Weyerhaeuser, Predatory Bidding, and Error Costs
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law Working Paper 08-03
Abstract
In Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons the Supreme Court held that the predatory pricing standard adopted in Brooke Group also applies to predatory bidding claims, because the two types of predation are “analytically similar”. I argue that predatory bidding is likely to be more harmful to consumer welfare than is predatory pricing. Successful input market predation may lead to a “dual market power” outcome in which the firm has market power in both the input and the output market. In spite of the analytical distinction, consideration of error costs leads me to conclude that Brooke Group remains the best standard to apply to predatory bidding claims.
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Suggested Citation:
Keith N. Hylton, "Weyerhaeuser, Predatory Bidding, and Error Costs " forthcoming in The Antitrust Bulletin (2008).
Contact Information
Keith N. HyltonBoston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215