Boston University School of Law

Fiduciary Duties of
Brokers-Advisers-Financial Planners
And Money Managers


Tamar Frankel

Boston University School of Law Working Paper 09-36

Abstract

Broker dealers and investment advisers form the lifeline of the financial markets. While in the past their functions were separate, and their regulation differed, throughout the years their functions were allowed to merge but their regulation remained separate. Advisers are their clients’ fiduciaries. Brokers are not, with some exceptions. It is recognized that the law has to change, and the question is how. In this Article I argue for imposing the fiduciary duty of loyalty and limiting conflict of interest all financial intermediaries, including broker dealers, and suggest a process for establishing the details of the law that should apply to them. Section One of the Article outlines the principles on which fiduciary law is based. Section Two offers a short overview of the past and current practice of broker dealers. Section Three highlights the fiduciary aspects of broker dealers and the risks posed to their clients from their conflicts of interest Section Four proposes changes in the current law and a process to achieve future changes. The law should impose principles; the financial intermediaries should seek the specificity.

 

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Suggested Citation:

Frankel, Tamar, "Fiduciary Duties of Brokers-Advisers-Financial Planners and Money Managers" (August 10, 2009). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 09-36.

Tamar Frankel Contact Information

Boston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215

Phone: (617) 353-3773

Email:

tfrankel@bu.edu

Home Page:

http://people.bu.edu/tfrankel/

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