THE LEGAL REGULATION OF SELF-SERVING BIAS

Ward Farnsworth

Boston University School of Law Working Paper 02-07

Abstract

This paper considers two questions about the role of self-serving biases in legal conflict: when are they a problem worth worrying about, and what can the law do to ameliorate them? With respect to the first question, the paper argues that not all self-serving biases are of equal concern. We should distinguish between self-serving predictions, which have the potential to create significant inefficiencies, and self-serving judgments of fairness, which have a more complicated normative standing and in some instances may not be problematic at all. Second, once a bias is found objectionable there are a number of possible strategies for dealing with it; the paper proposes a distinction between personal and structural strategies. Personal strategies are attempts to take people likely to be in the throes of self-serving biases and "debias" them. Structural strategies are attempts to put distance between biased parties and decisions their biases might affect. There are practical strategies that fit each of those descriptions, and others that fall between them; the paper suggests that structural strategies tend to be preferable to personal strategies, but also more expensive, and that the law may already be taking most steps that would be optimal to reduce disputants' problematic self-serving biases and their impact.

Size: 393 KB
Est. download time @ 28.8K: 14 seconds


Adobe Acrobat Reader v3.01 or greater is required to view this paper.
To obtain a free copy, click the button below



Ward Farnsworth Contact Information

wf@bu.edu
Boston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Ave
Boston, MA 02215
USA
(617) 353-4008

Presentation and Publication Information:

Published in 69 University of Chicago Law Review 211 (2002).

Social Science Research Network: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=314561

Click here to close this window.