Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and their Effects
Keith N. Hylton
Fei Deng
Boston University School of Law Working Paper 06-47
Abstract
This paper investigates a dataset that codes key features of the competition laws of 102 countries. It first compares the scope of the laws overall, and of various subcomponents such as the law governing dominance, collusive conduct, and mergers. The second question examined in this paper is whether competition law has any effect on the intensity of competition within a nation. We find, in ordinary least squares regressions, that the scope of a country's competition law is positively associated with the perceived intensity of competition in the country's economy. However, we find no evidence that the scope of competition law is positively associated with an objective proxy of the intensity of competition. Moreover, instrumental variables regressions, though preliminary, do not indicate that the scope of competition law affects the perceived intensity of competition.
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Suggested Citation:
Keith N. Hylton and Fei Deng, "Antitust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and their Effect," forthcoming Antitrust Law Journal, 2007.
Contact Information
Keith N. HyltonBoston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
Fei Deng
National Economic Research Associates (NERA)
One Front Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111
United States