PRESERVING COMPETITION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
LEGAL STANDARDS AND MICROSOFT


Ronald A. Cass
Keith N. Hylton

Boston University School of Law Working Paper 99-1

Abstract

A recent article by Steven Salop and Craig Romaine uses the Microsoft litigation as a focus for discussion of antitrust law. Salop and Romaine argue that each of the allegations against Microsoft could constitute evidence of a design by Microsoft to reduce competition and to preserve or extend monopoly power. They argue as well that the right legal standard to apply in monopolization cases is a "competitive-effects" test that balances the benefits and harms of the monopolist's conduct. This article exposes problems with their approach, explains why it departs from current antitrust standards, and urges an approach consistent with current standards.

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Ronald A. Cass Contact Information

roncass@bu.edu
Boston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Ave
Boston, MA 02215
USA
(617) 353-3112

Keith N. Hylton Contact Information

knhylton@bu.edu
Boston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Ave
Boston, MA 02215
USA
(617) 353-8959

Presentation and Publication Information:

Forthcoming George Mason Law Review

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