthal is editor-in-chief of the journal *Ethics & International Affairs*, and has oversight responsibilities for the Council’s main projects on ethics and armed conflict with conflict prevention; comparative human rights; justice and the world economy; environmental policy; and the politics of reconciliation. Rosenthal also serves as Adjunct Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University.

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He was the first chairman of the Texas Society to Abolish Capital Punishment and a leader in the integration of the University of Texas. Dr. Silber is a leading spokesman for the maintenance of high academic standards and has gained national attention for his advocacy of a rational, comprehensive system for financing higher education. He was instrumental in founding Operation Head Start.
CHANGING AND UNCHANGING VALUES in the World of the Future

In January 1971 John Silber became the seventh president of Boston University, and in 1996 he became Chancellor. In January 1996, Governor William Weld chose Dr. Silber to head the Massachusetts Board of Education, the state’s policy-making board for public education below the collegiate level.

Dr. Silber has written widely on philosophy (especially on Immanuel Kant), education, and social and foreign policy. His works include: _The Ethical Significance of Kant’s Religion, Being and Doing: A Study of Status Responsibility and Voluntary Responsibility, Human Action and the Language of Volition, Procedural Formalism in Kant’s Ethics, The Natural Good and the Moral Good in Kant’s Ethics_, and _Obedience to the Unenforceable_. His book _Straight Shooting: What’s Wrong With America and How to Fix It_, was published in 1989. Dr. Silber has also served as an editor of _Kant-Studien_, and has been the recipient of Fulbright, Guggenheim, and ACLS Fellowships.

Tony Smith

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Professor Smith has been at Tufts since 1970. He became the Cornelia M. Jackson Professor of Political Science in 1990, and for several years served as Department Chair in Political Science. He is also a core member of the International Relations Program.

Tony Smith’s books include _The French Stake in Algeria, The Pattern of Imperialism, Thinking Like a Communist, America’s Mission: The U.S. and the Global Struggle for Democracy in the 20th Century_, and _Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy_. His work has been published in _World Politics, Political Theory, International Organization, Foreign Affairs_, and _French Politics and Society_.

He has held grants from the Lehrman Institute, the Rockefeller Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, and the Woodrow Wilson Center. He was the Whitney Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in 1998 and was a Fulbright Professor in Guatemala, Spring 2000.
Ambassador Charles Stith

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The Reverend Charles R. Stith is the director of the African Presidential Archives and Research Center at Boston University. A former United States ambassador to the Republic of Tanzania, he is also the founder and former national president of the Organization for the New Equality (ONE). His tenure as ambassador started one month after the August 1998 bombing of the United States embassy in Dar es Salaam and he is credited with leading the embassy through its recovery. After his time in Tanzania, Stith founded the African Presidential Archives and Research Center (APARC) at Boston University. Stith has received a number of awards and special appointments in his career, including an honorary doctorate from his alma mater, Baker University. Also, in 1994, President Clinton appointed Stith to the official delegation to monitor the South African election. In 2001 former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle appointed him to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.

Fareed Zakaria

Editor, Newsweek International

Fareed Zakaria is editor of Newsweek International, and he writes a column that appears in the national edition of Newsweek, Newsweek International, and often the Washington Post.

He is the author of The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (April 2003), a book on global political trends, and From Wealth to Power, a provocative examination of America’s role on the world stage. He is co-editor of The American Encounter: The United States and the Making of the Modern World.

Zakaria was born in India, has a B.A. from Yale University (in history) and a Ph.D. from Harvard (in international relations). In 1992, at the age of 28, Zakaria became managing editor of Foreign Affairs, the leading journal of international politics and economics—a position he held through 2000. He frequently appears as a political analyst on several ABC News programs and other international news shows.

Zakaria has written for the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and The New Yorker, and was the wine columnist for Slate. He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the Overseas Press Club Award, the National Press Club’s Edwin Hood Award, the Deadline Club Award for Best Columnist, and a lifetime achievement award from the South Asian Journalists Association.