SYMPOSIUM

JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS:
A CONFERENCE ON RONALD DWORCKIN’S FORTHCOMING BOOK

EDITORS’ FOREWORD

The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.
– Archilochus

Boston University School of Law held a conference on Ronald Dworkin’s forthcoming book, Justice for Hedgehogs, on September 25-26, 2009. Professor Dworkin is widely viewed as the most important legal philosopher of our time and as one of the leading figures in moral and political philosophy.

In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin defends the unity of value – the one big thing he knows – and argues against “several foxy causes”: value skepticism, value pluralism, value conflict, and, in particular, the supposed opposition between the values of self-interest and those of personal and political morality. He argues for the integration of ethics (the principles that tell human beings how to live well) and morality (the principles that tell them how they must treat other people), and for a morality of self-affirmation as against a morality of self-abnegation. In doing so, he develops accounts of the indispensable conditions of living well – dignity, self-respect, and authenticity – and of our moral duties to others regarding aid and harm. He also argues that law is a branch of political morality that is in turn a department of morality more broadly understood.

At the Conference, prominent scholars in law, economics, philosophy, and political science gathered to comment on and engage with Professor Dworkin’s forthcoming book. Lively discussions on the major themes and theories of Justice for Hedgehogs ensued. Dworkin provided an advance summary of the book at his keynote address on September 25 and responded to each scholar’s presentation throughout the Conference. Video of the panels and Professor Dworkin’s keynote and responses can be accessed at http://www.bu.edu/law/events/audio-video/hedgehogs.shtml. The essays contained in this issue are organized by the following panels held during the Conference:
Panel I: Truth and Metaethics

The opening panel assessed Dworkin’s arguments for truth about value and against various forms of skepticism, including his rejection of Archimedean and metaethical attempts to address questions of ethics, morality, and justice from a standpoint outside of our ordinary ways of thinking about them. Philosophers Aaron Garrett, Russ Shafer-Landau, Daniel Star, and Michael Smith addressed these arguments.

Panel II: Interpretation

This panel responded to Dworkin’s arguments that interpretation in general seeks truth and that moral reasoning and legal interpretation are enterprises involving conceptual interpretation as distinguished from collaborative and explanatory interpretation. Professors Richard Fallon, David Lyons, Lawrence Sager, Lawrence Solum, and Benjamin Zipursky contributed to this panel.

Panel III: Ethics and Free Will

Herein of Dworkin’s arguments concerning the indispensable conditions of living well – dignity, self-respect, and authenticity – along with his response to the “no free will” challenge to ethical and moral responsibility. Providing diverse views on these issues were Anita Allen, Christine Jolls, Robert Kane, T.M. Scanlon, and Amartya Sen.

Panel IV: Morality: Aid, Harm, and Obligation

The issues considered include Dworkin’s arguments of substantive morality concerning duty, harm, and obligation, including associative and political obligation. Kwame Anthony Appiah, John Goldberg, F.M. Kamm, Kenneth Simons, and Susanne Sreedhar and Candice Delmas contributed to this discussion.

Panels V & VI: Politics and Justice

These two panels took up Dworkin’s arguments about political morality, including his account of political, legal, and human rights; his interpretive conceptions of equality, liberty, and democracy; and his argument about the relationship between law and morals. C. Edwin Baker, Hugh Baxter, James Fleming, Linda McClain, and Robin West contributed to Panel V, and Robert Bone, Samuel Freeman, Stephen Macedo, Frank Michelman, Robert Sloane, and Jeremy Waldron took part in Panel VI. Martha Minow and Joseph Singer contributed a paper on this topic.
The *Boston University Law Review* is honored to publish the outstanding contributions of these professors (including not only law professors but also philosophers, political scientists, and economists). We would like to thank all the contributing scholars, including our own Boston University professors who participated in and wrote for the Conference. Above all, we thank Ronald Dworkin for sharing his extraordinary book and providing such insightful feedback to all who attended the Conference. Thank you to Dean Maureen O’Rourke for her continuing support of the *Law Review* and the annual symposium, and most especially to Professor James Fleming, *Law Review* faculty advisor, who organized the symposium and greatly assisted in this publication. This special symposium issue would not be possible without the hard work of our dedicated *Law Review* editorial board and staff.

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