Boston University School of Law

 

Involuntary Servitude, Public  Accommodations Laws, and the Legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States


Linda C. McClain

71 University of Maryland Law Review 83 (2011)
Boston University School of Law Working Paper 12-54
(December 12, 2012)

Abstract

In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to pass Title II, the public accommodations component of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA). The Johnson Administration expressed hope that this unanimous decision would aid the “reasonable and responsible acceptance” of the CRA.   A less familiar legacy of this case is the role played by the Thirteenth Amendment and its declaration that “neither slavery and involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within  the United States.”  The owner of the Heart of Atlanta Motel  unsuccessfully  invoked this amendment to challenge Title II, drawing on a particular conception of private property. The Court rejected this argument briskly. Looking at this case in isolation  would leave a modern reader ignorant of the role played by the Thirteenth Amendment in the debate over the enactment of Title II.  This article revisits the Heart of Atlanta Motel case,  drawing on contemporaneous  press coverage and legal commentary about it and related legal challenges.  It then shows  how, when Congress considered Title II,  proponents and opponents both appealed to the Thirteenth Amendment.  The Administration and Congressional supporters emphasized the Commerce power as the constitutional hook for Title II, mindful of the Court’s invalidation, in the Civil Rights Cases (1883), of  the Reconstruction-era public accommodations law of 1875 and of the fate of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments there.  However,  they appealed to the Thirteenth Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment, and to the unfinished business of Reconstruction . The  Thirteenth Amendment, they argued, sought to abolish all the incidents of slavery and to secure full  citizenship; racial discrimination in public accommodations was a continuing badge of servitude.  By contrast,  opponents of Title II (e.g., Senator  Strom Thurmond) argued that the Thirteenth Amendment forbade Title II;  they  equated “involuntary servitude” with “rendering involuntary service”  and with violating private property rights.  This claim returns in the Heart of Atlanta challenge and the rhetoric of fellow Atlanta restaurant owner  (and, later,  governor) Lester Maddox. The article concludes by examining the legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel for later antidiscrimination laws and their critics, focusing on analogies between race discrimination and other forms of discrimination, such as sex and sexual orientation.  

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Linda C. McClain Contact

Boston University - School of Law
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
lmcclain@bu.edu

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