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NEWS FROM ABOVE: FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION BAN ON COMMERCIAL DRONES

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INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, unmanned aircraft systems ("UASs"), commonly referred to as drones, have captured the imagination of the news media, the public, and policymakers. This is largely the result of the United States’ increasing reliance on UASs to carry out surveillance and targeted killings of suspected terrorists around the world. When news media, scholars, and policymakers have turned their attention to UASs, they have most often focused on the ethics, efficacy, and legality of using drones as a surveillance-strike platform against suspected terrorists.

But there also has been growing interest in the potential domestic use of UASs by both the public and private sectors. In the public sector, law enforcement agencies have shown the most interest. The Department of Homeland Security is already using UASs and even loans them to other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.¹ In the private sector, real estate agents have begun to use UASs to survey properties and to give prospective buyers a new perspective on their potential purchase.² Farmers are


² Bay Area Realtors Now Using Drones to Market High-End Properties, CBS (Feb. 4, 2014, 8:33 AM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/02/04/bay-area-realtors-now-using-drones-to-market-high-end-property/ (archived at http://perma.cc/7ZGE-JPVP); Winnie Hu,
considering using UASs to survey crops and livestock, spray pesticides and fungicides, and monitor for disease outbreaks. Environmental scientists and natural resources managers are using UASs for tasks such as mapping and monitoring watersheds. China is even exploring the use of UASs to combat Beijing’s notorious air pollution. Various companies, large and small, are experimenting with using UASs for delivery, from Amazon and UPS to more novel services such as Tacocopter and the Lakemaid beer delivery service. There is even a growing “DIY drone” hobbyist community with its own online social network.


with journalism, the focus of this article, being one of the most promising.

Scholars have long demonstrated the important role that the news media plays in determining which issues are added to the public agenda and, in the process, priming citizens and policymakers to think about these issues only in certain ways. This is often done via problem framing; that is, by framing a problem or issue in such a way that it raises fear of the issue and identifies it as a problem in need of a solution. News media coverage and public policy discourse so often frame the adoption of new technologies as a problem to be feared and addressed through legislation or regulation that some observers have called the phenomenon a “technopanic,” a particular form of “moral panic” applied to technology. Most recently, problem framing and fear appeals have been prominent in public discourse around both actual and potential threats in and through cyberspace. The proliferation of problem framing and fear appeals concerning such cyber threats often relies on conflating a number of different technologies and their uses—most of which are not particularly frightening on their own—under a larger category more likely to evoke fear and a demand for action.

We can observe a similar pattern with similar effects in the area of domestic UASs. News media coverage often makes little distinction between the large UASs used by the military for surveillance and targeted killing overseas and the small UASs—amounting to little more than children’s toys—used most often in the domestic applications mentioned above. The generic “drone,”

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undifferentiated in its specific technological attributes or actual uses, becomes
the protagonist in stories that most often focus on potential threats to privacy or
safety. It is not surprising, therefore, to see that the public and policymakers
increasingly have expressed concern about the domestic use of UASs. An
August 2012 poll by the Associated Press found that a third of those polled
expressed fear that law-enforcement use of UASs could lead to violations of
individual privacy. An April 2014 survey by the Pew Research Center found
that sixty-three percent of respondents believed that “it would be a change for
the worse if ‘personal and commercial drones are given permission to fly
through most U.S. airspace.’” Policymakers have also begun to express
concerns about the privacy implications of domestic UASs, sometimes calling
for increased regulation. Lawmakers at the state level have shown the most
concern for the privacy implications of domestic UASs, with the result being
legislation pending in forty-three states that seeks to limit the use of UASs,
most often by law enforcement and other state agencies. Finally, safety and
privacy have also dominated concerns that the Federal Aviation Administration

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We believe that these privacy concerns are legitimate and deserve the attention that they have received. Safeguards like those being explored in state legislatures are important for protecting people from possible government intrusions on privacy through the use of this new technology. Where privacy infringements by nongovernment actors are concerned, however, we believe that existing law provides adequate remedy in the form of privacy and trespass torts. Should these laws prove inadequate, it would be appropriate to enact new laws to protect individuals’ privacy. In any case, more research should be conducted on the privacy implications of proliferating government and nongovernment use of UASs. But the focus of this article is the First Amendment implications of FAA attempts to ban the commercial use of UASs, an action that has received little attention to date. As this article concerns First Amendment–protected uses of UASs in public spaces, where there is no expectation of privacy, we will leave discussion of privacy concerns for another article.

Five years before the passage of the FAA Modernization and Reauthorization Act of 2012 (“FMRA 2012”), and in response to growing public concerns, the FAA released a notice of policy purporting to ban the use of UASs for commercial purposes.\textsuperscript{20} In doing so, the FAA fell victim to the kind of conflation of technologies and uses that so often drives techpanics. Technologically, the FAA did not differentiate between military UASs weighing thousands of pounds and radio-controlled children’s toys weighing mere ounces. For example, the DJI Phantom has emerged as perhaps the most popular consumer-grade UAS and often has been used by those engaged in First Amendment–protected activity.\textsuperscript{21} This device can be obtained relatively inexpensively from online retailers like Amazon;\textsuperscript{22} it weighs approximately two pounds and is approximately fourteen inches wide.\textsuperscript{23} In fact, the FAA has


said that a UAS can be as small as four ounces in weight and six inches wide, meaning that virtually any radio-controlled children’s toy would now count as a UAS under the FAA definition and, therefore, be subject to the Agency’s purported regulations.24 Similarly, in terms of use, the FAA has interpreted commercial activity broadly, such that any use of a UAS for profit or by a for-profit organization—even if the use of the UAS does not specifically generate profit—is considered commercial activity and therefore banned.25 These definitions have guided the Agency’s enforcement actions, which have included sending more than a dozen cease-and-desist letters since 2007 to individuals and organizations that it believes are violating the ban.26 In the most widely reported case of FAA enforcement to date, the Agency attempted to fine Raphael Pirker $10,000 after he was paid to use a four-and-a-half-pound radio-controlled Styrofoam airplane with a camera on it to take aerial photography on behalf of the University of Virginia.27

This is not the first or only case of the FAA taking enforcement action against an individual engaged in aerial photography with a small UAS. In fact, as we will demonstrate, most of the Agency’s enforcement actions have been taken against individuals engaged in aerial photography. This article argues that aerial photography with UASs, whether commercial or not, is protected First Amendment activity. This is particularly true when it is used for newsgathering purposes, as it has been in a number of instances where the FAA has taken enforcement action against domestic UAS operators. Though Congress has granted the FAA the power to regulate the integration of UASs into the domestic airspace, when those regulations apply to First Amendment–protected activity, they must comply with constitutional mandates. As currently formulated, the FAA’s blanket ban on commercial use of UASs, which it asserts includes aerial photography and newsgathering, constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on speech in a public forum.

The remainder of this article will explore the emerging uses of UASs for journalism, the current FAA policy on commercial use of UASs and how it has been enforced, and the First Amendment implications of UAS use and regulation. The article concludes by arguing that the FAA must do more to take First Amendment–protected uses of this technology into account as it proceeds with meeting its congressional mandate to promulgate rules for domestic use of UASs. We argue that where UAS restrictions in the name of safety potentially infringe First Amendment–protected uses, those restrictions must be narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restrictions. We provide general examples of what such restrictions might reasonably entail.

II. THE USE OF UASs FOR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND

24 2007 Notice, supra note 20.
25 Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 14 C.F.R. § 91 (2014).
26 See discussion infra section III.C.
NEWSGATHERING

The use of UASs for the capture and sharing of information is nothing new, although the technology has evolved over time. Cameras mounted on hot air balloons captured images of American cities as early as 1858, and commercial photographer George R. Lawrence popularized the use of aerial photography at the turn of the twentieth century by using kites and balloons to lift a specially outfitted forty-nine-pound camera over cityscapes. Lawrence, who made a name for himself photographing the devastation of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake from several hundred feet in the air, created the Lawrence Captive Airship, which relied on seventeen large kites and a series of stability weights to lift a camera up to several thousand feet. European photographers similarly employed kite cameras and camera-carrying pigeons for aerial shots and wartime surveillance. While archaic by today’s standards, these early uses of UAS technology demonstrated some of the unique benefits UASs offer journalists today. Four of these benefits are briefly examined here, including unique perspectives, safety, cost reduction, and innovation.

A. UASs Provide Unique Perspectives Unattainable by Other Means of Newsgathering

News organizations have relied on video footage captured by journalists and citizens, some of it with UASs in the form of lightweight quadcopters or hexacopters, in their coverage of difficult-to-reach spaces, such as human rights rallies and areas devastated by natural disasters. Consider the case of Typhoon Haiyan, which swept across the Philippines in November 2013, taking more than 6,000 lives and creating a natural disaster zone that was difficult for most journalists to reach. With traditional journalistic resources, news organizations would have largely relied on eyewitness accounts and delayed dispatches from the area. Efforts to display images would have been hampered by a collapse in local infrastructure, including the loss of necessary resources to transmit photos and videos (i.e., power for equipment, Internet access for transmittal). Even when those resources were restored, journalists would have been encumbered by the inability to traverse a landscape ravaged


29 Id.


by winds of more than 200 miles per hour and extensive flooding and mudslides. Yet images and videos of the devastation channeled across the globe with unexpected expediency, thanks in part to the use of UASs.\textsuperscript{32} CNN was among the first news organizations to deploy a UAS into one of the more remote and devastated areas of the Philippines, Tacloban.\textsuperscript{33} Reporter Karl Penhaul used a drone to broadcast images of the devastation ten days after the typhoon struck, narrating as a UAS hovered above heaps of debris and rescue workers.\textsuperscript{34}

Citizen journalists, who play an increasingly critical role in the news process,\textsuperscript{35} have made similar use of UASs. When a gas leak caused a major explosion in the East Harlem section of New York City in March 2014, business systems expert Brian Wilson was among the first at the scene.\textsuperscript{36} After asking responding authorities for permission to film, Wilson launched his quadcopter above the blast zone and captured more than thirty minutes of footage that was widely used among local and national news organizations.\textsuperscript{37} Wilson was able to provide early coverage that showed the damage of the explosion and was also able to provide footage from a vantage point not even news helicopters could reach. News organizations have also relied on UASs to


\textsuperscript{34} Id.


\textsuperscript{37} Hutchinson, \textit{supra} note 36; Oshiro, \textit{supra} note 36.
provide unique perspectives on rockslides in Italy,\textsuperscript{38} devastating bushfires in New South Wales,\textsuperscript{39} fiery uprisings in Ukraine,\textsuperscript{40} tornado damage in Arkansas,\textsuperscript{41} and a display of dolphin megapods off the coast of California.\textsuperscript{42} In each of these cases, journalists would otherwise have been limited to ground reporting without visual contextualization, given the inability to either reach the areas covered or complete their reporting outside harm’s way.

B. UASs Are Safer Than Traditional Means of Aerial News gathering

Many news organizations have begun relying on the public to contribute user-generated content to their coverage. This has taken place, most notably, in the form of sharing breaking news, photos, and videos through social networking services (“SNSs”) in situations such as crises and other potentially dangerous events.\textsuperscript{43} Nearly ninety percent of Americans with smart phones have watched videos on these phones, and more than a third have used them to capture and share news-related videos.\textsuperscript{44} News organizations have incorporated these videos and related SNS content into their news coverage of events.\textsuperscript{45}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{gilad} Gilad Lotan et al., The Revolutions Were Tweeted: Information Flows During the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 1375, 1377 (2011).
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Rather than relying on untrained individuals to capture the most telling angles of hazardous news stories, news organizations could employ UASs in such situations. This would allow news organizations to control their coverage without endangering the lives of journalists (and without exploiting the free labor of individuals who are endangering their lives by capturing and sharing such content).

Still, as the Professional Society of Drone Journalists points out, the use of UASs for news and information gathering is not without risk. Indeed, UASs can navigate into dangerous spaces, such as active volcanoes, that most journalists and other individuals could never safely approach. But when UASs are operated in crowded areas or above active disaster scenes where rescuers are at work, their dangers should not be ignored. Strong wind gusts, radio interference, mechanical malfunction, and operator errors could bring down a UAS with potentially deadly force.

Yet these same conditions could be even more catastrophic with current newsgathering technologies. Consider the case of a local television network helicopter that crashed in a bustling part of Seattle in 2014, claiming the lives of two individuals. The helicopter crashed while lifting off to cover a news story near the city’s famous Space Needle, killing the pilot and a news photographer and injuring several people on the ground. News organizations around the United States regularly employ such means of news coverage for traffic reports, crowd flyovers, and breaking news—all of which could be covered more safely, more cost efficiently, and less invasively with UASs. Helicopters rank among the most dangerous of transportation vehicles, recording a crash rate of 9.84 per 100,000 hours, as compared to the crash rate of all general aircraft (e.g., airplanes, helicopters, balloons, blimps, etc.), which is approximately thirty-five percent lower. Similarly, Slate reported an annual rate of 1.44 fatalities per 100,000 flying hours for nonmilitary helicopters versus 0.017 fatalities per 100,000 driving hours for cars, suggesting that

47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
51 Id.
“helicopters are 85 percent more dangerous than driving.”\textsuperscript{53} In short, as one drone law expert observed, “When a fuel-filled, 1,500-pound JetRanger becomes controlled solely by gravity, the risks, in terms of loss of life, injury and property damage are vastly worse than if the same were to occur with a battery-powered, 3-pound model aircraft.”\textsuperscript{54}

C. UASs Reduce the Cost of Aerial Newsgathering

UASs not only provide journalists with a safer, more effective mechanism of reporting on certain events, but they may also present a cost-saving alternative to aerial coverage at a time when news organizations are struggling with economic sustainability.\textsuperscript{55} UASs typically cost a fraction of what traditional manned flights (e.g., helicopters for news coverage) cost.\textsuperscript{56} Even the most effective UASs cost less than $1,000 and can be operated at a fraction of the cost of their heavier and more traditional counterparts.\textsuperscript{57}

Even without helicopters, ground reporting can be a costly venture, especially that which provides unique perspectives in order to convey visually powerful contextualization.\textsuperscript{58} The BBC’s Richard Westcott notes that bulky and expensive equipment often makes for stressful reporting, and that such anxiety (and costs) could be significantly reduced by employing UASs to “go close to something then soar into the air in one smooth movement” rather than having a reporter “creep along the ground, shimmy a fence, crawl through a tree then climb to 400-ft for a spectacular panorama.”\textsuperscript{59} All of this would be accomplished without hefty video cameras, dollies, grips, news vehicles, and other resources frequently needed for news broadcasts.\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{57} Id.


\textsuperscript{59} Id.

\textsuperscript{60} Id.
D. UASs Are the Future of Innovation in Newsgathering

Despite the potential cost-saving benefit of UASs, news organizations remain cautious in their approach. Such innovation is instead being led by hobbyists like Brian Wilson and by media scholars, who are less bound by journalistic norms and the regulations of news organizations and perhaps better positioned to experiment with drone technology on personal and professional levels. The Drone Journalism Lab developed at the College of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln in 2011 was created to help journalists who “are increasingly faced with two problems: a growing appetite for unique online video in an environment of decreased budgets; and restricted or obstructed access to stories ranging from disaster coverage to Occupy Wall Street protests.” While current organizational policies may restrict some journalists from making use of UASs, some scholars are encouraging the innovative incorporation of UASs into news coverage by students, who represent the journalists of tomorrow, and by citizen journalists, who continue to provide most of the UAS-captured footage that is used by news organizations.62 Both the Drone Journalism Lab at University of Nebraska and the Missouri Drone Journalism Program have run up against FAA scrutiny.63 However, both programs continue to seek clarification of the legal restrictions while still offering unique collaborations and partnerships with local and national news organizations, many of which have closely monitored the progress of these programs.64 Similar programs have begun to surface elsewhere in the United States and Canada at universities such as the College of the North Atlantic and the University of Utah.65 Both new programs have courses scheduled for 2014 that examine the legal and ethical aspects of UASs, as well as their innovative repurposing for journalism and beyond.66

III. FAA DEFINITIONS AND ACTIONS REGARDING UASS AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

The FAA has taken enforcement action on more than a dozen occasions

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62 Id.
64 Id.
66 Id.
against individuals employing drones for the purposes of aerial photography and newsgathering. The basis of this enforcement is twofold. First, the Agency’s definition of a UAS is so broad as to include radio-controlled model aircraft (“RCMA”), a type of flying device not traditionally regulated by the FAA. The RCMA is the type of device most commonly used by aerial photographers and drone journalists. Second, the FAA’s broad definition of commercial activity makes no distinction between First Amendment–protected activity and nonprotected activity. Enforcement actions based on these definitions have resulted in an effective government ban on aerial photography and newsgathering activities that use a type of device that has existed for decades and has never before been subject to regulation.

A. The FAA Definition of a UAS Is Overly Broad

As mentioned above, conflation of a number of distinct entities or activities under a larger category is a key rhetorical strategy that encourages technopanics and subsequent calls for greater regulation of new technologies. This phenomenon is at work in the FAA’s attempts to define UASs. Its 2007 policy statement on Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, which purported to ban commercial use of UASs, is the foundation of its enforcement actions. In this document, the Agency defines a UAS as “a device that is used, or is intended to be used, for flight in the air with no onboard pilot.” It acknowledges that this includes military drones, like those used in Afghanistan, but says that UASs also include RCMAs, the type of devices most commonly used by aerial photographers and journalists. Of course, Predator drones and RCMAs constitute an extremely broad spectrum of devices. The broadness of the definition seems intentional, given that the FAA policy says that UASs can be “controlled either manually or through an autopilot using a data link,” that their dimensions can range from “wingspans of six inches to 246 feet,” and that they can “weigh from approximately four ounces to over 25,600 pounds.”

In a definitional snowball effect, the Agency’s attempts to carry out enforcement against operators of devices falling under this broad definition of a UAS have also resulted in their attempt to broaden the category of “aircraft” in general. In the most severe case of enforcement to date, as mentioned above, the FAA tried to assess a civil penalty of $10,000 against Raphael Pirker for operating his Styrofoam, camera-carrying RCMA weighing four and a half pounds. The FAA sought to fine him for operating “an aircraft in a careless

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67 See supra notes 9, 10, 13, and accompanying text.
68 See 2007 Notice, supra note 20.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 6689.
or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.” The FAA argued that “[t]he aircraft referenced above is an Unmanned Aircraft System” and argued that it is subject to regulation under Part 91 of Federal Aviation Regulations (“FARs”) Section 91.13(a). But because “the classification UAS does not appear in the FARs,” the FAA asserted that the device in question was not just a UAS, but also an “aircraft.” 14 C.F.R. Part 1, Section 1.1 defines an “aircraft” as a “device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air.” Thus, the FAA argued, in essence, that even if existing regulations do not define a UAS as something that the Agency can regulate, they do give the Agency the ability to regulate “aircraft,” which includes virtually anything and everything that flies in the air.

However, the administrative law judge for the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”), in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, held that the FAA’s asserted definition of aircraft was overly broad to the point of being laughable in its implications. The judge wrote,

[to] accept Complainant’s interpretive argument would lead to a conclusion that those definitions include as an aircraft all types of devices/contrivances intended for, or used for, flight in the air. The extension of that conclusion would then result in the risible argument that a flight in the air of, e.g., a paper aircraft, or a toy balsa wood glider, could subject the “operator” to the regulatory provisions of FAA Part 91, Section 91.13(a).

The judge ultimately held that an RCMA does not meet the statutory or regulatory definition of an aircraft that is subject to FAA regulation.

Further evidence of the FAA’s attempt to conflate previously distinct entities under a broader category is found in the judge’s observation “that [the] FAA historically has not required model aircraft operators to comply with” the kinds of requirements now being imposed on operators of the newly minted category of UASs, which the FAA says includes RCMAs. “The reasonable inference,” the judge said, “is not that [the] FAA has overlooked the requirements, but, rather that [the] FAA has distinguished model aircraft as a class excluded from the regulatory and statutory definitions.” The judge viewed the FAA’s historical distinction between RCMAs and aircraft as correct and, therefore, rejected the Agency’s attempt to erase that distinction.

74 Id. at *1, *3.
76 Id. at *2.
77 Id. at *3.
78 Id.
79 Id. at *7.
80 Id. at *3.
81 Id.
by conflating the two.\textsuperscript{82}

However, this decision, which was hailed as a victory by drone enthusiasts, was short lived. The FAA appealed the decision to the full NTSB, which, in November 2014, reversed the administrative law judge’s decision and agreed with the FAA that “[a]n aircraft is ‘any’ ‘device’ that is ‘used for flight.’”\textsuperscript{83} The Board reached this decision even though it agreed with the administrative law judge that this definition of “aircraft” is indeed quite broad when it noted, “We acknowledge the definitions are as broad as they are clear, but they are clear nonetheless.”\textsuperscript{84} In the wake of this decision, Mr. Pirker and his lawyers decided to settle the case with the FAA. As part of the settlement, the FAA dropped a number of the original allegations in an Amended Order of Assessment and, in return, Mr. Pirker agreed to pay a fine of $1,100 (as opposed to the original $10,000) while not admitting to any of the allegations in the Order or a violation of any regulation.\textsuperscript{85}

B. The FAA Identifies Three Categories of UAS Use

Of course, every Agency must make decisions about when—and when not—to take enforcement action. But, as we explain, the FAA’s overly broad definition of a UAS does not allow for making distinctions as to type of device. Therefore, the primary distinctions employed by the FAA for purposes of deciding when to take enforcement action are based on by whom and for what purposes the UAS is used, rather than on its technical attributes, or how, when, and where it is used.

In its 2007 policy statement on UASs, the FAA stated that its “current policy is based on whether the unmanned aircraft is used as a public aircraft, civil aircraft or as a model aircraft.”\textsuperscript{86} Public aircraft are those used by government agencies, such as the military and law enforcement, for government purposes.\textsuperscript{87} To operate a UAS as a public aircraft, the FAA policy is that these agencies must apply for and receive a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (“COA”), obtain a Department of Defense airworthiness statement, or demonstrate the UAS’s safety “by other approved means.”\textsuperscript{88}

All uses of a UAS that are not public are civil, with a special category carved out for recreational and sport use of RCMAs.\textsuperscript{89} According to the policy, any use of a UAS “for hire,” or for “commercial” or “business purposes,” falls

\textsuperscript{82} See id.


\textsuperscript{84} Id.


\textsuperscript{86} 2007 Notice, supra note 24, at 6689.

\textsuperscript{87} Id.

\textsuperscript{88} Id.

\textsuperscript{89} Id. at 6689-90.
under the category of civil use.\textsuperscript{90} Two things are of note here. First, the FAA policy states that “operators who wish to fly an unmanned aircraft for civil use must obtain an FAA airworthiness certificate, the same as any other type of aircraft.”\textsuperscript{91} Civil use requires prior government approval.\textsuperscript{92} Second, the only kind of airworthiness certificate offered by the FAA at this time is for experimental aircraft, which is rarely given and places serious restrictions on how a UAS can be used.\textsuperscript{93} As of the 2007 policy statement, the FAA had only issued five of these certificates.\textsuperscript{94} All five certificates were “for the purposes of research and development, marketing surveys, or crew training.”\textsuperscript{95}

Neither aerial photography nor newsgathering are likely among the purposes for which the FAA will issue a certificate. This is because some of the provisions of the certification would make it impossible to do these activities. Operating a UAS under the experimental certification requires describing for the FAA, in advance, “[t]he time or number of flights . . . along with a description of the areas over which the aircraft would operate.”\textsuperscript{96} A professional or citizen journalist using a UAS for newsgathering purposes is not likely to fly it in only one location or to know in advance when and how many times it will fly. These factors will be dictated by breaking news events over which the journalist has no control. Finally, in any case, the FAA is explicit that “UAS issued experimental certificates may not be used for compensation or hire.”\textsuperscript{97} Even if a certificate is issued, the aerial photographer or journalist cannot be paid for his or her work because the FAA will deem this a violation of its policy and, therefore, an illegal use of a UAS.

As mentioned above, there is a sub-category carved out within the civil use category for recreational and sport uses of RCMAs.\textsuperscript{98} In 1981, the FAA developed a set of voluntary guidelines for operators of RCMAs, which are spelled out in \textit{Advisory Circular 91-57, Model Aircraft Operating Standards (“AC 91-57”).}\textsuperscript{99} The devices most commonly used by aerial photographers and journalists fall within this category, at least in terms of their technical characteristics. In response to this kind of use for RCMAs, the FAA noted in its 2007 policy that “some operators have used [AC 91-57] as the basis for commercial flight operations”; however “AC 91-57 only applies to modelers,

\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Id.} at 6690.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Id.} at 6690.
and thus specifically excludes its use by persons or companies for business purposes.” Under the FAA’s current regulations, using an RCMA for commercial or business purposes transforms it into a UAS in the civil aircraft category and, as such, makes its operation illegal without prior approval from the FAA.

Finally, it is not exactly clear what the FAA considers to be a commercial or business use. As the administrative law judge in the Pirker decision noted, “‘business’ is not defined, so it is unclear if the term is limited to ongoing enterprises held out to the general public, or if it includes a one-time operation for any form or amount of compensation.” The closest that the FAA comes to a definition in its 2007 policy statement is when it says that a UAS operating under experimental certification “may not be used for compensation or hire.” Whatever the case, it will become clear in the following section that the FAA considers paid aerial photography and newsgathering using a UAS to be a commercial or business use of the device and, as such, illegal.

The bottom line, from the FAA’s perspective, is that any use of a UAS, no matter its technical characteristics, requires government approval. The 2007 policy statement clearly asserts that “no person may operate a UAS in the National Airspace System without specific authority.” Public aircraft require a COA. Civil aircraft require an experimental airworthiness certificate, which is hard to get and restrictive. RCMAs operate under AC 91-57, unless used for commercial or business purposes, in which case they fall under the civil aircraft rules. We will see in the following section that a significant portion of the FAA’s enforcement actions under the 2007 policy statement have been against aerial photographers or journalists for using an RCMA for commercial or business purposes.

C. The FAA Has Sought to Enforce a Ban on Photography and Newsgathering with UASs

A string of news reports, seventeen FAA cease-and-desist letters released as the result of a Freedom of Information Act request, and statements from FAA spokespeople all establish that the FAA views photography and newsgathering

100 Id. In fact, AC 91-57 makes no mention of business use of RCMAs and is, in any case, a set of voluntary guidelines without the authority to specifically exclude any particular use or set of users. See id.


102 Id. at *5 n.16 (quoting 2007 Notice, supra note 20, at 6690).

103 2007 Notice, supra note 20, at 6690.

104 Id.

105 Id.

106 Id.

107 See id.
with drones as inherently commercial and, therefore, illegal. The FAA has taken action on a number of occasions to stop individuals from using RCMAs for photography or newsgathering without distinguishing between First Amendment–protected activities and nonprotected activities. In fact, the FAA has sought to enforce a ban on both, based on the same reasoning—that is, that commercial and business use is illegal.

In the category of clearly nonprotected activity, perhaps the most famous case to date is the FAA informing the Lakemaid Beer Company that it was in violation of the FAA’s purported ban on commercial use of UASs in the wake of national news coverage of the company’s plans to use radio-controlled octocopters to deliver its beer to ice fishermen. Given the potential safety concerns, this action against Lakemaid Beer seems at least somewhat reasonable. Radio-controlled vehicles carrying twelve-packs of beer through the air obviously have the potential to cause harm if they crash or drop their payload prematurely. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this action is still on shaky legal footing, given the lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking. It also raises concerns about overbroad regulations stifling innovation.

Perhaps more troubling is the release of seventeen FAA cease-and-desist letters, as well as a number of news reports, indicating that the majority of FAA enforcement actions have been carried out against individuals or organizations engaged in First Amendment–protected activity. Patrick McKay, who won the release of the documents, reported that his initial analysis of the letters indicated that the “FAA seems to be exclusively targeting UAS operators who are using drones for commercial aerial photography.” A more extensive analysis of the documents by journalist Jason Koebler of Motherboard also indicated that many of the released cease-and-desist letters cited aerial photography for commercial purposes as the violation that prompted the letter. Our own analysis of the letters shows that all but four of the seventeen letters identified either aerial photography or videography for commercial purposes as the offense that triggered the sending of the letter.

Finally, as mentioned above, in the case of Raphael Pirker, the FAA sought to impose a $10,000 civil penalty after Pirker was hired by a marketing company to take video for the University of Virginia using his camera-carrying...
One case in particular has made it abundantly clear that the FAA considers newsgathering with drones to be illegal. In January 2014, photographer Jesse Tinsley used a personal, radio-controlled quadcopter to shoot a video of the New Year’s Day polar bear plunge at Lake Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. Tinsley is also a journalist employed by the Spokesman-Review newspaper in Spokane, Washington. After his video was published on the newspaper’s website, an FAA spokesperson commented that this constituted an illegal use of a UAS for commercial or business purposes. Tinsley responded that he had operated his RCMA in his personal capacity, not in an official capacity or at the direction of the newspaper, that the device in question was his personal property, and that he had taken the video on his day off. Thus, he believed that his use of the RCMA fell into a “gray area” of current law regarding the use of UASs for aerial photography.

In response to Tinsley, FAA spokesman Les Dorr asserted that “there is no gray area.” He stated that “if you’re using [a UAS] for any sort of commercial purposes, including journalism, that’s not allowed.” He said that the FAA’s “main goal” in sending cease-and-desist letters “is to get them to stop.” Dorr continued, [i]t’s an attractive technology for journalists, and people would like to be able to use it . . . That said, the FAA is responsible for the safety of the air space. And as much as we’d like to encourage them, we can’t let them do it as long as there are no rules in place.

In a similar case, the FAA warned a television station in Little Rock, Arkansas that it was in violation of the ban on the commercial use of drones after it aired video footage of tornado damage that had been taken with a small

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113 Id.
115 Jones, supra note 112.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
As in the case above, the journalist works for the news outlet, but the journalist, not his employer, privately owned the small, camera-wielding UAS used to take the video. The news director of the television station has disputed the claim that use of the video is a violation of the FAA’s purported ban because, he said, the journalist is not required by the news outlet to take video with his small UAS and, as such, any UAS-created video he provides is the same as that provided by any other citizen volunteer. According to the news director, the FAA informed him that “they are aware of our drone and aware of our driving it, and in the FAA’s eyes that is a violation.” Nevertheless, he said that he would continue using video taken with the device because, in his view, “[t]his video is being used to advance the story and advance public information . . . . We don’t use it because it’s cool.”

The FAA has even launched investigations or taken enforcement actions in several instances when the use of UASs for aerial photography and newsgathering were not conducted explicitly for commercial or business purposes, thereby raising questions about the consistency of Agency enforcement. In two of the four released FAA cease-and-desist letters that did not mention photography or videography, the FAA identified using a “UAS for journalism education purposes” by two public universities, the University of Missouri and the University of Nebraska (referred to above), as the underlying offense. The FAA also launched investigations into the use of UASs in two recent cases, one in which an off-duty journalist used a radio-controlled, camera-carrying quadcopter to capture video of an accident scene in Connecticut and another in which a private citizen, operating an identical device, captured aerial video of a building explosion in New York City with the permission of first responders.

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122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Letter from Christopher L. Grotewohl, Aviation Safety Inspector, FAA, to Mo. Sch. of Journalism, Univ. of Mo. (July 10, 2013) (on file with authors); Letter from Christopher L. Grotewohl, Aviation Safety Inspector, FAA, to Coll. of Journalism and Mass Comm’n, Univ. of Neb.–Lincoln (July 10, 2013) (on file with authors).
letter sent to a company advertising aerial photography for hire seemed to indicate that any use of a drone for aerial photography is illegal. Though the letter sent to Hybird Video LLC identified the company’s commercial use of a drone as an offense, it also stated that “[t]he use of a Quadcopter UAS for aerial photography is prohibited without proper authorization.”

The Agency has subsequently indicated that its view of what constitutes commercial activity does not require direct compensation for the use of a UAS or RCMA and that journalistic use of these devices is prohibited. In June 2014, the Agency released its proposed Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft (the “Interpretation”) for public comment. This Interpretation seeks to clarify the FAA’s understanding of Section 336 of FMRA 2012, which provides guidelines to the Agency about what constitutes a model aircraft and places strict limits on how the Agency can regulate them. The Interpretation asserts that a model aircraft may not be used for any commercial purpose, including not only direct compensation for a flight, but any flight “in furtherance of a business, or incidental to a person’s business.” The Interpretation goes on to provide examples of prohibited uses, including a “person photographing a[n]... event and selling the photos to someone else.” However, it identifies that very same activity—photography of an event—as permissible for hobbyists.

In the most disturbing case of FAA enforcement, an FAA spokeswoman implied that even publishing drone video footage obtained by and provided to a news outlet by citizen volunteers is illegal. After a fire in Dayton, Ohio, local hobbyists offered to donate to the Dayton Business Journal video footage of the fire taken with their model aircraft. When the news outlet asked the FAA about the legality of using the footage, an FAA spokeswoman advised the following:


128 Letter from Christopher L. Grotewohl, Aviation Safety Inspector, FAA, to Hybird Video LLC (June 6, 2013) (on file with authors).

129 Id.

130 Id.

131 Id.

132 Id.

133 Id.

134 Id.


136 Id.
news outlet to “err on the side of caution” and not publish because, the
spokeswoman said, “[i]t’s still prohibited in the U.S. to use drones for
commercial operations, and if it had to go through the court we would get our
lawyers involved.”\textsuperscript{137} The news outlet explained that this warning was the
reason “[w]hy you won’t see drone footage from the downtown fire on our
site.”\textsuperscript{138}

It is clear, based on the news reports, the FAA’s cease-and-desist letters, and
the FAA’s official statements, that it sees aerial photography and
newsgathering with UASs as illegal. The most common rationale used by the
FAA when seeking to enforce this ban via the use of cease-and-desist letters,
or even civil fines, is the belief that aerial photography and journalism are
inherently commercial or business activities, no different from delivering beer,
and are, therefore, subject to FAA restrictions. Even in cases when the
photography or journalistic activity in question was not for compensation, the
FAA has still taken enforcement actions or, at the least, publicly announced
that it was conducting an investigation of the activity in question. In cases
where enforcement steps have been taken, the FAA has been clear that its goal
is “to get them to stop.”\textsuperscript{139} It is reasonable to expect that an off-duty journalist
or private citizen, upon learning of an FAA investigation into his or her use of
a UAS for photography or newsgathering, would likely stop those activities.
Even the announcement of an FAA investigation can lead to negative results
for a journalist that may not be ameliorated even if the investigation ultimately
exonerates the journalist. For example, the journalist in the Connecticut case
mentioned above lost his job and (as of this writing) was not rehired by his
former employer even though the FAA investigation found that he had not
used his drone recklessly or for commercial purposes.\textsuperscript{140} Additionally, the
results of such investigations can have the effect of further confusing the
picture for journalists about what is and is not permitted. For example, in the
wake of the Connecticut investigation, one journalist opined that the FAA
finding that the journalist had not used his drone commercially could serve “as
proof that drone journalism is not automatically considered a commercial
application,” which is, as we demonstrated above, in direct conflict with public
statements made by the Agency.\textsuperscript{141} Adding to this confusion is the fact that,
while claiming that the commercial ban is necessary to promote safety, the
Agency has allowed the very same uses by average citizens. In the next
section, we analyze the First Amendment implications of this regulatory
scheme and argue that it runs afoul of the Constitution. We then conclude the
article by proposing guidelines for reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions that would better promote the safety of the national airspace while

\textsuperscript{137} Id.
\textsuperscript{138} Id.
\textsuperscript{139} Barr, supra note 114.
\textsuperscript{140} Schroyer, supra note 127.
\textsuperscript{141} Id.
avoiding the constitutional problems of the Agency’s current regulatory scheme.

IV. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS

As we have established, the FAA’s proposed regulatory structure broadly interprets the definition of aircraft to include any and all devices designed to fly in the air, leading the FAA to classify small RCMAs in the same fashion as large, military-grade Predator drones. Further, the FAA’s three categories of UAS use—public, civil, and recreational—has the practical effect of classifying all civil non-recreational use of UASs as commercial. Because the FAA asserts that all commercial uses require prior approval from the FAA in the form of airworthiness certificates that, in turn, are only rarely issued, the FAA’s asserted regulatory power effectively bans all commercial use in the United States. The FAA’s ban on commercial use is even more troubling when combined with the FAA’s assertion that all aerial photography, including that used for newsgathering, is inherently commercial and thus illegal.

This section addresses the serious First Amendment implications of the FAA’s proposed regulatory scheme and concludes that the FAA’s overregulation fails constitutional scrutiny. Specifically, we argue that aerial photography and videography are First Amendment-protected activities. First, we argue that the First Amendment protects a basic right to gather news that guarantees journalists at least as much right to access information as the general public. Second, we argue that these activities do not lose their First Amendment protection merely because they are carried out for compensation. Finally, in addition to a general newsgathering right, we argue that the First Amendment specifically protects photography and videography as part of the newsgathering process.

We then turn our attention to whether the FAA’s proposed regulatory scheme impossibly infringes on journalists’ First Amendment rights. We argue that it does so in two ways. First, we argue that aerial photography and videography—as practiced with small UAS technologies—occurs in public forums. As such, the FAA’s proposed regulatory scheme must qualify as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction. We argue that it does not. Second, we argue that the FAA’s licensing scheme acts as a prior restraint on speech. Accordingly, the FAA must put in place narrowly drawn, definite licensing standards that prevent arbitrary enforcement actions by government officials. We argue that the FAA has failed to articulate a set of specific standards for when and how a party may seek a license to utilize UAS technology for journalistic purposes. As such, the FAA’s blanket ban on commercial UAS use acts as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. Additionally, when the FAA’s definitions and reasoning are adopted by other agencies of government, enforcement actions by those agencies also result in infringements on First Amendment rights.

A. Aerial Photography and Videography Are First Amendment–Protected
Activities

1. The right to gather news is guaranteed by the First Amendment.

The FAA has asserted broadly that journalists’ use of UAS technology for newsgathering operations constitutes “commercial” activity that falls within the FAA’s purported ban. The FAA’s position rests on a fundamental mischaracterization of the status of newsgathering under the First Amendment. Though the precise contours of the newsgathering right are not well defined, the existence of the right is firmly established.

The First Amendment protects the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” The law recognizes the importance of a free-flowing exchange of ideas on issues of public importance. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized the existence of a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” Of course, the press plays a critical role in ensuring “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources” that “is essential to the welfare of... a free society.” It is precisely because of the press’s importance in the marketplace of ideas that the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the bedrock First Amendment principle that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.” Accordingly, the Court has repeatedly reinforced the basic notion that the press must be afforded at least as much access to information as the general public.

These principles challenge the fundamental assumptions underlying the FAA’s ban on commercial UAS use as that ban is applied to journalists. The FAA’s proposed rules would allow the general public, in the form of hobbyists, to fly camera-mounted UASs and record public events, but would prohibit the exact same behavior by journalists because the journalists’ use is commercial. Such a distinction is constitutionally infirm because it acts to

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146 Id. at 684–85; Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). Indeed, these cases stand for the proposition that the government may exclude the press from any venue from which the public is also excluded. The converse—that the press may not be excluded from venues accessible to the public—is equally valid.
147 As discussed above, videography and photography are an increasingly important part of newsgathering. See supra Part II.
place greater restrictions on journalists’ access to information than the general public’s. At a minimum, government regulations that burden speech activity cannot favor the general public over the press.\textsuperscript{148}

Thus, the FAA’s proposed rules banning commercial UAS use, combined with its assertion that journalistic uses are inherently commercial, acts to exclude journalists from a newsgathering venue that is otherwise open to the public. Such a distinction rests on dubious constitutional grounds. Moreover, as explained in the next section, the FAA’s attempt to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial activity is unavailing in the context of First Amendment–protected activities.

2. Commercial newsgathering remains protected speech.

A central problem with the FAA’s purported ban is that it subsumes journalistic activity under the umbrella category of commercial activity. The Agency’s proposed regulatory structure assumes that commercial speech activities—including journalism—are subject to greater control. But, for the purposes of the First Amendment, this assumption is fatally flawed. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that “a speaker’s rights are not lost merely because compensation is received.”\textsuperscript{149} In \textit{Riley v. National Federation of the Blind}, the Court considered a state licensing provision that required professional fundraisers to acquire a license before engaging in solicitation, but allowed volunteer fundraisers to solicit without a license.\textsuperscript{150} The Court rejected the state’s argument that it had an interest in licensing professional fundraisers, noting that the “power to license professional fundraisers carries with it (unless properly constrained) the power to directly and substantially alter the speech they utter.”\textsuperscript{151} The Court explicitly acknowledged that “a speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is paid to speak.”\textsuperscript{152} Indeed, common sense supports the notion that the government cannot regulate the speech of the \textit{New York Times} simply because the newspaper is a profit-making enterprise. If the act of receiving compensation abrogated First Amendment protection, such protection would largely cease to exist.

Moreover, the \textit{sale} of First Amendment–protected materials is also protected.\textsuperscript{153} For example, in \textit{New York Times Co. v. Sullivan}, the paper published a full-page advertisement that accused state officials in Alabama of using violence and intimidation tactics against civil rights activists.\textsuperscript{154} The advertisement contained a public appeal for funds and support for the civil

\textsuperscript{148} See \textit{Branzburg}, 408 U.S. at 684–85.
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Bery v. City of New York}, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996).
rights movement.155 An Alabama official brought a libel suit against the activists and the New York Times, alleging that his reputation had been harmed by false statements contained in the advertisement.156 The official argued that the paper could not rely on the First Amendment for protection because the allegedly libelous statements were “published as part of a paid, commercial advertisement.”157 Though the Court had previously recognized that “commercial” speech is entitled to lessened First Amendment protection,158 the Court held that the advertisement “was not a commercial advertisement . . . [because it] communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.”159 The Court explicitly recognized that the paper’s acceptance of financial compensation for the advertisement did not magically transform otherwise core political speech into commercial speech.

The Court has continued to recognize that compensated speech remains protected under the First Amendment. After all, “[i]f a newspaper’s profit motive were determinative, all aspects of its operations—from the selection of news stories to the choice of editorial position—would be subject to regulation if it could be established that they were conducted with a view toward increased sales.”160 In fact, compensation can be a key driver of valuable expressive content.161 As the Bery court recognized, without some form of financial compensation, often speakers “would not have engaged in the protected expressive activity.”162 Many authors, painters, and photographers

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155 Id. at 257.
156 Id. at 258–60.
157 Id. at 265.
158 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 758 (1976) (modifying Valentine and recognizing a lessened protection for “commercial speech”). The Court has repeatedly stated that commercial speech in the form of advertisements is entitled to lessened protection. But these cases focus on the contents of the advertisement – price, descriptions, required disclaimers – as part of consumer protection measures. The Court has never held that compensated speech can be classified as “commercial speech.”
159 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988) (“Of course, the degree of First Amendment protection is not diminished merely because the newspaper or speech is sold rather than given away.”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (“The right to use the press for expressing one’s views is not to be measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge.”).
162 Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996).
engage in expressive conduct with the expectation of compensation. The FAA’s position, if accepted, would serve to undermine the creation of valuable speech by infirming the speakers’ ability to be compensated for his or her work. Such a position is completely at odds with the First Amendment and would impose a significant burden, not only on speakers, but also on the public’s ability to receive their speech.\textsuperscript{163}

Thus, the FAA’s ban on the use of UASs for commercial purposes, as applied to journalists and citizens engaging in journalistic activity, runs squarely afoul of core First Amendment principles. Whether a speaker is compensated for his or her speech is simply irrelevant under the First Amendment. Any other approach would permit the government to censor newspapers, book publishers, or any other for-profit entity engaging in even the most protected speech, solely on the basis that they profit from the dissemination of speech. As such, the FAA’s assertion that it can place more onerous regulations on journalists if their activities are commercial is erroneous. In short, whether newsgathering is for profit or not is simply irrelevant for the purposes of determining the scope of First Amendment protections.

3. Photography and videography constitute speech under the First Amendment.

As discussed above, professional journalists and private citizens have long relied on photography, and later videography, as part of the newsgathering and reporting processes.\textsuperscript{164} Thus, it is important to recognize that photography and videography play an increasingly vital role in core First Amendment–protected journalistic activities and are entitled to First Amendment protection.

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”\textsuperscript{165} By its plain text, the Amendment bars only laws that abridge speech. But the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the First Amendment’s “protection does not end at the spoken or written word.”\textsuperscript{166} Though the Court has rightly rejected the idea that any and all conduct can be protected as speech, it has “acknowledged that conduct may be sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope” of the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{167} To this end, the Court has recognized that conduct designed to convey a message to an audience qualifies for First Amendment protections.\textsuperscript{168} Thus, to qualify for First Amendment protection, a

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\textsuperscript{163} See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468–70. \\
\textsuperscript{164} See supra Part II. \\
\textsuperscript{165} U.S. CONST. amend. I. \\
\textsuperscript{166} Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). \\
\textsuperscript{167} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{168} See, e.g., id. at 405-06 (recognizing flag burning as expressive First Amendment conduct); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (holding that students’ wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam war qualified as}
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person must show that he has a message to be communicated and an audience for that message, regardless of the medium through which the message is communicated.169

Though the Court has not explicitly addressed photographers’ and videographers’ First Amendment right to record public events, the Court has recognized that “[p]hotography, painting, and other two-dimensional forms of artistic reproduction . . . are plainly expressive activities that ordinarily qualify for First Amendment protection.”170 In fact, visual depictions can be a particularly powerful speech medium because they “have the power to transcend . . . language limitations and reach beyond a particular language group to both the educated and the illiterate.”171 As such, “[v]isual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.”172 Thus, photographs and videos have the unique ability to communicate ideas and concepts beyond the written word and are entitled to the full range of First Amendment protections.

For example, in Bery v. City of New York, the plaintiffs challenged a city ordinance that barred the sale of any non-food items in a public space without a vendor license.173 The ordinance exempted vendors of newspapers, books, and other written materials from the licensing requirement.174 A group of visual artists challenged the ordinance on First Amendment grounds.175 The city argued that the artists’ works were merely “merchandise,” devoid of communicative content.176 The Second Circuit flatly rejected this argument, noting that “[s]uch a myopic vision not only overlooks case law central to First Amendment jurisprudence but fundamentally misperceives the essence of visual communication and artistic expression.”177 In rejecting the city’s argument, the court recognized a broad First Amendment protection for visual depictions, including photographs.178 Thus, it is the communicative properties

protected expression); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966) (holding that a sit-in by African Americans in a “whites only” area to protest segregation is protected conduct).


171 Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996).

172 Id.

173 Id. at 692.

174 Id.

175 Id.

176 Id. at 695.

177 Id.

178 Id. at 696 (“[P]aintings, photographs, prints and sculptures, such as those appellants seek to display and sell in public areas of the City, always communicate some idea or concept to those who view it, and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection.”).
of photography and videography that are the key to their First Amendment protection.

In fact, courts have only recognized one type of photography that does not fall within the ambit of First Amendment protection: personal, recreational, non-communicative photography.\textsuperscript{179} In \textit{Larsen v. Fort Wayne Police Department}, the plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest following an altercation related to the plaintiff’s desire to videotape his daughter’s choir performance.\textsuperscript{180} The choir’s booster group had contracted with a professional videography company to record the show, intending to sell copies of the video for fundraising.\textsuperscript{181} Because the group wanted to be able to sell videos of the performance, no other photography or videography was permitted during the performance.\textsuperscript{182} When the plaintiff argued that he had a right to videotape his daughter’s performance, he was asked to leave and was ultimately arrested when he refused. The plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim, arguing that his First Amendment rights were violated.\textsuperscript{183} Though the court agreed that videography is entitled to First Amendment protection, it rejected the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim because the plaintiff only wanted to record the performance for his own private, personal use and not to convey any message.\textsuperscript{184} The importance of the \textit{Larsen} court’s analysis lies in its easy recognition that videography is entitled to First Amendment protection. The plaintiff’s claim failed only because he asserted that he had no intention of communicating his video to any audience, but rather intended it only for his own personal use.

Finally, several recent cases reaffirm that photography and videography are key parts of the speech process and indispensable to the dissemination of information, particularly in regards to events of public concern.\textsuperscript{185} Several circuits have upheld citizens’ and journalists’ rights to record public events in public places. For example, the ACLU of Illinois planned to institute a “police accountability program,” which involved making audiovisual recordings of police officers performing their official duties in public places, such as during

\textit{See also} W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind.”).\textsuperscript{179} \textit{See} Larsen v. Fort Wayne Police Dep’t, 825 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980 (N.D. Ind. 2010); Porat v. Lincoln Towers Cmty. Ass’n, No. 04-civ-3199, 2005 WL 646093, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005).

\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Larsen}, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 968–73.

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Id.} at 968.

\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Id.} at 973-74

\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Id.} at 979–80.

\textsuperscript{185} Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
traffic stops and at public gatherings.\footnote{186} At the time, Illinois law contained an eavesdropping statute that made it a felony to make an audio recording of any conversation unless all parties to the conversation gave their consent.\footnote{187} The statute imposed enhanced penalties of up to fifteen years in prison if one of the parties to the conversation was a law enforcement officer.\footnote{188} The ACLU sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute, alleging that the eavesdropping statute, as applied to the ACLU’s accountability program, impermissibly infringed on First Amendment activity.\footnote{189}

The State of Illinois staked out the extreme position that “openly recording what police officers say while performing their duties in traditional public forums—streets, sidewalks, plazas, and parks—is \textit{wholly unprotected} by the First Amendment.”\footnote{190} The Seventh Circuit recognized the extraordinary reach of such a position, which would essentially ban videography, or even note taking, at any public event.\footnote{191} Further, the court recognized the important principle that “[t]he act of \textit{making} an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording.”\footnote{192} The court reasoned that “laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in the speech process” and concluded that restrictions on activities early in the speech process—for example, newsgathering activities—necessarily infringed on the speaker’s subsequent ability to communicate.\footnote{193} Thus, bans on audio or audiovisual recordings can act to suppress the resulting dissemination of information and therefore cannot be readily disaggregated from the act of speech itself. As the Ninth Circuit stated,

The process of expression through a medium has never been thought so distinct from the expression itself that we could disaggregate Picasso from his brushes and canvas, or that we could value Beethoven without the benefit of strings and woodwinds. In other words, we have never seriously questioned that the processes of writing words down on paper, painting a picture, and playing an instrument are purely expressive activities entitled to full First Amendment protection.\footnote{194}

Thus, the First Amendment broadly protects photography and videography as speech that is intended to convey a message. Courts have routinely

\footnote{186}{ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012).}
\footnote{187}{Id.}
\footnote{188}{Id.}
\footnote{189}{Id.}
\footnote{190}{Id. at 594.}
\footnote{191}{Id. at 595–96.}
\footnote{192}{Id. at 595.}
\footnote{193}{Id. at 596 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010)).}
\footnote{194}{Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010).}
recognized the communicative value of visual depictions. Video, of course, offers a powerful medium for journalists and citizens to convey messages, especially in conjunction with social media and the Internet. As discussed above, media outlets increasingly look to citizen journalists for content, and UASs equipped with video cameras offer these citizens the ability to contribute to the news process in ways they never could previously. And, as this discussion establishes, the creation of audio and audiovisual recordings is entitled to the full range of First Amendment protections as part and parcel of the act of disseminating those recordings. Accordingly, the FAA’s purported ban on aerial photography, under the label of commercial activity, implicates core First Amendment–protected activities.

B. The FAA’s Proposed Regulatory Scheme Violates the First Amendment

Having established that the FAA’s proposed regulatory scheme targets activity within the scope of the First Amendment, we must question whether it does so permissibly. As the above discussion establishes, the act of recording public events is intimately connected with the act of disseminating information about those events and the FAA’s distinction between aerial photography for recreation and for profit is unavailing. We are left to consider whether the FAA’s restrictions can be constitutionally justified, despite effectively banning aerial photography or videography for journalistic purposes. We argue that they cannot.

1. The FAA’s regulations impermissibly restrict speech in public forums.

The FAA has asserted that no party may use UASs in the national airspace without explicit authorization. The Agency’s proposed regulatory scheme requires all civil users of UASs to obtain an airworthiness certificate. But the FAA has refused to issue these certificates except for a narrow class of “experimental” uses: research and development, marketing surveys, or crew training. As we discussed previously, the requirements imposed by these certificates effectively render journalistic uses of UASs impossible because applicants must detail, in advance, the number of proposed flights, the time the flights will take place, and a description of the physical location in which the flights will take place. Because journalists cannot possibly provide this kind of information in advance, they are effectively barred from using UASs for journalistic purposes under the FAA’s proposed regulatory scheme.

Traditionally, the Supreme Court has looked to the nature of the forum the speaker wishes to employ in order to ascertain what limits on speech will be

195 See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
196 2007 Notice, supra note 20.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
permissible. The Court has identified three basic types of forums: the traditional public forum, the limited public forum, and the nonpublic forum. It is important to note, here, that our analysis is focused on journalistic uses of UASs in public places. We do not argue that journalists should be permitted special access rights to private property or other restricted sites. Instead, our focus in this article is on journalistic uses of UASs to record events of public interest that occur in publicly accessible places—the type of events that most implicate First Amendment protections. Supreme Court precedent has long recognized that public streets, parks, sidewalks, and the like are archetypal traditional public forums. Because these traditional public forums are historically important venues for the free exchange of ideas, speech occurring therein receives the highest protection under the First Amendment.

“In these quintessential public fora, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity.” Rather, the government may only restrict First Amendment–protected activity under narrowly proscribed circumstances. The Supreme Court has recognized two basic categories of restrictions on expression: content based and content neutral. Whether the restriction is content based or content neutral determines the level of scrutiny courts will subject it to. If the government wishes to restrict expression based on its content, “it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” However, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions are permitted, provided they “are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Content-neutral restrictions must be based on furthering a legitimate government interest other than disagreement with the message being conveyed by the speaker.

Thus, when evaluating government activity that infringes on speech, we...
must determine what type of forum is involved and evaluate the type of restriction to determine whether it passes constitutional muster. We argue that journalistic use of UAS technology for newsgathering in public places takes place in a traditional public forum. Because the FAA’s proposed regulatory structure is not a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction, we argue that it fails to stand up to constitutional scrutiny.

a. The airspace within a traditional public forum should also be considered a public forum.

Sidewalks, parks, and public streets are quintessential public forums because they are traditionally used for assembly and debate. The question facing journalists and citizens who wish to utilize UASs for newsgathering in public places is whether the airspace directly contiguous to a public forum also constitutes a public forum. If so, then the government cannot restrict speech activities, including aerial photography, without a sufficiently important interest and appropriately tailored regulations.

In Center for Bio-ethical Reform v. City and County of Honolulu, the Ninth Circuit held that the airspace above a public forum is not a public forum. The Center for Bio-ethical Reform wished to hire airplanes to tow aerial banners displaying graphic photographs of aborted fetuses over heavily populated beaches. The Center had used the aerial banner technique in other areas in an effort to further its antiabortion advocacy. Honolulu had a long-standing ban on aerial advertising that was designed to protect the aesthetics of the city’s beaches and, consequently, the city’s valuable tourism industry. When Honolulu refused to allow the Center to display its aerial banners, the Center brought suit, arguing that the city ordinance violated its First Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the airspace at issue was not a public forum on the grounds that the airspace was “physically separate from the ground or beaches, require[d] special equipment and authorization for access, and has never typically been a locus of expressive activity.”

Though the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Center for Bio-ethical Reform can superficially be read to categorically determine that airspace is a nonpublic forum, upon closer examination the facts are readily distinguishable. Center for Bio-ethical Reform dealt with manned aircraft, which necessarily must fly

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210 Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2006).
211 Id. at 916.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 922-23.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 919–20.
in navigable airspace above 500 feet in altitude.\textsuperscript{216} Though the Ninth Circuit may be correct that the airspace in which passenger planes travel is not a public forum, the opinion offers little help when determining whether the airspace directly contiguous to a public forum—i.e., fifty feet above a public sidewalk—is also a public forum.

When determining whether an area contiguous to a public forum is itself a public forum, the Supreme Court has focused on the degree of physical separation between the two. In \textit{United States v. Grace}, the Court held that the sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds were public forums for First Amendment purposes.\textsuperscript{217} At the time of that case, U.S. law prohibited the “display of any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization or movement” on the grounds of the U.S. Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{218} Two protestors who were removed for picketing on the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court’s grounds brought suit, arguing that the law violated their First Amendment rights.\textsuperscript{219} The central issue facing the Court was whether the public sidewalks surrounding the Court’s grounds were public forums for the purposes of the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{220} The Court reasoned that the sidewalks were “indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C.”\textsuperscript{221} The Court focused on the fact that there was physical separation between the sidewalks surrounding the Court’s grounds and other sidewalks in Washington D.C.\textsuperscript{222} In so doing, the Court distinguished its prior case, \textit{Greer v. Spock}, in which it held that sidewalks inside an enclosed military base were separated from other sidewalks, and thus, a nonpublic forum. Therefore, the Court’s public forum analysis focuses on whether the space at issue is distinguishable from a traditional public forum.

Under this framework, the airspace occupied by small UASs above a public forum should be considered as \textit{within} the public forum. The immediate airspace above a park, for instance, is indistinguishable from the park itself. Indeed, it is best to think of a public forum in three dimensions. A public forum certainly has length and width measurements, but it also necessarily extends some height above the ground. Otherwise, the government could bar the use of banners, balloons, or tall signs, even in a public park, under the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\textsuperscript{216}] See 49 U.S.C. § 40,103(2)(b) (2012) (instructing the FAA to develop plans “for the use of the navigable airspace”); \textit{id.} § 40,102(32) (defining “navigable airspace” as “airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by [FAA] regulations”); 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (2014) (defining minimum safe altitudes as 500 feet over non-congested areas and 1,000 feet over congested areas).
\item[\textsuperscript{218}] \textit{id.} at 172-73.
\item[\textsuperscript{219}] \textit{id.} at 173–76.
\item[\textsuperscript{220}] \textit{id.} at 179.
\item[\textsuperscript{221}] \textit{id.}
\item[\textsuperscript{222}] \textit{id.}
\end{footnotes}
theory that the airspace above the park is a nonpublic forum. This would be a radical departure from established First Amendment jurisprudence.

Because of the relatively recent rise of UAS technology in civilian operation, courts have yet to confront this question. But “[o]ur public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression into one which grants the government the authority to restrict speech by fiat.” The purpose of the First Amendment’s guarantees would not be well served by a refusal to recognize new avenues of expression. Thus, the proper inquiry should focus on the broad characteristics of a traditional public forum as an avenue for expression and recognize that the airspace within a public forum should be categorized as a public forum in and of itself.

b. The FAA’s blanket ban on commercial use unconstitutionally restricts speech in public forums.

Because the airspace within a public forum should itself be considered a public forum, the government may only restrict the journalistic use of UAS technology with content-neutral regulations of the time, place, or manner of such use. Such regulations must be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,” and “leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” The FAA’s blanket ban on commercial use fails to meet this test.

The FAA’s ban is not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction. The FAA has made no attempt to regulate when and how a UAS may be used for aerial photography. The proposed ban does not differentiate between classes of UASs and their varying capabilities. Nor is the FAA’s commercial ban narrowly tailored to serve the Agency’s asserted interest in public safety. The line drawn by the FAA—receipt of compensation—is wholly unrelated to the safety of any particular use of a UAS. Under the FAA’s proposed rule, a

223 To be clear, we do not argue that the airspace above a public forum remains a public forum unto the heavens. Rather, we assert the modest proposal that public forums necessarily exist in three dimensions. As the rise of UAS technology opens new avenues for expression, courts need to recognize that speech need not be tethered to the ground to warrant First Amendment protection.


228 Id.

229 See id.
hobbyist could undertake the exact same flight and film the exact same event as a journalist, but only the journalist’s flight would be barred. The fact that the journalist received compensation for the flight does not make the flight any more or less safe than that of the hobbyist. Though we do not dispute that public safety is an important government interest, the FAA’s focus on commercial use is not tailored to achieving that interest. Finally, the FAA’s proposed regulations operate as a blanket ban on the use of UAS technology for journalistic purposes. This in no way leaves open alternative channels of communication.

It might be argued that the FAA’s ban on commercial use could be sustained on the grounds that journalists’ use of UASs incorporates both “speech” and “nonspeech” elements. In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court allowed the government to restrict nonspeech elements of otherwise expressive conduct if “a sufficiently important interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”\(^{230}\) Thus, “if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression” and “if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the interest,” the government may regulate the nonspeech elements of speech.\(^{231}\)

There is no indication that the FAA’s ban on commercial use is specifically targeted at suppressing expression. Rather, the FAA has consistently asserted an interest in public safety as its justification for the ban. As such, the FAA’s commercial ban could be viewed as an incidental restriction on journalists’ First Amendment rights. But even under this less stringent standard, the FAA’s ban fails to pass constitutional muster. A blanket commercial ban restricts substantially more speech activity than is necessary to ensure public safety—that is, it is overly broad. The FAA could easily place limits on the type of device used, on the time and location of the use, or on use in certain types of weather, or institute any number of other reasonable restrictions. Instead, the FAA has chosen to ban all commercial use. As discussed above, commercial use is not necessarily any more or less safe than noncommercial use. Accordingly, the FAA’s blanket ban fails even the more lenient O’Brien test.

2. The FAA’s regulations are an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.

Not only does the FAA’s proposed regulatory framework impermissibly restrict speech in a traditional public forum, but it also acts as a prior restraint on speech. As discussed in the previous section, the FAA’s framework acts to close traditional public forums to journalists by banning them from using UASs for journalistic purposes.\(^{232}\) Journalists are not even provided the opportunity to engage in the protected conduct; the ban operates prospectively.

The primary purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent the


\(^{231}\) Id. at 377.

\(^{232}\) See supra section IV.B.1.
government from placing restraints on speech prior to the act of speaking.\textsuperscript{233} The law is particularly suspicious of government actions that create prior restraints on speech because such restraints constitute “an immediate and irreversible sanction.”\textsuperscript{234} Where after-the-fact penalties, such as defamation suits, act to restrict speech, they do so only after “the whole panoply of protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted.”\textsuperscript{235} In contrast, prior restraints constitute “the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights” because they stop speech before it happens.\textsuperscript{236} These restraints lack any of the particularized procedural safeguards that after-the-fact penalties feature because the speaker is never given the opportunity to defend his particular message.\textsuperscript{237} Because of this feature, prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{238} The government bears the heavy burden of justifying any prior restraint on expressive activity.\textsuperscript{239}

Courts have recognized that government regulations that serve to deny access to a forum constitute prior restraints.\textsuperscript{240} Similarly, if the government requires parties to seek permission prior to engaging in protected activity, it is a prior restraint.\textsuperscript{241} The FAA’s proposed regulatory scheme requires civil operators to apply for airworthiness certificates—effectively permits—before using UASs for aerial photography or videography.\textsuperscript{242} But, because the FAA heavily restricts the issuance of such permits,\textsuperscript{243} the Agency has effectively closed the forum for journalistic purposes. This type of restriction runs squarely afoul of the Supreme Court’s prior restraint jurisprudence. And, though the Court has recognized that the government may require permits prior to the use of a public forum, any permitting scheme must comply with constitutional requirements.\textsuperscript{244}

If the government wishes to require permits before speech in a public forum, it can do so only after establishing “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite

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\textsuperscript{233} Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (“[I]t is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication.”).
\textsuperscript{234} Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
\textsuperscript{235} Id.
\textsuperscript{236} Id.
\textsuperscript{237} Id.
\textsuperscript{238} Id.
\textsuperscript{239} Id.
\textsuperscript{240} Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A prior restraint of expression exists when the government [denies] access to a forum before the expression occurs.”) (quoting United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2000)).
\textsuperscript{242} See 2007 Notice, supra note 20.
\textsuperscript{243} Id.
\textsuperscript{244} Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 130.
\end{flushleft}
standards for [permitting] officials to follow."\textsuperscript{245} The absence of such standards invites arbitrary application and censorship.\textsuperscript{246} Moreover, any justifications offered by the government in support of a prior restraint cannot be based on "surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result" from the expressive conduct.\textsuperscript{247} In \textit{Forsyth County}, the Court considered a challenge to a city permit scheme that required parade organizers to help defray the costs of road closing and extra law enforcement personnel for their parades with a fee that ranged up to $1000 per day.\textsuperscript{248} The problematic part of the permit scheme was that the county administrator was allowed to set the actual amount of the fee on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{249} The county did not set any standards by which the administrator was to calculate the fee and required no explanation after the fact.\textsuperscript{250} The Supreme Court held that, while the county was justified in charging a permit fee, the county’s scheme vested too much discretion in the administrator.\textsuperscript{251} Without some objective, articulable standards to restrict the administrator’s discretion, the permit regulation allowed the administrator to “encourag[e] some views and discourag[e] others through the arbitrary application of fees.”\textsuperscript{252}

The FAA asserts that civil UAS operators, including journalists, must seek permission of the Agency before engaging in aerial photography or videography.\textsuperscript{253} And yet, the FAA has not undertaken the burdensome task of establishing “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards”\textsuperscript{254} that would serve to constrain the discretion of Agency personnel. Such standards must necessarily be reasonable and not overly broad. In the absence of such standards, the Agency’s prior restraint on expressive activity fails to survive constitutional scrutiny.

The FAA’s lack of articulated standards is compounded by the Agency’s overall approach to regulation in this area, which has relied on the use of Agency threats in an attempt to enforce quasi-regulatory mechanisms like its 2007 policy notice.\textsuperscript{255} Rather than proceeding through notice-and-comment

\textsuperscript{245} Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
\textsuperscript{246} \textit{Forsyth Cnty.}, 505 U.S. at 131 ("If the permit scheme involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion by the licensing authority, the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great to be permitted.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
\textsuperscript{248} \textit{Forsyth Cnty.}, 505 U.S. at 126.
\textsuperscript{249} \textit{Id.} at 133.
\textsuperscript{250} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{252} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{253} \textit{See} 2007 \textit{Notice, supra} note 20.
\textsuperscript{254} \textit{See} Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
\textsuperscript{255} On agency threats as a mode of regulatory action, see Tim Wu, \textit{Agency Threats}, 60
rulemaking as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, the FAA has opted to pursue an ad hoc cease-and-desist approach in which it brings enforcement actions against UAS operators engaged in First Amendment activities on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{256} While such an approach is problematic from an administrative law perspective, it is even more troubling in the context of the important First Amendment principles at stake. The Supreme Court has recognized that two discrete due process concerns arise when the government acts to regulate parties without giving adequate notice of what conduct, precisely, is prohibited: “first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so that they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.”\textsuperscript{257} “When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those [notice] requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.”\textsuperscript{258}

Specifically, the Court has recognized that vague or unclear regulations, by their very nature, inhibit speech by causing citizens to err on the side of caution in order to avoid potential transgressions.\textsuperscript{259} Thus, “[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”\textsuperscript{260} As the Court has routinely held, government regulations that burden speech must clearly inform the public as to what conduct, specifically, is prohibited.\textsuperscript{261} Far from meeting its burden in this instance, the FAA has undertaken an ad hoc enforcement strategy that leaves journalists and the general public uncertain about what they may and may not do with UASs. Such confusion was demonstrated in the case of the \textit{Dayton Business Journal} in April 2014.\textsuperscript{262} There, a private citizen took video footage of a fire in Dayton, Ohio using his personal UAS and offered to donate the footage to the newspaper for publication on its website.\textsuperscript{263} Though the private citizen received no financial compensation and was not otherwise

\textsuperscript{258} Id.
\textsuperscript{259} Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
\textsuperscript{260} Id.
\textsuperscript{261} NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963) (“[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression . . . . Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”).
\textsuperscript{262} Navera, \textit{supra} note 135. \textit{See supra} Part III.C.
\textsuperscript{263} Navera, \textit{supra} note 135.
affiliated with the paper, an FAA spokesperson nonetheless informed the paper that it should “err on the side of caution” and not publish the footage.264

The Dayton case is particularly concerning. The media’s constitutional right to publish information it obtains lawfully—even if the source obtained the information unlawfully—is a bedrock principle of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.265 Nonetheless, the confusion engendered by the FAA’s ad hoc approach has muddled even this fundamental principle. The Dayton newspaper, as the regulated party, was clearly uncertain as to the propriety of publishing the video it obtained from a private citizen. Furthermore, the Agency’s response cannot be viewed as anything other than an arbitrary restriction. Even the Agency’s own public policy statements acknowledge hobbyists’ rights to operate UASs for noncommercial purposes. Yet the Agency threatened the paper with legal action if it decided to go ahead with publication—a classic prior restraint on publication. This is precisely the type of arbitrary Agency action that proper notice-and-comment rulemaking is designed to prevent and that the FAA’s ad hoc regulatory approach encourages.

As the above discussion establishes, the FAA’s proposed regulatory framework is nothing less than a prior restraint on speech. The Agency has failed to articulate a set of clear, non-arbitrary standards that would serve to limit the discretion of Agency personnel. And as the Dayton example demonstrates, Agency personnel have been acting to prohibit the publication of material legally obtained by journalists—an archetypal case of prior restraint. The vague and uncertain status of the regulations governing UAS use facilitates such arbitrary and illegal action by the FAA and must be addressed.

3. The FAA’s overly broad definitions and reasoning lead to infringements by other agencies.

As we have demonstrated, the FAA has taken enforcement actions that violate the First Amendment. Now, other agencies have begun to adopt the FAA’s overly broad definitions of RCMAs as aircrafts and have subjected RCMAs to any and all Agency regulation without notice-and-comment rulemaking. Thus, the FAA’s reasoning has also resulted in other agencies taking enforcement actions that are clear violations of the First Amendment.

The most egregious example comes from the National Park Service (“NPS”). In seeking to ban the use of UASs in national parks, the NPS has decided to ignore the Code of Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”) definition of aircraft as “a device that is used or intended to be used for human flight in the

264 Id.

265 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 713-14 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing to enjoin the media from publishing a classified study of the Vietnam War). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527–35 (2001) (upholding the media’s right to publish information it lawfully obtained, even when the ultimate source obtained the information unlawfully).
air, including powerless flight.”

Instead, the NPS has sought to adopt the FAA’s broader definition, which includes any “device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air,” thereby abandoning the “human flight” element of the NPS definition. As a result, the NPS is able to argue that “aircraft” includes unmanned aircraft, which in turn, it says includes “radio controlled aircraft” and “model aircraft.”

Of course, this is precisely the definition that was rejected by the administrative law judge in the Pirker decision, but ultimately upheld by the full NTSB Board on appeal.

The NPS believes that it can abandon its own definition in favor of the FAA definition because the C.F.R. states that, “[t]he use of aircraft shall be in accordance with regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Such regulations are adopted as a part of these [NPS] regulations.” This incorporation of FAA regulations by reference also serves as the basis of the Agency’s reasoning that it can ban UASs in national parks. But, by incorporating FAA definitions and policies by reference, the NPS has also adopted the overly broad and vague nature of those definitions and policies. For example, the definitions employed by the NPS differ from national park to national park. Additionally, the Grand Canyon, Zion, and Yosemite each have slightly different policies, some claiming that certain uses of UASs are allowed, others that all uses are prohibited; some relying on the NPS C.F.R. definition of aircraft, others relying on the FAA definition.

Moreover, the Fire and Aviation Management web page for the NPS uses the FAA definition of aircraft, not the NPS definition. But unlike the FAA and some (but not all) of the individual national park policies, it does not specifically include RCMAs in its list of UASs covered by the FAA definition.

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266 36 C.F.R. § 1.4(a) (2014) (emphasis added).


268 See discussion supra section III.A.

269 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(d) (2014). But, as Greg McNeal has argued, this only gives the NPS the ability to incorporate by reference rules for aircraft use, not the FAA definition of aircraft, for which this agency has its own definition. See Greg McNeal, Yosemite Looks to Ban Drones by Relying on an Absurd Legal Argument, FORBES (May 3, 2014, 3:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/05/03/yosemite-looks-to-ban-drones-but-the-law-is-not-on-their-side/ (archived at http://perma.cc/753Q-S9MS); McNeal, supra note 267.

267 Id.

270 Id.

271 Id.


273 Id.
Given its adoption of the FAA’s overly broad and vague definitions and policies, it should come as no surprise that NPS enforcement actions have also resulted in infringements of First Amendment rights. In the most disturbing example, the individual in question was, once again, none other than Raphael Pirker. This incident took place before the case now under appeal to the National Transportation Safety Board. In this prior case, park rangers at the Grand Canyon demanded that Pirker delete video footage he had taken with his small UAS. After rangers threatened to get a search warrant, Pirker turned the video over to the rangers. Park officials demanded the deletion or confiscation of the video footage taken by Pirker for the express purpose of preventing it from being published on the Internet because, as the citation report in the case notes, officials worried that the video could “invite additional individuals to replicate these prohibited flight maneuvers within Grand Canyon National Park.” Even after Pirker paid a civil penalty of $325, which should have ended the matter, authorities still refused to return the video to him. Of special note here is that at no time did park officials confiscate Pirker’s UAS itself. They were only keen to confiscate the video taken by the UAS. This is a textbook example of a prior restraint on publication.

Thus, the FAA’s overly broad definitions, vague policies, and attempts to implement a blanket ban on UASs in contravention of the required notice-and-comment rulemaking process are dangerous, not only when the FAA seeks to enforce its ban against First Amendment–protected activities, but also because other government agencies adopt these definitions and policies and then engage in the same rights-infringing activities.

275 See id.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id. As of this writing, the video in question has still not been returned to Pirker. Instead of returning the memory card on which the video was contained, officials sent Pirker an inferior memory card and indicated that they would not be returning the original card and its contents. Id.
282 See Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that police officers’ confiscation of videographer’s camera and film was unconstitutional prior restraint on speech); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Minn. 1972) (“[T]he seizure and holding of the camera and undeveloped film was an unlawful ‘prior restraint’ whether or not the film was ever reviewed.”).
V. CONCLUSION

In this article, we have focused on the First Amendment implications of the FAA’s attempt to ban the use of UASs for commercial purposes. Though the use of drones by the military has garnered a lot of attention from the public, the press, policymakers, and scholars, less attention has been paid to the legal issues surrounding the domestic use of this technology. When the discussion does turn to domestic use of UASs, the focus has thus far been on issues related to privacy or administrative law. But as we have demonstrated in the preceding pages, there are significant First Amendment implications to the way in which the FAA chooses to fulfill its congressional mandate to promulgate rules for the integration of UASs into the domestic airspace.

Thus far, the FAA approach has been much too broad and draconian. Its current, working definition of a UAS makes no distinctions between the radically different types of devices that make up this category. The FAA’s only basis for distinction when making enforcement decisions is the type of user and the use of the device. But here again, the FAA’s three categories—public, civil, and recreational—are much too broad. The result has been a purported ban on all commercial or business use of UASs, again, broadly defined. Through its enforcement actions and public statements, the FAA has made it clear that it believes that journalism is an inherently commercial activity, and thus, any use of a UAS for photography or newsgathering, even if the vehicle used is the same as those allowed for recreational purposes, is banned or subject to a restrictive government licensing scheme. As such, we have argued that the FAA’s purported ban is an unconstitutional restriction of speech in a public forum. Additionally, we have argued that the requirement to seek prior FAA authorization for the use of UASs for First Amendment–protected activities constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.

As it moves to meet its congressional mandate to promulgate regulations for domestic use of UASs, the FAA must take a much more nuanced approach to defining the technological artifacts, users, and uses it seeks to regulate if it is to avoid running afoul of the Constitution. First, technologically, the universe of what the FAA is calling a UAS is much too broad for a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation. Styrofoam RCMA and toy quadcopters with cameras are not the same as Predators, just as ultralight aircraft and balloons are not the same as jumbo jets. Though the current C.F.R. regulations recognize the differences between vehicles in the latter set and thus regulate them differently, to date the FAA has not recognized the obvious and consequential differences between the wide spectrum of vehicles in the UAS category. It must do this if it is to create fair and effective regulations.

283 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
284 See supra section III.B.
285 See supra section III.B.
286 See discussion supra section III.C.
Second, the Agency must also define users and uses in a much more nuanced way. Just as all devices are not the same, neither are all uses and users currently lumped under the civil aircraft category the same. As we have noted, the most problematic uses and users lumped under this category include photography and newsgathering carried out by private citizens and professionals alike. Not only are these uses and users not the same as delivering beer or packages, they are also not treated the same way under the Constitution, which provides special protections for newsgathering activities.

Luckily, the FAA’s 2007 policy statement tacitly acknowledges that its current categories of uses and users may be too broad and anticipates the potential creation of a new category that could account for commercial use of RCMAs. Devices in this category could be defined by the operator’s visual line of sight and are also small and slow enough to adequately mitigate hazards to other aircraft and persons on the ground. The end product of this analysis may be a new flight authorization instrument similar to AC 91-57, but focused on operations which do not qualify as sport and recreation, but also may not require a certificate of airworthiness.288

Indeed, the broad contours offered here to describe this potential category could serve as the basis for constructing more reasonable restrictions on the use of UASs. These restrictions would be narrowly tailored enough to pass constitutional muster because they would be directly related to the Agency’s compelling interest in promoting the safety of the national airspace, unlike its blanket ban on commercial activity, which we have argued is irrelevant to this interest. For example, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the use of UASs, even for First Amendment-protected activities, could include the following:

- **Time:** Restrictions related to time of day, weather conditions, emergency situations, etc.
- **Place:** Restrictions related to flights over crowds, near airports, over military bases, etc.
- **Manner:** Restrictions related to the weight of the device, the speed and altitude of its operation, the distance it can be flown from the operator (e.g., a visual line of sight requirement), etc.

In any case, when contemplating potential restrictions, the FAA should take First Amendment-protected uses into account and work with relevant stakeholder groups. So far, however, the FAA response to these uses and users has been a mixed bag, though there is some room for optimism. In May 2014, Jim Williams, the head of the FAA’s unmanned systems office, indicated that the Agency is several years from promulgating rules for the kinds of small UASs most often used by journalists.289 Though he did indicate that the

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289 John Goglia, FAA Official’s Comments Indicate Legalizing Small Commercial Drone Operations Long Way Off, FORBES (May 9, 2014, 7:50 PM),
Agency would seek to work within provisions of FMRA 2012 that allow the FAA to make exceptions to its ban on a case-by-case basis, journalism was not, at that time, one of the “industries” that he identified for a possible exception, nor was the process for applying for an exemption transparent because there are no published guidelines for doing so. Williams also noted that the Agency would continue to take enforcement actions against those it believes are violating its prohibition against commercial use of the technology, meaning that future enforcement actions against those involved in First Amendment–protected activities with UASs is not out of the question.

By the beginning of 2015, however, there were two indications that the FAA had begun to alter its course and to take First Amendment–protected uses into account as it develops rules for small UASs. First, in mid January, CNN announced a partnership with Georgia Tech to test small drones for newsgathering with FAA approval. Then, three days later, a group of ten news media companies announced a similar deal, which would see them work with Virginia Tech at an FAA approved UAS test site to gather data on the safety aspects of using drones for journalism. Though some media outlets claimed that the era of legal drone journalism had finally arrived, the Columbia Journalism Review correctly noted that these deals do not, in fact, allow journalists to use drones in the field. Rather, the deals only allow the named companies and universities to engage in research at designated sites, and nothing more. Second, at the end of January, ESPN announced that it would air the first, live drone footage from a sporting event in the United States, all with FAA approval. However, this approval was only given because the
company is “operating in a closed-set environment... meaning no public access whatsoever.”

So, while the ESPN deal is a step forward, such “closed-set” requirements still make drone use impossible for most journalistic purposes.

Though these deals are a step in the right direction, the FAA needs to remember that the First Amendment protects not only large media organizations, but all citizens, including the amateur news gatherers and photographers who are becoming increasingly important to the collection and dissemination of vital information in our democracy. The First Amendment cannot be suspended while the Agency develops its rules for UASs. Therefore, in the meantime, the Agency should prioritize the drafting of an exception for small UASs used for newsgathering. Such a move would not be unprecedented. In fact, as various major media outlets note in their amicus brief filed in support of Raphael Pirker, “throughout modern lawmaking the federal government, and even the FAA itself in other contexts, has crafted laws and regulations to accommodate the First Amendment rights of journalists to gather that news and the public’s corresponding rights to receive information.” For example, the brief notes that even when the FAA restricts airspace due to disasters or other, similar situations, “accredited news media are expressly permitted to enter the area.”

Finally, and most importantly, the FAA needs to follow the law in making rules. It must be held to Administrative Procedure Act requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking so that stakeholders and the public have an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. Next, the Agency should also be held, as much as is practicable, to the timetable for promulgating rules that Congress gave it in FMRA 2012, which the Agency has so far admitted it will not meet. In the meantime, the FAA should refrain from acting on the temptation, driven by fear and uncertainty, to use Agency threats as a means to enforce quasi-regulatory mechanisms like its 2007 policy statement. The dangers of this regulatory approach are no mere matter of esoteric administrative law. Rather, as we have demonstrated, use of threats to enforce illegally promulgated rules, in particular a ban on journalistic use of UASs, infringes on perhaps our most cherished constitutional rights of free speech and a free press.


297 Id.


299 Id.