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Cultural Factors in the North American Reception of Karl Jaspers¹

Alan M. Olson
Boston University
amo@bu.edu

Abstract: This essay examines some of the cultural, religious, political, and ethnic factors having a bearing on the Jaspers reception amongst English speaking scholars in North America during the last half of the twentieth century. The essay begins by elaborating Paul Tillich's observation that the two leading, but quite different, German figures in existentialism during the 1950s were Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. According to Tillich, Karl Jaspers represents the classical tradition of German humanism and, like Kant, is concerned with "what it means to be a person." Heidegger, by contrast, represents the more arcane tradition of German mysticism and is concerned with "the meaning of Being." Olson attempts to explain the magnitude of the Heidegger reception vis-à-vis the far more limited reception of Jaspers by scrutinizing various historical, religious, cultural, and ethnic factors in the makeup of American intellectual life, including the factor of *ressentiment* amongst German-Americans following World Wars I and II, all of which play a role in the receptions of Jaspers and Heidegger and also factor into the historic divide between the so-called "Analytical" and "Continental" camps of philosophy in America. The essay concludes by commenting on the present and future state of Jaspers Studies in North America, especially in the areas of the philosophy of communication, the philosophy of history, and world philosophy.

Hegel's famous words in the foreword to his *Rechtsphilosophie* are not inappropriate to Karl Jaspers' way of thinking:

Das was ist zu begreifen, ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie, den das *was ist*, ist die Vernunft. Was das Individuum betrifft, so ist ohnehin jedes ein *Sohn seiner Zeit*; so ist auch die Philosophie *eher Zeit in Gedanken erfaßt*.

The relentless attempt of Karl Jaspers "to comprehend his own time in thought," to make rational sense out the world as he found it, is what initially attracted me to his philosophizing. Little did I realize the extent to which

his *oeuvre* would sustain me throughout much of my academic career, including an opportunity to reflect on the North American reception of Jaspers at this remarkable celebration of Oldenburg's favorite philosophical son. I sincerely thank you, and especially Professors Kurt Salamun and Reinhard Schulz, for inviting me to be a part of *Jaspersjahr*.

In what follows I examine some of the cultural, religious and political factors having a bearing on the Jaspers reception in North America. Obviously this examination is guided by my personal reception of Jaspers, a reception that moves from theology in

¹ This lecture was presented 31 May 2008 at Carl von Ossietzky Universität, Oldenburg, and was published in the *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Gesellschaft*, Volume 22, 2009. The title is somewhat misleading since the author makes no attempt to assess the reception of Jaspers by the Spanish or French speaking philosophical communities in North America.

divinity school to existentialism, phenomenology and German Idealism in graduate school and subsequent research and publication. I hope that the lens of own experience will not distort what I say in ways that are inaccurate or unrepresentative of the overall reception of Karl Jaspers in North America. A comprehensive evaluation of the continental reception of a prominent thinker is a daunting task and far beyond the scope of a single essay. Such a task also requires a perspective far greater than my own. I will conclude my comments with some reflections on what I see as being on the future of Jaspers studies in North America.

The Historical Factor

Being "a child of his time" (*ein Sohn seiner Zeit*) meant that Karl Theodore Jaspers (1883-1969) was part of the truly remarkable generation of German speaking "Continental"² philosophers and theologians: Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976), Karl Barth (1886-1968), Friedrich Gogarten (1887-1968), Paul Natorp (1884-1974), Nicholai Hartmann (1882-1950), Emil Brunner (1889-1966), and Paul Tillich (1884-1965). All of these distinguished scholars and thinkers were born in the 1880s. If we extend the list back a year to 1879, we can add the illustrious name of Albert Einstein.

It was a generation, as Friedrich Gogarten put it famously, *Zwischen den Zeiten, Zwischen Gott und Welt, Transzendenz und Immanenz*, like no other, perhaps, in the modern history of philosophy and theology. The thinkers of this generation were in their thirties during WWI and in their fifties during WWII; in other words, they were at the peak of intellectual maturity during these world-defining conflicts.

Not surprisingly, those of us born far away in North America during the early decades of the twentieth century turned to *Continental* scholars for insight regarding the meaning of the dramatic events of the first half of the twentieth century, both its achievements or its horrors. No one in academia had been more directly affected by the catastrophic events of two world wars than those born in the 1880s – especially those who had spoken out, who resisted, or who were forced to emigrate, whether that emigration was "outer," as in the case of Cassirer and Tillich, or "inner," as in the case of Jaspers.³

Karl Jaspers died in 1969, the year I commenced my doctoral studies at Boston University, and this foreclosed any opportunity to meet and hear him in person. Thus I became what Kierkegaard calls a "disciple at second-hand" since my knowledge and familiarity came by way of the translators and mediators of Jaspers' published works—people for whom Jaspers had been a *Doktorvater*, whether directly or indirectly, and who were dedicated to making him known in the English speaking world.

The task of introducing Jaspers to the English speaking world was admirably undertaken by another generation of remarkable scholars born during the first two decades of the twentieth century: Hannah Arendt, Ralph Manheim, E. B. Ashton, Charles Wallraff, William Earl, Richard Howey, James Collins, Walter Kaufmann, Eugene Long, Oswald Schrag, and Richard Grabau, among others. Leonard and Edith Ehrlich⁴ belong to this distinguished group, and the Ehrlichs, more than any others, continue to be responsible for the transmission of the philosophy of Karl Jaspers to Americans, whether through translation or commentary and interpretation. It was the Ehrlichs, together with George Pepper, who

² I use the terms "continental" and "analytic" with some hesitation since these designations are increasingly regarded as being inaccurate characterizations of the philosophical enterprise in the late-twentieth century. Nevertheless, these designations have been used for at least fifty years in order to indicate quite different approaches to philosophy, the *continental approach* placing great emphasis on the European cultural tradition and history of ideas, as contrast to the *analytical approach*, which has been far more formalistic with minimal regard for the historical and especially a religious contextualization of the history of ideas and problems in philosophy. In this essay, my reference to "continental" philosophy has to do with twentieth century German (and French) philosophy and the American philosophers devoted to major figures within the European tradition.

³ I had the pleasure of meeting only one of the stellar thinkers of this generation in person, namely, Paul Tillich, who lectured at Saint Olaf College and Macalester College (Minnesota) during the Spring of 1963. At Saint Olaf, Tillich spoke on "Hegel, Schelling, and Kierkegaard" and, at Macalester College, he delivered a sermon entitled, "Discover Your Saving Power." I could have also seen Karl Barth in 1963, had I taken the time to drive from Luther Theological Seminary in Saint Paul to the University of Chicago. But Karl Barth was not for me as interesting as Paul Tillich, since Tillich, like Jaspers, was a Lutheran (though many doubted this identity) whereas Barth was a Calvinist and, as Tillich called him, a "supernaturalist."

⁴ Leonard Ehrlich also wrote his Yale doctoral dissertation on "Karl Jaspers's Philosophy of Science" in 1960.

founded the *Karl Jaspers Society of North America* at the Boston meeting of the *American Philosophical Association* in 1980, and who developed a fine introductory reader to his philosophical works.⁵

In the case of my own contemporaries, born in the 1930s and 1940s, the philosophy of Karl Jaspers was transmitted not only by translators and disciples, but also by way of a host of distinguished teachers and colleagues greatly influenced by Jaspers. For me this included teachers and mentors such as Harold Oliver and Erazim Kohak (who were my dissertation readers) and other eminent scholars such as Fritz Buri, Eric Voegelin, John N. Findlay, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur, who respected Jaspers in deeply admiring ways.

To this impressive list I would also add John R. Silber, the philosopher-president of Boston University, under whose watchful eye I worked for over thirty years. As it turned out serendipitously, John Silber was the friend and classmate of Richard Grabau at Yale University. Richard Grabau, in 1953, wrote one of the first American doctoral dissertations on Jaspers, *viz.*, "Existence and Truth in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers," and went on to translate Jaspers' famous 1937 lectures on *Existenzphilosophie*.⁶ Richard Grabau's exposition of the philosophy of Karl Jaspers remains one of the most illuminating in the English language. John Silber's approval of my own work was due, at least in part, to his admiration of Jaspers by way of Richard Grabau and to his own philosophical identity as a Kantian.⁷ Had I specialized in Heidegger, I do not think that I would have been so fortunate.

This brings me to the first of several religious and cultural factors affecting the North American reception of Jaspers—factors that can be amplified by some reflections on the rather complicated Jaspers-Heidegger

relationship and the Heidegger reception in America as contrast to the reception of Jaspers.

The Heidegger Factor

Martin Heidegger enjoyed a much larger following in the United States than Jaspers following WWII, and his popularity continues to the present time. The numbers are significant and, for Jaspers scholars, somewhat discouraging.⁸

There have been about 40 theses and dissertations devoted to Karl Jaspers in North America since 1950, most being written during the 1960s and 1970s. During the past 10 years, however, there have been only 6 theses and dissertations on Jaspers, of which 4 have been in political science and history.

Heidegger, in contrast to Jaspers, has been the subject of over 600 theses and dissertations since 1960, and these numbers show no sign of abating.⁹ Thus the perplexing question: How could a thinker with the extraordinary range of Jaspers, who wrote on every aspect of the philosophical sciences, including psychiatry, be seemingly eclipsed by Heidegger? How could an avowed Nazi sympathizer, like Heidegger, enjoy a far greater reception amongst Americans than Karl Jaspers, a philosopher who did not have "dirty hands" (to use the phrase of Michael Walzer) and was handpicked by the American occupation forces in 1946 to play a leading role in the project of *De-Nazification*? Indeed, how was it possible for Heidegger to become more influential in America, perhaps, than any other

⁵ See *Karl Jaspers: Basic Philosophical Writings*, eds. Edith Ehrlich, Leonard Ehrlich, George Pepper (New York: Humanity Press, 1986). See the Appendix to this essay for a partial list of major North American publications on the philosophy of Karl Jaspers.

⁶ Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy of Existenz*, trans. Richard Grabau (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).

⁷ John Silber's doctoral dissertation at Yale University was entitled, "The Highest Good as the Unity of Form and Content in Kant's Ethics" (1956); and he went on, shortly thereafter, to write a truly remarkable introductory essay entitled "The Ethical Significance of Kant's *Religion*" for the English edition of Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960).

⁸ As Gregory Walters points out in the *Preface* to his important study of *Karl Jaspers and the Role of Conversion in the Nuclear Age* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1988), the fact that Jaspers was not receiving the attention he deserved amongst American philosophers was already disquieting to Charles Wallraff in the 1970s. See the debate between Wallraff and Adolf Lichtigfeld as to whether this inattention was due to lapses in translation and communication or to failures of interpretation. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (June 1977), pp. 537-548; and Vol. 41, No. 1/2 (Sept-Dec., 1980), pp. 216-224. I believe that Lichtigfeld's conclusion was correct (in 1980) and remains so today, namely, "that Jaspers' [philosophical] categories have not yet been assimilated by the present generation for the simple reason that the Jaspersian inquiry as to 'what is timeless throughout time' [*vis-à-vis* Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*] has not yet been researched in its ultimate consequences as regards the future of philosophy."

⁹ See www.proquest.com.

twentieth century European "continental" thinker, given the events of the 1930s and the 1940s?

The reasons are manifold, but I think that the Jaspers and Heidegger receptions are capable of being elucidated by reflections on some of the unique and understated peculiarities of American culture, especially American religious and political culture. Indeed, Paul Tillich was one of the first to do this, and in what follows I rely a great deal on his analysis.

An immigrant to America in 1933 and, like many others, a refugee of the so-called *Rote Universität* in Frankfurt am Main, Tillich had an interesting and I think accurate perspective on some of the cultural and religious factors affecting the Jaspers and Heidegger receptions. Tillich accomplished this in ways unavailable to other American scholars, including Reinhold Niebuhr, his American friend and sponsor at Union Theological Seminary in New York, precisely because he was an *outsider*, so to speak, and able to assess American culture in ways that escaped the notice of *insiders*. Paul Tillich's notoriety in America during the 1950s and 1960s (including a *Time Magazine* cover¹⁰ also provided him with a privileged platform to reflect on this phenomenon and he did so in an essay on "Heidegger and Jaspers" which we were fortunate to publish in a collection by the same title in 1994.¹¹

Originally presented at the Cooper Union Forum in New York City, March 25, 1954, Tillich's lecture was designed to introduce Americans to existentialism—the new, "hot" intellectual movement of the day. Tillich did so by contrasting Jaspers and Heidegger in a way that gets to the heart of the matter regarding their basic difference: "Heidegger," Tillich asserts, "represents *fundamental ontology*" whereas "Jaspers represents *classical German humanism and ethics*." In other words, and as Tillich put it, "Heidegger wants to know *what it means to be*" whereas "Jaspers wants to know *what it means to be a person*."¹²

To this characterization I would add that Jaspers, like Kant, not only wanted to know what it means "to

be a person" but what it means "to be a *moral* person." This difference is mirrored in their basic methodologies, the difference, as Fritz Buri once put it, between the "hermeneutics of Being" (through *Daseinsanalyse*, in the case of Heidegger) and the "hermeneutics of meaning" (and *Existenzerhellung*, in the case of Jaspers).¹³

Tillich was himself a kind of theological combination of Jaspers and Heidegger, but he owed much more to Heidegger. Indeed, it was the incorporation of Heidegger's ontological inquiries into philosophical theology that made Tillich particularly attractive to the students of my generation, and it also made him controversial—especially in the conservative, highly dogmatic, Lutheran circles to which I belonged.

One of the reasons we knew less of Jaspers than Heidegger was because American divinity students in those days had only a modest understanding of Kant and Hegel, and we knew even less of Goethe and classical German humanism.¹⁴ As divinity students, of course, we knew of the origins of German humanism by way of great debate between Luther and Erasmus on the bondage of the will; and we were also taught that Luther was right and that the humanist, Erasmus, was wrong. But we did not know exactly why apart from accepting at face value Luther's interpretation of Saint Paul in Romans 1:17, "*Der Gerechte wird seinen Glauben leben*" as the basis for the Lutheran doctrine of *Rechtfertigung, sola scriptura, sola fides, sola gratia*.

In the case of Kant we learned, by way of Neo-Thomist Catholic theologians such as Étienne Gilson, that Kant was the *bête noire* of orthodox Christianity, not only because he had refuted the classical arguments for the existence of God but also because he had allegedly reduced theology to ethics. Kant's refutation of natural theology was not a problem for the Neo-Reformation theologians of the 1950s and 1960s, but his voluntaristic humanism and the reduction of Christianity to ethics was a significant problem since this was tantamount, for orthodox Lutheran theologians, to yet another form of Pelagianism and self-salvation (*Selbst-Rechtfertigung*).

A personal incident may help to clarify what I mean by this. While in Divinity School, we were required to take a course in *Lutheran Symbolics*—a course that

¹⁰ It is exceedingly rare, in America, for any intellectual to grace the cover of a popular news magazine.

¹¹ I discovered this essay in the Tillich Archive at Harvard Divinity School, and Paul Tillich's daughter, Muti Tillich Farris, a psychiatrist in New York City, graciously gave us permission to publish it in *Heidegger and Jaspers*, ed. Alan M. Olson (Temple University Press, 1994), pp. 16-28.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 17 [emphasis, mine].

¹³ APA/KJSNA, Boston, 1983. See: www.bu.edu/paideia/kjsna/conferAll.htm

¹⁴ The Hegel revival did not commence, in America, until the 1960s, the work of John N. Findlay being instrumental in this regard. See: *Hegel: A Reexamination* (New York: Macmillan, 1957).

consisted, in the main, of memorizing (and assenting to) the orthodox confessional doctrines of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. These doctrines were contained in a compendium developed by the Erlangen theologian, Heinrich Schmid, in 1875 and translated into English by the Philadelphia theologians, Charles Hay and Henry Jacobs in 1899 under the title, *The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*.¹⁵ The Schmid compendium consisted of various sixteenth century documents, including the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, the Smalcald Articles, the Large and Small Catechisms of Luther, the Formula of Concord, and various writings by Melanchthon, Gerhard, and Chemnitz, among others. It was a work, in its third edition, designed to play a critical role in the "back to Luther" movement of Neo-Reformation theology—a movement designed to combat eighteenth and nineteenth century rationalism and humanism, especially the influence of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher.

When examined by my professor, a highly dignified and orthodox dogmatic theologian by the name of Herman Amberg Preus, I was shocked on receiving a low grade for having quoted Tillich's *Systematic Theology* rather than paying exclusive attention to Schmid's compendium as to the meaning and significance of various Lutheran doctrines. Years later I came to appreciate this mark and took the time to tell Professor Preus that I thought the grade justified. I had reached this conclusion upon discovering that Hegel, while at the Tübingen Stift in the 1790s, had a similar problem with the dogmatics interpretations of what he referred to as the "pseudo-Kantian" Professors, Storr and Flatt. Hegel greatly preferred the classic *Sartorius Compendium*, a work very much like Schmid's, since the *Sartorius Compendium*, for Hegel, was the manifestation of the *Objective Spirit* of Lutheran symbolics or, in Jaspers' phrase, the manifestation of *ciphers of transcendence*. In other words, these primary symbols were the artifacts of *intentio recta* apart from which an *intentio obliqua* would be quite meaningless. Jaspers' hermeneutical critique of Bultmann on the question of *Entmythologisierung* and the proper interpretation of Holy Scripture remains unintelligible, I think, apart from this distinction.¹⁶

¹⁵ Charles Hay and Henry Jacobs, *The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Church* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1875).

¹⁶ See Karl Jaspers, *Die Frage der Entmythologisierung* (München: Piper Verlag, 1954).

I make mention of this incident to point out that Tillich's popularity in America, like Heidegger's, had much to do with his ability to convey the spirit of German Romanticism by way of the Schellingian dialectic of Being and Non-Being. While Jaspers, late in life, also came to admire Schelling, he was not a Romantic; and while he admired certain mystics, like Cusanus, Jaspers was not a mystic. He was the uncompromising rational devotee of Kant in the areas of epistemology and ethics, of Max Weber in social and political philosophy, of Hegel in the areas of the philosophies of history and religion, and of Kierkegaard as regards the meaning of subjectivity and truth.

But many, if not most, American philosophy and theology students in the 1950s and 1960s were yearning for a romanticism and mysticism of the deeper, darker type, represented by Heidegger and Tillich. We wanted to "escape from Pietism," so to speak, and the doctrine of special revelation that dominated mainstream Protestant biblical theology. Paul Tillich understood this very clearly; that is, he understood that pietism of a rather unique type had defined religious education and practice in America during the first half of the twentieth century. And Paul Tillich's awareness of this phenomenon was a primary reason for his success, not only amongst philosophers and theologians, but also the many art historians, literary critics and psychologists who had been raised in the same religious and cultural milieu.

The essence of Tillich's insight rested on his recognition that a unique feature of nineteenth century American intellectual life had precisely to do with the absence of Romanticism as it had been known and experienced in Europe and especially in Germany. More precisely, Tillich believed that Americans experienced only what he called the "light" or "soft" side and not the "dark" side of Romanticism. By this he meant that American Romanticism was a sort of bland combination of the naturalism of Thoreau and the transcendentalism of Emerson coupled with a fervent preoccupation with religious experience in the language of biblical personalism and *Wiedergeburt*; a preoccupation that initially commenced with the First and Second Great Awakenings, Jonathan Edwards, and with what John Wesley famously referred to as "the heart strangely warmed." In other words, American Romanticism had nothing whatever to do with what Schelling had described as the dialectic of Being and Non-Being in his *Freiheits-Philosophie*—which, for Tillich, was the foundation text of modern

existentialism and emblematic of the "dark side" of Romanticism and the breakdown of the universal synthesis of philosophy and religion in Hegel and Schleiermacher.¹⁷

The so-called "light" side of Romanticism also had political implications militating against an appreciation of what Kurt Salamun refers to as "the spirit of liberality" in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers.¹⁸ In other words, while some mainstream American Protestants influenced by Pietism developed a liberal ethos similar to that of Social Democrats in Germany and Scandinavia, many others did not. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and the counter-culture radicalism of the 1960s engendered the powerful Neo-Pentecostal religious and Neo-Conservative political reaction that followed in the 1970s.¹⁹ Therefore while many children of the 1960s became Left-leaning Liberals (like Bill and Hillary Clinton), others in the so-called "Bible Belt," and under the influence of Billy Graham and Oral Roberts, were baptized into the Neo-Fundamentalist Religious Right. Guided by Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, James Dobson, and the "Tele-Evangelism" of the 1980s and 1990s and into the new Millennium, these movements are synonymous with

what today is referred to as the "right-wing religious conservative base" of the Republican Party in America. The influence of the "light side" of Romanticism, in the form of emotivist conversions and being "born again," continues to this day. Indeed, the political influence of this major bloc of voters, and their suspicion of the liberal intellectual elite establishment, is directly responsible for eight years of George W. Bush.²⁰

A major public manifestation of late-twentieth century pietistic "Light" Romanticism took place during the 2000 presidential campaign during one of the so-called presidential debates. It was December 15, 1999, and the moderator, John Bachman, asked the five Republican candidates to name their favorite political thinker. The first two provided predictable answers, referring to Madison and Lincoln, but when it came to G. W. Bush he blurted out "Jesus Christ!"

Now this was a potentially interesting response had the moderator been up to developing its implications in some depth. But when Bachmann asked "Why Jesus?" Bush simply replied, "Because he changed my life!" Bachman and the other candidates (including John McCain) were so taken-aback by Bush's "born again" response that they proceeded to turn what had been a philosophical question into personal confessions of religious faith, each trying to outdo the other with respect to shoring up their Christian identity and loyalty. Thus, the moderator simply let the matter drop and the discussion went on to the conventionally vapid topics that usually typify presidential debates.²¹

Had Tillich been present to observe this event, he would have understood it as clear confirmation of the political influence of the "light side" of Romanticism in American life; that is, confirmation of the bible-based pietism, nature mysticism, transcendentalism, and the personalistic rhetoric of individual self-fulfillment as dominant forces in the horizon of the American consciousness. The debate had nothing whatever to do with encountering the "dark side" of Romanticism,

¹⁷ See Friedrich W. J. Schelling, *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände* (1809); *Of Human Freedom*, trans. James Gutman (University of Chicago Press, 1936). For Tillich, Schelling is the paradigm case of the movement between what he calls the "light" and "dark" sides of Romanticism. See Tillich's *A History of Christian Thought* (University of Chicago Press, 1967).

¹⁸ See Kurt Salamun, "Liberal Education in the Face of Anti-Democracy," in *Educating for Democracy*, eds. Olson, Steiner, and Tuuli (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 171-179; see also Salamun's sustained analysis of Jaspers' political philosophy in *Jaspers* (München: C. H. Beck, 1985).

¹⁹ The so-called "Reagan Revolution" of the 1980s came about largely as the result of the great switch of "Dixiecrats" or white Southern Democrats into what came to be known as "Reagan Democrats." When Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act in 1965, the act fully emancipating Afro-Americans regarding the right to vote, he famously observed that signing this legislation would come at the cost of losing many if not most Southern White Democrats to the Republican Party for decades to come. He was absolutely correct. It was a loss also accompanied by the slow but certain decline of the Democratic Farmer-Labor party in the Upper-Midwest and organized Labor Unions generally during the final decades of the twentieth century due to the economic transformations and dislocations caused by what is now known as globalization.

²⁰ At least 20% or more of the popular vote in America is directly identified with Neo-Evangelicals. It also is important here to mention that had it not been for the presidential bid of third-party candidate, Ross Perot, in 1992, Bill Clinton, in all likelihood, would not have defeated George Herbert Walker Bush.

²¹ The "vapidity" of American presidential debates is very largely the result of excluding "third party" candidates like Ralph Nader, who raises questions causing discomfort amongst the political establishment.

namely, Nothingness and dread of Non-Being, but rather with a nationalistic loyalty test regarding those who considered Jesus to be one's "personal savior."

I make mention of these political developments simply to point out that the time was ripe for Tillich, and also Heidegger, in the 1950s and 1960s. But it was not ripe for Jaspers, whose influence was no greater, and, perhaps less, than that of Gabriel Marcel, Jacques Maritain and Martin Buber—the other so-called "existentialist" thinkers with whom he was frequently compared. The younger generations of scholars were ready for the dark side of Romanticism and fundamental ontology but not for rigorous inquiries into moral theory. Nurtured by a very conservative form of pietism, we were ready to "move on," so we thought, to what was considered as being far more profound issues in philosophy and theology. Indeed, the burning issue for divinity students in those days had to do with whether it possible to be religious apart from a *sacrificium intellectus*. Heidegger and Tillich, we surmised, provided ways of doing this since pondering the darker issues of Being and Non-Being did not require intellectual sacrifice and became pseudo-standards of profundity lasting well into the present century. Indeed, the new discipleship entailed a speculative commitment to the new forms of natural theology and speculative ontology that transmogrified into deconstruction and post-modernism in the late twentieth century. We simply were not satisfied with revealed biblical theology as understood within the context of Neo-Reformation theology. In sum, few of us were ready, at the time, for the demanding moral and ethical theory and complex speculative metaphysics of Karl Jaspers that required, as Adolf Lichtigfeld observed, a thorough "assimilation" of his complex category theory.²² Thus when certain Catholic philosophers and theologians heavily influenced by Heidegger, like Karl Rahner, observed that Luther's doctrine of "justification by faith alone" really implied "ontological transformation," we were eager to listen.²³

Ethnographic and Linguistic Factors

The tremendous popularity of Heidegger, as contrast to the modest reception of Jaspers, can further be amplified,

²² *Op.cit.*, note no. 8.

²³ Tillich's christology, of course, was predicated on his notion of "the new being."

I think, by a few demographic and ethnographic reflections on the religious and cultural topography of the United States in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries as contrast to that of Germany.

As Tillich reminds us, Karl Jaspers was the bourgeois product of a rather sophisticated Liberal, Northwest German Protestantism; whereas Heidegger was the rustic product of Conservative (and even reactionary) Romantic, Southwest German Catholicism.²⁴

Most German and Scandinavian Americans, in the 1950s and 1960s, were much closer to the "rustic" Swabian background of Heidegger than to the bourgeois background of Jaspers. Practically all of us, Lutherans and Catholics alike, came from late-nineteenth century peasant and working class backgrounds. Our exposure was to the folk and not the humanistic traditions of the old country. What our parents and grandparents admired and looked up to, striving to attain, was the success and status of the urban Yankee-Anglo entrepreneurial class. And even though there were significant tensions between Catholics and Lutherans (especially on the issue of inter-marriage), what we most shared in common was a non-English, that is, a "continental" cultural and linguistic background and identity.²⁵

²⁴ In his autobiography, *On the Boundary* (1966), Tillich also reflects on his father's Brandenburg background and his mother's Rhineland background, contrasting the Eastern and Western parts of Germany in the following manner: "In Eastern Germany, an inclination to meditation tinged with melancholy, a heightened sense of duty and personal sin, and a strong regard for [Prussian] authority and feudal traditions are still alive. Western Germany, by contrast, is characterized by a zest for life, love of the concrete, mobility, rationality and democracy" (pp. 13-15). One cannot fail to note the proximity between Tillich's use of "boundary" (*Grenzlinien*) and Jaspers' *Grenzsituation* with *Grenze* as the leitmotif of philosophizing in each respective instance. In any case, Jaspers would probably agree with the Kantian assertion of Tillich in his *Religiöse Verwirklichung* (1929) that "The boundary is the best place for acquiring knowledge"—although, in this instance, Tillich is using "boundary" as a geographical metaphor, whereas Jaspers' usage is usually existential and epistemological.

²⁵ German immigration to the United States was second only to that of the Irish during the nineteenth century and Germans were, by far, the largest non-English speaking group of immigrants—some 20 million or so. Approximately 70 million Americans today claim German or Scandinavian ancestry, nearly 25% of the total population. The fact that the Irish and most Germans were Roman Catholic plays very directly, I suggest, into the popularity of Heidegger in America.

Indeed, Lutherans, in the 1950s and early 1960s, thought of themselves as being somewhere between Catholicism and Protestantism. In Minnesota, where I was raised, most Germans were Catholics, and the Scandinavians were Lutheran. Scandinavians tended to be Republicans and the Catholics, almost without exception, were Democrats. As the two largest ethnic and religious groups in the industrial and agricultural Upper-Midwest, Lutherans and especially Catholics had difficulty with what was typically considered to be a true American identity. Indeed, I recall a New Testament professor at Luther Theological Seminary lamenting that "Lutherans don't really belong in America!"²⁶ What he meant was that Lutherans had little political power and much less in common with revivalistic Protestants than with Catholics. The truth of this observation became fully evident in 1963 after the assassination of JFK, the commencement of Vatican II, the English Mass and the ecumenical movement, during and following which Lutherans and Catholics "re-connected," so to speak, with respect to their common roots.²⁷

I mention these demographic and ethnographic factors in order to recall the intense Anglo-inspired intimidation of non-English speaking Americans during the early part of the 20th century, especially during the First World War. My parents frequently mentioned political "loyalty tests" regarding one's patriotism in those days, such as being forced to "kiss the flag" if one happened to be of German ancestry, and of the tremendous pressures to affirm the pseudo-values embedded in the "war fever" propaganda leading up to the entry of the United States into WWI.²⁸ Because of this intimidation and the suspicion of being

"Un-American," Scandinavian and German speaking Lutheran Churches rushed to become the first "English Speaking" Lutheran parishes in America to demonstrate patriotic loyalty. This transition was all but complete by 1918—the upshot being that by the beginning of WWII, most of the children of German and Scandinavian immigrants could no longer speak, and much less write, the mother tongue.²⁹

The Factor of *Ressentiment*

I make this brief excursus into ethnography in order to address the subtle issue of *ressentiment* as regards the devotees and practitioners of "continental philosophy" *vis-à-vis* the devotees and practitioners of "analytical philosophy." Cultural *ressentiment*, I believe, plays a significant role in the triumph of Anglo-American *Analytical* philosophy and its dominance of professional philosophy in North America during the latter part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. It also explains, at least in part, the popularity of *Continental* philosophy in the last half of the twentieth century and

²⁹ For Lutherans, "reading for the minister," prior to WWI and in preparation for Confirmation, was in German or one of the Scandinavian languages. This practice was an effective basis of preserving the traditions of the "old country." The transition to English meant that children no longer learned to read and write in the mother tongue—nor was it spoken in public for political reasons, except amongst friends. For Germans, the reason for this reluctance was obvious; for Scandinavians, less so, apart from the fact that to many Anglos, Scandinavian dialects "sounded" like German. There is also the additional factor that the English Mass was not introduced until the early 1960s, hence Catholicism for non-Catholics seemed in many ways a *mystery* religion until the transition into the vernacular.

Thus the question persists (the Heideggerian question of language and Being, as it were) as to whether someone with an ethnic, that is, a non-Anglo, familial name can become president of the United States. Only five out of forty-three American elected presidents have non-Anglo names, Martin Van Buren and the two Roosevelts, Teddy and FDR (who were from seventeenth century "Patrician" Dutch-American ancestry), and Dwight Eisenhower (who the average voter, in 1952, did not seem to recognize as German but simply as a great General and patriot). Richard Nixon, Eisenhower's Vice President and later President, was half-German, as was Herbert Hoover. But Nixon Anglicized his maternal middle-name from *Müllhaus* to *Millhous* for political reasons, and Hoover's name, of course, soon became synonymous with vacuum cleaners. There were also the two Johnsons, Andrew and Lyndon, both of British and not Scandinavian stock, who came to the presidency by way of assassination. Thus the major question, as of this writing, is whether someone with a highly "ethnic" name, like Obama, can become president of the USA.

²⁶ Professor Roy Harrisville, an enthusiastic follower of Rudolf Bultmann and thus a kind of Heideggerian, was the source of this comment.

²⁷ This is not to underestimate the presence of "paranoia" regarding perceived "outsiders," whether manifest in the forms of Anti-Catholicism, Anti-Semitism, Anti-Communism, Racism, or "Anti-Intellectualism" in America. It was, after all, the age of McCarthyism and a "Demonization of the Other" which, as Richard Hofstadter famously pointed out, has always played an important role in American politics—the most recent targets of suspicion being Muslims. See Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Knopf, 1963), and *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1965).

²⁸ As a child I was both surprised and intrigued by the discovery that we had great-aunt briefly jailed in Seattle for protesting the entry of the United States into WWI.

its *denouement* in the twenty-first. Analytic philosophy, one must remember, is very largely Anglophone philosophy, and after two world wars it was also the "philosophy of the victors." As such, many post-war American philosophers were loath to think that one might look to the continent, to the vanquished, and least of all to Germany, for insight regarding the direction of contemporary philosophy. Why indeed would one do so, unless it was for personal, that is, cultural, and not scientific reasons? Thus Karl Jaspers and other so-called "Continental" philosophers were swimming against the tide of Anglo-American analytical philosophy throughout the last half of the twentieth century. Indeed, analytic philosophers perceived, perhaps correctly, that the pursuit of continental philosophy probably had more to do with cultural retrieval and preservation than with basic issues in logic and science.³⁰

Why, then, the rather exceptional case of Heidegger? It is here, I think, where the factor of cultural *ressentiment* may play an important, albeit, a very subtle role in his popularity.

The so-called "Pluralist" coalition that challenged the leadership of the American Philosophical Association in the 1980s (a leadership which was then and remains today overwhelmingly "analytic") was made up almost entirely of scholars who identified with continental philosophy one way or another, that is, with phenomenology and existentialism.³¹ This was

especially true in the case of those engaged in Heidegger studies; and while the brilliant creativity of Heidegger was itself sufficient to attract a large following, the fact that he was a German Catholic on the "wrong side" of history and "politically incorrect," so to speak, may also have played an important role in his popularity. While I've not undertaken an empirical survey of the matter, I would venture to estimate that Heidegger scholars continue to be overwhelmingly Roman Catholic in matters cultural and religious. Indeed, "continental philosophy" and Heidegger studies in America today have their major strength at Catholic universities such as Notre Dame, Boston College, Georgetown, Marquette, Fordham, DePaul, Loyola, Duquesne and Villanova. Secular and state universities, by contrast, and with few exceptions, remain overwhelmingly analytic in philosophical orientation even though they may provide some passing attention to "continental philosophy."³²

In contrast to Heidegger, Jaspers scholarship has been and continues to be far more diverse; that is, those who have written on various aspects of Jaspers' philosophy cannot easily be identified with any particular ethnic or religious group. In the main, Jaspers scholars in America come from liberal, non-dogmatic Protestant, Catholic (both Roman and Orthodox), Jewish and even Muslim backgrounds. These scholars tend to have great respect for religious tradition, but are not necessarily religious. On the other hand, there are those who are, in fact, quite religious in their personal life and who view the philosophy of Jaspers as a complement to their own spirituality and morality.

The American Jewish reception of Jaspers is particularly interesting but also more difficult to assess. On the one hand, Jewish scholars, such as Leonard and Edith Ehrlich and William Kluback, were the early champions of Karl Jaspers in America following WWII.

³⁰ The major exception would be the philosophy of science and the influence of logical positivism and the Vienna Circle, which obviously had Germanic and therefore *continental* origins. But I also recall the observation on Anglophone philosophy by one of my teachers, Erazim Kohak, a phenomenologist from Czechoslovakia, that "only philosophers from mono-linguistic cultures, like England and America, would assume that the entire meaning of human experience might be captured by a single language." It is also worth noting that the Steering Committee for the 20th World Congress of Philosophy (1998), the membership of which was overwhelmingly analytic, provided no real venue for Existentialism, Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, or Post-Modern Philosophy. Hence scholars such as Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty and Paul Ricoeur, were not invited as keynote speakers. There were dedicated sections for Asian, African, Latin American, and Gender Philosophy, and a single section for Contemporary Philosophy, which provided venues for contributions falling outside of approximately 45 designated areas. See: <http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Program.html>

³¹ Thomists, Pragmatists and Process philosophers can also be included in this group of dissenters from the mainstream.

³² It has frequently been pointed out that creating a space for so-called "Continental Philosophy" is simply to bolster enrollments since students are prone to finding "Analytic Philosophy" rather tedious and dull. The philosophy department in my own school, Boston University, has traditionally been historically oriented, attempting to avoid the classification of being either "Analytic" or "Continental." Whether this will continue to be the case at Boston University, following the retirement of John R. Silber, is difficult to say. The reader is advised to consult the famous, and for many, "infamous," *Philosophical Gourmet* of Brian Leiter, published by Wiley-Blackwell, to check on the overall ranking and classification of philosophical studies in America.

Indeed, it is difficult to surmise what the Jaspers reception in America would have been apart from his influential Jewish following. They were scholars and translators with continental, Germanic, backgrounds, and direct connections, for example, with Ernst Cassirer, Karl Löwith, and Hermann Cohen of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. Indeed, a love and respect for Kant is a common denominator in the American Jewish reception of Jaspers—as is respect for Jaspers' personal history, his Jewish wife, Gertrud Mayer, and association with the Max Weber circle.³³

More recently, however, there have been doubts on the part of some Jewish intellectuals regarding Jaspers, especially following the publication of Hannah Arendt's *Eichman in Jerusalem* (1963) and his rigorous defense of his most famous student against her Jewish critics.³⁴ The Six Day War in 1967 and geo-political changes of the 1970s, following the Munich Olympics in 1972, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the intensification of American Jewish nationalism as regards the survival of the state of Israel, has also influenced the Jewish reception of Jaspers and other German thinkers during the troubled time of WWII and its aftermath. To be sure, many distinguished Jewish scholars have participated in the research programs of the Karl Jaspers Society of North America during the past two-and-a-half decades—but perhaps with increasing reticence in the wake of nearly fifty years of Holocaust studies which has contributed to a suspicion regarding all things Germanic.³⁵

In sum, and as the bibliographic record indicates, American philosophers have been drawn to Jaspers because of his social and political philosophy, to his ethics and moral philosophy, to his foundational work in psychopathology and speculative metaphysics, and to his pioneering work in the cross-cultural philosophy of communication and comparative studies in the philosophy of religion. Paul Tillich was correct: Karl Jaspers was then and remains today not only a primary representative of "Classical German Humanism" but "World Humanism" by way of the philosophy of freedom and the history of ideas, his devotion to Kant

Counterfactual questions like this are impossible to answer. It has been frequently pointed out, however, that Jaspers' initial reaction to Heidegger's rectoral address at Freiburg on 4 May 1933 was congratulatory and that their *Briefwechsel* continued to be friendly until the passage of the Nuremberg Laws on 15 September 1935. In other words, the letters between Jaspers and Heidegger are positive testimony to the character of their *Kampfsgemeinschaft* in the mutual attempt to "revolutionize" German philosophy in the 1920s and early 1930s. It is only when the real character of the Nazi regime became entirely clear, in 1935, that the breach between them becomes fully evident, as Karstin Harries points out. See his impressive essay, "Shame, Guilt, Responsibility," in *Jaspers and Heidegger*, ed. Alan M. Olson (Temple University Press, 1994), pp. 49-64, and also the essays by Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore. See also *The Heidegger-Jaspers Correspondence (1920-1963)*, eds. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner, transl. Gary E. Aylesworth (New York: Humanity Press, 2003), Letters 112ff.

I later had the opportunity to relate the disturbing incident mentioned above to Gershom Scholem who, prior to Elie Wiesel, was the first Mellon Professor of the Humanities at Boston University. One day at lunch I asked him, "What do you think about someone calling Jaspers a Nazi?" He was initially amazed at the audacity of such a question, saying, "Of course, there is no objective evidence for such a charge.... But then there is the case of Hannah Arendt, and this makes one wonder..."

"But what about Jaspers' *Die Schuldfrage*?" I queried, since Jaspers in 1946 was the first German philosopher to directly address the question of German culpability. "Yes," Scholem pondered. "Those of us in Palestine listened with great interest to the radio addresses of Karl Jaspers following the war—and they were, for the most part, very impressive, as was *Die Schuldfrage*. But somehow it was not enough..."

In sum, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that as the number of scholars with direct cultural connections to continental Europe, and especially Germany, declines in America, whether these connections are ethnic or religious, whether Protestant, Catholic, or Jew, there may be a corresponding decline in Jaspers studies. Future students will need to be attracted to Jaspers for reasons other than historical and cultural kinship, and this will be the major challenge for Jaspers studies in the future, especially in America.

³³ See the fine studies by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Freedom and Karl Jaspers Philosophy* (Yale, 1961), as well as her biography of Hannah Arendt: *For Love of the World* (Yale, 1982) and, most recently, the biography of Suzanne Kirkbright, *Karl Jaspers: Navigations in Truth* (Yale, 2002).

³⁴ See the *Hannah Arendt – Karl Jaspers Correspondence: 1926-1969*, eds. Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner, transl. Robert and Rita Kimber (New York: Harper, Brace, Javanovich, 1992).

³⁵ The following personal incident may shed some light on this reticent ambivalence. In the early 1970s, when I was finishing my dissertation on Jaspers, a young Jewish doctoral candidate at Princeton (and a specialist in German Romanticism) asked me about the topic of my dissertation. I replied, "Jaspers and the Problem of Transcendence." He shook his head as if to chide me saying, "That Nazi?"

I was greatly taken aback at this response since I knew that compared to Heidegger, there was no basis for making such a charge, and I told him so. "Perhaps," he replied. "But do you really think that Jaspers would have been different than Heidegger had he not had a Jewish wife?"

and Hegel by way of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and, as Elizabeth Young-Bruehl said of Hannah Arendt, because of his boundless "love of the world."³⁶

Present and Future Projects

What then of Jaspers studies today? Can the philosophy of Karl Jaspers "stand on its own," so to speak, apart from reasons of cultural kinship? This question has been raised many times at numerous Jaspers conferences, both national and international. The very raising of such questions, however, betrays certain doubts regarding the strength of Jaspers' legacy in the twenty-first century, at least in North America. Of course, Karl Jaspers is not alone in this regard. Very few thinkers in the history of philosophy are able to make it over the temporal *aporia* of a new century as regards continuing major recognition. Will Jaspers be able to transcend this temporal barrier?

As one looks over Jaspers publications during the past thirty years, especially the contents of the published proceedings of *Jaspers Internationals*³⁷ held in conjunction with the last five *World Congresses of Philosophy*, there are some encouraging signs. What is especially encouraging is the interest the philosophy of Karl Jaspers continues to generate in places beyond Western Europe and North America, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union³⁸ and in East and South Asia. Moreover, this interest is developing in disciplines other than philosophy, such religious and historical studies, political science, and psychiatry. Thus, the breadth and depth of Jaspers' *oeuvre* seems to guarantee the continuing relevance of his philosophy for years to come.

One of the areas where Jaspers' work is particularly encouraging, at least to me, is the philosophy of history and what he famously identified as *Weltphilosophie*. It is unfortunate, as mentioned

above, that it is not in philosophy proper that this prospect exists, but in religious and historical studies. A reason this is the case, at least in America, is that the history of philosophy and, indeed, the philosophy of history, occupies a place of less importance in philosophical studies than it once did.

It was in response to this state of affairs that I raised this question "Does the Philosophy of History have a Future?" in a paper presented at the 20th *World Congress of Philosophy* in Boston (1998); a paper greatly inspired by the following statement of Jaspers on "The Meaning of History":

History is the *great* question for philosophy and the question which remains unresolved and can never be resolved by thought alone but only by reality; the question whether the movement of history is a mere interlude between non-historical conditions, or whether history is the breakthrough into the depths. If it is the latter, then history in its entirety will lead, even in the face of boundless disaster and the accompaniment of danger and ever-renewed failure, to Being become manifest through man and to man himself, through an upward sweep whose limits we cannot foresee, laying hold of potentialities of which we can have no foreknowledge.³⁹

This statement is taken from what clearly has to be one of Jaspers' most enduring works, namely, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (1949), the work in which he advances his *Achsenzeit* hypothesis. The British scholar and former nun, Karen Armstrong, picked up on this notion and generated a popular discussion of Jaspers' philosophy of history in religious studies by way of her best-selling work, *The Great Transformation: The Beginnings of our Religious Traditions* (New York: Knopf, 2006). Prior to this, Armstrong enjoyed considerable notice with her book with the rather pretentious title, *A History of God* (1994), and went on to write several popular biographies of Buddha, Muhammad, and other religious figures, thus paralleling the historical, biographical and intellectual examination of the "greats" made famous by Karl Jaspers in his *Die Großen Philosophen* (1957).

The notion of an *Achsenzeit*, which Jaspers developed in *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (1949), is both powerful and appealing. But the critical question

³⁶ Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World* (Yale, 1982).

³⁷ Leonard and Edith Ehrlich, Richard Wisser, Hans Saner, Kurt Salamun, Gregory Walters, and Andreas Cesana need to be credited and acknowledged for the tremendous amount of effort expended in the planning and execution of these international conferences and the publication of their proceedings.

³⁸ Jaspers' identification with the "philosophy of freedom" has been particularly attractive to scholars in Eastern Europe, both before and after 1989.

³⁹ See my "Epochal Consciousness and the Philosophy of History," in *Contemporary Philosophy*, Vol. VIII, ed. Daniel Dahlstrom, *Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy* (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000).

has to do with "why" it is appealing and for whom? Obviously, it is a notion highly dependent on the "great man" theory of history, in particular, on Hegel's notion of the "world-historical individual." And while Jaspers modifies Hegel's developmental conception of the *Weltgeist* in history, aesthetics, and religion, by suggesting that these transformational developments take place simultaneously in the Orient and the Occident and not in a strictly linear manner (which sometimes appears to be the case in Hegel), it remains nevertheless a theory suggesting some kind of *telos* or *design* in the development of consciousness. In other words, the *Achsenzeit* hypothesis can also be taken as an oblique cultural endorsement of design arguments for the existence of God, not in terms of cosmology (as would be the case in Catholic natural theology and currently in the *intelligent design* discussion) but rather more like Hegel, and especially J. C. K. von Hoffman, in terms of historiography and therefore consistent with the nineteenth and early-twentieth century Protestant notion of *Heilsgeschichte*. Thus the critical question has to do with whether the *Achsenzeit* hypothesis can "stand on its own," as it were, disconnected from Eurocentric and neo-colonial assumptions regarding the meaning of history?

I have yet to resolve the multiple issues connected with this fascinating topic. But since *Weltphilosophie* is the primary focus of the *Karl Jaspers Society of North America* during the meetings of the *American Philosophical Association* in 2008-2009, it will be interesting to see what develops.

Appendix:

Major North American Studies of Karl Jaspers

Carr, Godfrey Robert, *Karl Jaspers as an Intellectual Critic: The Political Dimension of His Thought* (Frankfurt, Bern, New York: Peter Lang, 1983).

Ehrlich, Leonard H., *Karl Jaspers: Philosophy as Faith* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975).

Ehrlich, Leonard H. and Richard Wisser (eds), *Karl Jaspers Today: Philosophy at the Threshold of the Future* (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1988); *Karl Jaspers: Philosopher Among Philosophers* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993); *Philosophie auf dem Weg zur "Weltphilosophie"* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann; Amsterdam: Rodopi-USA/Canada, 1998).

Erickson, Stephen A., *The (Coming) Age of Thresholding* (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).

Howey, Richard Lowell, *Heidegger and Jaspers on Nietzsche* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

Kotersky, Joseph, and Raymond Langley, *Karl Jaspers on the Philosophy of History and the History of Philosophy* (New York: Humanity Books, 2003).

Kane, John F., *Pluralism and Truth in Religion: Karl Jaspers on Existential Truth* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1981).

O'Connor, Bernard F., *A Dialogue Between Philosophy and Religion: The Perspective of Karl Jaspers* (Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1988).

Olson, Alan M., *Transcendence and Hermeneutics: An Interpretation of the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).

Olson, Alan M. (ed.), *Heidegger & Jaspers* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).

Salamun, Kurt, and Gregory Walters (eds), *Karl Jaspers's Philosophy: Expositions and Interpretations* (New York: Humanity Press, 2006).

Samay, Sebastian, *Reason Revisited: The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971).

Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.), *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, augmented 2nd edition (LaSalle: Open Court, 1981). [Contains Jaspers' "Philosophical Autobiography" (including chapter: "Heidegger"), critical contributions by 24 authors, and Jaspers' "Reply to His Critics").

Schrag, Oswald O., *Existence, Existenz, and Transcendence* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1971).

Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth, *Freedom and Karl Jaspers's Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

Wallraff, Charles F., *Karl Jaspers: An Introduction to His Philosophy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970).

Walters, Gregory J., *Karl Jaspers and the Role of 'Conversion' in the Nuclear Age* (Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1988).

Walters, Gregory J. (ed.), *The Tasks of Truth: Essays on Karl Jaspers's Idea of the University* (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, New York, Paris, Wien: Peter Lang GmbH, 1996).

For scholarly papers and essays presented at the annual meetings of the Karl Jaspers Society of North America: www.bu.edu/paideia/kjsna/conferences.html.

For scholarly papers and essays published on Jaspers and related topics in the on-line journal, *Existenz*: www.bu.edu/paideia/existenz/index.html.