Beck (1996) noticed that in German, there seemed to be a problem interpreting questions in which a member of a certain class appear above a *wh*-in-*situ*.

(1) a. "Wen hat **niemand** wo gesehen?"  
   Whom has nobody where seen  
   ‘Where did nobody see whom?’

b. "Wen hat **Luise** wo gesehen?"  
   Whom has Luise where seen  
   ‘Where did Luise see whom?’

c. "Wen hat **wo niemand** gesehen?"  
   Whom has where nobody seen  
   ‘Where did nobody see whom?’

Her proposal at that time was that these intervenors syntactically interfered with covert *wh*-movement, and that it was by virtue of the fact that they are quantifiers.

Seemingly similar effects have been since discovered (or reclassified) in many languages since. It became clear that simply “quantificational” does not make quite the right cuts, and in Beck & Kim (1997) it was observed that in fact there seems to be some crosslinguistic variation in what counts as an intervenor (demonstrated there between Korean and German).

The question of what causes the intervention effect, as well as what it is that makes intervenors intervene, is tied in closely with understanding of *wh*-movement and in particular how *wh*-in-*situ* is interpreted.

The introduction to Beck (2006) has a nice overview, and gives examples from Hindi, Japanese, Mandarin, Malayalam, Turkish, German, Korean, French, Dutch, English, Passamoquoddy, and Thai. She lists (2) as commonly occurring intervenors.

(2) only, even, also, not, (almost) every, no, most, few (and other nominal quantifiers),  
always, often, never (and other adverbial quantifiers)

---

**Syntax, semantics, and pragmatics**

- **Syntactic accounts**: Intervenors block some relation between C and the *wh*-word.  
  Examples: My account, detailed below; Beck (1996); Pesetsky (2000)
- **Semantic accounts**: Intervenors disrupt the semantic interpretation.  
- **Pragmatic accounts**: Intervenors are in a position reserved for topics, and can’t be topics.  
  Example: Lee & Tomioka (2002)

**Basic goal here (more modest than my abstract suggested)**: To outline a particular syntactic account, with glancing mention of alternative accounts, and make the argument that there is at least a syntactic component to the problem. And just to introduce myself to the McGill/Montréal linguistics community.

**A word about *wh*-in-*situ* and focus in situ**

Languages differ in how they treat their *wh*-words. Some move just one *wh*-word (English), some move all of them (Bulgarian), some don’t move any (Japanese).

Why do *wh*-words move? A longstanding thought (Huang 1982, helped along by Karttunen 1977) is that they move because it’s required for interpretation:

(3) What did you buy?  
(4) Tell me the *x* such that [you bought *x*].

The idea is that the trace of *wh*-movement serves as a variable for an operator that must take clausal scope. Given that “What did you buy?” means pretty much the same thing in all languages, no matter where the *wh*-word is, this suggests that even in languages where you don’t see the *wh*-word taking clausal scope, it has somehow moved abstractly by the time interpretation occurs. A very similar argument was made for focus as well:

(5) John bought a LAMP <sub>F</sub>.  
(6) A lamp is the (only) *x* (of the alternatives) such that John bought *x*.

The problem is that both *wh*-in-*situ* and focus in situ seem to be able to escape from islands, which the overt movement counterparts cannot.

(7) a. *What did John call the police after you stole?*  
    b. Who called the police after you stole what?  
    c. John called the police after you stole the LAMP <sub>F</sub>.
This also seems to be an effect shared by indefinites, but not for other quantifiers—which suggests that the covert movement of other quantifiers is constrained by islands, and makes it difficult to maintain the idea that covert movement is simply island-oblivious.

(8) a. If a boy runs fast, he will join the track team.
   b. * If every boy runs fast, he will join the track team.

So—there was an effort to figure out how to interpret these things (focus, wh-words, indefinites) in situ, without having to move them around, even abstractly.

Hamblin (1973) had a proposal for the interpretation of questions that Rooth (1985) picked up and adapted for the interpretation of focus, and that others (including me) have since picked back up for the interpretation of questions. The central component of this idea is that focus and wh-words make use of a set of alternatives in the computation of their semantics, and that there is a way to tinker with the compositional machinery in such a way that the alternatives wind up interpreted in the right place and in the right way without having to have a formal connection (such as that established by covert movement) between the operator and the focused element or wh-word.

With this move, the interpretation of wh-in-situ (and focus in situ) was moved further into the domain of semantics and away from the domain of syntax.

What I’m exploring here, primarily with reference to Japanese, is the interaction, and places that syntax seems to play a role.

**Japanese, its questions and its morphology**

(9) Taroo-ga hon-o kaimasita.  (10) Taroo-ga hon-o kaimasita ka?
T-NOM book-ACC bought.POLITE  T-NOM book-ACC bought.POLITE Q
’Taro bought a book.’  ‘Did Taro buy a book?’

(11) Taroo-ga nani-ka kaimasita.
   (12) Taroo-ga nani-o kaimasita ka?
T-NOM what-Q bought.POLITE  T-NOM what-ACC bought.POLITE Q
’Taro bought something.’  ‘What did Taro buy?’

(13) John-ka Bill-(ka)-ga hon-o katta.
John-Q Bill-(Q)-NOM book-ACC bought
’John or Bill bought books.’

(14) Taroo-si ka LGB- o kaw-anakat-ta?
Taroo-only,qp LGB-ACC buy-NEG-PAST
’Only Taro bought LGB.’

---

**Some (morpho)syntactic hypotheses and assumptions**

(15) dare-ga  who-NOM book-ACC bought.POLITE ka?
‘Who bought a book?’

Hypothesis 1. The *ka* that appears above is the same basic morpheme in all the examples.
Hypothesis 2. The *ka* reaches the clause periphery in questions by moving there.
Hypothesis 3. If a wh-word is inside an island, the *ka* can start outside.

Assumption 1. Movement is constrained by islands.
Assumption 2. Movement is constrained by minimality (shortest move).

Ultimately: I would like to be able to claim that this actually happens in all languages in some form. That “Q” and “dare”—even if realized differently (or not at all) in other languages—is fundamental in the semantics of questions.

**“Intervention effects” in Japanese**

(16) Movement must be as short as it can be. (Attract Closest, Shortest (Move))

(17) [nani-o Q]_1 CP
John-ka Bill VP

(18) The proposal is that there is initially a structure something like that on the left. The QP can be scrambled as a whole.

(19) QP
nani
ka

---

(11) in the semantics of questions.

(12) (perhaps lit. “except”)

(13) Movement is constrained by islands.

(14) Movement is constrained by minimality (shortest move).
The fact that other things containing ka “get in the way” is evidence that the ka in these things is at least the same kind of thing (and perhaps the same thing), and that there is some kind of relation between the position of the wh-word and C that is subject to minimality. Like movement.

Movement is supposed to be constrained by islands… this didn’t seem to work. However, the behavior of the emphatic ittai can give us a clue as to what happened.

(20) a. ?* [John-ka] Bill-ga nani-o nomimasita ka? ka ‘or’ intervenes John-or Bill-NOM what-ACC drank Q (‘What did John or Bill drink?’)

b. nani-o, [John-ka] Bill-ga t, nomimasita ka? scrambling saves it what-ACC John-or Bill-NOM drank Q ‘What did John or Bill drink?’

c. dare-ga [sake-ka] biiru(ka)-o nomimasita ka? (the meaning who-NOM sake or beer(ACC) drank Q ‘Who drank either sake or beer?’)

(21) a. ?? dareka-ga nani-o nomimasita ka? dareka ‘someone’ someone-NOM what-ACC drank Q (‘What did someone drink?’)

b. nani-o, dareka-ga t, nomimasita ka? what-ACC someone-NOM drank Q ‘What did someone drink?’

c. dare-ga nani-ska o nomimasita ka? who-NOM something-ACC drank Q ‘Who drank something?’

(22) a. ?* Taroo-sika nani-o yoma-nai no? Taroo-only_ska what-ACC read-NEG Q (‘What did only Taro read?’)

b. nani-o, Taroo-sika t, yoma-nai no? what-ACC Taroo-only_ska read-NEG Q ‘What did only Taro read?’

c. dare-ga LGB-sika yoma-nai no? who-NOM LGB-only_ska read-NEG Q ‘Who reads only LGB?’

An initial lack, but an eventual return, of island effects in Japanese.

(23) Hiro-ga [Sue-ni nani-o ageta hito-ni] aimasita ka? Oops! Wait…

John-NOM S-DAT what-ACC gave man-DAT met.POL Q ‘What did Hiro meet [the man that gave t to Sue]?’

Hypothesis: Ittai starts in the same place as Q

Ideas:
• Q can start outside islands.
• Ittai marks the original position of Q. (modulo its own scrambling)

If Q is adjoined to DP, the details of this become a bit trickier.

(24) John-ga ittai nani-o t, kaimasita ka? Introducing ittai…

John-NOM what-ACC bought.POL Q ‘What in the world did John buy?’

Ittai and ka are quite intimately related.

(25) Hiro-ga nani-o tabeta? Generally, ka can be dropped…

H-NOM what-ACC ate ‘What did Hiro eat?’

(26)?? Hiro-ga ittai nani-o tabeta? But not with ittai…

H-NOM ittai what-ACC ate (‘What in the world did Hiro eat?’)

(27) Ittai → Q Ittai implies Q

Ittai is not allowed inside islands… But ok just outside… (Pesetsky 1987)

(28) * Hiro-ga [Sue-ni ittai nani-o ageta hito-ni] aimasita ka? (If Q is adjoined to DP, the details of this becomes a bit trickier.)

John-NOM ittai S-DAT what-ACC gave man-DAT met.POL Q ‘What in the world did Hiro meet the man that gave t to Sue?’

(29) Hiro-ga ittai [Sue-ni nani-o ageta hito-ni] aimasita ka?

H-NOM ittai S-DAT what-ACC gave man-DAT met.POL Q ‘What in the world did Hiro meet the man that gave t to Sue?’

(27) Ittai → Q Ittai implies Q

Ittai is not allowed inside islands… But ok just outside… (Pesetsky 1987)
Ittai can be separated from the wh-word…

(31)  a. John-what ittai  kinoo  honya-de  nani-o  kaimasita  ka?  
    John-TOP  ittai  yesterday  bookstore-LOC  what-ACC  bought-POL  Q  
    ‘What in the world did John buy in the bookstore yesterday?’  
    (Yanagida 1995:60)

b. (*) nani-o,  Taroo-ga  ittai  ti  yonda  no?  
    what-ACC  Taroo-NOM  ittai  read  Q  
    ‘What in the world did Taro read?’

Scrambling the wh-word over the intervenor doesn’t help if ittai is below the intervenor.

(32)  a.  ?*  nani-o,  [John-ka  Bill]-ga  [ittai  ti  t0]  nomimasita  ka?  
    what-ACC  John-or  Bill-NOM  ittai  drank  Q  
    (*’What in the world did John or Bill drink?’)

b.  [ittai  nani-o  t0],  [John-ka  Bill]-ga  t,  nomimasita  ka?  
    ittai  what-ACC  John-or  Bill-NOM  drank  Q  
    ‘What in the world did John or Bill drink? 

(33)  ittai,  …  t0  …  ka

Testing the prediction: If Q starts outside islands, no intervention effects within them.

(34)  [island  …  nani  …  ]  t0  …  ka?  
    If above is correct, the path of Q doesn’t cross stuff in the island…

…So we would expect intervention effects to go away…

(35)  a.  ?*  [John-ka  Bill]-ga  nani-o  katta  no?  
    what-ACC  John-or  Bill-NOM  what-ACC  bought  Q  
    (*’What did John or Bill buy?’)

  b.  Mary-wa  [John-ka  Bill]-ga  nani-o  katta  ato  de]  dekaketa  no?  
    Mary-TOP  John-or  Bill-NOM  what-ACC  bought  after  left  Q  
    ‘Mary left after John or Bill bought what?’

c.  Mary-wa  [nani-o,  [John-ka  Bill]-ga  t,  katta  ato  de]  dekaketa  no?  
    Mary-TOP  what-ACC  John-or  Bill-NOM  bought  after  left  Q  
    ‘Mary left after John or Bill bought what?’

  d.  ?*  [John-ka  Bill]-wa  [Mary-ga  nani-o  katta  ato  de]  dekaketa  no?  
    John-TOP  Mary-NOM  what-ACC  bought  after  left  Q  
    (*’John or Bill left after Mary bought what?’)

Summary so far

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th align="left">Q (ka) moves to the overt clause-final position from:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="left">• Next to the wh-word if possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">• Otherwise, next to the island containing the wh-word.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Languages in which we can arguably see Q before it has moved

Premodern Japanese—kakari-musubi

(36)  tare-ka  mata  hanatatibana-ni  omoi-temu.  
    who-Qagain  flower-orange-DAT  remember-M  
    ‘Who will again remember (me) at the time of the mandarin orange flower?’
    (Shin Kokin Wakashū [1205]:3, Ogawa 1977:222)

(37)  [ika  yoo  naru  kokorozasi  aramu  hito-ni]-ka  awamu  to  obo.  
    how  kind  is  love  have  person-DAT-Q  wed  that  think-M  
    [’What kind of love do you think you would want to marry a person that has t?’
    (Taketori Monogatari [c. 900], Ogawa 1977:216, Whitman 1997:166)

Shuri Okinawan

(38)  a.  Taruu-ya  nuu  kam-yi-ga?  
    Main clauses like Japanese  
    Taru-TOP  what  eat-PRES-Q  
    ‘What does Taru eat?’

b.  taa-ga  ich-u-ga?  
    who-Q  eat-ACC  
    ga  is  Q,  ga  is  also  NOM.

    Embedded  
    I-TOP  Taru-NOM  what-ACC  eat-PRES-M  want-to-hear  kakari-musubi  
    ‘I want to hear what Taru eats.’

    I-TOP  who-NOM  apple  eat-PRES-M  want-to-hear  
    ‘I want to hear who eats apples.’

(See Sugahara 1996)
In Sinhala, we see the same range of functions for the question particle as in Japanese.

   *(I wonder) who Taru is reading the book written by.*

   *(I wonder) who Taru is reading the book written by."

(41) a. Taru-ya [nuu kiki-gachinaa]-GA benkyoo soo-ra. Taru-TOP what listening-while-Q study doing-M
   *(I wonder) what Taru is studying while listening to."

   *(I wonder) what Taru is studying while listening to."

And, Q cannot appear inside an island, but can appear just outside it...

(49) * [Chitra monowa da kanno kota ] Ranjit puduma unee? Chitra what Q ate when Ranjit surprise became-E
   *(Ranjit was surprised when Chitra ate what?"

(50) [Chitra monowa kanno kota] da Ranjit puduma unee? Chitra what-Q ate when Q Ranjit surprise became-E
   *(Ranjit was surprised when Chitra ate what?"

   *(You read the book that Chitra gave to whom?)"

   *(You read the book that Chitra gave to whom?)"

These are indeed islands... cleft and scrambling out of them prohibited.

(53) lankaave ayoo t i kannu bal Cleft
   Sri Lanka-GEN people eat-E rice
   *It’s rice that Sri Lankans eat.*

   *Cleft
   *(It was to Ranjit, that you read the book that Chitra gave to.)"

(55) Ranjiit-ta, oyya dannawa [Chitra t ee potha dunn kiyaalla] Scramble
   Ranjiit-ta, you know Chitra that book gave that ble
   *(To Ranjit, you know Chitra gave that book"

(56) * Ranjiit-ta, oyya [Chitra t dunn potha] kieuw Ranjiit-ta, you Chitra who-Q give book read-E Scramble
   *(To Ranjit, you read the book Chitra gave.)"

Navajo (perhaps) (see Schauber 1979, Barss et al. 1991, Perkins 2000)

(57) a. Jáan hái-lá yiYii4tsq? John who-Q 3.3.saw
   *Who did John see?"...

b. Jáan lá hái yiYii4tsq? John who-Q 3.3.saw
   *(or in second position.
   *(Who did John see?)"...

Perkins (2000): -lá is more emphatic than -sh, and that a second-position -sh seems to mark a topic. Indefinite hái-shQQ ‘someone’ is based on hái ‘who’, as is hái-da ‘anyone’.
The semantics of questions (Hamblin 1973)

Propositions can be either true or false (depending on the world state). But not questions. They do communicate something, though.

For example, we know from (59) that (60) but not (61) is a possible answer.

(59) Who broke the toaster?
(60) Homer broke the toaster.  A possible answer
(61) It always rains on the Fourth of July. Not a possible answer

Hypothesis: Questions tell us which propositions are possible answers.

For (59), answers are of the form $x$ (human) broke the toaster.
(e.g., {Homer broke the toaster, Maggie broke the toaster, Lisa broke the toaster, ...})

To characterize the set containing propositions like $x$ broke the toaster where $x$ is human:

(62) $\forall p : \exists x \in \text{humans} . \ p = \lambda w : x \text{ broke the toaster in } w$

'A proposition $p$ is in the set if and only if

there is an $x$

in the set of humans

such that

$p$ is $x \text{ broke the toaster}'

Indefinites are derived forms, almost without exception.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>wh</th>
<th>some</th>
<th>no</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>person</td>
<td>ki</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thing</td>
<td>kio</td>
<td>nento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>place</td>
<td>kie</td>
<td>ie</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(most below from Haspelmath 1997:166)

Japanese dare-ka someone ka or
Sinhala mokak-do something da or(alt.qs)
Kannada yaar-oo someone -oo or
Korean nwukwu-na anyone -(i)na or
nwukwu-tuncī anyone -(i)tunci or
Russian kto-libo anyone libo or
Basque edo-nor anyone edo or
Nanay uj-nuu someone -nuu or

The “indeterminates” dare and nani

In Japanese, there are a couple of things that can attach to dare ‘who’—not just ka.

(67) dareka ‘someone’
(68) daremo ‘everyone’ (also, with a different intonation ‘anyone(NPI)’)
(69) daredemo ‘anyone(PC)

So things like dare ‘who’ and nani ‘what’ (called “indeterminates” by Kuroda 1965) seem to serve as a kind of restriction, with the quantificational force determined by what’s hooked onto them.

The quantificational particles can appear at a distance from the indeterminates.

(70) a. [dare-ka/mo-no hahaoaya]-ga paatii-ni kita. (Yatushiro 2001)
who-Q/mo-gen mother-nom party-to came
‘A mother of someone/everyone came to the party.’

b. [dare-no hahaoaya]-mo paatii-ni kita
who-gen mother-mo party-to came
‘Everyone’s mother came to the party’

c. [dare-no hahaoaya]-ka paatii-ni kita
who-gen mother-ka party-to came
‘Someone’s mother came to the party’
When the indeterminate is in an island, it must have been separated from \textit{ka} even initially.

\begin{itemize}
\item[(71)] Hiro-ga [ Sue-ni nani-o ageta hito-ni ] aimasita ka?
\end{itemize}

\textit{H-NOM S-DAT what-ACC gave man-DAT met.POL Q}

\texttt{What did Hiro meet [the man that gave t to Sue]?)}

We need some way to interpret these.


\item[(72)] Indeterminates like \textit{dare} are semantically represented as a set (of alternatives).

\item[(73)] The combination of a function with a set of arguments yields a set of results.

Hamblin (1973:48) puts it this way (emphases his):

\begin{quote}
\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item[a]\text{[a]}lthough we are inclined to class ‘who’ and ‘what’ with proper names we cannot by any stretch regard them as denoting individuals. But there is a simple alternative: they can be regarded as denoting \textit{sets} of individuals, namely the set of humans and the set of non-humans, respectively. This does not mean, of course, that the formula ‘who walks’ asserts that the set of human individuals walks: we must modify other stipulations in sympathy. We shall need to regard ‘who walks’ as itself denoting a set, namely the set whose members are the propositions denoted by ‘Mary walks’, ‘John walks’, \ldots, and so on for all individuals. Pragmatically speaking a question sets up a choice-situation between a set of propositions, namely, those propositions that count as answers to it.
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

What he means is something kind of like this. I’ll call what happens in (78) \texttt{Flexible functional application}.

\begin{itemize}
\item[(74)] \texttt{ [ John ] = JOHN}
\item[(75)] \texttt{ [ who ] = \{ JOHN, MARY, BILL, SUE, \ldots \} }
\item[(76)] \texttt{ [ walks ] = \lambda x \ [ x walks ]}
\item[(77)] \texttt{ [ John walks ] = [ walks ] ( [ John ] ) = \lambda x \ [ x walks ] ( JOHN )}
\item[(78)] \texttt{ = JOHN walks}
\item[(79)] \texttt{ \{ who walks \} = \{ \lambda x \ [ x walks ] \} ( [ who ] ) = \lambda x \ [ x walks ] ( [ JOHN, MARY, BILL, SUE, \ldots ] ) = \{ JOHN walks, MARY walks, BILL walks, SUE walks, \ldots \} }
\end{itemize}

\begin{quote}
This isn’t quite what he proposed—for Hamblin, the difference was between singleton and multi-membered sets, rather than a difference between elements and sets. It’s easy to translate from one to the other, and there are reasons one might want to use “denotation-sets” even for things like \texttt{ [ John ]}, as Hamblin did, but I find it easier to discuss this way.)
\end{quote}

\item[What is \textit{ka} for, then?]

\begin{itemize}
\item[If that were all there is to it, then \textit{ka} (here, \textit{no}) wouldn’t actually be doing any work at all in a question like (79). Though, actually, you can ask a question without the \textit{ka} morpheme. (Recall also (25))]
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item[(79)] \texttt{ dare-ga kita no?}
\item[(80)] \texttt{ dare-ga kita ?}
\item[(81)] \texttt{ who-NOM came Q}
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item[If the fact that no Q is pronounced in (80) means that no Q is actually \textit{there}, then Hamblin’s semantics already predicted that this is a question.]
\end{itemize}

\texttt{Question Recognition \hspace{1em} (formalizing Hamblin’s idea—pragmatics)}

\begin{itemize}
\item[If the denotation of an utterance is a set of propositions, then the utterance is a question. (To respond, pick one or more, or refuse to pick one)]
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item[There are some reasons to think Q really isn’t there in (80) (though there is some debate). Yoshida & Yoshida (1997) observe that (a) Q-drop can never happen in embedded questions, (b) can happen with yes-no questions only with certain verbs, and (c) can never happen with \textit{naze} ‘why’ questions. Additionally, as we saw before (from Hagstrom 1998), it cannot happen with \textit{ittai} questions.]
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item[Also, a syntactic note: If there is no \textit{ka} there, then the thing that drives movement of \textit{ka} can’t be there. It would seem to imply that there is no (or at least a different) interrogative C.]
\end{itemize}
A prediction that I just noticed and have never checked: You shouldn’t get intervention effects in questions with *ka* dropped. That is, there should be a contrast between (82a) and (82b):

(82) a. ?? dare*ka*-ga nani-o katta no? dareka ‘someone’
someone-NOM what-ACC bought Q 
(‘What did someone buy?’)

b. *a* dare*ka*-ga nani-o katta? predicted to be better
someone-NOM what-ACC bought ‘What did someone buy?’

Fine. But, I repeat: What is *ka* for, then?

The sentence in (83) is not a question, but it has *dare* in it, which we are supposing is a set of individuals. In order to avoid having this mean the same thing as (80), we need something in (83) to take the set introduced by *dare* back to an individual so that we wind up with a single proposition.

A fairly obvious hypothesis: *ka* is providing the existential force. It says ‘there is a way to choose from the set’—it is (something related to) a *choice function*.

(84) *Af. f(people) came.*

Whether *ka* is a quantifier (*Af*) or simply a variable bound by some kind of existential closure is an open question. I argued that it is a quantifier on the basis of data I had collected showing that it cannot scope out of islands, but some have disputed the data (e.g., Yatsushiro 2001). However, it would serve as a nice parallel to *mo*, which is a bit less controversially something more like *Af* (Shimoyama 2001, and others).

When *ka* is remote from the *wh*-phrase

(70) d.  [dare-no hahaoya]-ka paatii-ni kita
who-gen mother-ka party-to came
‘Someone’s mother came to the party’

The “sethood” of *dare* propagates up until it gets tamed by *ka*.

(85) *(John’s mother, Bill’s mother, Sue’s mother, …)*

(86) *Af. f((John’s mother, Bill’s mother, Sue’s mother, …)) came to the party.*

---

**Why can you ask questions with and without *ka***?

Above, we worked out how we can get a question meaning from just a *wh*-word in questions that have no *ka* (basically just what Hamblin proposed, but with Japanese words).

We have now proposed a meaning for *ka*. So what about questions with *ka*? How is it that this meaning *ka* has does not seem to have an effect on the meaning?

**Answer (has got to be):** In this context, *ka* turns out to have no effect on the meaning.

(87) dare-ga kita no?
who-NOM came Q
‘Who came?’

(88) dare-*tka*-ga kita no
(C is not pronounced, but drives movement of *ka*)

The syntactic movement has this semantic effect:

(90) *λp Af. p = λx. f(people) came in w.*

Characterizes a set of propositions of the form *x came* (*x* is a person that can be chosen from set of people).

‘A proposition *p* is in the set if and only if there is a choice function *f*

such that

*p* is the proposition

*x came* where *x* is the person chosen by *f*

from the set of people.

(“λp. f(people) came in w”)

**The point:** Two mechanisms (flexible functional application vs. movement of *ka* to *C*) converge on the same abstract representation (same set of propositions).

And that is why the questions with and without *ka* mean the same thing.
Components of this explanation:

*ka* is responsible for existential quantification over choice functions.

This involves a selective binding relation between the operator (*ka* in its derived position, either via QR or Q-motion), but the set from which it is built is possibly built up using flexible functional application.

C_interrogative is responsible for abstraction over propositions.

Two ways of deriving the same meaning (allowing the set to propagate, and a quantification over choice functions)—that seems kind of inefficient and suboptimal.

Except that there is a place where we need both: multiple *wh*-questions.

### Multiple *wh*-questions?

So, the generalization is: **Q starts by the *wh*-word.** The *wh*-word? Presupposition failure?

(91) **dare-ga nani-o kaimasita ka?**

Japanese

who-NOM what-ACC bought.POLITE Q

‘Who bought what?’

Japanese is not very revealing for this, but we now have other languages to check…

(92) a. *[ kau mokak də kieuwe kiyala] dannawa da?**

Sinhala

who what Q read-E that know Q

Do (you) know who read what?’

b. *[ kau də mokak kieuwe kiyala] dannawa da?**

who Q what read-E that know Q

(‘Do you know who read what?’)

(93) a. *háí-lú há’áťfí-lú nayiisni?’

Navajo

who-Q what-Q bought

(‘Who bought what?’)

b. háí-lú há’áťfí nayiisni?’

who-Q what bought

‘Who bought what?’

(Barss et al. 1991:34)

c. háí há’áťfí-lú nayiisni?’

who what-Q bought

‘Who bought what?’

(Peggy Speas, p.c.)

### The availability of pair-list readings

Pair-list readings seem to depend on Q

(94) a. **taa-ga-GA nuu kam-ta-ra who-NOM-Q what eat-PAST-M**

Special reading of some sort required.

‘(I wonder) who ate what.’

Who “D-linked”? Foods exhausted?

b. **taa-ga nuu-GA kam-ta-ra who-NOM what-Q eat-PAST-M**

(=Sugahara 1996:246)

‘(I wonder) who ate what.’

(95) a. dare-ga nani-o motte kitano?

who-NOM what-ACC brought Q

‘Who brought what?’ (pair list reading available)

b. dare-ga nani-o motte kita?

who-NOM what-ACC brought Q

‘Who brought what?’ (single pair reading only)

Pair-list reading seems to depend on Q being able to start in amongst the *wh*-words.

(96) Taroo-ga [ dare-ga nani-o katta toki-ni ] okotta no?

Taro-NOM who-NOM what-ACC bought when got.angry Q

‘Taro got angry when who bought what?’ ( *PL, SP)

Using ittai to localize Q, it appears that forcing the Q to start low precludes SP.

(97) a. dono hito-ga ittai nani-o katta no?

which person-NOM ittai what-ACC bought Q

‘Which person bought what (in the world)?’ (PL, *)

b. ittai dono hito-ga nani-o katta no?

ittai which person-NOM what-ACC bought Q

‘Which person (in the world) bought what?’ (PL, ?)

Pairing in pair-list reading seems to be pairs of things above and below Q…?

(98) **dono hito-ga [ dare-ga nani-o katta toki-ni ] okotta no?**

which person-NOM who-NOM what-ACC bought when got.angry Q

‘Which person got angry when who bought what?’ (person-event pairs only)
Force Q to start out high, lose the pair-list reading (cf. intervention effects)

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<td>‘Who bought what yesterday?’ (PL, SP)</td>
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**Pair-list readings in the semantics: The View from the Armchair**

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What **ought** to be the difference between SP and PL questions?

The PL meaning of *who bought what?* seems to be a lot like:

*What did John buy? What did Sue buy? What did Bill buy? What did Mary buy?*

‘For everyone $x$ who is contextually relevant, what did $x$ buy?’

We do not fear sets, ontologically. ($p = <st>$, single question = $<pt> = <st,t>, …$)

So, how about: A PL question is a set of questions ($<pt,t> = <st,t>, …$)? So:

(103) **Multiple Question Recognition**

If the semantic value of an utterance is of type $<pt,t>$ (a set of questions), then the utterance is a (pair-list multiple) question.

To respond: For each member set $A$, respond to $A$. (via SQR)

Ok, so we have an idea about • single questions, • PL multiple questions.

How about SP multiple questions?

They **behave** like single questions. You pick one proposition, altogether.

So we’ll suppose they’re $<pt>$ and handled by Single Question Recognition.

[ Who just bought what? ] = $\{ p : p = that \text{ just bought } y \text{ for } x \text{ a person } y \text{ a thing } \}$

A set of propositions, a “Single Question,” pick one and you specify a pair.

In support of the apparent “redundancy”*, ka in multiple questions...

We saw that presence vs. absence of *ka* didn’t seem to affect the meaning of (104–105).

(104) **dare-** gauge | kita | no? |
|    | **who-NOM** | came | Q |
|    | ‘Who came?’ |

(105) **dare-** gauge | kita | ? |
|    | **who-NOM** | came |
|    | ‘Who came?’ |

And we saw why—two different mechanisms converge on the same set of possible answers. Do we really need two different mechanisms? In fact, yes.

It turns out that *ka* does have an observable effect in multiple questions.

(106) **dare-** gauge | **nani-o** | katta | no? |
|    | **who-NOM** | **what-ACC** | bought | Q |
|    | ‘Who bought what?’ |

(107) **dare-** gauge | **nani-o** | katta | ? |
|    | **who-NOM** | **what-ACC** | bought |
|    | ‘Who bought what?’

The idea behind the (106) vs. (107) contrast: We have two ways of getting sets.

*One* is flexible functional application, which deals with sets of arguments.

The *other* is moving *ka* outside the proposition (to C—or, outside of “?”).

In (107) there is no *ka*, so we have only one means available (flexible functional application)—We can only get a set of propositions (a single pair question).

In (106), we have *ka* so we can use both means of set construction—

One gets a set of propositions (a question),

the other gets a set of questions (a pair list question).

Start with (107). Look, no Q. No choice function. Wh-words are sets. We’ll need FFA.

(108) a. **[ nani ]** = thing$\times$context $=$ candy, gum, coffee, soda, milk, …

b. **[ dare ]** = people$\times$context $=$ John, Mary, Bill, Sue, …
(109) **Compositionally:**

\[ \text{dare} \xrightarrow{\text{nani}} \text{katta} \]

(110) \[
\text{katta} \equiv \lambda x \lambda y \cdot y \text{ bought } x \quad \text{(type}<\!<\text{en},<\!<\text{et}>> \text{or so)}
\]

(111) \[
\text{katta nani} \equiv \text{katta} (\text{nani})
\]

\[ FFA \ (ii) \Rightarrow = \{ \text{katta} (\text{candy}), \text{katta} (\text{gum}), \ldots \} \]

\[ = \lambda P \exists x \in \text{things}_{\text{context}} \cdot P = \text{katta} (x) \]

\[ \text{‘the set of predicates like } \text{bought } x \text{ for } x \text{ a contextually relevant thing.’} \]

\[ FFA \ (iv) \Rightarrow = \{ \text{bought-candy'}(\text{John}), \text{bought-candy'}(\text{Mary}), \ldots, \text{bought-gum'}(\text{John}), \text{bought-gum'}(\text{Mary}), \ldots \} \]

\[ = \{ \text{that John bought candy, that Mary bought candy, … ,}
\]

\[ \text{that John bought gum, that Mary bought gum, …} \]

\[ \text{‘the set of propositions like } \text{y bought } x \text{ for } x \text{ a thing, } y \text{ a person.’} \]

That’s what we expect as the representation for a SP multiple question. Pick one, you specify a pair. All is well.

Ok, now for (106). (106) has Q, and a PL reading. (106) needs to be a set of questions.

(106)

\[
\text{dare-}g d \text{ nani-}o \text{ katta } n o ?
\]

\[
\text{who-}N O M \text{ what-ACC bought } \text{Q}
\]

To get a set of questions (a PL question) we use both means of getting sets:

- Flexible Functional Application
- Interrogative

Let’s try it. Start with (113) and then replace Taroo with dare as in (114)…

(113) \[
\text{Taroo-}g d \text{ nani-}o \text{ katta } n o ? \quad \lambda P \exists f . p = \text{Taro bought } f (\text{what})
\]

\[
\text{Taro-}N O M \text{ what-ACC bought } \text{Q}
\]

\[
\text{‘What did Taro buy?’}
\]

\[
\{ \text{that Taro bought } \alpha , \text{that Taro bought } \beta , \ldots \} \text{ if } \text{things}_{\text{context}} = \{ \alpha , \beta , \ldots \}
\]

(114) \[
\text{dare-}g d \text{ nani-}o \text{ katta } n o ? \quad \lambda P \exists f . p = \{ \text{dare} \} \text{ bought } f (\text{what})
\]

\[
\text{who-}N O M \text{ what-ACC bought } \text{Q}
\]

\[
\text{‘Who bought what?’}
\]

**FFA:** If an argument x gives you a representation of type α,

\[
\text{using } \{ x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots \} \text{ as that argument gives you a representation of type } \text{ot}.
\]

We expect a set of questions like \text{what did } x \text{ buy?} for the x’s in \{ dare \}.

\[
\{ \{ \text{that A bought } \alpha , \text{that A bought } \beta , \ldots \} , \{ \text{that B bought } \alpha , \text{that B bought } \beta , \ldots \}, \ldots \} \]

\[
\text{if } \text{things}_{\text{context}} = \{ \alpha , \beta , \ldots \} \text{ and } \text{people}_{\text{context}} = \{ A, B, \ldots \}
\]

This of course is what we’d hoped for—that’s the pair-list question \text{who bought what?}

**Proposal:** **PAIR-LIST ANTSUPERIORITY GENERALIZATION.**

A multiple-wh-question has a PL reading when not all wh-words are in the scope of Q.

Incidentally, (106) (= (114)) also has a SP reading. (115) \[ \text{dare nani katta} \] \[ t_0 \]

Suppose syntactically in this case Q moves from someplace outside both wh-words.

Then FFA will yield a set of propositions \text{x bought y} below \text{t}_0, and the choice function introduced by Q will choose among them. \[ \lambda a \exists f . a = f (A) \] characterizes A (like \( \lambda a . a \in A \)). So Q (and interrogative C) will have no real effect (it’s as if we’d left it off).

**Side note:** There are only two ways to generate sets, to get a “list-reading” (C+Q and FFA)—there should be no such thing as a real list of triples, but it should instead be a pairing of one wh with the other two together. Moreover, if we have to exhaust the one outside the scope of \text{t}_0, it had better be that Q starts under the topmost wh-word.

**Discussion of some alternatives**

Although there are still some things that haven’t been fully specified, we’ll leave the account above now to talk a bit about some alternatives (if there’s even any time left!). However, there isn’t really time left for me to prepare this handout, so this will be sketchy.

**Beck (2006): Intervention effects are semantic, due to interference with focus**

What makes an intervenor an intervenor? Kim (2002), and Beck (2006), propose that it is the property of being focused that does it. The essential idea is that the alternatives involved in focus interfere with the alternatives involved in questions.

If it works, this is very elegant—focus is the other place where we see these sets of alternatives, and if they both arise in the same way, then they could interfere with each other.
A very quick introduction to alternative semantics for focus

The basic idea of an alternative semantics for focus (Rooth 1985):

(116) a. Everything has two distinct semantic values: a normal semantic value, and a focus semantic value.
   b. When an element is focused, its focused semantic value is a set of alternatives to the focused element.
   c. Focus semantic values are combined using FFA.
   d. Focus-sensitive operators (like only) refer to the focus semantic value, and “reset” the focus semantic value to the normal semantic value.

It’s something like this:

(117) (only) [Mary], left.

(118) [[Mary]] = {x: x is an alternative to Mary}

(119) [[left]] = \( \lambda x[x \text{ left}] \)

(120) [[Mary left]] = \( \lambda x[x \text{ left}] \) \( \{x: x \text{ is an alternative to Mary} \} \)
   = \{Mary left, Bill left, John left, Sue left, …\}

(121) [[only XP]] = true if [[XP]] is true and the only member of [[XP]] that is true is [[XP]].

Beck’s proposal is simple: Wh-words are elements for which the ordinary semantic value is undefined. They have only a focus semantic value.

This means that a wh-word cannot combine with anything that cares about the ordinary semantic value (above, only refers to [[XP]], which would be fatal if [[XP]] were undefined). There is just one thing on her proposal that can do this, which is essentially Q. Q is a function that takes the focus semantic value of its argument and discards the ordinary semantic value (so it doesn’t matter whether it was defined or not) and turns it into a question in whatever way questions are defined.

The problematic configuration, where Op is focus sensitive (referring to both focus values and ordinary values).

(122) [[Q … |Op [φ … XP … wh … ]]]

What goes wrong is that both the XP and the wh-word generate alternative sets, but then either (a) both are collapsed by ~ into an ordinary semantic value, or (b) ~ cares about the ordinary semantic value, but the wh-word has “infected” it and has left it undefined.

Side note: This is elegant—I tried for a while to think of a way to make something like this work, but I was always foiled by the fact that questions are sets of ordinary semantic values, while focus involves sets of focus semantic values. One of the reasons I was trying to do this is the fact that in Sinhala, questions and focus both result in the marking of the predicate with “-e”. The question is what they have in common. Although I haven’t sat down to work it out, I think this proposal allows for a common description of the circumstances in which “-e” appears.

This is an account of intervention effects: it is entirely semantic.

As Beck herself notes, it is possible to combine this with the syntactic account I proposed earlier, and I think that’s probably the right way to go. In Beck’s account, Q is simply base-generated where, in my account, it has moved to. And the feature that ka and dareka, daremo, etc. share could be focus—although it is possible that “focus” might not any longer really be the right label for it. “Involving alternatives” however might work.

A hybrid account however does leave us with two ways to rule out simple intervention effects: one being that there is a feature intervention, and the other being that—even if there weren’t—the resulting semantic computation would fail.

To the extent that the semantic analysis of pair-list readings that I presented above is viable, this is something that my account does that Beck’s account doesn’t address, and it is not obvious how else to tack it on.

Lee & Tomioka (2002): Intervention effects (in Japanese and Korean) are pragmatic

The basic idea is that the things that serve as intervenors are those things that cannot serve as topics. They are restricting their attention entirely to Japanese and Korean here.

Essentially, the way this works is that a sentence is divided into Topic…wh(Focus)…Tail. And when an ATI (Anti-Topic Item) is before a wh, it has been put into the topic. This makes it essentially a linear intervention problem.

They claim that intervention effects go away regardless of whether embedded in an island or just a normal complement, and say that this is expected (although it is not clear to me that there cannot be embedded topics).

This is an account of intervention effects: it is semantic/pragmatic.

Part of the problem with this account is that it is so far quite language specific, and it is not clear how to generalize it, even if it could undermine the story about Japanese.
Cable (2007)

Cable (2007) brings in some interesting data from Tlingit, which seems to show a couple of new things. He makes a pretty elegant proposal about how Q works, although it does not entirely fit with the proposal I outlined above.

Q-adjunction vs. Q-complementation: Cable tackles the question of wh-movement more thoroughly, as he argues that Tlingit has both wh-movement and a morphologically visible Q. His argument is essentially that it is Q that has a relationship with C (not the wh-word), and Q can be attached in one of two ways, either by adjoining to something containing a wh-word, or by taking something containing a wh-word as its complement.

Where Q is adjoined, Q can move alone, and these would be wh-in-situ languages. Where Q takes the wh-containing phrase as a complement, Q carries its complement along, and these would be wh-movement languages. Cable does allow for the possibility that wh-movement languages may still carry out their movement covertly (he classifies Sinhala as a language of this type).

Q-complementation is how I described it above, and there are a few thorny issues. Among them: selection and what it means for a QP to be in the way (which Cable discusses at some length, though ultimately there are still questions open). Q-adjunction complicates the understanding of itai I proposed above. There are also questions about what kind of movement Q-movement is (on my account)—if it is head movement, it is very far for head movement to go.

Another thing that Tlingit shows is that there is a Q for every wh-word. This is different from Sinhala (arguably at least) and also different from what has been proposed for Japanese. It would not really make much sense under my proposal to have multiple Qs, but it is worth thinking about if there is some kind of parametric differentiation here.


Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) explore a particular type of intervention effect, although they don’t address the ones that were the primary concern here. The specific effect they were after was the necessity of a wh-word to associate to the closest ka, essentially deriving the wh-island effect. They do make crucial use of FFA in deriving it.

Despite the forum, I actually won’t concentrate much on this here, since much of the relevant machinery is compatible with what I was saying above (although in the extension to German tragen- indefinites, which is their main point, things may get more complex. In particular, recent work by Kratzer has been pursuing the idea that Groenendijk & Stokhof may have been closer to the right track in their question semantics—and this might require incorporating a kind of “Exhaustivizer” into the semantics I proposed for Q to make it work out).

Shan (2004) brings up a problem with the application of FFA in the way that Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) define it, but Kratzer (2004) notes that the case he is concerned with is one that would be ruled out by an intervention effect of the type we’ve been discussing.

Yanovich (2005)

In an interesting study of a couple of different indefinites in Russian, Yanovich (2005) comes to the conclusion that both kinds (choice functions and alternative sets) are needed.

Identifies a difference between alternative-set-type indefinites in terms of whether they are trapped by the nearest operator.

So: Are intervention effects syntactic or semantic?

Well, I don’t know, really, but I believe that syntax is deeply involved—and probably the most important evidence of that is the role that syntactic islandhood seemed to play above.

One crucial component of this question is really: What kind of thing are the intervenors?

On my account, they’re things that share the features probed for by interrogative C, so they can’t be closer to interrogative C than the ka that is supposed to end up in C. On Beck’s account, they’re things that are focused (or perhaps things that involve alternative sets—though that’s my own speculative extension). On Lee & Tomioka’s account, the property intervenors share is non-topicalizability, which is a bit vague (to the extent that we don’t know exactly what this means), but it probably requires, among other things, that no intervenors can be marked by wa. Any of these things could correspond to a syntactic feature, although we also don’t want to doubly (or triply) rule out intervention effects if we can help it.

One other difference between Beck’s account and my account is where the intervention effect actually happens. On my account, it’s something that happens above the intervenor, between C and the (last) position of ka: if there’s a offending feature along that path, an intervention effect results. On Beck’s account, it’s something that happens below the intervenor, between the wh-word and the focus-sensitive operator associated with the focused item. Can this be turned into a prediction?

Yeah, I know. Not very satisfying.
A couple of things I claimed in my abstract that I’d mention

The “Tanglewood” problem?
I’m not anymore convinced that this is really a problem, though I mentioned it in the abstract. I need to think about this a bit more. It revolves around the question of how “What did you buy because I did?” would be interpreted, and (more importantly perhaps) how such questions would look in Japanese. The issue has to do with what to do with a wh-word in an ellipsis site, because it seems as the alternatives are not a cross-product of the alternatives, but rather a reading where the alternative considered at a given moment match.

Short answers?
One of the facts that was highlighted by Nishigauchi (1990) and Pesetsky (1987) in favor of an “LF pied piping” view of wh-words within islands is the fact that the shortest answer you can give to a question in Japanese generally seems to include the whole island. The idea would be something like this: The whole island moves into SpecCP, and then the short answer is formed by saying what is in SpecCP.

Under my account, there is no obvious reason for this to be true, but the short answer would correlate with the “launching site” of Q.

Extensions, problems, universal morphology?
In Japanese and Sinhala, things were very pretty… but...

Sinhala: $dō$ is Q
- Q forms yes-no questions.
- Q forms wh-questions.
- Q forms indefinites with wh-words.
- Q forms disjunctions in alternative questions.

Japanese $-ka$ is Q
- Q forms yes-no questions ($no=\neg no~desu~ka$)
- Q forms wh-questions.
- Q forms indefinites with wh-words.
- Q forms disjunctions.

Obvious hypothesis: Q is a universal category that:
- forms yes-no questions
- forms wh-questions
- forms indefinites with wh-words
- forms disjunctions.

However, the crosslinguistic morphological evidence is not so clear. Already, there’s a question in Sinhala:
Why is the disjunctive capacity of Q limited to alternative questions?
In declaratives, you use $-hari$. e.g., “A-hari B-hari” either A or B.

WH+hari = ‘someone or other (nonspecific)’
This probably means WH+dō at least can mean ‘someone (specific)’.
Japanese dareka can mean ‘someone (specific)’

Maybe Q is specific, alternative questions use specific disjunction.
So, Japanese fails to make a distinction that Sinhala makes.
That is, the nonspecific indefinite (analogy of $-hari$) accidentally happens to be “-ka” too.

(123) Hái-sh yinīhtsū? ‘Whom did you see?’
(124) Hái-shī(h) kingōō naayāá lá. ‘Someone must have gone to the store.’

Is shī(h) is sh-$h$? Is the Q in indefinites more complex than the Q in wh-questions?
What’s the relation between the wh-Q and the yes-no Q? Not always (often?) the same.

Short answers? (continued)

What’s the relation between Indef Q and no questions? Not always (often?) the same.

Other intervenors in Japanese

| (125) | a. dare-mo hon-o kaw-anakat-ta. | daremo as ‘anyone’
| | who-MO book-ACC bought-NEG | ‘Noone bought books.’
| b. dare-mo-ga kita. | daremo as ‘everyone’
| | who-MO-NOM came | ‘Everyone came.’

| (126) | a. John-ga hon-mo zassi-mo katta. | mo as conjunction
| | John-NOM book-MO magazine-MO bought | ‘John bought both books and magazines.’
| b. dare-ga ki-te-mo hookoku-si-te kudasai. | mo at the edge of
| | who-NOM come-MO report-do please | ‘Whoever comes, report (him) to me.’

Mo seems to intervene for ka movement too… Suggests they’re the “same kind of thing.”

| (128) | a. ?? daremo-ga nani-o kaimasita ka? | (Hoji 1985)
| | everyone-NOM what-ACC buy Q | ‘What did everyone buy?’
| b. nani-o, daremo-ga t, kaimasita ka? |
| | what-ACC everyone-NOM buy Q | ‘What did everyone buy?’

(129) ano mise-de-wa minna-ga nani-o katta no? Minna is fine.
| | that store-at-TOP everyone-NOM what-ACC bought Q | ‘What did everyone buy at that store?’

27
(130) [dare-no tegami-made]-ga nakunatta no? -made is fine.  
who-GEN letter-even-NOM disappearedQ  
‘Even whose letter disappeared?’

(131) ?? [dare-no tegami-sae] nakunatta no? -sae is not fine.  
who-GEN letter-even disappearedQ  
‘Even whose letter disappeared?’

Tricky. It’s not being quantificational that makes an intervener (cf. minna), and even focus would seem to be at risk (what’s the difference between made and sae?)

Syntax: Does Q start by the wh-word—unless the wh-word is in an island?

(132) a. Remote Generation (to be rejected)  
... [sand ... wh ... ] t_q ... C - Q

b. Local Generation (to be adopted)  
... [sand ... wh t_q ... ] t_q' ... C - Q

(133) a. ?? [John-ka Bill]-ga nani-o katta no? Repeated from before  
John-NOM what-ACC bought Q  
(‘What did John or Bill buy?’)

b. Mary-wa [John-ka Bill]-ga nani-o katta ato de] dekaketa no?  
Mary-NOM what-ACC bought after left Q  
‘Mary left after John or Bill bought what?’

c. Mary-wa [nani-o, [John-ka Bill]-ga t, katta ato de] dekaketa no?  
Mary-NOM what-ACC John-NOM bought after left Q  
‘Mary left after John or Bill bought what?’

(134) a. ?? [sand ... [ ... Int. ... wh ... that] ... ] t_q ... -ka?  
b. ... [sand ... [ ... wh ... Int. ... t ... that] ... ] t_q ... -ka?

(135) a. ?? Taroo-wa [Hanako-ga [John-ka Mary-ga nani-o sita to]  
Taroo-TOP Hanako-NOM John-or Mary-NOM what-ACC did that  
itta ato de ] kaetta no?  
said after go.home Q  
(‘What did Taro go home after Hanako said John or Mary did?’)

b. Taroo-wa [Hanako-ga [nani-o, John-ka Mary-ga t, sita to]  
Taroo-TOP Hanako-NOM what-ACC John-or Mary-NOM did that  
itta ato de ] kaetta no?  
said after go.home Q  
‘What did Taro go home after Hanako said John or Mary did?’

(136) Taroo-wa [John-ka Mary-ga [ Hanako-ga nani-o sita to]  
Taroo-TOP John-or Mary-NOM Hanako-NOM what-ACC did that  
itta ato de ] kaetta no?  
said after go.home Q  
(‘What did Taro go home after John or Mary said Hanako did?’)

(137) a. ?? C°-ka ... t_q [sand ... [that- ... Int. ... t_q wh ... ] ... ]  
(=135a)

b. C°-ka ... t_q [sand ... [that- ... [t_q wh] ... Int. ... t ... ] ... ]  
(=135b)

c. C°-ka ... t_q [sand ... Int. ... [that- ... t_q wh ... ] ... ]  
(=136)

Is “migration” really some kind of movement to the edge of a phase? Quite possibly.  
• Is ka in dareka ‘someone’ the same as the ka in questions?  
• Without a feature distinction, migration must not be driven by features.  
• But if they share the feature that interrogatives want, yet  
differ somewhere else, this could be “EPP” movement to the edge.

(138) Q: ni-zhā’ē hāģōł-lā fiyáa-go nicha? Nanaji  
your-father whither-Q he.went-COMP you-cry  
‘You are crying because your father went where?’

A: Kinšání-goo fiyáa-go yishcha.  
Flagstaff- to he.went-COMP 1-cry  
‘I am crying because he went to Flagstaff.’ (Schauber 1979:273–4)
Some structural questions...

Head movement? That’s pretty far.

(140) a. mama[ S'iri [ Chitra monawa də daekka kiyala] kiiwe kiyala] dannawa.
   I S'iri Chitra what Q saw that said-E that know
   ‘I know what S'iri said that Chitra saw.’

   b. mama[ S'iri [ Chitra monawa daekka kiyala] kiiwe də kiyala] dannawa.
   I S'iri Chitra what saw that Q said that know
   ‘I know what S'iri said that Chitra saw.’

   I-TOP John-NOM Mary-NOM what-ACC bought that said Q knows
   ‘I know what John said that Mary bought.’

(142) Ján ñ Bil Mary háágóó díínáá yi[Ní ni?]
   Long distance
   John Q Bill Mary where.to 2,FUT.go 3.3.say 3.say movement
   ‘Where did John say Bill told Mary to go?’ (Schauber 1979)

(143) DP ka A clitic that just happens to ‘lean left’?

Where does Q move to?

Somewhere close to, but below (the part of) C expressed by kiyala.

(144) a. [kau də aawe iyye kiyala] Ranjit dannawa.
   who Q came-E yesterday that Ranjit know
   ‘Ranjit knows who came.’

   b. [kauru iyye aawe də kiyala] Ranjit dannawa.
   who yesterday came Q that Ranjit know
   ‘Ranjit knows who came.’

A FEW REFERENCES—POSSIBLY INCOMPLETE OR WITH SOME SUPERFICIAL ONES


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