The Economics of Public Nuisance Law and the New Enforcement Actions
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law Working Paper 08-19
Abstract
In contrast to the traditional legal commentary, I find nuisance law to be a coherent body of rules that serves an explainable function. Nuisance optimally regulates activity levels. Nuisance law induces actors to choose socially optimal activity levels by imposing liability when externalized costs are far in excess of externalized benefits or far in excess of background external costs. The new enforcement actions for lead paint abatement or gun control purposes have an arguable theoretical basis in nuisance law. However, as currently framed, the lawsuits are inconsistent with significant parts of the doctrine and the theory.
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Suggested Citation:
Keith N. Hylton, forthcoming in the Supreme Court Economic Review symposium on public nuisance.
Prepared for and presented at the Research Roundtable on Public Nuisance Litigation, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, Northwestern University School of Law (April 6 and 7, 2008).
Contact Information
Keith N. HyltonBoston University School of Law
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215