Boston University School of Law

 

The Economics of Third-Party financed Litigation

Keith N. Hylton


Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 11-57

Abstract
This paper examines the law and economics of third-party financed litigation.  I explore the conditions under which a system of third-party financiers and litigators can enhance social welfare, and the conditions under which it is likely to reduce social welfare.   Among the applications I consider are the sale of legal rights (such as contingent tort claims) to insurers, to patent trolls, and to financiers generally.

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Suggested Citation:

Keith N. Hylton, "The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation," B.U. Law Working Paper No. 11-57 (December 12, 2011), SSRN Paper No. 1971229 (see link below).

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215

knhylton@bu.edu

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