MARKET SYMMETRY AND THE TAX EFFICIENCY OF EQUITY COMPENSATION
David I. Walker
Boston University School of Law Working Paper 04-05
Abstract
At first blush, the deferral of employee income recognition associated
with equity compensation appears to provide a tax advantage in a rising
market but an offsetting disadvantage in a declining market. Merton Miller
and Myron Scholes argued, however, that this apparent symmetry is misleading
and that employees can hedge to ensure tax efficiency despite market uncertainty.
This article demonstrates that the effect of employee hedging is fairly
small, but that a combination of factors, including capital loss limitations,
the possibility of employee-favorable ex post adjustments to equity compensation
arrangements, and employee hedging, do cause compensatory stock grants
and nonqualified options to be tax advantaged on an expected value basis.
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David I. Walker Contact Information
diwalker@bu.edu
Boston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Ave
Boston, MA 02215
USA
(617) 353-3174
Presentation and Publication Information:
To be announced.
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