War and Diplomacy: The Suez Crisis

1. Introduction

Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution, and Mariah Zeisberg’s War Powers, are two remarkable books that certainly deserve an entire symposium devoted to them. These books complement each other in the same way that the war powers, some vested in Congress and others in the President, are in correspondence with each other. Griffin’s book revolves around the history of the war powers since 1945, and in this sense is more empirical. Its thesis is that the cold war and Truman’s subsequent decision to launch the war in Korea destabilized American constitutionalism. In the following decades the United States has found itself confronting an endless string of constitutional crises related to the deployment of troops abroad, and the quest for a formula to resolve the constitutional puzzles is as strong as ever. Zeisberg’s book, which took advantage of the fact that Griffin’s book preceded it, is more normative, even though it should be emphasized that Griffin also offers important normative insights. Both books are anchored in democratic theory in that they emphasize the cardinal significance of inter-branch deliberation. Both endorse the notion that the implicit assumption underlying the text of the Constitution is that while the war powers are divided between the legislative and executive branches, these institutions are expected to deliberate internally as well as externally when confronting the critical matter of war.

Griffin weaves his magisterial analysis around the concept of “the cycle of accountability”. By this concept he means a process of inter-branch interaction over time. “Once a cycle is created, each branch knows that its decisions will be reviewed by the other. A pattern of mutual testing and deliberation
results”. The presence of a cycle of accountability”, he says, “means there is a potential to learn from mistakes”. These cycles are conceived as an ongoing “institutional practice in which both branches are held accountable”. Griffin elaborates on the application of this concept throughout his book.

Zeisler weaves her book around the connected principles of rationality and organization. “When the branches mobilize their institutional capacities, develop good understandings of the security needs of the moment, and place themselves in responsive relationship, they generate constitutional authority over war.” Her important contribution is her emphasis on the performativity of the constitutional interbranch relationship: “authority is... both presumed and created by their interactive processes.”

Both, thereby, envision the Constitution as a living rather than a reified text, a basic charter able to adjust to the various crises of human affairs, and capable of generating arrangements that will meet the here and now. (McCulloch) In the context of that world view which holds that regeneration and growth are a part of intellectual life, I wish to salute Mariah Zeisberg for joining the growing number of women who have entered this historically male field of war and the powers assisting in its execution. I also wish to commend Stephen Griffin for demonstrating in his text that while the Constitution refers to the President as “he”, scholars should now expect a woman to assume the powers vested by Article II.

I propose to tie this very important discussion to my own work. In the course of writing the biography of Golda Meir, Israel’s fourth prime minister, who led Israel to and through the Yom Kippur War (1973), I came across an earlier war, one that has been assigned to the dustbin of history: the Suez war of 1956. That war was fought in late October into November, 58 years ago. The belligerent parties in that war were the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, who together colluded to invade Egypt. The Suez War is only mentioned in passim by Griffin, twice, and not mentioned by Zeisler. But in that war the United States was not a neutral bystander. It faced a choice: to support the belligerents or to oppose them.
President Eisenhower, using his implied powers to make foreign policy for the United States, had to decide whether to apply the newly developing international law embedded in the decade old Charter of the United Nations, thereby applying the theory of foreign affairs known as idealism or moralism, or whether to follow another well-known theory known as realpolitik or realism. (Kissinger, World Order) Carl Von Clausewitz famously said: "War is a mere continuation of politics by other means". The course of action chosen by President Eisenhower for the United States consisted of politics rather than those “other means” in Clausewitz formula. Thus, the war powers discussed by both Griffin and Zeisberg and contemplated by the Constitution were seriously implicated, even if they were not explicitly invoked.

Within a month of the Suez War, both Great Britain and France lost their hegemony as colonial powers in the Middle East. Because the cold war was raging and Eisenhower understood that cooperation with the Soviet Union might result in substantial advantages to the Soviets at enormous cost to American interests, he saw no option but to introduce the United States into the Middle East. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the events of the Suez War dragged the U.S. kicking and screaming into what has ripened into its dominant role and extensive involvement in the region today.

In this essay I intend to accomplish two goals. First, I shall present the constitutional arrangements related to war powers in the United Kingdom, France, and Israel. I shall show that deliberation as contemplated by Griffin and Zeisberg has also inspired the three constitutional regimes (albeit in somewhat different ways), but that the principle of deliberation was mainly honored in the breach, as realpolitik was the theory that guided their actions. Second, I shall assess the constitutional mechanisms propelling the United States to react as it did as soon as President Eisenhower was informed of the invasion of Egypt. President Eisenhower masterfully deployed his various executive powers to accomplish the withdrawal of the three countries from Egypt in full compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions (resolutions, I might add, drafted and passed in close consultation with the United
States). This second part brings me to address a question not directly asked by Griffin and Zeisler: what is the role of the United States when war erupts between third parties and the President concludes the outcome necessarily affects vital American interests and wishes to act but not through deployment of military means?

2. 1956: The Suez War, background

On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Two days later the French and British governments issued an appeal (really an ultimatum) to both Egypt and Israel to stay clear ten miles of the Suez Canal. They then proceeded to attack by air Egyptian targets along the Suez Canal. France and Britain attempted to regain control of the Canal by military means, and simultaneously orchestrate a regime change in Cairo.

The Canal, a vital channel for goods and oil shipments to Europe, had been nationalized by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser four months earlier. Throughout these four months the United States government, in cooperation with the United Nations, tried to resolve the crisis of nationalization through diplomatic means. But I should add, not through diplomatic means alone. As both Griffin and Zeisler show, President Eisenhower was a great believer in clandestine operations, and in this case was contemplating, already for a year, a CIA instigated coup in Egypt.

When the ultimatum was announced it became clear that the purpose of the Israeli invasion was to give Britain and France a pretext to attack. In other words the two European powers were working in concert with Israel.

Each of the three had distinct motives and objectives in launching the war. In July of 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s charismatic president, nationalized the Suez Canal, one of the last
vestiges of colonial power in the Middle East and a vital maritime connection between Asia and the Mediterranean. The move vexed Great Britain, the dominant colonial power in the Middle East up to and during WWII. France, a secondary but still significant colonial power, shared Britain’s concerns, but experienced a more immediate irritation: Algeria was pressing for independence of French rule, and the Algerian rebels were supported and encouraged by Egypt’s Nasser. To make matters worse, the Cold War was casting a menacing shadow over world affairs. Nasser had just completed a large arms deal with the Czechoslovakia, a Soviet satellite. The deal appeared to turn Egypt into a major military power in the Middle East, and gave the Soviets an important foothold in the region. Britain and France had a history of colonization as well as competition for hegemony in the Middle East. But now their shared concerns brought them together. The Soviet ascent in Europe made them nervous. They did not wholly trust the United States’ commitment to protect them against Soviet power in Europe itself. In addition, they were eager to maintain their status as world powers, a status that was threatened by the demise of colonialism and the traumatic consequences of WWII. For a brief moment in 1956, Britain and France joined forces to reassert the colonial and European hegemony in the Middle East.

Israel, small, poor, insecure, and only eight years old when these events unfolded, had its independent grievances against Egypt. Egypt was Israel’s biggest and most powerful enemy, provoking bloody border skirmishes and leading an intense propaganda campaign denying Israel’s very right to exist and promising its imminent annihilation. In addition, Egypt shut down the passage of Israeli ships through the Straights of Tiran, thereby denying Israeli ships an important route through which to pursue commerce with Asia. Israelis were certain that a second
round of war (following the 1948 war of independence) was inevitable. They only wondered when it would happen, and were anxious to take all means necessary to guarantee their survival. If it were up to Israel, 1956 would not be the year to start a war. Israel had just begun to develop a close relationship with France, following the French willingness to supply Israel with modern weapons. In the aftermath of Egypt’s big arms deal with the Soviet Union, the French actions were most welcome to Israel’s decision makers, and yet their bargaining power with the French was weak and fragile. When French officials insisted that October 1956 should be the time of attack, Israel decided it should comply. Furthermore, when the British insisted that Israel commit actions of “real war”, Israel felt under pressure to comply.

From the perspective of international relations, the military invasion of Egypt came at a particularly inopportune moment. To Western eyes the Soviet Union was an evil empire, intent on domination and threatening the values of freedom, liberty and justice. Restlessness behind the Iron Curtain in the post-Stalin era fixed the gaze of the free world on Hungary, eager to assert its independence of Soviet control. Amid the gathering storm in both the Middle East and in Eastern Europe, Dwight Eisenhower was in the final weeks of his campaign to win a second term as President of the United States. For its part, the United Nations, barely a decade old, with Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld at the helm, was struggling to shape a meaningful role for itself as guardian of the principles of the UN charter and the international law of nations.

On October 24, 1956, nine days before the presidential elections in the United States, a secret agreement was signed between French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, British representatives of Prime Minister Anthony Eden, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (known as the Sevre Agreement). The agreement stipulated that Israel would strike first, thereby providing the
European powers with a pretext to launch a military intervention. The agreement furthermore provided that it would be kept classified and confidential, meaning it would not be shared with the United States Government.

The explanation to the reason for working behind the back of the United States is not very complicated, but in hindsight was extremely inopportune. First, since the nationalization of the Suez Canal four months earlier, Eisenhower was leading an international effort to resolve the crisis by diplomatic means. The considered position of the United States was that diplomatic efforts had not been thoroughly exhausted, and that therefore military action was premature. It is also worth remembering that Eisenhower was famous for asking his aides “and then what” when a particular military measure was recommended. It would have been hard to satisfy him that, in fact, the three nations could achieve their strategic goals in the proposed war.

Why did the parties not wait until after the Presidential elections? War, with ground troops, preparedness of military bases, air attacks, as well as a myriad of logistical factors related to a war effort, particularly when it takes place away from home, is a complicated undertaking. In the Middle-East, winter was at the gate. The British military bases expected to serve the combatants were mainly in Cyprus, and both the British and the French generals feared that the long period of waiting (since September of 1956), combined with complications posed by winter weather, would work against prospects of a swift military victory. Both the British and the French military firmly insisted that late October was definitely the final opportunity to engage in combat. British and French civilian leaders deliberated and concluded that if the opportunity were not seized, the “operation” would be either postponed or called off. Still, both Anthony Eden, Britain’s Prime Minister, and Guy Mollet, France’s Prime Minister, were eager to launch
the operation. From their perspective Nasser was another Hitler, and accepting the nationalization of the Canal another “Munich-like appeasement”.

On October 31st, following the attack, with Israeli troops firmly in control of large parts of the peninsula and getting close to their target near the Canal, and with Britain and France poised to take over the Canal, President Eisenhower fiercely demanded an immediate withdrawal. Britain and France, as long term allies of the United States, were bitterly disappointed to learn that Eisenhower decided to oppose their aggression. Given their historic friendship and the fact that Nasser was now a soviet client and friend, if not ally, and therefore a quasi-enemy of the United States, and given the intensity of domestic U.S. electoral politics, they could have well expected Eisenhower to feebly protest and then drop the matter. The Soviet government quickly echoed Eisenhower’s ultimatum. This was the only event in the history of the cold war where the superpowers collaborated in denouncing a war while insisting on a return to the status quo ante. The collaboration between the two rival superpowers took place in the midst of a serious and noisy international turmoil about events in Hungary. As war in the Middle East was raging, Soviet tanks entered Budapest to crush an uprising against the Soviet domination of Hungary.

Still, Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary General of the United Nations, insisted on an immediate withdrawal of Israel, France, and Britain from Egyptian soil. It stands to reason that without full U.S. support, Mr. Hammarskjold would not have insisted so vigorously. Very quickly the three acquiesced. From this perspective, international law, as it was embedded in the U.N. Charter, prevailed. But the history of the cold war and that of the Middle East shows that, in fact, much aggression and very little rule of law followed.
The results of this war were not the same for Britain and France as they were for Israel. Britain and France, shaken to their foundations, feeling betrayed and misunderstood, failed abysmally in realizing their objectives. They hurriedly withdrew from the Canal Zone, thereby conceding the end of the colonial era in the Middle East, as well as the end of their international status as colonial powers. Many see in these events the seeds of the European Union as we know it today, as France, and then Britain, turned their attention to Europe. Israel, on the other hand, emerged equally traumatized, but with a few substantial gains in hand. It did withdraw from the occupied Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip, but the Egyptian army did not return to its previous positions. Instead, with the Canadian government it brokered a deal whereby a U.N. Peace Force was created to stand between the rivals. The Straits of Tiran, which were closed to free navigation by Nasser, were now opened to all and that included Israel.

3. Constitutional Mechanism

The United Kingdom, France, and Israel were proud democracies, operating under the rule of law. The question I shall address next is: what were the constitutional mechanisms concerning the decision to make war which obtained in each of these countries prior to the 1956 War, and to what extent were they followed by the respective governments? This is a very important question, not only because the precedent stayed in the historical consciousness of the three nations. It is obviously relevant to the central question underlying this symposium: do constitutional regimes expect a high measure of deliberation before they go to war and, if so, were the processes of deliberation observed? Put another way, did the three nations consider any of the results of that war, and could we speculate that deliberations might have spared them the
humiliation and loss they experienced in its aftermath? One may even ask if the world would look differently had they properly deliberated and perhaps decided to take another path.

The United Kingdom

To be added

France

To be added

Israel

To be added

The United States

As stated above, since Egypt’s nationalization of the Canal, the United States was intensely involved in trying to achieve a diplomatic solution to the crisis. At the same time, American intelligence was closely monitoring the movement of forces in the area and documented British, French, and Israeli military maneuvers of a character that strongly indicated preparations for an impending war. President Eisenhower and high U.S. officials strongly warned the parties, numerous times, to refrain from aggressive action. From the American perspective, the fact that the three belligerents succeeded in keeping their plans secret must have been experienced as a humiliating intelligence failure and a devastating betrayal of friendship. To add injury to insult, the attack took place ten days before the Presidential elections. President Eisenhower, suspending much of his electoral campaign, issued an ultimatum to Israel to withdraw immediately. Two days later, when he learned of the Anglo-French pending
invasion, he immediately suspected collusion and was torn between two reactions. Britain had been the United States’ most trusted and closest ally during WWII. Britain was also a senior member of NATO and a staunch partner in the cold war. There is evidence that had the British implemented their plans of attack and immediately came to control the Canal, the President might have turned a blind eye to the invasion (quote Divided We stand). There is also evidence that Eisenhower would have been content with a quickly orchestrated regime change (bump off, quote Little). But Prime Minister Eden decided to stall military action. Remember that the Sevres Agreement stipulated that Israeli forces would approach the Canal, thereby appearing or pretending to threaten its safety. That was the pretext Eden believed he needed in order to issue an ultimatum and make Great Britain appear law abiding and peace loving. That is also why he insisted that Israel be the one to commit “acts of war” against Egypt, rather than mere “raids”. In this drama of War Theater, Eden was determined to demonstrate that the British and French only acted out of commitment to law and order. But from Eisenhower’s perspective the slow pace was fatal. As the hours passed, delay in the Anglo-French assault tilted the pendulum.

Eisenhower, already furious at being betrayed, decided to take the high moral ground and coerce the Europeans to abort their mission.

What were the constitutional mechanisms through which the President and (now) President-elect accomplished his plan? It turns out that he actively used four powers and refrained from using a fifth. (Question not addressed: If Adlai Stevenson were elected on November 6th, and indicated his preference to support the European powers, would Eisenhower’s constitutional powers be less potent? See Beermann’s article re transition.)
The power Eisenhower refrained from using was his power under Article II, Section 3 to “…on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them”. The language of Article II Section 3 clearly gives the President discretion. He may convene both or either house. He does not have to. There is evidence that Eisenhower considered calling Congress for a special session, but ultimately decided against it. Congress only came into play a month later, in January, 1957. The Congress was in the hands of the Democrats and Eisenhower might have thought that it would not be entirely supportive of his determination to abandon a major Western power and thereby support the Soviet Union. He might have expected, as indeed happened, that Congress would remain in democratic hands. It is useful here to remember Steven Griffin’s analysis of party politics as they related to the War Powers.

But the President did use his other formidable powers quite vigorously.

*First,* his implied power as “sole organ” of foreign affairs. In public, President Eisenhower, as well as his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, condemned Britain and France for a gross violation of the United Nations Charter. He ordered his ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council, where a strongly worded resolution was proposed. Britain and France, using their power as permanent members of the Security Council, vetoed the resolution. They had deliberated this eventuality, and expected their veto to put the matter to rest. But Eisenhower was furious and adamant to prevail. He pulled out a resolution the United States had used before. In 1950, during the crisis in Korea, the United States encouraged the U.N. General Assembly to pass a *Uniting for Peace* resolution. That resolution enabled the General Assembly to assemble on an emergency basis and consider security matters vetoed by one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. GA377A was passed by the Western Powers because the Soviet Union vetoed Security Council
Resolutions related to the war in Korea. Now this resolution was turned against America’s own Western Allies. Eisenhower’s justification for this quite startling and unforeseen move was legal: the principle of equal protection of the laws. All U.N. members were bound by its charter, and none should be allowed to violate its principles. The General Assembly convened immediately, the Soviet Union joined the United States in condemning the aggressors, and a variety of sanctions were considered. The Assembly remained in session between November 1st and November 10th, and with vigorous American leadership it tightened the noose around the three belligerents.

Second, the president’s powers as Commander in Chief. Upon hearing that Britain and France invaded Egypt, Eisenhower declared that the attack amounted to a violation of the tri-partite agreement of 1950. That agreement, between the United States, Britain, and France, declared the “unalterable opposition” of the three Western Powers “to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area.” It also stipulated that “the three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would... immediately take action... to prevent such violation”. The President understood well that the Tripartite Agreement might sanction a possible U.S. military intervention to restore the status quote ante, against Britain and on behalf of Nasser. Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet, stationed in the Mediterranean, to be on high alert. While he was contemplating his further action, Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin issued a statement threatening Britain, France, and Israel with Soviet military action, implying that the nuclear option was on the table. These warnings placed Eisenhower in a terrible dilemma. The U.S. had an obligation to the countries of the Middle East, and therefore to Egypt under the Tripartite Agreement, but this commitment came
into conflict with the U.S. obligation under the NATO Treaty to defend Britain and France as NATO members. Matters soon got much more complicated. Rumors began to fly that Soviet intervention on behalf of Egypt was imminent, and that the Soviets were sending “volunteers” to assist Cairo against the Franco-British forces. On November 6th, election day in Washington, the joint chiefs convened, made plans “to improve readiness for a general war”, and asked the President to return to the White House from his stay in Gettysburg. David Nichols, author of The President's Year of Crisis -- Suez and the Brink of War, reports that the meeting at the White House was “nothing less than a council of war.” Using his powers as Commander in Chief, Eisenhower issued an order to “put the Sixth Fleet and the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets on battle-ready alert, deploying additional ships, submarines, and tactical air resources, and placing heavy troop carrier wings on the twelve-hour alert.” Only after these orders were placed did the President drive to the Sheraton Park Hotel, to watch the election returns. He won by a wide margin. As the U.S. was sliding towards war, Eisenhower delivered a speech to the American people where he promised to continue to work “for peace in the world”. Like the Cuban Missile Crisis, this situation could have amounted to the scenario where one knows that who will “blink first” will decide the confrontation. Just like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the management of the conflict by the Commander in Chief was critical.

Third, Recognition Powers. Eisenhower was simultaneously handling the Suez Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Soviet tanks entered Budapest on November 4, 1956, precisely as the Suez Crisis was escalating, and two days before the presidential elections. The President of the United States was enforcing the rules of international law against his Western allies, using the principle of equal protection of the laws. Could he ignore the flagrant violation of the same
principles by the U.S. archrival in Moscow? Eisenhower faced a terrible dilemma: should he apply the morality of the rule of law when it came to Suez and realpolitik when it came to Hungary? Or should he insist on an even application of the neutral principle recognizing as valid only wars of self-defense? One option Eisenhower considered was breaking off diplomatic relations with Moscow. He had full power to do so under Article II’s recognition powers, and such a move would have demonstrated a more even treatment of both crises. But the President decided it would be a futile gesture. The U.S. implicitly recognized the Soviet domination of the countries behind the Iron Curtain. It would be better to keep the channels of communications with Moscow open even if its rulers were thugs. And so it was.

Fourth: Powers to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, or powers as head of the vast federal bureaucracy. The reference to “politics” as distinct from “war” in Von Clausewitz’s famous maxim is fully illustrated in the set of economic pressures deployed against Britain during the crisis. Historians agree that these pressures indeed led to the collapse of the Anglo-French operation in Suez. These pressures took two forms, both orchestrated by the President: monetary pressure and oil supply.

In terms of monetary pressure: in the financial markets the pound sterling (the British currency) had been weakening since the nationalization of the Canal in July, 1956. However, immediately following the invasion there occurred a “run on the pound” in the financial markets. In the first two days of the British invasion of Egypt, Britain lost 50 million dollars in currency reserves, and “speculation accelerated against the pound in currency markets.” Therefore, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer (minister of the treasury) asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to release back to Britain British funds previously deposited in the Fund. The U.S. Department of the Treasury declined the request. That action was based on a discretionary
power of the Department, and there was little doubt that that it was orchestrated by the President himself. He was using his Article II power to “take care that the laws are faithfully executed”.
Throughout November 1956, Harold Macmillan, the British Secretary of the Treasury, was urging George Humphrey, his American counterpart, to release British IMF funds back to Britain, to no avail. When Britain finally declared it would abide by all the U.S. conditions, the Treasury instantly changed its policy. Something must have happened during the meeting between the US Secretary of the Treasury and the British delegation: “At the beginning of their meeting on December 3, Humphrey continued to insist that his government could not support a large-scale support operation from the IMF. Then, quite abruptly and to the astonishment of his visitors, he swept aside those worries and proposed that the British should draw $561 million immediately and take out a stand-by arrangement for another $739 million, a massive total package of $1.3 billion (100 percent of the U.K. quota in the IMF).
At that meeting the U.S. secretary of the Treasury also announced that his department would recommend to Congress to immediately waive $143 million in interest payments on a WWII loan, due December 31. And here you have an illustration of the interaction between the President and Congress in making foreign policy in economic matters.
Another issue of critical importance was oil. The Suez crisis shut off two of the three major oil supply routes to Europe: the Canal itself (blocked by eight or nine ships sunk there by Egypt as soon as the Franco-British attack began), and the Iraq pipeline. As a result, Europe was facing a serious oil shortage and winter was approaching. The threat to the European economies, not to mention the prospects of human suffering, was evident. In the beginning, the furious Eisenhower quipped “let them boil in their own oil”. But he soon relented. The United States could, and eventually did help, but it exacted a price, simultaneously with the price it was
exacting in relation to the monetary crisis: unconditional British withdrawal. U.S. help had to take the form of encouraging domestic U.S. oil companies to increase oil production. Here the President had to be more circumspect. An open U.S. decision to increase oil production might exacerbate Arab rage at the invasion, and might even result in an Arab oil embargo. Therefore, Eisenhower’s aides arranged for a less visible action: the President “approved the movement of U.S. Gulf Coast Oil to the East Coast in foreign flag tankers, a move designed to camouflage preparations for sending it to Europe.” In addition, on November 30, the U.S. office of Defense Mobilization “released a statement that ‘with the approval of the President,’ the Interior Department had been requested to authorize fifteen American oil companies to coordinate efforts to provide oil to compensate for” the shortage resulting from the crisis”.

With the defeat of the two European-Colonial powers, brought about through deft deployment of his Article II powers, the President realized that he had created a vacuum. The Soviet Union was already in the region, and getting stronger because of the Arab hostility to Western interests. That vacuum, Eisenhower realized, had to be filled. He also realized that under the circumstances only the United States could fill that vacuum, but this could not be done simply through Article II powers, as potent as they were. Congress came into the picture. Here Griffin’s cycle of accountability and Zeisberg’s relational theory come into play.

On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower delivered a special message to Congress. He announced what came to be known as “The Eisenhower Doctrine”, which initiated the United States into the Middle East. The doctrine provided that a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. The threats Eisenhower foresaw came from the Soviet Union.
Congress came into the picture with full force as did the party system. The 1956 elections reinstalled the democrats as the majority party in Congress. The myth of bi-partisanship in matters of foreign affairs was shattered once again, as was the myth that the President is the sole organ of foreign affairs. Inter-branch negotiations ended with a more moderate and balanced bill than Eisenhower had originally wanted. But the heart of the doctrine was kept, and the following year, in 1958, the President used his congressional authorization to send troops to Lebanon. Decades later, the United States is still heavily involved in the Middle East, even though the Soviet Union, as well as the Cold War, are relics of the past.

As stated in the introduction, the Suez Crisis also precipitated the rise of the European Union. Hurt, and feeling deeply betrayed, Britain and France came to the conclusion that their future lay with Europe, not with the Middle East. Israel, through a very long and convoluted process, turned itself into a staunch U.S. ally. There too, the friendship was not always warmly accepted by U.S presidents. Which takes us again to Griffin and Zeisler: two branches of the U.S government, the President and the Congress, have different powers and different world views. Most of the time, not always for the better, U.S. policy is a result of these two institutions persuading, coercing, outmaneuvering, and manipulating each other until some modus vivendi is reached.