ARBITRATION: GOVERNANCE BENEFITS AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law Working Paper 04-09
Abstract
These remarks, presented at the 2004 AALS Annual Meeting panel on civil
procedure, review the economic theory of arbitration and related empirical
evidence. For parties who can choose between alternative legal regimes,
the key determinants of that choice are the governance benefits and enforcement
costs connected to the rules under each regime. The choice between arbitration
and litigation should be made on the same basis. The empirical literature,
though sparse, suggests that superior governance benefits provide a significant
reason for arbitration agreements.
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Keith N. Hylton Contact Information
knhylton@bu.edu
Boston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Ave
Boston, MA 02215
USA
(617) 353-8959
SSRN Location
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=594301
Presentation and Publication Information:
To Be Announced
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