Boston University The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future

Africa 2060: Good News from Africa
Africa 2060: Good News from Africa

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A report of the Pardee Center Conference
Africa 2060: Good News from Africa
held on April 16, 2010.
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Preface

As the keystone event of a research program called “Africa 2060,” the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University convened a conference on April 16, 2010 called *Africa 2060: Good News from Africa*. The program featured more than a dozen expert panelists from Boston University and across the world, and the approximately 100 participants included many African scholars and citizens from the continent who contributed to lively and well-informed discussion. The Pardee Center conference was co-sponsored by Boston University’s Africa Studies Center (ASC), the African Presidential Archives & Research Center (APARC), and the Global Health & Development Center (GHDC).

Instead of providing a transcript or a typical rapportage on the conference, we are adopting a different approach with this report, which consists of commentary reflecting upon and information pertaining to the substance of the conference. An introductory overview reflects upon the major issues discussed at the event, which are placed within the larger literature on Africa’s future. Four short essays prepared by Boston University graduate students provide readers with more specific reflections and highlights of each conference session and the main issues discussed by panelists. The final section presents analyses of key trends and projections related to societal, economic, and governance issues for Africa and a commentary on what this information tells us about the drivers that will determine the continent’s future.

We hope this conference report offers insights into new directions for Africa in the first half of the 21st century. Feedback is welcome and appreciated. Video of the conference is available at the Pardee Center website at www.bu.edu/pardee/multimedia.

Many people contributed to the development of the conference and this report and deserve special thanks. Pardee Fellows Alfredo Burlando, Julius Gatune Kariuki, and Heran Sereke-Brhan did much of the work to identify and invite panelists and conceptualize the program, and also contributed significantly to the writing and editing of this report. Boston University graduate students Sophia Aba Jebel, Trevor Green, Jamie Mercurio, and Tithee Mukhopadhyay wrote summaries of conference sessions and helped compile and analyze information presented in the trends and projections section. Pardee Center staff
member Cynthia Barakatt served as the final editor of the report, and the conference logistics were overseen by Pardee Center staff members Theresa White and Elaine Teng. The Pardee Center thanks all of the panelists (listed in the agenda and presenters’ biographies section of this report) for contributing their time and expertise, and all who attended the conference on April 16. The discussion sessions were quite engaging and informative because of the participation of so many knowledgeable Africa scholars and well-informed global citizens.

Professor Adil Najam

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The 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup hosted by South Africa has once again shined a spotlight on the continent. The tournament's theme song—"This Time for Africa," sung by Shakira—resounds on television sets, iPods, and stereo systems around the globe. It captures the scintillating rhythms, vibes, and energy that the world has come to associate with Africa, and in many real ways the world cheered the continent of Africa as much as it did any particular team as the tournament unfolded. Yet, this is not the first time that the world has cheered the continent, or been captivated by its great potential. Those who have followed Africa's development fortunes know the story too well: bursts of peaking global interest (optimism), followed by periods of global neglect (pessimism); recognition of continental potential, followed by litanies of despair and dismay; expressions of great expectations, followed by prognoses of hopelessness and helplessness (Gatune Kariuki 2010; Fosu 2009).

As the world sways to Shakira's beat, it does seem that this time could be different. According to most development indicators, Africa remains the continent with the most poverty, least human development, and most dismal development statistics. Yet, since the beginning of the new millennium, a number of key trends are moving in the right direction (Okonjo-Iwaela 2010). By most measures, Africa's knowledge economy remains behind all other continents, but a revolution of technological leapfrogging—especially in the innovative use of cell phones—seems under way on the continent (Economist 2009). Africa remains home to a very large number, and even larger proportions, of the world's poor, but the continental as well as national economies seem to be on the mend and are unleashing the entrepreneurial potential of the African population (Mahajan 2008). Many perennial conflicts linger and institutions of national governance remain fragile—and some states like Zimbabwe and Somalia flirt with the brink of collapse. But unlike any other point in its history, most of the continent is today under democratic and elected rule (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009).
development gains Africa has made and seems poised to make remain fragile, the record is mixed, the optimism could be fleeting, and some degree of skepticism is justified (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2007; Young 2010).

As one looks at Africa's future, several questions emerge: which of these gains can be consolidated? Which of the positive trends will be sustained? Has this recent period of global attention provided the continent with a real institutional scaffolding on which a positive future can be built? And what needs to be done to ensure that the dangers of chronic poverty, conflict, and institutional collapse that still lurk in the shadows will be contained long enough that they eventually disappear? These and other such questions inspired the Africa 2060: Good News from Africa conference in April 2010 organized by Boston University's Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer Range Future. In reflecting upon the ideas discussed at the conference by leading experts on different aspects of Africa's economic, political, social, and cultural development, we seek to highlight some of the key drivers that are likely to shape the longer-range future of the continent.

We base our observations on the intense discussions during the conference by practitioners and experts with an engaged and informed audience, plus a broader reading of the literature, including that which was presented at the conference. These observations reflect a locus of expert and informed opinion and provide a window into the priorities that are engaging the imaginations of those thinking deep and hard about Africa's future. We also understand, of course, that there are “many Africas” and many realities within Africa. To say anything about the entire continent is to condemn oneself to saying only that which can be easily generalized. We choose to do so knowingly. We do so with great respect, even reverence, for the specific and the nuanced, but also with the recognition that identifying larger overlaying trends—and the driving forces behind those trends—is a useful enterprise. Despite all its known limitations, this exercise can lead to a better identification of those specific and nuanced national and local policy levers that have the greatest potential of triggering positive change, even at the continental scale.

**DRIVERS OF AFRICA’S FUTURE**

In addressing the conference’s title, speakers identified much that can be classified as “good news” from Africa: poverty in Africa is falling, and falling fast (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2007); food productivity is rising (Denning 2009); inequality is falling (Young 2010); women are assuming positions of leadership
(Ngunjiri 2006); democracy and elections are becoming the norm (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009); regional markets are developing (Mahajan 2008); anti-corruption measures are gaining prominence (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009); Africa is becoming an important destination for foreign direct investment, especially from China (Mahajan 2008); African intelligentsia is finding a more prominent voice in defining Africa’s options (Zewde 2008); and continent-wide cultural expression is strengthening a positive continental identity (Adichie 2010).

A number of persistent challenges and hurdles to progress were also identified: serious health deficiencies plague the continent and many are increasing in intensity (ECA 2007); access and availability of education in Africa remain dismal (OECD 2009); even economies experiencing high growth rates have a high number of poor living at the margin (ECA 2007); serious challenges of food security remain (World Bank 2008); concerns about foreign direct investment overwhelming local development priorities persist (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009); major institutional and governance lapses run the risk for over-turning the democratic gains on the continent (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009); the population of unemployed and restless urban youth grows larger (Sommers 2009); and there is a criminal element in entrepreneurship activities (Kiggundu 2002).

From the nuances of this rich discussion, we distill seven key drivers that are of particular importance in shaping Africa’s longer-range future. Of course, all of these can operate in either a positive or a negative direction. As many of the speakers at the Pardee Center conference made clear, it is the decisions that will be made by African and international policy-makers, businesses, civic organizations, and citizens today that will determine which direction Africa will be “driven” towards tomorrow.

**Driver #1: Perceptions**

Speaking at the Pardee Center conference, Vijay Mahajan, author of *Africa Rising* (2008) made the passionate case that how Africa views itself may be even more important than how it is viewed by the rest of the world. Indeed, the two perceptions reinforce each other, which is why Africa has the ability—as it did in the recent FIFA World Cup—to rebrand itself as a continent recognized for its vibrancy, diversity, and energy rather than its poverty, instability, and conflicts. Although it was not always seen as such (Gatune Kariuki 2010), since the era of colonialism there has been a tendency towards “Afro-pessimism” as characterized by Joseph Conrad’s description of Africa as the “heart of darkness.” These powerful forces of perception have shaped not only how outsiders have viewed
Africa, but also how Africans themselves view their continent. The tendency to extrapolate and generalize the bad news, to consider any good news to be an anomaly, and to believe that a pessimistic portrayal will forever be the most persistent, has been a dominant trait within the continent’s own discourse.

Moments such as this one—when many economic, social, and governance indicators are moving in a positive direction—are critical because they provide opportunities to turn these perceptions around. Creating within the continent a confidence in its own potential becomes even more important for the youth in this most youthful of continents both because such confidence is key in nurturing the spirit of entrepreneurism in the future, and because an absence of such confidence can push the restless young into the depths of despair, with significant social consequences (Sommers 2009).

Recent examples of the changing international perception of both China and India demonstrate that (a) even deep-rooted international perceptions can change, and change very swiftly, and (b) that a change in a community’s confidence in its own abilities is a necessary precursor to a change in international perception (Mahajan 2008). There is an opportunity to turn world perception, which has historically been preoccupied with “worrying” about Africa, towards viewing its own future as being intertwined with Africa’s. The good news that is coming from Africa—from individual icons such as Nelson Mandela, to successful world events such as the FIFA World Cup, to strengthening democracy and stability on the continent—is driving a subtle change in international perceptions. Most important of these is the shift in international finance, where Africa has long been viewed as a place to “send aid to” and is now beginning to be also seen as a place to “invest in.”

It is not entirely clear whether world perceptions about Africa will actually shift. But it is clear that these perceptions will influence the continent’s ability to shape the reality it wants in the future. It is even clearer that how the world imagines Africa in the future will be influenced by how the continent imagines itself.

**Driver #2: Governance**

Governance remains Africa’s perennial challenge (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009). There are many persistent challenges—including corruption—that continue to plague the continent, and countries like Zimbabwe and Somalia have become internally and internationally dysfunctional (although for different reasons). However, continent-wide the story is clearly one of improvement. The regular
military coups of the 1970s and 1980s are now aberrations rather than norms. Elected democracies, even if imperfect ones, have begun to take root across the continent. The media is also freer. Public outcry against corruption is louder and efforts to curb it are becoming more common, even though not always successful. Overall, the trend in governance moves towards improvement, although slowly and with many pockets of serious concern, within and across countries on the continent. As Robert Rotberg pointed out in his presentation, this positive trend needs to be nurtured and strengthened, but it is equally important to focus on cases within the continent (such as Zimbabwe) where deep problems persist. This, he argued, needs to be done with a sense of urgency to ensure that these cases do not start influencing other parts of the continent and destroy the gains that have been made elsewhere.

To better understand governance, new and sophisticated tools have been developed and are being taken increasingly seriously by African leaders. For instance, the Africa Governance Index (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009) has been widely accepted and leaders, such as those in Rwanda, have shown great interest in understanding what they can do to improve their ranking in a given category. Though many leaders may dispute specific rankings, the fact that they are trying to decipher the ranking components is itself a sign that they care about how their governance is perceived internationally, and are willing to make changes in their own actions in order to change these perceptions. Such efforts have also begun to produce regional role models of “best practices” that others can use as motivation and work to emulate. For example, in his keynote address to the Pardee Center conference, Ambassador Kaire Mbuende of Namibia described how his own country is gaining world-wide recognition for its fisheries policies. He noted that Namibians with foresight studied the lessons learned by Norway in its fisheries policies, and improved and adapted those policies for the Namibian context. Similarly, Botswana is gaining international accolades for how it manages its mineral resources. We have also seen improvements in Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Congo, which have signed on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Index (EITI); indeed of the 32 countries implementing EITI, 20 are in sub-Saharan Africa (EITI 2010).
Good leadership begets good governance, which in turn begets good participatory culture, which begets good institutions. As Ambassador Mbuende, Robert Rotberg, and Oyeronke Oyewumi highlighted at the conference, leadership will be a key determinant of Africa’s future. Of course, the most iconic example of leadership turning around a polity in Africa is that of Nelson Mandela’s in South Africa, but now a crop of less iconic but effective leadership from democratic rather than revolutionary roots has begun to emerge. One example often cited is that of Ghana, which is maturing as a democracy and had a peaceful transition despite closely contested elections. But good governance is driven not only by political leadership but also leadership in other arenas: for example, leadership in business and civic spheres were cited repeatedly at the Pardee Center conference as key drivers of positive changes in the future.

**Driver #3: Knowledge and Education**

Knowledge and education are going to drive the future everywhere, not just in Africa. But they become even more important for Africa’s future because the continent lags so far behind other parts of the world in these areas. While the forces of globalization and technological dissemination may be providing Africa with important opportunities to catch up—maybe even leapfrog—in some areas, the essential knowledge challenges of Africa remain deep. Without the driver of knowledge and education being mobilized, any gains from other drivers of change could be lost.

On the positive side, there are examples of elite schools in Africa—like the African Leadership Academy (ALA 2010)—selecting and working with Africa’s top young students, training them at the most rigorous global standards to prepare the best in Africa to compete with the best globally. At the same time, the internet is opening new avenues of knowledge and opportunity and in many ways leveling the global knowledge playing field for Africans, just as it has already done for new generations of Chinese and Indians. As Nathan Eagle pointed out at the conference, the talent for software development amongst the young in Africa is no less than anywhere in the world.

However, for this driver the overall story is far from positive. Speaker after speaker at the conference pointed out that in many different ways education systems across Africa are failing the young people they are meant to serve. The issues that were highlighted include: education remains highly rationed; there is a steep pyramid structure where the majority of those who enter school leave only with a primary education; access to education is restricted to the rich; even...
for many in the middle class, few make it to secondary school and fewer still to universities, and those who do find themselves in institutions facing massive resource and related constraints. A participant pointed out that in Nigeria, for example, there are over two million applicants for higher education, but only 100,000 positions. Another participant noted that in Ethiopia, schools operate as many as three “shifts” in a day and the local refrain is that they have turned into “daycare” centers rather than serving as places of learning. Harounan Kazianga noted that in Burkina Faso, many families with low and unstable incomes do not see enough utility in education to send children to school. Similar examples were cited all across the continent.

The future implications of these challenges are severe and multidimensional. In a world that is already being defined by knowledge economies, educational deficits can lead to long-term disempowerment. But even in the more immediate term, the cost of educational deficiencies, for example, on health—as was pointed out by Richard Clapp—can be severe (Naidoo et al. 2008). Given the age structure of this very young continent, these educational challenges are exacerbating the cadres of disenfranchised, unemployed, and often unemployable youth—often congregating in volatile and growing urban centers, as Marc Sommers (2009) detailed—who already pose serious social challenges to their communities and indeed to their own futures.

Overall, this driver of Africa’s future is important not only because it is such a universal driver of change, but even more so because the general direction of trends for this driver remains negative. This makes it, therefore, a high priority for action today if the continent’s future is to be more secure.

**Driver #4: Technology**

Technology leapfrogging has been one of the most striking “good news” stories from Africa. In particular, the rapid spread of cell phones in the continent has been the poster child for the potential of technology for development, not just in Africa but across the developing world.

However, technology can be a double-edged sword. Agriculture is a good example of a sector where the past promise of technology has failed to deliver and also where technology has sometimes led to unintended negative consequences. Seventy percent of the African population and 30 percent of its GDP is supported by agriculture (ECA 2007). However, despite advances in agricultural technologies and significant gains made elsewhere, Africa still suffers from low
agricultural productivity, and consequently from food shortages (World Bank 2008). But even as the benefits of new technologies, such as the use of pesticides, have not translated to increased food security, negative consequences have begun to accumulate. For example, pesticide use in South Africa, the most agriculturally advanced country in Africa, has been linked to numerous health problems including cancer and respiratory diseases as people inhale and ingest these persistent contaminants (Naidoo et al. 2008).

But the overall story of technology as a driver of Africa’s future is a net positive one, largely because of the rapid diffusion of mobile telephones. This diffusion has begun to accumulate development benefits. For example, cheap and dependable mobile phones are allowing farmers to access market prices and get better deals for their produce (Economist 2009). Mobile phone penetration combined with rapid and widespread improvement in skills in application development is sparking a wave of frantic innovation. For example, in Rwanda an application has been built that now allows people to pay for electricity in the same way people buy air-time via use of scratch cards. In Kenya, a mobile banking innovation, M-PESA, is bringing banking services to a whole new market of consumers and making it easier for people to transfer money, trade in vital services, and even save money. Mobile phones in Kenya are now becoming essential tools of business, allowing day laborers to not only find work but also to be paid for that work through micro-transactions over the mobile phone. Mobile phones are thus having a direct impact on large numbers of Africans, including those at the bottom of the economic scale (Economist 2009).

Technology, of course, is not a panacea. But a culture of continuous innovation is. For instance, as Dr. Nathan Eagle explained at the Pardee Center conference, in Kenya a mobile phone application was developed to better monitor availability of blood supply and improve the management of blood banks. However, the application failed to draw participation until a method was found for linking this application to an innovative way to pay nurses through micro-transactions for reporting blood availability. The application,
he pointed out, has subsequently revolutionized the availability of real-time data in an area critical to health care.

However, the possible dark side of new technologies is always present. For instance, as Eagle pointed out, broadcast mobile phone text messages have also been used as instruments for spreading hate. Broadcast text messages, for example, contributed greatly to poisoning the atmosphere in the prelude to Kenya’s post-election violence that took many lives. Such examples should highlight the need for care and caution, but they should not stop us from benefiting from the great potential of technology as a key driver of positive change.

**Driver #5: Entrepreneurship**

Vijay Mahajan argues in *Africa Rising* (2008) that the greatest asset of Africa—the youngest continent with the fastest growing population—is the entrepreneurial zeal of its young. He also points out that although the image we have constructed of Africa is of poverty and deprivation, the continent as a whole is much more affluent than most people, even Africans, think. He pointed out in his presentation that if Africa is taken as a single economy, then it has a higher per capita income than India. There is also an already substantial and growing consumer middle class in Africa that is brand-conscious and makes up an important consumer class for quality products. This has not been lost on business, as both local and international companies are aggressively expanding in the African market. But it is the entrepreneurship of the young in Africa that holds the potential of turning all of the above into a major force in the future.

Africans are increasingly identifying opportunities and seizing them. Adaptation has been the keyword in the deployment of new technologies to respond to persistent local needs. One good example from the cultural sphere is the phenomenal rise of the local Nigerian film industry—popularly referred to as “Nollywood.” As Pardee Center Research Fellow Dr. Heran Sereke-Brhan noted, lacking big budgets to make 35 mm films and distribution networks to back them, innovators in Nigeria have adopted a different model. Using simple digital video cameras and shooting directly onto DVDs, they have greatly cut production costs. Today, Nollywood is credited as the world’s second-largest movie-making industry in the number of films made. The industry generates revenues of upwards of $75 million per year, Sereke-Brhan said, and employs between half a million to one million people. Other estimates have put revenues upwards of $200–300 million per year and over one million people employed (*Economist* 2006). According to Sereke-Brhan, it is estimated that Nollywood now contributes $500–600 million to the GDP of Nigeria.
Of course, entrepreneurship is not an easy venture and there are significant hurdles to reaching the potential in Africa. Weak governance is of particular importance because it results in a failure to provide the environment in which entrepreneurship can be incubated. According to Dr. Nathan Eagle, the government monopoly over wireless telecommunications in Ethiopia has restricted the extent that the mobile phone innovations seen elsewhere in Africa are not occurring in Ethiopia. Banking regulations in many African countries restrict the growth of mobile banking, which can stymie entrepreneurship. Credit constraints are also going to continue impacting the development of small business innovators.

Unfortunately, it is also true that because of the lack of policy space to apply entrepreneurship to legitimate use, sometimes African entrepreneurship gets diverted to illegal and criminal activity, including the widespread, highly irritating, and largely unsuccessful internet scams of various types that have become strongly associated with Africa. The solution here, again, lies in the governance driver already discussed. Governance comes into play in both cracking down on the illegality and in providing an environment where the entrepreneurial energies of the continent can be put to better use. In essence, the key to this driver of Africa’s future—as it is for many others, too—is good governance and, in particular, the ability of government to remove structural hurdles to Africa’s entrepreneurial spirit. This is starting to happen now as the World Bank’s Doing Business surveys indicate (Okonjo-Iwaela 2010).

**Driver #6: Globalization**

Globalization has been a major driver of change in the last few decades and is likely to remain so at least in the near future. Globalization may have arrived a little late in Africa, but it is now arriving in full force.

As Africa has become more integrated with the world, its links with both the West and the emerging powers in the South are becoming strong; in particular trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have seen a marked rise in recent years. China, India, the Middle East, and now Brazil are the new entrants into the African marketplace, helping to raise the continent’s status as a participant in the global arena. China, in particular, is taking the lead in investing in Africa and arguably has made a significant contribution to the recent growth spurt seen in Africa (Broadman 2007). China’s influence is spreading from economic to political to cultural spheres. China is investing heavily in economic sectors, especially in construction, mining, and telecommunications. It is now also actively spread-
ing Chinese culture through its cultural centers—the Confucius Institutes—that are proliferating on the continent (Broadman 2007).

But foreign direct investment flow resulting from increased connection to the world has its drawbacks. Investment often comes with expectations attached, no matter where it comes from. Africa has seen exploitation in the name of investment before, and the danger of experiencing it again is all too real even as new countries enter the fray. Mineral and oil exploitation has sometimes become a “resource curse” as governments focus on capturing rents at the expense of the citizens with the resource firms as facilitators (Friedman 2006; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003). Now new dangers lurk in the land leases where large swaths of land are being leased exclusively to foreign countries and firms for food and bio-fuel production for export back to investing countries (Blas and England 2008; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). These so-called “land grabs” are happening as nations scramble to secure their food supplies, often at the expense of the leasing countries in addition to disenfranchising local farmers.

Although China is not the only country arriving in Africa on the wave of globalization—Middle Eastern countries, India, and now Brazil, are also joining the European and American interests that have already been there—China has become a source of concern. For some observers, China is seen as infiltrating African societies. Some view its deals as being exploitative, such as fisheries exploitation off the coast of West Africa. Stories of corruption are rampant. But these practices are not, and have not historically been, limited to China’s dealings on the continent. They are endemic to foreign investment in Africa. The driver of Africa’s future, however, will not be the magnitude or even the quality of these incursions in globalization. Instead, it will be Africa’s own response to these incursions.

The driver of Africa’s future, however, will not be the magnitude or even the quality of these incursions in globalization. Instead, it will be Africa’s own response to these incursions.

For example, the presence of new players seems to be improving the policy-making environment in many parts of Africa. By providing flexibility in how Africa can finance development, this new environment is helping governments in Africa to recover policy space that had been lost in the strict conditionality of
financing from the West and from multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank. This itself has proved to be a major driver of change in the availability as well as deployment of international finance in Africa.

One aspect, however, was clear at the Pardee conference on Africa: the locus of global power relationships with Africa is changing. Through an intense day of discussions on all of Africa and its future, the single country that was mentioned more often than any other and discussed with more vigor was China. Surprisingly, neither the United States nor Europe was mentioned much. Clearly, there is a power shift in progress, and Africa is beginning to look East rather than West as it seeks the fruits of globalization that had earlier seemed to pass it by.

**Driver #7: Society**

A major theme of this entire paper—and of the Pardee Center conference—is that Africa’s future will be shaped most of all by Africa itself. That means that political, economic, and social dynamics within African society are of paramount importance. There are many aspects of how African societies develop that will drive its future, but two areas of particular importance are women and youth.

Oyewumi’s work (2005), for example, shows an upward trend in women joining leadership ranks in Africa (see also Ngunjiri 2006). Liberia has a woman president and seven countries in Africa now have more than 30 percent women parliamentarians, while Rwanda leads the world in having the largest proportion of women parliamentarians (BBC 2008). But the change in the attitudes of and attitudes toward women in the public sphere is even more fundamental. For instance, Paliwala, in his presentation, noted that Malawi has a creative new program that allows women to address injustices that have been inflicted on them through a unique system that counsels and re-integrates men rather than using the conventional legal systems or the traditional systems that employ elders.

Youth, like women, constitute a major proportion of Africa’s population and similarly have the potential to drive dramatic changes in African society. This is particularly evident in the work of Marc Sommers (2009). He finds high levels of disenfranchisement and disengagement, particularly among Sierra Leone’s urban youth. Most lack jobs, have very little education, and are moving from rural areas to teeming slums in the cities. In places of past or present violent conflict, the youth have been part of the violence, which has left them traumatized and vulnerable. Because of cultural norms, young males who cannot afford a dowry or a piece of land are unable to marry, and thus cannot ascend to formal
membership of society. Society already views them as failures and this only exacerbates the alienation between mainstream society and large proportions of its youth. A major challenge is that the youth are largely unreachable. But this does not mean that they are not represented. Youth organizations are large and powerful in many countries across Africa. The challenge for policy-makers, according to Sommers, is to find ways to reach them so that they can become drivers of positive, rather than negative, change.

Youth, like women, constitute a major proportion of Africa’s population and similarly have the potential to drive dramatic changes in African society.

The shape of society in Africa will be influenced by these two key demographics, but also by a multitude of social cohesion forces, including the intelligentsia, writers, and public celebrities from various fields such as sports and entertainment. Bahru Zwede (2008) from Ethiopia considered some of these forces and articulated the trends shaping the regional and continental identity of “African society” in these and related areas. The challenges of creating an African identity remain large, even though mega-events such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa help—as do global achievements of other African sports stars, for example in long-distance running.

Ultimately, societal change will have to come at societal scales, and in particular from decisions made at very local levels in creating healthy and cohesive societies that can drive Africa to brighter futures.

FINAL THOUGHTS

As we review the lessons from the 2010 Pardee Center’s Africa 2060: Good News from Africa conference, two overarching conclusions are evident.

First, Africa’s future will ultimately be driven by African decisions. There are many external forces—including those of technology and globalization—that are and will remain important, but in the final analysis these, too, will be shaped by the decisions made by Africans and in Africa. In particular, the first two and the last of the drivers we have identified are critical in shaping Africa’s contribution to its future. How Africa sees itself will determine the level of confidence the continent will assert in its own future. Governance, at every relevant level, will remain a key challenge but also a key opportunity and in many ways this is the most significant factor that steers every other driver in our list. Finally, it
forces within African society and how it develops over the next half century that will be as important as any economic force, external or internal.

Second, there are a number of exciting opportunities that await Africa in its future, but many of these also come with potential hurdles and pitfalls. Innovation, entrepreneurship, technology, knowledge, and globalization are among the areas that have generated significant “good news” to record from Africa. But within each of these areas there is also the potential and reality of bad news. Related to our first point, the choice now lies with African citizens, decision-makers and societies as to whether they are able to make the type of decisions that will control the negative tendencies of these drivers and accelerate the positive tendencies.

There is no certainty that Africa’s immediate future will be any better than Africa’s immediate past. But there is plenty of reason to believe that it could be. And that decision rests in the hands of Africans themselves. The rest of the world cannot determine Africa’s future, but it can help the empowerment process for Africans to do it for themselves.
2. Reflections on Africa: Today and Tomorrow

Edited and introduced by Cynthia Barakatt and Heran Sereke-Brhan

The Pardee Center’s *Africa 2060: Good News from Africa* conference was conceived as a means to gather interdisciplinary groups of leading scholars to discuss Africa’s possible futures in four major areas: social development, economic development, politics and institutions, and culture and society. To take advantage of the expertise and local knowledge of the many more Africa scholars and citizens of the continent who were among the attendees, the sessions were designed to include ample time for discussion after each panel’s presentations.

This section features the reflections of four Boston University graduate students, each on one of the four main sessions. These reflections build upon the presentations as well as the discussions, but are reflections of the authors rather than formal reportage. Each report seeks to highlight a small set of the many themes that were raised in the corresponding session. It should, therefore, be noted that the sum of what was discussed in each session was broader than what is presented here.

As they—and the introductory piece by Najam and Gatune Kariuki—note, consistent themes emerged throughout the day. First, there are positive trends for Africa in many areas, but serious long-term challenges remain. Second, while it is easy and tempting to generalize about “one Africa”, the continent’s individual countries and regions face different challenges and respond in different ways, depending on cultural traditions and the strength of local governance. Finally, while outside investors and aid providers have a vested interest in the future of Africa, that future will be determined largely by the decisions and actions of Africans themselves.

**SESSION I: AFRICA’S SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT**

*Jamie Mercurio*

A diverse panel of experts on social development discussed issues best summarized by session chair Jonathon Simon (Boston University) as “good, big,
and hot.” Within the “good” news there are “big” challenges on what constitutes development, providing “hot” topics for debate. Speakers presented on three specific areas of hot topics and good news, including the proliferation of academic peace studies programs around the world and in Africa; the growing awareness of the human health effects of pesticide use in South Africa; and the rapid and widespread increase in the use of mobile phones and their role in countries such as Kenya. Throughout the presentations, common themes included the notion of growth versus development, the importance of education for Africa, and the “correct” method of capacity building. While panelists and conference participants may not have solutions for Africa’s quest for social development, discussions pointed to significant progress that has been made in the field. This is evidenced by a growing number of peace studies programs, increased South-South collaborations in agricultural projects, and the burgeoning mobile phone industry. Clearly, these developments provide the foundation for further advancement.

**Peace Studies in Africa.** Seble Dawit (Goucher College) began by discussing the increasing number of academic peace studies programs around the world, including in Africa. As of 2000, there were at least 350 institutions (two of which are in Africa) with such programs. Degrees offered from these institutions range from undergraduate to graduate and terminal degrees. Curriculum content varies from place to place, and although many seem to focus on conflict resolution—which is perceived to produce mediators that can resolve any conflict—others highlight pre-conflict issues. These pre-conflict programs include a focus on peace and justice, specifically the idea of structural violence, and the role of education on peace, such as the possibility of K–12 education having a non-violence framework at its core. Other programs explore the intersection between peace and history or peace and psychology. While existence of such programs in Africa is good news, Dawit admits that finding information about them can be difficult, preventing awareness of a newer academic discipline and possibly hindering interested students from attending.

**Pesticide Use and Health Effects in Northern KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.** Richard Clapp (Boston University) spoke about what began as an act of “post-Apartheid solidarity work” in 1990—a study funded by the U.S. Fogarty International Center at the National Institutes of Health in collaboration with the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. Led by University of Cape Town’s Leslie London (affectionately known as “Dr. Pesticide”), the project sought to investigate the health effects, specifically that of brain disorders among
women and children, stemming from pesticide use (Naidoo et al. 2008). This study is important because it addresses the health effects of common practices in agriculture, one of the largest industries on the continent. While pesticides may lead to increasing crop yields, adverse health effects lead to lower productivity—negating any positive effect.

Pesticides cause many occupational injuries in the developing world, but are also a common suicide mechanism. Northern KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa had increasing levels of exposures and soil contamination from the agricultural and vector control uses of pesticides. In regions where malaria is endemic, DDT use was necessary to enable people to work the fields. Aside from occupational exposures in fields by skin contact (dermal), inhalation (airborne droplets), and incidental ingestion (soil, larger particles), women and children were often exposed to DDT in the home. These exposures included wet clay masks (filled with pesticide runoff) used as sun block, old pesticide containers used for water storage, and home storage of occupational pesticides.

As for the good news in pesticide use in Africa, Clapp shared that there is an increasing global connectedness of research and policy work and growing South-South collaborations. One South-South network, which includes teams from South Africa, Tanzania, Brazil, and Costa Rica, has helped to raise awareness of and provide training on the health risks of pesticides.

**Phone Technology—The Next Frontier.** Nathan Eagle (MIT; Txteagle, Inc.) shifted the geographical focus up the eastern coast of the continent to Kenya and eastern Africa, where he has made use of very large datasets, which in Africa primarily come from cell phones. These datasets are a new phenomenon, driven by technology companies that collect massive amounts of information, such as locations, calls, and movement from their subscribers. Eagle stressed that when discussing data generated by individuals’ activities, there is a need to move past the negative “Big Brother” understanding, which implies governments are gathering and using data to control the public. Instead, researchers and policy-makers should explore its use for social good. By understanding this data—for example, the common movements of mobile phone users in Africa and the high traffic areas in cities—urban planners can determine the best location for building public services or roads, and ultimately have a positive impact on health and development.

Eagle’s activities in Africa exemplify a few growing trends in development, especially the mobile phone industry. His curriculum on mobile phone application
development at the University of Nairobi was so popular that he began training teachers (as opposed to students), which has proven to be one of the most successful methods of capacity building—allowing exponentially more people access to education. He believes the curriculum has been successful because it responds to local demands, for example, allowing applications to be designed for the native market. Africans may not need the remote car starter application for Apple’s iPhone, but instead students can create locally in-demand applications for the more inexpensive phones commonly found on the continent.

The final development realized in Eagle’s work was discovered after a failed attempt at optimizing blood delivery at a coastal Kenyan hospital via mobile phone texting technology. Eagle saw that mobile technology provides a simple way to make existing systems more efficient. In the example he discussed, nurses who knew that blood level supplies were low in their clinics were able to text ahead and arrange for replenishment and get compensated airtime for their effort. This was the basis behind the creation of his company, Txteagle, Inc., which has created a new outsourcing industry in Kenya, generating up to $20 million in potential business by switching from large structures with considerable overhead costs to individuals with a cell phone or laptop in a cyber café in remote areas. However, negative issues with the growth of the industry cannot be ignored. In some countries, cell phones have been used to organize protests and riots, and others question if the growing profits of the industry are coming at the expense of the poor who are not reaping any of the benefits. As the industry grows and develops, Eagle believes that the current and potential benefits outweigh the few negatives, but that diligence is still necessary.

Questions and Discussion. The panelists’ presentations were followed by “hot” topics for debate, and three overarching themes emerged. The first was the tension between growth versus development. Questions were raised about the rapid growth of the telecom industry, which led to large profits for firms, but no improvements on the ground in Africa. Clapp stressed that growth does not necessarily result in
development, but Eagle added that the growth of the mobile and telecom industry is adding value to Africa. Africans are now connected with the world through this new mode of communication. People are also able to easily transfer funds, and even start saving money in more secure ways (as opposed to previous methods of purchasing bricks or livestock). The increasing number of cell phones provides a tool for budding entrepreneurs, and the general opinion is that the growth of the mobile phone industry is doing more good than harm.

The next theme was the importance of access to education. Whether education comes from peace study programs, South-South partnerships, or mobile learning, it is important for education to come from Africa. Clapp stressed that it may not always be effective to export U.S. or Western ideals, especially in agriculture, to Africa, and that the knowledge needs to be home grown. Dawit maintains that this indigenous knowledge should be the basis for African-based analysis and decision-making on social, economic, and political issues, informing how governments open markets or structure education. The lasting effects of colonialism need to be confronted before peace is possible.

The final theme that arose during the discussion session was the need to discern the correct method of capacity building. Dawit stressed that capacity building can only occur if training and educational efforts go both ways. Sending American students to study abroad in Africa is not enough—partnerships need to be mutually beneficial. Eagle added that the successes he has seen by using the training-of-trainers method for capacity building can be sustainable, but only with a comprehensive approach. Increased skills and training for professors need to be coupled with better compensation and a higher profile given to the profession, which is easier said than done in a continent experiencing obvious financial pressures.

While the panel presentations and discussions may have raised more issues than they resolved, as Clapp explained, it is discussions such as these that lead to solutions. If nothing further, the first panel of the Good News from Africa conference reinforced the idea that news from Africa’s social development is definitely “good, big, and hot.”

**SESSION II: MARKETS & ECONOMY**

*Tithee Mukhopadhyay*

The global economic crisis spread around the world, but the story is more complex and more hopeful than many believe. For Africa, various trends are
pointing to positive economic development in the future, despite the continent’s numerous political, social, and environmental challenges. Pragmatism is driving stronger economic ties between Africa and the rest of the world and delivering opportunities to millions, despite setbacks. Yet Africa’s struggle seems far from over. The “Markets and Economy” panel took a closer look at the paradox of progress in the continent.

What trends have the potential to improve the economic landscape of Africa? Session Chair James McCann (Boston University) urged the use of “imagination” in identifying these propellants. Changing perceptions, entrepreneurial development, reducing credit constraints, demographic transition, and greater global integration were discussed as the greatest influences on the progress of the African economy.

**Changing Perceptions through the Ages.** Having emerged from centuries of insufferable oppression by colonial powers, bloody independence struggles, and corrupt home-grown regimes, Africa today is transforming and determined to join the mainstream globalization process. Julius Gatune Kariuki (Boston University) reviewed the historical changes in perceptions of Africa, noting its wide variation over time. He posits that a positive shift in perceptions will ultimately be one of the key drivers of the continent’s economic development. For instance, the continent was thought to be a symbol of greatness and power throughout the Greek and Roman eras. The phase of colonial power brought an end to this view, and the ghosts of the colonial past still haunt Africa’s present.

The achievement of independence galvanized a new spirit throughout Africa; growth increased as the promise carried by the “winds of change” swept across the continent. But the optimism was short lived. Weak political structures and archaic, alien institutions inherited from colonial powers resulted in failure to deliver the independence promised by modernization. This created opportunities for the establishment of military rule in Africa, transforming it into a “bloody continent” in the eyes of the world.

The 1973 and 1979 oil shocks exacerbated the situation that soon after ushered in global recessions. Africa as a whole fared poorly in this turbulent period. As a result, the high per capita income growth of 2.2 percent experienced in the 1960s plunged to zero percent by the end of 1970s (Gatune Kariuki 2010). The Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s resulted in the downsizing of government spending, which in turn led to stagnancy and decline in development. At this point, the continent was perceived as “Dying Africa.” The political
The economy of Africa had reached its lowest trench. Over the next two decades, changing leadership, improvement in social conditions, and positive turns in the business climate, led to Africa’s resurgence; the first decade of the new millennium has brought hope for a better future.

Entrepreneurship in Africa: More Power to the People. Researchers have shown that poverty is a malady that incapacitates individuals economically, indirectly subjecting its victims to a state of destitution, powerlessness, and even violence. But can the hypothesis about misery and poverty in Africa be accepted without challenge? Vijay Mahajan enlightened the gathering with often overlooked facts that point to progress. GDP per capita is one of the most important tools for a cross-country analysis of economic development. His comparative analysis shows that there are 16 nations in Africa that have GDP per capita greater than that of China. In addition, remittances by immigrants in the U.S. amount to around $40 million per year, equal to Indian remittances. The tourist inflow to Africa is close to 25 million people every year, almost five times the annual number of tourists visiting India. Such numbers usually are associated with a booming hospitality industry.

In Mahajan’s view, entrepreneurship in Africa is vital to the empowerment of the poor because they are the most potent source of employment creation in the economy. Africa’s economic performance has improved dramatically in the last few years and conflicts in the region have decreased, setting the stage on which the continent will undergo a business metamorphosis that relies less on natural resources and more on innovation and private sector growth—hallmarks of entrepreneurship. Africa has been breeding a generation of entrepreneurs with potential to be the new torchbearers. The entrepreneurial landscape is diverse and pro-active. It consists of micro- or small-scale informal sector vendors, traditional or multinational large-scale formal sector firms, and global businesses.

Entrepreneurs have the potential to strengthen private sector regional cooperation in African countries, to develop and expand formal commerce and trade among businesses regionally and globally, and to work with governments to change policy and regulatory environments.

Entrepreneurs have the potential to strengthen private sector regional cooperation in African countries, to develop and expand formal commerce and trade among businesses regionally and globally, and to work with governments to change policy and regulatory environments.
and regulatory environments. Mahajan asserts that the economy will be built by consumers and entrepreneurs in the near future. These entrepreneurs have influenced business practices, trade, and regulatory policies in their countries. The entrepreneurial zeal on the continent points towards a positive outlook among business people and market players. This provides a different perspective on the future of the African economy and points to new avenues for investigation.

**Unshackling Constraints: The Role of Micro Finance Institutions.** Informal and small-scale lending arrangements have long existed in many parts of the world, especially in rural areas, and they still survive. Good examples are schemes in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria (“merry-go-rounds,” “esusus,” etc.). They provide the rural population with access to savings within the local area and encourage community ownership. The groups formed provide joint collateral and serve as instruments for spreading valuable information that is useful for economic and social progress. But such initiatives are ineffective in insuring farmers against risks of geographical and environmental catastrophes. The absence of formal credit in Africa constrains optimizing the economic behaviour of farmers.

Kazianga assumes a microeconomic perspective when analyzing these prevalent financial constraints. His data drew from the aftermath of a drought in Burkina Faso in 1984–85 to succinctly explain the nature of credit constraints and the solutions implemented. The farmers are most sensitive to economic shocks and this leads to risk-averse behaviour. They are disinclined to adopt new farming techniques as there are initial investments and uncertain outcomes. It is observed that households with capricious income arrangements are less likely to send their children to school. This highlights the strong need for formal credit and complete insurance to improve the productivity of farmers.

Kazianga provides evidence of the effectiveness of small-scale financial innovations in Burkina Faso. The Rainfall Risk Index Insurance set up there provides insurance to farmers involved in rain-fed agriculture. There are provisions like fertilizers and subsidized inputs that may increase per capita yields. The farmers are optimistic about this program. They are associating themselves with the microfinance institutions and testing micro insurance mechanisms. Such programs seem to have a future in this largely agrarian economy.

**Africa: The New-Age Phoenix?** The evidence for sub-Saharan Africa suggests that the recent economic recovery was influenced by improvements in macroeconomic policies and structural reforms. Margaret McMillan asserts that
research findings by venerated economists around the world confirm “good news from Africa.” She specifically discussed the research results of Alwyn Young (2009) and Maxim Pinkovskiy and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2007).

Young used demographic and health surveys to conclude that measures of real consumption (based upon ownership of durable goods, quality of housing, health and mortality of children, education, etc.) indicate that sub-Saharan living standards have been growing in excess of three percent per year, i.e. more than three times the rate indicated in international data sources like Penn World Tables and the UN Statistical Office.

The conventional wisdom that Africa is not reducing poverty is challenged by Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2007). They estimate income distributions, poverty rates, and inequality and welfare indices for African countries for the period 1970–2006 and provide evidence that African poverty is falling, and falling rapidly. African poverty reduction is remarkably general: it cannot be explained by a large country, or by a single set of countries possessing some beneficial geographical or historical characteristic. They also emphasize that if present trends continue, the Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people with incomes less than one dollar a day will be achieved on time.

McMillan also considers the demographic transition in Africa as a potential source that is propelling the economy. The growing labor force and human capital on the continent will provide it with a competitive edge. Rising commodity prices have been a classic indicator of economic growth, and thus Africa is on the economic growth path.

Africa-Can. Africa is seeing a dramatic transformation. Among other things, this favourable economic outlook is spurred by better governance, an improving business climate, innovation, market-based solutions, a more involved citizenry, and an increasing reliance on home-grown solutions. More and more, Africans are driving the continent’s development and the belief that Africa can harness this dynamism for long-lasting development.

SESSION III: POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS

Trevor Green

Africa has resources. Infrastructure is improving. Regimes are changing at the ballot box and the middle-class is growing. As the panel chair, Timothy Longman, put it: “Africa is not just a place to be helped. It has a future.”
But that’s not enough. Africa’s bright future is an all-too-familiar story that often is derailed by tragedy. The Politics and Institutions panel delivered the message loud and clear: there is good news from Africa today, but that doesn’t guarantee more tomorrow. The group of political scientists, gender and legal scholars provided plenty of Afro-optimism but were careful to temper it with a healthy dose of Africa’s volatile recent history. There was general agreement with Robert Rotberg’s (Harvard University) assertion that, to move forward, Africa needs good leadership and governance. This in turn will beget healthy political institutions and public participation while propelling the nation-states forward.

Rotberg believes in the power of one, citing the emergence of “more Mandela-like” leaders. His assertion is rooted in data from his 2009 Index of African Governance, which is based on five categories: Safety and Security; Rule of Law, Transparency, and Corruption; Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunity; and Human Development. Most indices rating governance in Africa use a variation of the same broad categories comprised of more specific data. However—and herein lies the problem of rating African governance—the categories listed above are not mutually exclusive. Rwanda is an example of a country that loses points in the index for participation and human rights but gains even more for safety and security and rule of law. “The African Big Man role is even more vital in fragile societies,” claims Rotberg, “but there must be a vision, which is a vision for the entire country—not just one person.”

Local Leadership Is Key. Is there such a thing as a benevolent dictator? If so, are foreign experts really equipped to make such a distinction? Abdul Paliwala (Warwick University) asks tough questions that often divide the development and human rights communities. He sees democracy and peace as a precursor to economic prosperity and observes part of the good news as increasing agency: “African people are taking command intellectually…and ordinary people are taking control of their own lives instead of relying on others.” For example, in Malawi, groups of women are organizing to encourage abusive men in the community to act more responsibly. This “bottom-up” approach to solving a civil society problem was in line with the grassroots, entrepreneurial spirit that Vijay Mahajan had identified in an earlier panel as key to Africa’s success in the business sector. Just as we see small-scale enterprise blossoming throughout Africa, the development of a vibrant civil society signals a willingness by local groups to shape their own futures.
Local leadership may well be the key to better governance in the future of the African continent. The fallacy concerning Africa is that there is one Africa. Western political structures cannot be re-shaped to accommodate the varied historical legacies along with the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity within each country, which breeds complicated representation issues. There is not a one-size-fits-all form of governance; rather, it should be left to Africans to decide how they want to be governed, assuming they have the political and civil freedoms to express opinions.

Oyeronke Oyewumi (Stony Brook University) noted the recent visibility of women in African politics as evidence of more inclusive politics. She is ecstatic about the fact that Rwanda has the highest ratio of women in parliament in the world, Liberia has a female president, and several African states have parliaments with at least 30 percent women members, placing them well above the world average of around 15 percent. Indeed the increasing participation of women in leadership roles signals progress that goes beyond the feminist movement. The recent inclusion of women in African politics provides yet another historically underrepresented group with a voice—and that voice is being heard. This recent gender shift is most striking in post-conflict societies that offer significant avenues of opportunity and change. Oyewumi said that she welcomes this development, not because she is a feminist, but because the African state is too important to be left to any one man, woman, or group.

The Next Generation: What Will It Hold? With their discussion of different sources of leadership, the panelists raised the following questions: Who can Africa look to in the future? Is it the prototypical African “Big Man”? The grassroots leader? Or will women be at the forefront of African politics? It will likely be some combination of the three, plus new and innovative forms of governance. In addition, China’s presence looms large whenever the conversation shifts to leadership and governance as it maintains a large portfolio of investment throughout Africa. Some observers watch this recent development with trepidation because China generally refuses to attach human rights guarantees on new loans to African states, and has been engaged with dictatorial governments. China’s dealings are unlike those of the Western countries, which favor at least a modicum of civil and political freedom from would-be borrowers. Pressure
on China to condition new loans with human rights standards would be best applied by the African Union or regional bodies rather than Western powers. Nationalism in China might refute external pressure from foreign powers but it also motivates the government to act in a certain fashion appropriate for a global superpower. A positive shift in China’s stance on human rights standards would have a dramatic effect on African governments that continue to seek support for development initiatives.

The structure and stability of various institutions in Africa is related to leadership and governance. The data on democratization illustrates a freer Africa today than 30 years ago, and the presence of domestic civil society groups reflects much greater participation. Oyewumi suggested that governments are more engaged with their citizens than before, and this has improved political accountability. Furthermore, the new victim support groups, such as those in Mali, have sought to lessen society’s dependence on the government to solve all problems. This relates back to Paliwala’s assertion that individuals and civil society are finally beginning to drive success in Africa.

If we focus on the good news from the Politics and Institutions Panel, we see that new African leaders are emerging in various countries. Good governance does not begin and end with elected politicians but trickles down through the elementary school teachers, policemen, and doctors. Kaire Mbuende, the Namibian ambassador to the United Nations and keynote speaker at the conference, reminded the audience that “leadership is much broader than governance. There should be competition in leadership just as there is in business.” Failed companies go bankrupt and ineffective leaders should be replaced. Although, it is up to women, entrepreneurs, youth leaders, and civil society groups to demand accountability and work for change. The Markets and Economy panel noted that the greatest strength of the African economy is human capital. The development of this capital might well lead to economic gains and it will most certainly foster the next generation of African leaders.

**SESSION IV: CULTURE & SOCIETY**

*Sophia Aba Jebel*

As chair of the Culture and Society session, Fallou Ngom (Boston University) charged the presenters with the task of closing the gap in the understanding of diversity, the arts, and culture in Africa. Panelists Bahru Zewde (Forum for Social Studies), Marc Sommers (Tufts University), and Heran Sereke-Brhan
(Boston University) drew from their distinct and specialized backgrounds to discuss current developments. Bahru Zewde spoke of the importance of indigenous knowledge production as a symbol of independent capacity-building while Marc Sommers discussed his research on the urban youth movement in Sierra Leone, highlighting emerging trends among African youth. Heran Sereke-Brhan presented on current happenings and trends in African film and music production to illustrate the varied mediums of artistic expression continuing to emerge from the continent. Though panelists acknowledged many challenges, all reported on good news in arts and culture from Africa.

The Arts and Culture in Africa’s Future. In discussing the role and value of the arts, Sereke-Brhan quotes Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen: “Music and the creative arts will never, of course, replace the need for food and medicine, but nor would food and medicine replace the need for the creative arts.” Her presentation addressed an important question: Do African arts and cultural expression have a role to play in the continent’s future? Panelists were eager to discuss “good news” in this sphere, and perhaps implicit in that invite was an opportunity to finally celebrate African arts and cultures. To celebrate Africa is to present Africa as it is: a source of intellectual thought and home to richly diverse cultural and artistic expressions, not just a recipient of international aid. Assigning a conference panel to society and culture in Africa broadens the discourse and includes interdisciplinary perspectives—and perhaps recognition of Africa’s contribution to global sportsmanship, music, film, and knowledge production is long overdue.

According to Sereke-Brhan, the arts serve as a mechanism for “communities to wrest meaning out of confrontations.” When discussing arts and culture in Africa, referring to the continent as one entity obscures nuanced understanding; though economic and political challenges across African communities are similar, there is immense diversity of response to those challenges. Often underestimated, this diversity is responsible for a great variety of artistic expression. Advances in technology have allowed for the exchange in music, literature, and film. A particular set of themes threaded the discussion of trends in art and culture: technology, demography, and competition.

Barhu Zewde highlighted the activities of four prominent African think tanks that have received international recognition: the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODERSIA), the Organization for Social Science Research in East and Southern Africa (OSSREA), the Forum for Social
Studies (FSS), and TrustAfrica. CODERSIA was nominated as one of the most influential think tanks globally, and OSSREA was the only African think tank nominated amongst the top 50 non-U.S. think tanks. While their rankings are impressive, Zewde emphasizes that the importance of these think tanks is that they offer a platform for a distinctly African voice. While Africa has suffered from myriad challenges of development, think tanks offer a way to foster a tradition of both democratic governance as well as a multidisciplinary exchange of knowledge at national and sub-regional levels. Think tanks also encourage indigenous knowledge production, resulting in research and publications.

In other areas of society and culture, Zewde noted that Africa has contributed significantly to world athletics, and that 2010 marks the first time in which an African country (South Africa) has played host to the World Cup. Such achievements are thus far regarded with skepticism, because, according to Zewde, “when it comes to Africa, there will always be question marks.”

Descriptions of such indicators of progress were met by a reminder of the challenges faced by Africa’s youth, as described by Marc Sommers. He suggested that observing the demographic trends across Africa will help direct attention towards future patterns in social development. Sommers noted that, with a population whose current average age is 14.5 years, Africa will be young for approximately another 30 years.

Youthful Migrations, Shifting Traditions. Africa’s youth are not exempt from global trends, which encourage rural dwellers to migrate towards cities. Youth are habitually challenged by economic instability: rural life seems less economically and socially promising than the appeal of the city. While globally this migration is attributed to economic hardship, Marc Sommers argues that traditional cultural roles are also responsible for this shift.

Globally, gender roles are imbued with economic responsibilities. Sierra Leone, like many other African countries, is no exception. A young male is expected to marry and can only do so if he owns land. Womanhood is dependent on being married and having children. But Sommers notes that the current reality is that most youth will not have access to rural land. The overwhelming migration from rural communities to urban settings exacerbates this reality. On the surface, in Sierra Leone this migration is a result of traditional gender roles. Using a fiscal lens, not having access to land is an economic issue, not a cultural problem. Thus, in non-African countries this migration is easily attributed to the
political and economic climate. Yet in Africa, Sommers attributes this shift to cultural traditions. In the past, these culture-based gender roles have served a social and economic function to rural society, but that is now changing.

Sommers notes that African cities “do not make economic sense.” However, the overwhelming majority of the population is expressing that African rural life does not make economic sense either. The migration from rural farms of Sierra Leone to Freetown is a cultural response to economic and political challenges, which arguably are the residual effects of globalization. Culture is elastic; it is the best equipped system to respond rapidly to unanticipated changes in climate (drought), politics (coups d’états), and economic challenges (recessions). Therefore, much like the youth, culture cannot afford to be neglected.

Inherent in studying African youth is a study of the location in which they live: the urban setting. According to Sommers, scholars could focus on the dangers and challenges of urbanization, but given the demographic trends, which indicate current and pending “youth bulges,” it seems it could be more beneficial to observe the advantages of urbanization. Cities provide youth an opportunity for independence, autonomy, and exposure to capital markets. Sommers explains that the latent issue of urbanization is that it results in a marginalization of the youth from the majority of the population. To address this challenge, Sommers proposes beginning the conversation among international actors. Given Africa’s history with political and economic colonialism and the push for a bottom-up, internal approach to resolving inequities (as highlighted by Zewde’s discussion), this raises an important question of agency: in the context of social change, should we not prioritize African participation in forging solutions above that of international actors?

The youth are surviving—if just barely. Could it be that the words of Bob Marley in the streets of Accra or the presence of Nollywood street vendors in Lagos have provided the soundtrack and visual setting for the somewhat peaceful urbanization of African cities? Sommers’s assessment of urbanization and African youth was
followed by Sereke-Brhan’s discussion of specific artistic mediums. The quest and pursuit of identity and history define certain typologies of African film within which lie a wealth of variation in content. How films and music are produced and where they are showcased point to complex interactions between aesthetic expressions and economic realities on local and global levels. African arts production is not completely independent of international influence. West African film production is largely funded by France, which also supports the Festival Pan African du Cinéma de Ouagadougou (FESPACO), the largest African film gathering held biannually.

**Good News, but Challenges Remain.** The world has much to look forward to from Africa. The panel illustrated that there are indeed positive accomplishments to report, although tempered with challenges. Africa’s first opportunity to host the World Cup combined with rapid advances in technology (mobile telephones and internet access) suggests that 2060 might be an overestimate of the time required to observe significant change. This picture is complicated by the fact that availability of technology has not resulted in tangible development—for example, people have mobile phones but it still takes them hours to reach a hospital. Other challenges include the production and distribution of technological and artistic goods. However, the creation of various think tanks signifies an advance in knowledge production and capacity building.

Similar positive trends to look for include growth in the private sector, strengthened government recognition of the arts, and a swap of heavy investment from foreign to domestic investors. There have been efforts by the World Bank to engage in culture to support the African music industry, although these efforts should be monitored and regulated closely by leaders within the African entertainment industry. Accompanied with growth of the film and music industry is a growth in concomitant industries: marketing and advertising, patent laws, music and film production, and security and performance venues, which will provide employment opportunities that will in turn create a need for skilled employees. We can look forward to training institutes and/or educational institutions expanding career placement opportunities.

Though usually one might hesitate to refer to Africa as one entity, the conference provided safe space for attendees and panelists to discuss Africa, the continent. Sereke-Brhan concluded both her presentation and the conference with a discussion of music. African music serves as a great reminder of the immense diversity of expression that prevails and will continue to color “good news” from the continent.
3. Trends and Projections: Africa’s Challenges, Past and Future

Edited and introduced by Alfredo Burlando

No report on international development is complete without a statistical appendix. This generally includes a long list of numbers representing economic and social indicators, organized by year, country, and region, neatly organized in columns, for pages on end. The statistical appendix usually offers a sense of great hidden knowledge, with little in the way of what insights one can gain by processing those numbers. In this report, we believe that these trends deserve more attention than simply being tucked into an appendix. We therefore replace the rows of numbers with graphs, charts, and maps, in the hope that these provide more analysis and some immediate insights about what Africa's past might have to say about its future. For this purpose, we selected some widely available indicators (mostly on sub-Saharan Africa) and organized them in sections—economic performance, governance, social development, demography, technological progress, and resource use. For each indicator we provide an illustration and a brief explanation of its meaning and significance.

What do numbers tell us about Africa? One thing that became very clear as we organized the raw data into graphs was that our own view of Africa's performance depended very much on what Africa was compared to. In comparison with countries in other continents, there is little in these indicators to generate optimism about sub-Saharan Africa. The numbers point to high levels of poverty, low gross domestic products, poor institutional development, weak governments, low levels of education, unhealthy populations, and so on. Relative to Southeast Asia, Latin America, or Eastern Europe, one could be justified in thinking that Africa is, and remains, a basket case.

There is, however, another perspective that compares sub-Saharan Africa's recent evolution to its own past. From this vantage point, it is much clearer that there has been progress. For the past 15 years, economic growth has been sustained, democracy has taken hold across vast swathes of the continent, and levels of education and health have increased. Indeed, many
African governments are better and more efficiently run today than they were 15 years ago.

Looking at the overall positive and negative trends, there are at least two major questions about the future. The first is whether sub-Saharan African countries are taking divergent paths. One Africa—comprised of countries in the east, south, and some western nations—is fast-growing, increasingly educated, and democratic, focused on setting the foundations for future growth and integration in the world economy. The other Africa—made up mostly of Central Africa and some Sahel nations—is being left behind, and suffers from unstable governments, low levels of social spending, and weak governance structures. The second question looms over the impact that the global financial crisis will have on the continent. As the figures in this section show repeatedly, global crises (such as the oil crisis in the 1970s, and the debt crisis in the early 1980s) have often marked turning points in Africa’s prospects. This past speaks ominously for the future, given the havoc caused by the current crisis worldwide. Nonetheless, projections indicate strong growth on the continent. With African nations better prepared today than they were in the past to confront economic crises—thanks to more solid economic foundations—there is some hope that the continent will continue with its current upward trajectory.

**How did we choose the indicators?** We chose these indicators out of hundreds available from dozens of sources based on several criteria. First, we decided early on to compare Africa against itself and not against the rest of the world. (Although in some instances we do show cross-continent comparisons.) Because of this choice, we favored indicators that had a clear historical record, with data points over decades. Second, we also wanted indicators that pointed to substantial present and future trends. Thus, while information about internet coverage and telephony was limited both in time and in its past importance, we highlight their impact by including projections for the future. Third, we exclude many important indicators (such as poverty, inequality, financial depth, and press
freedom) that were limited either in quantity, or quality, or availability. Many indicators do not go back in time for long or are seldom collected. Others (such as commonly used inequality measures) had multiple sources that offered different, competing values.

**How are the figures constructed?** The selected indicators, by and large, were measured through the years at the country level. We aggregated countries by region, and provide the time series evolution for East, West, Central, and Southern Africa separately. An issue we confronted in aggregating was how to consider countries of different sizes. This is particularly problematic on a continent where the best performing nations are often islands on the periphery, such as Cape Verde and Mauritius, or are sparsely populated countries such as Botswana and Namibia. Within each region, we weighed each country’s indicator score by its population at the time, so that big countries counted more than smaller nations. The advantage of this method is that it provides a measure for the “average” African living in East, West, Central, or Southern Africa. It provides, in our view, a better statement of Africa as a whole than other weighted measures—which often implicitly favor the country with the largest amount of the indicator being measured. The disadvantage is that such “average” Africans tend to be Nigerian, Ethiopian, South African, or Congolese. With the exclusion of southern Africa, this average representation favors countries that are poorly run and lowly developed. If anything, then, the graphs presented here tend to under-represent progress for non-Nigerians, non-Ethiopians, and non-Congolese.

**What figures are included?** This part of the report is organized in six sections, with two or three indicators per section. A standard measure of economic development is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Africans have witnessed periods of both great economic growth and decline. The most recent phase—which involved a healthy pace of economic expansion—has often been attributed to its mineral and oil wealth, and to the high prices these commanded during the 2000s. The second graph explores trends in the commodity prices, to highlight that this explanation goes only so far. More precisely, it plots terms of trade, which measure the price of overall exports (as mentioned, mostly minerals, oil, and agricultural products) relative to the price of imports (mostly finished goods and oil for non-exporter countries). The high values seen in the 2000s imply that the trade environment was very favorable to Africa, and in all likelihood this was due to the high commodity prices. Nonetheless, terms of trade were favorable in the 1980s, too—a time where the local economy was in continuous decline.
A key element of the potential for economic opportunity and living standards is the governance of a country. To measure that elusive element, we turned to the African Governance Indicator, which was first put together by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and is currently maintained by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University as a way to make African governments accountable for their performance. The governance index has the advantage of using definite criteria and “objective” data sources. Unfortunately, the index has been around for less than a decade, and was thus unable to capture the great strides in democratization that took place in the 1990s. A better sense of the historical trajectory is provided by the Freedom House index, for which we have data starting from the 1970s. The index traditionally relies on analysis of less reliable data, and a judgment of a country may have been based on information from secondary sources such as newspapers and “grey” publications and subjective indicators as much as hard ones. Even with these weaknesses, it provides a good approximation of the trajectory of the democratic progress in Africa.

The following two sections present data on two important aspects of social development that are closely tied to governance and economic development: health and education. Expenditures on both sectors (as a fraction of the country’s GDP) have not changed much over time, with the possible exception of a large increase in education spending in East Africa after the year 2000. Despite this, we show some evidence that services are reaching more and more Africans: we provide the example of immunization rates for one-year-olds (which are converging towards full vaccine coverage), and a measure of schooling, the gross enrollment rate (which measures the fraction of children who attend a given grade as a fraction of all children who are old enough to attend that grade). After falling throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enrollment has increased significantly, and now the vast majority of children are in school.

We present historical and future projections of population trends and total fertility. Africa's population is growing at a brisk pace, but the rate of growth is declining. The decline in the rate of growth is largely due to the fact that total fertility (the average number of children born to a woman through her lifetime) has been falling and is projected to continue falling.

We also include both historical data and projections on the use of telephones (both landlines and cellular) and the Internet. Africa’s Information Technology (IT) future is already here: cellular phone use is growing faster than on any other continent, and African IT companies have pioneered mass-use services that were subse-
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Recently introduced elsewhere, such as banking on mobile phones and satellite-based Internet. Recent heavy investments in telecommunications (including several submarine cables) have increased bandwidth and reduced costs of Internet access. Extensive competition and light regulation have resulted in declining prices and more innovation, and we are yet to see the full extent of the IT revolution in Africa.

We conclude with a review of the use of resources in Africa through data on energy use and the change in forest cover. Again, the prevailing view has been very negative, with Africans accused of massive deforestation to fuel woodstoves, to cite an example. Recent data from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), however, indicates that deforestation is slowing—in contrast to trends in South and Southeast Asia and Latin America, where the rate is high and increasing. Finally, energy consumption in Africa remains low, and, as a consequence, so do global warming emissions. Per capita consumption has remained substantially flat, unlike other developing areas of the world.
Africa’s economies entered the post-independence period with strong and sustained economic growth. With the first oil shock in 1973, most economies stopped growing and began a long period of deterioration that continued until the mid-1990s. Only Southern Africa fared better: it was not until the 1980s that it entered a slump. The erratic history has taken a sharp turn towards sustained growth in the mid-1990s. Since then, income increased by almost one-third—with the significant exclusion of central Africans, who remain significantly worse off than in the past, likely due to continuous civil strife in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Will this 15-year trend of sustained growth last? While Africa suffered an economic reversal in the 1970s and 80s, it is not unreasonable to think that in the face of another global crisis spurred by the financial meltdown in the Western world, the gains could be short lived. Fortunately, many African economies have demonstrated resilience to this latter global crisis: preliminary indicators show continuing growth in Eastern and Western Africa.

—A. Burlando
A country’s terms of trade measures the average price of its exports over that of its imports; it shows how favorable a trade environment is for a given country. African economies are tremendously dependent on the world price of the country’s main exports—oil, minerals, and agricultural products. The value of these export commodities (relative to the value of the imported goods) suffered a steady decline from the 1980s until the mid 1990s, and contributed to a large extent toward the decline in the economic performance of the continent. Since 1995, however, Africa’s terms of trade have steadily improved.

It is noteworthy that the fast economic growth of the last decade is often attributed to the unprecedented boom in commodity prices. Yet, it is clear from the graph that the terms of trade in the 2000s were not much different from those prevailing in the 1980s, a time of economic decline for Africa.

—A. Burlando
SECTION 2: GOVERNANCE

The 2009 Index of African Governance

Source: Data from Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009.

The conventional wisdom about government and governance in Africa—that they are uniformly bad—is not only a painful generalization, but is also false. Some African nations are safe, well run, and competently managed. Indeed, there is great variation in governance within the continent, as demonstrated by the governance index. The index ranks countries by their performance on safety and security; rule of law, transparency, and corruption; human rights; sustainable economic development; and human development. Each category is represented by a variety of indicators, and the weighted average of all indicators provides the values for the index presented. On the Freedom House scale, higher numbers correspond to higher levels of freedom.

Botswana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, Namibia, and South Africa enjoy stable governments, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and a high degree of human development. Countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad, Zimbabwe, and Sudan, on the other hand, have serious problems of human rights violations, erratic governments, widespread insecurity, and limited economic opportunities.

A striking feature of governance in Africa is that there are clear regional clusters in governance quality, with only a few isolated instances of states performing categorically different than their neighbors. This reaffirms the strong correlation between governance quality and regional stability.

—A. Burlando and T. Green
Civil rights and political freedom in Africa are fragile concepts. They swing hopefully forward and spectacularly tumble in any given year. These fluctuations wax and wane with the tides of war, regional instability, world markets, and foreign pressures. Fortunately, the overall trend (as measured by Freedom House) continues to be positive: the ratio of Africans living in free or partly free countries has increased relative to the total population, from 33 percent in 1972 to over 60 percent in 2008. This is reflected in the graphs presented above and on page 41: Africans in 2008 have better access to civil rights and more say on their governments than Africans in 1988.

—T. Green

Notable in the graph on page 40 and the one above is the end of the Cold War: before 1991, most regions had illiberal states, with most countries showing a negative trend or none at all. After that date, the trend is towards improvements in all regions (perhaps with the exclusion of Central Africa, where the situation remains consistently dismal). Two other particular moments of significance are jumps towards more civil liberties and political rights observed in Southern Africa around 1994–1995 and in West Africa in 1999. These shifts relate to the end of apartheid in South Africa and the end of the Abacha regime in Nigeria.

–T. Green
The African continent is relatively sparsely populated: its 900 million inhabitants are fewer than the 1.1 billion residents of India. However, a combination of high fertility rates and relatively young populations implies that the population will continue to grow at a brisk pace for the next 50 years. The Pardee Center for International Futures predicts that by mid-century, there will be a total population of 1.9 billion Africans—double the present number. East and West Africa will remain the most populous regions, although most of the growth will occur in Central Africa. It is estimated that the rate of population growth will decline slightly, from 2.8 percent per year between 2005 and 2025, to 2.5 percent per year in the following quarter century.

—A. Burlando
Total fertility measures the average number of children a woman gives birth to during her reproductive lifetime. It is closely linked to population growth. Relative to some other developing countries, fertility in Africa remains high. Nonetheless, African families are getting smaller, at an increasing rate. Relative to other countries, African families remain large—an average of five children are born for each woman, well above the 2.1 births that are generally needed to keep the population from falling. However, that is a significant drop over fertility levels that prevailed in the 1960s, when women could expect to have seven children.

—A. Burlando
Despite the great health challenges facing the continent, African countries have not increased their financial commitment to preserving or maintaining health. The total expenditure on health (including both private and public funds) as a percentage of GDP has remained steady for the past 10 years, with the exception of East Africa where health spending marginally increased over the past two decades. This contrasts with the experience of developed countries, which have seen very large increases in expenditures going towards health (almost 14 percent in the U.S.).

Despite a lack of growth in resources, there are some indications that health services are improving in many countries, as are health outcomes. Yet, transformative gains in health are unlikely to be achieved unless the sector receives significant additional resources across the continent.

–J. Mercurio
Immunization rates in regions across Africa have increased over time, but even in Southern Africa (with 90 percent of children receiving DTP 3), there is still work to be done. The three-dose DTP 3 vaccine is given to one-year-olds to prevent diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus, and needs to be given to 85 percent of children to ensure herd immunity against diphtheria and 92 percent for pertussis. In 2007, most regions had converged to a 65–90 percent coverage, but, excluding Southern Africa, all of the regions are still well below other areas of the world (see graph on the next page), especially the 92 and 94 percent coverage in the American and European regions, respectively.

—J. Mercurio
As the graph on the previous page shows, Southern Africa has the highest vaccination coverage, at 90 percent of children. Central and Western Africa saw the most dramatic increases in coverage, with a 51 and 43 percent improvement from 1990 to 2007, respectively. The improvement in Central Africa is even more striking when comparing the lowest point (across all regions) of 32 percent coverage in 1992 to the final coverage rate of 65 percent (a 103 percent increase).

–J. Mercurio
Africa will not be able to sustain rapid growth without investing in the education of its people. Many governments will need to implement changes in the way education is financed and managed. So far, at least on financing, the continent as a whole is sending mixed signals. Educational expenditure shows divergent trends across regions in the past—mostly plummeting to various degrees. East and South Africa have generally maintained a certain level of spending for education between the 1970s and the 2000s, whereas Central and West Africa have devoted fewer and fewer resources to this sector. Since the 1980s, the share of GDP spent on education has decreased in 13 nations. Perhaps more significant, this share is still less than three percent in 10 countries, mostly concentrated in West Africa.

The silver lining is that, from the new millennium onwards, in both East and West Africa resources for education have increased tremendously, and access has been made easier by eliminating school fees in several countries (most notably in Kenya). It is hoped that the rest of the continent will take notice and do likewise.

—T. Mukhopadhyay
A measure of schooling attainment is the gross enrollment rate or GER—the number of children enrolled in a grade as a proportion of the number of children who belong to that grade. Many countries had a GER of over 100, which implies that a country is engaged in “catching up” by enrolling older children into primary schools. Once this catching up is complete, and children who are too old for their grade have completed their education, GER values must decline to below 100 (as is happening in Southern Africa).

Primary enrollment growth slowed in the 1980s. The GER fell by almost 30 percent when the economic crisis severely affected schools. Declining public resources and private economic hardship resulted in an erosion of primary level participation rates. As of the 21st century, some of these setbacks have begun to reverse. East and West Africa have recently expanded education; in some countries such as Kenya, this was achieved by eliminating schooling fees.

—A. Burlando and T. Mukhopadhyay
Africa has had the highest growth in mobile phone use globally—twice the global average over the past three years, according to Hamadoun Touré, head of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Across all African regions, telephone usage has increased significantly within the past two decades, signifying a continent-wide increase in access to technology. Data from the 1990s helps illustrate the dramatic positive increase between 2000 and 2007. In 2007, approximately 95 percent of South Africans had a phone—the highest on the continent and comparable with OECD nations. As of 2005, according to the ITU, more than $8 billion was invested in Africa’s telecommunications infrastructure. Heavy investments in cell phone banking or “mobile money,” such as that started with the M-Pesa program in Kenya, are driving innovation and usage.

Projections indicate that cell phone coverage will continue its rapid increase, and only a small minority of Africans will not have cellular phones by mid-century.

—S. Aba Jebel
Internet connections in Africa have consistently increased from 2000 to 2007, albeit from a very small base. In 2007, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, The Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were estimated as the least connected. Coverage is estimated to increase rapidly throughout the continent, and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) projects that by 2012 more than a third of Africa’s citizens will have access to broadband Internet. Major infrastructural investments have been made in adding undersea optical cables for high speed Internet that connect coastal countries in Southern and East Africa to Europe and India. It is hoped that these will lead to increased reliability and lower broadband prices, which in turn could spur the growth of Internet-related outsourcing industry.

Though the opportunities have grown, the ITU suggests that Africa can improve quality of Internet activity. One of the challenges of improving quality of Internet development is that a majority of Internet traffic is directed outside the continent. The lack of interconnectivity within the continent serves as one of the greatest obstacles to Internet development as well as one of the greatest incentives to expand and improve access within the continent.

—A. Burlando and S. Aba Jebel
Deforestation remains a significant problem in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily because forests are actively used for charcoal production and as an important source of domestic fuel. The subcontinent continues to lose forests at a relatively fast pace, with only South Asia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa having a faster rate. Fortunately, the rate of deforestation is declining. This is somewhat surprising, since population pressure keeps increasing. The pattern for Africa is not unique: overall, deforestation is slowing down around the world, with only Latin America and South and Southeast Asia losing more forests today than in the 1990s.

–A. Burlando
Energy consumption for the African continent has remained essentially flat for the past 30 years, whereas that of Asia and the Middle East has doubled from 1980. Low growth in consumption is happening even though Africans consume fewer barrels of oil per person than any other people in the world. Growth in energy consumption is intimately related to growth in the economy. Hence, the graph highlights that Africa is, and remains, an economic laggard when compared to other emerging economies. Second, growth in energy is also correlated with growth in greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, it is also clear that Africa does not have to go as far as others in reducing emissions. Just like with information technology, Africa can hope to move into a low-carbon economy without having invested too heavily in a carbon infrastructure.

–A. Burlando

References and Further Reading


Africa 2060 Conference Agenda

OPENING REMARKS

Adil Najam
*Frederick S. Pardee Professor of Global Public Policy*
*Director, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University*

SESSION I: AFRICA’S SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Jonathon Simon (Session Chair)
*Professor of International Health and Director, Center for Global Health and Development, School of Public Health, Boston University*

Seble Dawit
*Assistant Professor and Director, Peace Studies Program, Goucher College*

Nathan Eagle
*Chief Executive Officer, Txteagle, Inc. Omidyar Fellow of the Santa Fe Institute*

Richard Clapp
*Professor of Environmental Health, School of Public Health, Boston University*

SESSION II: MARKETS & ECONOMY

James McCann (Session Chair)
*Professor of History, Boston University*

Vijay Mahajan
*John P. Harbin Centennial Chair in Business, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin*

Margaret McMillan
*Associate Professor of Economics, Tufts University*
Julius Gatune Kariuki
*Post-Doctoral Fellow, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University*

Harounan Kazianga
*Assistant Professor of Economics, Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University*

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS**

Ambassador Kaire Mbuende
*Namibian Ambassador to the United Nations*
*Vice-Chairman, Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development*

**SESSION III: POLITICS & INSTITUTIONS**

Timothy Longman (Session Chair)
*Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science*
*Director, African Studies Center, Boston University*

Robert Rotberg
*Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University*

Abdul Paliwala
*Professor of Law*
*Director of International Development Law and Human Rights, Warwick University*

Oyeronke Oyewumi
*Associate Professor of Sociology, Stony Brook University, New York*

**SESSION IV: SOCIETY & CULTURE**

Fallou Ngom (Session Chair)
*Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology*
*Director of the African Language Program, African Studies Center, Boston University*

Bahru Zewde
*Executive Director, Forum for Social Studies*
*Emeritus Professor of History, Addis Ababa University*
Marc Sommers
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Research Fellow, African Studies Center, Boston University
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The Fletcher School, Tufts University

Heran Sereke-Brhan
Post-Doctoral Fellow, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the
Longer-Range Future, Boston University
Conference Presenters’ Biographies

Richard Clapp  
*Professor, Environmental Health, Boston University*  
Richard Clapp is an epidemiologist with more than 30 years of experience in public health practice and consulting. He has been a faculty member in the Department of Environmental Health at Boston University School of Public Health since 1993. He is currently working on community-based research in New England and pesticide health effects research in South Africa.

Seble Dawit  
*Director and Assistant Professor, Peace Studies Program, Goucher College*  
Seble Dawit is currently Director and Assistant Professor of the Peace Studies Program at Goucher College in Baltimore. Before coming to Goucher she taught in the departments of Women's Studies, Africana Studies, and the Peace Studies Program at Wellesley College. Prior to teaching, Dawit worked on human rights issues throughout Africa, serving as advisor and consultant to numerous organizations seeking to strengthen their national and regional policy impact.

Nathan Eagle  
*CEO, Txteagle, Inc.*  
Nathan Eagle is the CEO of Txteagle, Inc. He holds faculty appointments at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Laboratory and Northeastern University, and is an Omidyar Fellow at the Santa Fe Institute. His research involves engineering computational tools designed to explore how the petabytes of data generated about human movements, financial transactions, and communication patterns can be used for social good.

Julius Gatune Kariuki  
*Post-doctoral Fellow, Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future*  
Julius Gatune Kariuki is from Kenya and is passionate about Africa, especially its future. He has a multidisciplinary background covering engineering, computer science, business administration, and policy analysis. He has recently been a consultant with McKinsey & Co. working in the sub-Saharan Africa office in Johannesburg, South Africa and is currently policy advisor to various African
governments as a Fellow with the African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET) in Accra, Ghana.

**Harounan Kazianga**  
**Assistant Professor, Economics, Oklahoma State University**  
Harounan Kazianga is a development economist who specializes in agricultural economics and human development issues in West Africa, and is currently a member of the faculty in the Economics Department of the Spears School of Business at Oklahoma State University. Over the past 10 years he has conducted extensive field research in West Africa on technological change in agriculture, the use of financial markets, asset accumulation and gift exchange to cope with risk, household investments in education, property rights, and a variety of other aspects of rural economic organization.

**Timothy Longman**  
**Visiting Associate Professor and Director, African Studies Center, Boston University**  
Timothy Longman serves as Director of the African Studies Center and is Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston University. Prior to arriving at BU, he taught at Vassar College, the International Human Rights Exchange at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa, and at the National University of Rwanda. His work focuses primarily on religion and politics, human rights, ethnic identity and politics, and gender and politics in Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo. His book, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press.

**Vijay Mahajan**  
**John P. Harbin Centennial Chair in Business, University of Texas, Austin**  
Vijay Mahajan holds the John P. Harbin Centennial Chair in Business at the McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin. He has received numerous lifetime achievement awards including the American Marketing Association (AMA) Charles Coolidge Parlin Award for visionary leadership in scientific marketing. The AMA also instituted the Vijay Mahajan Award in 2000 for career contributions to marketing strategy. Mahajan is author or editor of ten books, including *Africa Rising* (Wharton School Publishing, 2009).
Ambassador Kaire Mbuende

*Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the United Nations*

Kaire Mbuende is Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the United Nations. He is the Vice-Chairman representing Africa on the Bureau of the seventeenth session of the Commission on Sustainable Development. Mbuende was a member of Parliament from 2000 to 2005 and a member of the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly from 2000 to 2002, and served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2000 to 2004. Mbuende is a renowned author of several books and numerous articles on a broad range of political, social, economic, and trade issues.

James McCann

*Professor, Department of History, Boston University*

James McCann is the author of several books on the history of agriculture in Africa, including *Maize and Grace: Africa’s Encounter with a New World Crop*, which won the 2006 George Perkins Marsh Prize as the best book in environmental history for 2005 from the American Society for Environmental History. He currently leads a joint research team investigating the link between malaria and maize cultivation in Africa, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and including the Harvard School of Public Health, the World Health Organization, and the Ethiopian Ministry of Health.

Margaret McMillan

*Associate Professor of Economics, Tufts University*

Margaret McMillan’s research has been published widely in leading scholarly journals in the areas of international trade and investment focusing primarily on developing countries. Understanding the distributional consequences of international economic integration is the key focus of her work. She is a Faculty Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research and a recipient of research grants from the National Science Foundation and the Center for AIDS Research. McMillan has worked in several African countries including Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa.
Adil Najam
Fredrick S. Pardee Professor of Global Public Policy
Director, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University
Adil Najam is an expert in international diplomacy and development. His research interests include sustainable development, Muslim and South Asian politics, environmental politics in developing countries, and philanthropy among immigrant communities in the United States. Much of his work has focused on longer-term global policy problems, especially those related to human well-being and sustainable development. He has served as a Lead Author for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), work for which the IPCC was awarded the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize along with Al Gore. In 2009 he was awarded one of Pakistan's highest civil awards, the Sitara-i-Imtiaz (Star of Excellence) medal by the President of Pakistan.

Fallou Ngom
Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology
Director of the African Language Program, African Studies Center, Boston University

Oyeronke Oyewumi
Associate Professor of Sociology, Stony Brook University
Oyeronke Oyewumi was born in Nigeria and educated at the University of Ibadan and the University of California at Berkeley. Oyewumi has been widely recognized for her work. The monograph Invention won the 1998 Distinguished Book Award of the American Sociological Association and was a finalist for the Herskovitits Prize of the African Studies Association in the same year. She has garnered a number of research fellowships, including Rockefeller Fellowships, a Presidential fellowship, and a Ford Foundation grant.
Abdul Paliwala
Professor of Law, University of Warwick
Abdul Paliwala’s current research is in the areas of globalization and legal regulation of the digital divide, law and economy in developing countries, and information technology in legal education. He is the Director of International Development Law and Human Rights, Law Courseware Consortium, Electronic Law Journals. He is also a Senior Consultant (ICT) for the UK Centre for Legal Education and an Associate at the Centre for Globalization and Regionalization.

Robert Rotberg
Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Robert Rotberg currently serves as President of the World Peace Foundation in addition to his position at the Belfer Center. He is the author and editor of numerous books and articles on U.S. foreign policy, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, most recently Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (2005). Under Rotberg’s direction, an Index of African Governance was created in 2007 that ranks all 48 sub-Saharan African countries according to quality of governance.

Heran Sereke-Brhan
Post-Doctoral Fellow, Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University
Heran Sereke-Brhan joined the Pardee Center after a hiatus in Ethiopia where she worked on a range of academic and cultural projects. She received a BA from Mills College in Oakland, California, then went on to graduate school in African History at Michigan State University, studying with Harold Marcus, a Distinguished Professor in Ethiopian Studies. Her research interests include social and political history, African art history and material culture, as well as African-American and Caribbean history.

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Jonathon Lee Simon is the Chair of the Department of International Health, Director of the Center for Global Health & Development, and Professor of International Health at the Boston University School of Public Health. He has been involved in applied child health research activities for 20 years, working in more than 20 developing countries. Simon has extensive experience working in Africa, particularly on issues including child survival, infectious diseases, and capacity strengthening.
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Marc Sommers is a Research Fellow with Boston University’s African Studies Center and an Associate Research Professor of Humanitarian Studies in the Institute of Human Security at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, in addition to his position at USIP. He is completing his seventh book, titled *Two Hundred Francs: The World of Rwandan Youth*, and writing another called *Marley’s War: Youth, Terror and Popular Culture in Sierra Leone*. Over the past two decades, Sommers has conducted research, assessment, and evaluation work related to war-affected youth in 20 countries (15 in Africa), and has consulted for policy institutes and numerous United Nations, non-government, and donor agencies.

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The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University convenes and conducts interdisciplinary, policy-relevant, and future-oriented research that can contribute to long-term improvements in the human condition. Through its program of research, publications, and events, the Pardee Center seeks to identify, anticipate, and enhance the long-term potential for human progress, in all its various dimensions.

As part of its mission, the Pardee Center sponsors public conferences on topics that are particularly relevant to the global longer-range future. Such conferences feature interdisciplinary panels of experts who are asked to present their perspectives and play an active role in discussing the topic with all conference participants. The Pardee Center Conference Reports are published in association with selected conferences to provide reflections on the discussions and capture the highlights of the panel presentations. They are intended to help disseminate expert knowledge and inform ongoing discussions about important issues that ultimately will influence the direction of long-term human development.

**Africa 2060: Good News from Africa**

As the keystone event of a research program called “Africa 2060,” the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University convened a conference on April 16, 2010 called Africa 2060: Good News from Africa. The program featured more than a dozen expert panelists from Boston University and around the world. Approximately 100 attendees included many African scholars and citizens from the continent who contributed to lively and well-informed discussions. This Pardee Center conference was co-sponsored by Boston University’s Africa Studies Center (ASC), the African Presidential Archives & Research Center (APARC), and the Global Health & Development Center (GHDC).

This report provides commentary reflecting upon and information pertaining to the substance of the conference. An introductory overview looks at the major issues discussed at the event, which are placed within the larger literature on Africa’s future. Four short essays prepared by Boston University graduate students provide readers with more specific reflections and highlights of each conference session and the main issues discussed by panelists. The final section presents analyses of key trends and projections related to societal, economic, and governance issues for Africa and a commentary on what this information tells us about the drivers that will determine the continent’s future.

We hope this conference report offers insights into new directions for Africa in the first half of the 21st century. Video of the conference is available at the Pardee Center website at www.bu.edu/pardee/multimedia. For more information about the Africa 2060 project, visit www.bu.edu/pardee/research/africa-2060/.