Send us a note to subscribe to Perspective.
& Political Parties: Interview with Boris Nemstov
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy
During his tenure as the governor of Nizhny Novgorod, beginning in 1991,
Boris Y. Nemtsov gained international renown as one of the most promising
young reformers and a possible successor to President Yel'tsin. In 1997
he was summoned to the Kremlin to become deputy prime minister (and later
first deputy prime minister) in Victor Chernomyrdin's government. After
Sergei Kirienko became prime minister, Boris Yefimovich continued in his
post, concentrating on curbing monopoly power and supervising the ceremonial
funeral of Nikolai II. He resigned his government position in the aftermath
of the ruble devaluation last August and went on to organize the coalition
called "Just Cause," which unites several democratic parties for
the upcoming Duma elections. Susan Cavan and I met with Boris Yefimovich
on February 8. We appreciate the courtesy of Harvard University's Davis
Center for Russian Studies in facilitating this interview. -- ML
Miriam Lanskoy: When you first entered the government you referred
to yourself as a "kamikaze." That was a term Gaidar used in '92
as well. What did you mean, that you would be swallowed up in intrigue or
that your measures would prove unpopular?
Boris Nemtsov: I had never been a bureaucrat before. I was elected
every time -- three times -- to my previous positions. I had some ideas
what Moscow's corridors of power would mean. I didn't know of any examples
of persons who spent some time in the White House in Moscow [and] who became
more popular than they were before the appointment. If you are popular before
Yel'tsin puts you in the White House, you immediately become unpopular.
If you are intelligent, your popularity will grow and then go down. If not,
it will happen immediately. That's why I used this term, "kamikaze."
Second, I didn't know about the underground scene inside the White House.
When I was in Nizhny Novgorod I believed that I knew, but I was mistaken,
I did not know. I did not understand what kind of pressure needed to be
put on Yel'tsin, on Chernomyrdin, and other persons [to accomplish one's
objectives]. I did not know what kind of treatment you would receive if
you did something wrong, for example from the oligarchs' point of view.
I couldn't even estimate the number of conflicts on the inside.
I feel, generally, that it is not so easy to be in Moscow for a long time
and to do something to stop some of the corrupt practices. And that's what
we did. My first real accomplishment was to alter the distribution of contracts
among suppliers to the government.
I instituted a system where public officials had to make full public disclosure
of their property and finances.
Susan Cavan: But only a few officials actually did that.
BN: No, thousands and thousands did: everybody except Luzhkov.
SC: Was anyone ever investigated?
BN: Sometimes, yes. You know this is not so bad. I knew there would
be wrong information -- bureaucrats are not so afraid about such things.
They would try to find some opportunity to overcome this difficulty. Finally
the independent press tried to investigate. Not everyone tried, but those
who were interested, like Berezovsky, tried to investigate this more carefully
and found a lot of things.
This is very important. This [trend toward disclosure] is impossible to
stop. How can you issue a decree now to abolish the financial disclosure?
How would you explain that to the public? We started it and it's impossible
to stop. If you have some elements of democracy, it is impossible to reverse
SC: What is
the role of public opinion now?
BN: Russia has independent mass media. What does it mean in Russia?
There are several groups, for example, the MOST-Media group, the Berezovsky
group, the Alekperov group, the Potanin group, the Luzhkov group and then
some independent papers, like Kommersant. (1) They have different
views on the same subject. And this is really the independence of the press.
But, within a group there is no independence. Within a group there is strong
control and discipline, like under the communist system. Fortunately we
have several groups and there is no monopoly in this area. Primakov tries
to control everything -- he's Soviet. (2) He is intelligent, experienced,
but Soviet. He wants to control everything. But it's not so easy. For example
he came to agreement with Vyakhirev and Gusinsky, but he has no idea how
to find compromise with Berezovsky.
ML: Primakov seems to have become more powerful in recent months
while Berezovsky's influence has declined. How did that come about?
BN: There are several rumors about the resignation of the prosecutor,
Yuri Skuratov, last week.(3) One of the quite realistic explanations is
that this is the result of Berezovsky's influence.
What is the source of Berezovsky's power? There is only one source -- he
has two, but the most influential is the First Channel (ORT). He always
uses ORT for his political purposes, for blackmail. If he wants to press
me, [present] me with specific views or demands, there will be a Sergei
Dosenko special on [the issue]. I don't think he is weak now, because he
has another source of power, his relationship with some people in the Kremlin,
like Yel'tsin's daughter [Tatiana Dyachenko]. That's why I don't think that
Berezovsky will decline.
ML: The explanation for extensive presidential power has been the
need to push through reform. But now Primakov has that power ...
BN: Can you give me examples of his strong power, examples of Primakov's
ML: He's chairing a meeting of the Security Council and they're expected
BN: No! Never! Never! He will be fired immediately after that. His
"treaty" will be neglected tomorrow. Forget about that! I know
that -- I looked into this very carefully. Yel'tsin is very envious about
anyone in the world who wants to cut his power, his own power. There are
three parts to Primakov's "treaty." First, the Duma has to stop
the impeachment process. Second, Yel'tsin will not dismiss the State Duma.
Third, Yel'tsin has no chance to fire the government. One is nothing for
Yel'tsin, because to organize impeachment is very complicated in Russia.
Second, to dismiss Duma -- he's not worried about that. But the third part,
when Primakov suggests to Yel'tsin 'don't fire me,' that is impossible.
Yel'tsin was so angry about that. Believe me; look at tomorrow's news. The
treaty will be about the first two parts. The third: Never.
SC: There were reports on Friday that Yel'tsin agreed to it at the
Security Council meeting.
BN: To what?
SC: The Primakov proposal.
BN: No, what kind of proposal ... the third one ?
BN: Don't fire the government ...
SC: All of them are in place until the next Duma elections.(4)
BN: This is another story. (Laughter) Let me explain. The Primakov
treaty had a very important chapter, that Yel'tsin can't touch Primakov
until the next presidential election. This is not the same. Now he can read,
"don't touch the bulk of the government until the Duma election."
That's a great idea. I totally agree. Because you know Primakov organized
a very stupid economic policy this year; to organize barter, to forget about
cash flow into the budget, and to print a huge amount of money. It is his
responsibility, what has happened with the Russian economy during these
few months. I absolutely agree with Yel'tsin. What is absolutely unbelievable,
and what is not going to happen, is Yel'tsin agreeing not to touch Primakov
up to 2000. That's another story you know.
I think that Yel'tsin has a chance to appoint his own successor. This is
his chance. He will try to use it. He will appoint a new prime minister
and the new prime minister will be his successor. This is Yel'tsin's view
-- I know him.
ML: Who would that person be?
BN: I know who it is not. (Laughter) Luzhkov it's not.
ML: Not Luzhkov ...
BN: Primakov, maybe, but he is not so lucky... maybe. There will
not be too many choices. This is the main thing now. The main struggle for
the next few months will be over who will be appointed prime minister after
the Duma elections. This is the main challenge for Russia.
Disunity Among Democrats
ML: Let's talk
about the Duma elections. It seems that the Democrats have the best chance
against the Communists if they are united. Why did you unite into a coalition
of parties rather than as a party?
BN: Well, it doesn't matter for the election; under Russian laws,
if you have a coalition, you also have a united list. The same thing happens
[with a coalition as] with a party. So, it doesn't matter. To organize a
united party is a very complicated task because we have a lot of small parties
who believe that people will love their courage. If you tell them "forget
about your supporters, let's organize some united party," it would
take a lot of time, a lot of discussion, a lot of trouble, and maybe some
of the parties you ask will never want to be together. But the coalition
is enough to take part [in the Duma election] as a united team.
The problem is not whether we run as a coalition or as a party. The problem
is what will happen with Yavlinsky and what will happen with "Our Home
is Russia." We have our coalition, "Just Cause." My view
is that, to win, we have to play together. Yavlinsky's view: Never.
ML: Why is that?
BN: "I'm the leader. I'm great and people love me and that's
why I'll be on my own forever" -- this is his view. This may be a bit
primitive way of putting it, but generally this is his view.
ML: Is that because Gusinsky will support him with money?
BN: Not money. Prospects, opportunities to have some use of TV and
regional branches. Gusinsky has a lot of regional branches, not only nationwide,
but regional branches. This is important.
Another explanation for Yavlinsky is that he doesn't want to have anything
to do with these guys who were in the government, who are responsible for
reform. That's why he is absolutely against Gaidar and Chubais. Their popularity
is low -- that is true. What is strange for me is that he is against Kirienko.
This is strange. The intelligentsia in Russia, the elite, has two problems
with Yavlinsky. First, he will never be responsible for anything. He is
in opposition to everything and he has no concrete task in his life. Second,
he has no ideas on how to organize coalitions. People are nervous about
I think that Yavlinsky needs us more than we need him. But he's against
this. Then if we will join them, I will [bring in] more votes. I am a symbol
of democratic reform -- but there is no movement from him in that direction.
ML: He was here in December and I asked him whether he would cooperate
with your coalition. He said he invited all of you into YABLOKO. (5)
BN: I'll explain to you how he did it. It's a funny story. He said,
"We won't let you into YABLOKO right away. First you have to be a candidate
member for five years." This is very offensive. Who is he that I should
be his candidate? He worked under me in Nizhny Novgorod. When he proclaimed
the idea that, "Boris, you can be a member after four years" --
this is impossible. Maybe, this is for you, so he can explain "I invited
[Nemtsov] to be a member of YABLOKO, but he refused." If he had said,
"Let's organize a coalition and YABLOKO will be our symbol," that
would be different.
ML: Well, what are you going to do about it?
BN: This is a bad joke -- candidate for four years. Probably, he
is afraid about his leadership. I'm not.
ML: Your coalition, then, does it have a regional structure?
BN: We have the coalition in 20 regions now. But the main task for
me, especially for me, is to define it structurally, with different members
taking the responsibility for different sections of the country. I'm responsible
in the Volga region and some Siberian regions like Krasnoyarsk krai and
so on. The main task is to organize the structure of the coalition.
SC: When you said 20 regions, did you mean that the governors or
members of the legislative council are in line?
BN: It's funny: Officials are not against us. Maybe they're afraid
of Chubais because he is chief of our electricity system,(6) or maybe there
is another reason. I don't know. They are always very pleased to meet us.
They are concerned about our public support. Deputies from regional parliaments,
they support us a lot; especially managers and new business representatives.
SC: I hate to press the point: When you say they support you, do
you mean that you have an office there with staff, or is it just that you've
heard from people...
BN: No, we have a much easier way of feeling their support: Governor
TV. The governor goes on a TV show about my visit to his region. "Governor
TV" means regional TV stations. If they show "Boris met with the
governor, they discussed this, this, and this. Then Boris gave a lecture
at the university" -- without any argument or discussion -- this means
I have their support. Offices don't really matter to us. TV is really the
ML: How powerful
is the Security Council and to what extent does that power depend upon who
is SC secretary? It seems that when Skokov was there it was very powerful
and since then it declined ...
BN: Unfortunately there is no legal foundation for the Security Council;
that's why everything depends upon personal politics and the personal position
of the Security Council secretary. Lebed was very powerful. That's why the
council was powerful at that time. Lebed was involved in the Chechnya war
and the peace treaty, and after that he was fired. Rybkin had no political
connection -- he was weak. That's why the council was weak. There is no
legislation about the Security Council. The only thing we have is the constitution,
which suggests the existence of such organization inside the Kremlin. But
there is not a law -- I think this is a problem. It all depends on underground
relationship with Yel'tsin, Tatiana, Yumashev and Bordyuzha.(7)
SC: That is an interesting point. Bordyuzha is both chief of staff
and head of the Security Council. Doesn't that give him significant power?
BN: Yes, but it's not enough. You have to be a political leader and
this is a problem -- to be a political leader and to stay in the Kremlin.
If you are not Yel'tsin, this is impossible.
SC: Some people manage it for awhile.
BN: Can you give me an example? I know of only one -- Lebed.
BN: No. He wasn't a political leader.
BN: I mean Secretary of Security Council. Bordyuzha does have much
more power than before. That's true, but that's not enough to solve big
questions like resolutions of the government, appointments for very important
SC: Do you have any idea why Yumashev was dismissed?
BN: Today Yel'tsin is at the funeral [for King Hussein of Jordan].
He went because he wants to show the world that he's powerful, he's in good
shape. I have my own view: Maybe it's just a joke. I think that when he
was in the hospital, he read the newspaper and noticed that he had no power,
that nobody paid any attention to him. Life was going in one direction and
Yel'tsin was staying in another hospital. Well, I think that he was so angry
about that he wanted to prove to the nation that he's a Russian tsar. How
to prove it? Fire somebody. If you fire some very small bureaucrat nobody
will notice. It was impossible to fire Primakov or somebody in his government.
What other choice did he have? To fire Dyachenko? That's why his choice
was his chief [of staff]. This is my explanation, maybe it's not true, but
ML: Let's look at some other instances of firing. When Chernomyrdin
was fired in March '98, what was the run-up? Were you involved in the decision
BN: I was not. Chernomyrdin made several very important mistakes.
His first mistake was when he reduced our power, I mean Chubais and myself.
When we got into office we did very efficient things. We reduced the inflation
rate; there was GDP growth, rate of incomes for people increased in that
year; foreign investment tripled; the situation in industry improved dramatically.
In the end of '97, Chernomyrdin was so afraid of the powerful assistants
that he decided to reduce our powers. And he did. He said "I am responsible
for the energy sector, I am responsible for this, this and this, and that."
ML: What led up to his firing?
BN: Yel'tsin was sick, like every time. In the middle of January
when we took a helicopter ride, Yel'tsin said to me "Boris, what is
happening with Chernomyrdin? Does he need more power, that he takes power
from Chubais and Nemtsov?" Yes, he did [take power away from us]. But
this was his mistake because he had no idea how to cooperate with the government.
We had all the power. He [Chernomyrdin ] would be responsible...for salaries,
His second mistake occurred in the United States when he met with Al Gore
and said "you and me, we'll define the future of our great nations
in the 21st century." Unbelievable! Unbelievably stupid! Of course,
Yel'tsin was shocked by this move. But I was not involved in this. Early
in the morning I was driving my car from the country, it was a Monday, and
Chubais called me in the car and said "Boris!" he was so excited
about this news, he said "Boris! I was fired just now! A few minutes
ago! But you're still in the government, we'll meet now in your office."
(Laughs) I had no idea about his resignation, really.
SC: What about the appointment of Sergei Kirienko?
BN: Well that's a funny story about the appointment of Kirienko.
I saw Kirienko the day before that, it was Sunday. He was my deputy, as
the Minister for Fuel and Energy. He is my guy, but if he had known about
his new appointment I would have noticed. He said nothing. We discussed
some very interesting things about the Unified Energy System, but he did
not know, I'm sure. Early the [next] morning he was invited to Yel'tsin's
SC: But who would have selected Kirienko? I mean, did Yel'tsin know
enough about everyone in the government to be able to say "Kirienko
is the one I want"?
BN: Yel'tsin saw Kirienko three times before. One time -- the 10th
of March, as far as I know -- I think it was in March, I was in Germany
and Kirienko called me and asked what kind of behavior was required of him
when meeting with Yel'tsin. Well, because I've known Yel'tsin for about
eight years, I gave him some advice about that. Up until then, there had
been no connection. I think that it was some discussion between Yumashev,
Dyachenko, Berezovsky, and some other oligarchs, maybe Chubais. The discussion
started in the middle of '97 about appointing a new chairman of the government,
but this was only talk.
SC: In March was there any awareness of what was coming down the
road -- the possible devaluation?
BN: We had a political task at that time: to get support from the
State Duma. As far as the financial situation is concerned, we paid more
attention to the stability of the [domestic indicators]. By then it was
too late; from my point of view we had to devalue the domestic currency
by the end of '97, immediately after the Indonesian and South Korean crises.
ML: Is it possible that Kirienko was set up to take the blame for
the economic crisis?
BN: No, I don't think so. I don't think that Russian bureaucrats
are so clever. Nobody had any ideas about the financial crisis. The first
time we discussed that was in the end of April with [US Deputy Treasury
Secretary] Larry Summers and [US Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs] David Lipton. They came by my office and we discussed,
not exactly devaluation, but the financial situation in the country, the
domestic and international debt, and general aspects of economy. Larry told
me at that time that the eastern crisis could affect the Russian economy
deeply and we would have to prepare something to defend against it.
SC: During April, before the actual confirmation, was the government
BN: No, no, we met. But when you have one task -- to get through
the State Duma -- you have to concentrate on that task. There were a lot
of meetings, a lot of discussions, but none of that really counted. It's
obvious. It's impossible to do two serious things at the same time. You
have to be concentrating on the subject. If you already know in general
what's happening in the economy, you can pick up on what is going on, but
you have to talk all the time to Zyuganov, to Yavlinsky, and with others.
And it's funny -- Yavlinsky was against us -- 100% against us.
SC: He supported Primakov.
BN: No, no. He was against us. Absolutely, 100%. Without any explanation.
SC: You had access to Yel'tsin, but didn't other ministers have to
go through someone to get access to Yel'tsin?
BN: Yes, yes. For one year. From March '97 to March '98. After that
no, there was no connection. Maybe also during the funeral days.
SC: What's the connection between the presidential apparat and the
government in decision making?
BN: It depends on the personal relationship between Yel'tsin's chief
of administration and the prime minister. This is absolutely an apparatchik
problem. For example, when Kirienko was appointed, he insisted that Yumashev
give him more freedom to deal with economic questions. A special decision
from the president's office determined how decrees should be prepared and
how such decisions would go through the system, the Kremlin administration.
It was a very important decision and we simplified the system dramatically.
Chernomyrdin's office would have to wait months for an important decree;
with Kirienko, two days was enough.
SC: In the Chernomyrdin government a decree traveled first to the
chief of staff and then...?
BN: When we were working in the Chernomyrdin government, we prepared
the decrees. In the Kirienko government we did the same. But Chubais told
me before that some decrees were prepared in the Kremlin administration,
including economic ones.
SC: When Chubais was chief of staff?
BN: He was hmm maybe at that time. I don't know exactly about that. Good
ML: The last question is on foreign policy. Sometimes there is such
an obvious difference between the Democrats and the Nationalists and Communists
in the domestic issues, like the budget.
The difference in foreign policy is not always so obvious.
ML: Is there a difference?
BN: Well, we have some differences and some similar positions. We
are against "NATO expansion." I think this is really a very terrible
decision from the NATO organization because Russia appears to be only a
small part of the international world. If you occupy the boundaries of Russia
with some organization, it looks like Russia is not part of the economy,
not a part of European peace, not part of international [peace].(9) This
is my explanation. The Communists' explanation is that NATO is our enemy
that wants to destroy the country. Nonetheless, both of us are against NATO
As far as Iraq, we have another position. We are against Hussein very much,
and of course, the Communists support Hussein. But we are against the American
position, not because we support Hussein, we are against him. But this is
very artificial. America organized a very strong alliance of United Nations
members around Hussein. He has become a hero once again. You don't destroy
Hussein! You do nothing! You organized very strong support for this gentleman.
ML: Would you support an all-out US effort to destroy Hussein?
BN: Well, that's better. Frankly, that's better. That's better than
bombing Iraq and nothing happening.
ML: How about Iran?
BN: I think we have a similar position with the Communists. We are
for cooperation with Iran but we are against the distribution or sale of
nuclear weapons that the Communists support. For example, the US State Department
insists that we stop any relationship with Iran. This is stupid. This is
business: Iran has a lot of oil resources, for example, our oil companies
want to invest money in Iran to take out oil. We are for competition. We
regret that the American government is against American business. They forbid
American companies to invest money. To produce oil -- not nuclear weapons,
but oil. I have my own position: To invest money in Iran -- I support that.
As I explained to the State Department, "you are not a planning committee."
We are for competition and the private sector. I told Strobe Talbot about
that several times. We are against nuclear weapons distribution -- this
is true, but this is business
SC: I just wonder, with Iran having all that oil, why do they need
a nuclear reactor?
BN: They started to build this reactor ten years ago. It's a long
story. We have to finish it, not because it's right, but because if we stop,
there will be an exorbitant penalty for the Russian economy. We would have
to pay a huge amount of money if we stop. It's in the contract. Who will
give us money? We are not so wealthy, like the United States. That's why
we have to finish it. SC: It's a Soviet contract?
BN: Yes, of course. Everybody knows. The State Department guys know
about that, but they say "stop it." What does it mean, "stop
it"? Give us money and we will stop everything.(10)
ML: What is the difference with the Communists on the policy towards
the "Near Abroad?"
BN: I'll give a more interesting example: Belarussia. Our new position
is that we are for unification with Belarussia but it has to be a region
of the Russian Federation. Lukashenka would not be a president, but instead
a governor or a member of our parliament. We would stop the Belarussian
Central Bank immediately. Their central bank becomes only a branch of the
Moscow central bank, we have a united customs administration with its chief
in Moscow. And Lukashenka would be like [Tatarstan President Mintimer] Shaimiev.
We will implement a democracy to this country, publish newspapers, stop
prohibitions on propaganda, including anti-Lukashenka propaganda. We want
unification, Slavic people want to be together, but without stupid decisions
from Mr. Lukashenka. He has to forget about his independence, that is our
position. The Communists are for unification, but only in words, because
they are afraid of Lukashenka as a political competitor. They are of the
same type. That's why we are for unification and they are against.
SC: Are there
any other states, besides Belarus, with which you want to unify?
BN: No. I don't
think so. I'm not that stupid.
(1) Each of the most powerful "oligarchs"
is associated with a set of media holdings. The state-run media under Prime
Minister Yevgeni Primakov include television channels (RTR and 51% of ORT),
the wire services ITAR-TASS and RIA Novosti, and several radio stations
and newspapers. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov controls the city-owned local
television and cable channels and is influential with some Moscow papers.
In addition to the major newspapers, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Ogonek,
and Novye izvestia, Boris Berezovsky, the president of LogoVAZ, controls
the board of ORT and, through one of his companies, owns 38% of ORT shares.
Vladimir Gusinsky of the MOST Bank and allied MOST Media group boasts the
private television station NTV and Radio Ekho Moskvy. The newspapers Izvestia
and Komsomol'skaya pravda are associated with Vladimir Potanin, president
of Oneximbank. Gazprom Chairman Rem Vyakhirev has some influence over NTV
and several newspapers. Due to his status as president of LUKoil, Vagit
Alekperov has some influence with the new television network REN and the
newspaper Izvestia. See Floriana Fossato and Anna Kachkaeva, "Russian
Media Empires IV" on the RFE/RL web site at www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia4/index.html.
(2) In January and early February Prime Minister
Yevgeni Primakov attempted to gain personal control of the major state-owned
media by appointing his KGB cronies to top positions. Former information
chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Yuri Kobaladze, was made
first deputy chairman of ITAR-TASS and deputy chairman of the holding company
that controls the RTR television network. Primakov also named SVR officer
Lev Koshelev to be in charge of RTR's Vesti news program. SVR officer Igor
Amvrosov was appointed to run Radio Russia. See Russia Reform Monitor,
No. 579, 27 January 1999.
(3) It is widely believed that Boris Berezovsky
used his influence to obtain Yuri Skuratov's resignation in retaliation
for a raid on the offices of Berezovsky's company Sibneft. -- ML
(4) What exactly was agreed to at the 5 February
Security Council meeting remains unclear. According to some reports, the
president agreed to keep the government in place until the next Duma elections
while others suggest he merely agreed to consult with the other branches
before removing the government. See Susan Cavan's analysis, Editorial Digest,
Vol. IV, No. 3, 15 February 1999, on ISCIP's web site at www.bu.edu/iscip/news.html.
On 25 February, Yel'tsin promised to keep Primakov as prime minister until
the presidential elections in 2000. The following week, the Primakov-Berezovsky
power struggle appeared to be tilting in Primakov's favor. On 4 March, Yel'tsin,
as chairman of the CIS Council of Heads of State, unilaterally fired Berezovsky
from his position as CIS executive secretary. -- ML
(5) Grigory Yavlinsky spoke at the Kennedy School
of Government on 14 December 1998. In response to my question about the
need for unity among the Democrats, he said that he would welcome the members
of Just Cause into YABLOKO and in the event of electoral success they would
share the Duma seats and cabinet portfolios. He later went on to say that
there was no danger of splitting the democratic vote, because Just Cause
lacks a substantial following. The only people who will vote for them, he
said, are "their wives." The last word, so far, belongs to Boris
Nemtsov, who told his Davis Center audience on 12 February that "Yavlinsky's
wife will vote for me." -- ML
(6) After he left the post of first deputy prime
minister in March 1998, Anatoly Chubais became chairman of the board of
Unified Energy System, the Russian electricity monopoly. -- ML
(7) Yuri Skokov, secretary of the Security Council
from May 1992 to May 1993; Aleksandr Lebed, secretary of the Security Council
from June to October 1996; Ivan Rybkin, secretary of the Security Council
from October 1996 to March 1998. Nikolai Bordyuzha was appointed secretary
of the Security Council in September 1998; in December 1998 he replaced
Valentin Yumashev as the president's chief of staff.
(8) Sergei Filatov was Yel'tsin's chief of staff
from January 1993 to July 1996.
(9) This, of course, is a gross exaggeration: NATO
is not about to "occupy" Russia's borders. Of the three newest
NATO members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, only Poland is contiguous
with Russia, and that is a border with the Russian militarized exclave of
Kaliningrad, which is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and
Belarus. -- ML
(10) Russian military analysts, like Pavel Felgenhauer,
give an entirely different explanation. Thus, the latter has written that
the purpose of Russian cooperation with Iran was to oppose the United States
in the Persian Gulf. See Pavel Felgenhauer, "Defense Dossier: The Arms
Bazaar Beckons," The Moscow Times, 24 September 1998.Copyright ISCIP 1999
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal have been commissioned especially