Political Economy of Criminal Procedure
Keith N. Hylton
V. S. Khanna
Boston University School of Law Working Paper 08-16
Abstract
This chapter presents a public choice theory of criminal procedure. The core idea is that criminal procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state’s law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most part we focus on a set of core procedural protections that can be considered long-established norms.
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Suggested Citation:
Keith N. Hylton and V.S. Khanna, "Political Economy of Criminal Procedure," forthcoming Criminal Law and Economics, N. Garoupa, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing.
Contact Information
KEITH N. HYLTON
Boston University - School of Law
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston , MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Law School
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor , MI 48109-1215
United States
734-615-6959 (Phone)