Boston University School of Law

 

The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common Law
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law


Boston University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 13-34 (August 7, 2013)
Boston University School of Law Law & Economics Paper No. 13-34 (August 7, 2013)

Abstract

The common law process appears to have checks and balances that prevent the self-interest of a particular embedded actor (judge or lawyer) from having a substantial distortive effect.  The question that follows is whether the Restatement project is also immune, to the same extent as the common law, from the self-interested incentives of actors involved in its creation.  I argue that the Restatement process is far more vulnerable to distortion from self-interest than is the common law process.

Size: 104KB

Adobe Acrobat Reader v3.01 or greater is required to view this paper.
To obtain a free copy, click the button below

 

 

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University
Professor of Law

Boston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215

knhylton@bu.edu

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK