Abstract

Responding to a critique that our earlier article on predatory pricing moved too swiftly and decisively to implement modern strategic theory in antitrust enforcement, we urge that (1) strategic theory is robust and provides a solid foundation for legal policy, (2) the several elements of our proposed rule effectively distinguish between predation and competition, and thereby avoid over enforcement risks, (3) claims that post trial evidence in three relatively recent cases disproves the feasibility of a strategic approach to predatory pricing are without foundation, the courts having made no attempt in those cases to evaluate the facts within a strategic framework. Finally, we elaborate and extend our previous analysis of predatory pricing in our defense of the economic robustness of strategic theory in Part I and in our development of the proposed legal rule in Part II.

This response has been published as 89 Geo.L.J 2495. (2001). A draft of our original article has been posted on this site as B.U. Working Paper 99-5, "Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy," and the final version has been published under the same title at 88 Geo. L.J. 2239 (2000).

Size: 0 KB
Est. download time @ 28.8K: 0 seconds

Adobe Acrobat Reader v3.01 or greater is required to view this paper.
To obtain a free copy, click the button below

Joseph F. Brodley Contact Information

brodley@bu.edu
Boston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Ave
Boston, MA 02215
USA
(617) 353-2844 (Phone) / (617) 353-3077 (Fax)

Patrick Bolton Contact Information

pbolton@princeton.edu
Princeton University - Department of Economics
Fisher Hall, 306
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
(609) 258-4000 (Phone) / (609) 258-6419 (Fax)

Michael H. Riordan Contact Information

mhr21@columbia.edu
Columbia University
3022 Broadway
New York, New York 10027
United States
(212) 854-6984 (Phone)

SSRN Site:

http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=294682

Presentation and Publication Information:

89 Geo.L.J 2495. (2001)

Click here to close this window.