Perspective
Volume XVI Number 1 (October-November 2005)

Hysteria à la Kyiv

By Dr. Stephen Blank

The first blush of the Georgian Rose and Ukrainian Orange revolutions may have faded but the specter of democracy still haunts Eurasia and has induced a kind of hysteria among the dictators of the CIS and their supporters. (1)

While Ukraine's revolution has encouraged reformers; Russian and Central Asian elites are defensive, charging that this revolution was "stage-managed" (to use Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s term) (2) from abroad, namely by the United States and associated NGOs.  Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev compared the supposed U.S. export of revolution to the Bolshevik export of socialist revolution, an indicator of his regime’s panic over the situation. (3) Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused the United States of applying double standards to engineer anti-Russian and pro-Western political outcomes under the guise of democracy. (4) Allegedly, Americans used a technique that had been perfected earlier in Serbia, Georgia, and now Ukraine. 

According to Kremlin commentator Vyacheslav Nikonov, the Kremlin views this revolution as a “refined special operation” or as an externally directed unconstitutional coup against Russia to eliminate its influence in the CIS and replace it with an American presence. (5) Professor Aleksei Pushkov of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations called Ukraine a continuation of the “West’s strategic line of staging a political takeover of the post-Soviet space.” (6) And Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov said that, "as inspections have shown, the activities of certain NGOs created at the expense of various sponsors go far beyond their declared charters and programs to carry out specific goals ordered up by others." (7) As a result, the CIS leaders (8) have made it clear that they will resolutely resist this so-called export of revolution to their countries, even by force if necessary. Here they clearly rely upon Russian support as Moscow long ago made clear its refusal to export democracy, i.e., support democratic reform, in Central Asia or the Caucasus. (9)

Thus, revolution, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere, is allegedly a foreign plot introduced by enemies of the regime to destabilize otherwise legitimate governments.  Not content with denying the popular roots of democratic social change in Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004, these leaders have acted in suspiciously synchronized fashion to forestall any repetition of Ukraine’s revolution and to launch heightened repression against reformers.  In Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan the authorities have used the political police, courts, and election authorities to ban unwanted opposition candidates and in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan they have threatened violence. (10)  In Kyrgyzstan, when opposition forces coalesced in revolution and, most notably in Andijan, resorted to the use of force was rejected, and the Kyrgyz President fled, instead, to Moscow.

In Karimov’s January 2005 speech to the newly-elected Parliament – itself the result of a parody of a democratic Parliamentary election – he gestured to the diplomatic loge and stated that,

Examination of some Western aid groups has shown that their activity goes far beyond declared programs and it aims at certain goals.  --- We have enough power to curb the aid groups that violate our laws, I hope those sitting at the balcony understand that.” (11)
This sort of thing might be expected in Uzbekistan and has duly occurred there, where tough repressions have been launched repeatedly against Western NGOs; Kyrgyzstan’s reaction to the Ukrainian revolution had followed the same script.  Kyrgyzstan’s Parliamentary elections took place on February 27, 2005 and Presidential elections will take place in October.  Demonstrations in Bishkek late in 2004 supporting Ukraine's revolution made the government particularly anxious, almost hysterical, about the possibilities of a Kyrgyz “yellow (or tulip) revolution.”  As a result Akayev and other officials toured Kyrgyzstan and Russia making fiery speeches denouncing America’s export of revolution and promising to fight it. (12) Akayev, Karimov, and Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakstan, all have received solid expressions of support from Russian President Vladimir Putin, suggesting that this Central Asian and Russian reaction to the orange revolution is itself "stage-managed" and certainly externally synchronized.

Of course, these statements about the external origins of the revolutions and of supposed foreign or opposition elements’ attempts to use them to subvert the government represent an effort to conceal the fact that the Ukrainian revolution, like Georgia's before it, was fueled by internal discontent.  Obviously, these leaders think or want to think that all dissent must be inspired by foreign forces, not wanting to acknowledge that such discontent as arose in Kyiv and Tbilisi, not external support, is what could trigger a reversal of fortune for ruling leaders.  But these outbursts of hysteria signify more than that.

In Kyrgyzstan, Akayev and his followers had tirelessly proclaimed the threat of a coup d’état, of revolution being imported from the outside by a “clandestine international,” and of attempts by terrorists, drug runners, and other enemies to exploit the elections either by financing the opposition or encouraging a repeat of events in Ukraine by charging rigged elections and thereby delegitimizing the government. (13) To listen to Kyrgyz elites who charged that the opposition was only made up of disaffected former officials who are receiving money and instructions from foreign, i.e. American sources, one might have gotten the impression that the only thing missing from this scenario was little green men emerging from a spaceship saying we are here to bring you democracy.  Akayev’s deputies were no less assiduous in charging that the opposition in Parliament was making moves that looked like a replica of the Georgian Rose revolution.  The former Foreign Minister, Askar Aytmatov, denounced the idea of velvet revolutions and extolled Kyrgyzstan’s alleged transition to a new more democratic form of governance, a form of rule that has yet to be seen. (14) If anything, as a recent U.S. analysis of Kyrgyzstan has shown, it had regressed in virtually every political and economic way from its earlier promise. (15) Likewise, Kyrgyzstan's ruling party had accused the West, and especially U.S. Ambassador Stephen Young, of siding with opposition leaders and thus interfering in Kyrgyzstan’s domestic affairs. (16)

These types of warnings and charges have become standard operating procedure by now, and it is unlikely that anyone possessing some political literacy seriously believes them except frightened officials who have fallen victim to their own propaganda.  But in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan these charges suggest a much deeper apprehension by ruling elites that they, like Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Edvard Shevarnadze in Georgia, if not Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, have something to fear.  What these remarks and threats against the opposition and foreign promoters of democratic reforms signify is that the ruling elites recognize their own fundamentally illegitimate governance and understand that they no longer enjoy genuine popular support and that the future is quite unpredictable.  Hence any sign of weakness or of reform on their part either invites or seems to them to represent a threat to the entire state and all public order.

In Uzbekistan during 2004, public violence broke out on four different occasions, terrorism was implicated in at least two of them, and there is visible evidence from reporting inside the country as well as from foreign travelers there that the public is utterly disaffected from the regime.  In other words, only repression may suffice to keep Karimov in power, and that may not be enough.  Indeed, even Karimov’s neighbors like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan are increasingly alarmed that the harshness of Uzbek rule has created or exported instability and revived terrorist movements like the Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU) or Hizb ut-Tahrir that are causing terrorism in their own countries.  And they have the evidence to prove or confirm these growing apprehensions. (17) As Ahmed Rashid writes,

The closing down of Uzbekistan is more than a threat to the country's own population.  It also represents a growing danger to all Central Asian nations.  The arbitrary behavior of Karimov's administration is increasingly seen as a destabilizing factor for the entire region. (18) (emphasis author)

Clearly the rising potential for unrest in Uzbekistan due to the brutality, corruption, economic stagnation, and periodic violence thoroughly alarms other Central Asian governments that worry about the spread of violence into their own countries which could worsen if Karimov's regime falls.  For instance, Vladimir Bozhko, First Deputy Director of Kazakhstan's National Security Committee, warned publicly that as long as Uzbekistan's and Afghanistan's populations remain economically depressed and the local situation in those countries remains politically volatile, Kazakhstan will be at risk from terrorist attacks.  Moreover, he and other Kazak authorities have repeatedly caught Uzbeks engaged in terrorism within Kazakhstan, or going back and forth to Uzbekistan, a pattern repeated as well in Kyrgyzstan. (19)

Thus this inner sense of illegitimacy and weakness and the resort to threats of violence makes this atmosphere of extravagant and unfounded charges dangerous for all of Central Asia and increases the likelihood of attempted violence by the government.  We now know that government inspired violence almost broke out in Ukraine. (20) During the unrest in Uzbekistan, force was used with alacrity.  High-ranking officials in Kyrgyzstan mobilized their troops to prepare to use force.  A draft law before parliament would have banned all public demonstrations not registered nine days in advance and designated the presidential residence, Parliament, and certain governmental buildings and transportation routes as off limits. (21) In similar fashion, the government called a meeting of the Defense Council in December 2004 although this may have violated its statute.  Former Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev here lumped together the threat of terrorism which Kyrgyz authorities routinely have warned about for more than two years with that of an electoral victory by the opposition which would, he charged, destabilize the country. (22) At this meeting of the Defense Council, which by law is not supposed to meet until after martial law has been declared, Akayev ordered his colleagues to do their utmost to make certain that public safety, Kyrgyzstan's sovereignty and the country’s territorial integrity were all defended.  And here he explicitly invoked the military component. (23)

In January 2005, Tanayev reportedly met with regional governors and informed them that Akayev had sanctioned repressive measures against the opposition up to and including the physical elimination of regime opponents.  The startling success of opposition forces in Kyrgystan, as well as the swift departure of Akayev suggests that elites might have prepared in advance for an array of possible contingencies afer the elections.  Fortunately, Kyrgystan has managed, thus far, to avoid the use of force in its "tulip revolution."

In light of President Bush’s inaugural and State of the Union speeches calling for an end to tyranny in the world, it is more than an academic question how Washington will respond to repression in Uzbekistan.  While Washington clearly has supported free elections and made evident its unhappiness with corrupt, repressive regimes whether in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan, it certainly is not sponsoring revolutions there, nor is it teaching techniques for overthrowing dictators. (24) Only Russia and its client dictators in the CIS benefit from spreading this false rumor.  It is also more than likely that Moscow’s support lies behind these moves against democracy in the Central Asian states.  That support would only further confirm the validity of the warnings offered by former Georgian President Edvard Shevarnadze’s former Assistant, Tesmur Basilia, who wrote in 2003 that,

Nowadays there are many in the West who believe that Russia has changed – and, having reformed, seeks to interact with neighboring countries in conformity with international norms.  Some Eurasian countries would disagree with this opinion, and believe instead that the Russian mentality has not changed much, and that Russia continues to deem the “near abroad” as its sphere of social influence.  After the second war with Chechnya, many think that Russia regards violence as its major tool for resolving social and political problems, especially with regard to non-Russian peoples from the former empire.  Thus integration into the international community should be viewed as a guarantee for security and further development. (25)

Basilia similarly observed that in many CIS states, e.g. Georgia and Ukraine, “the acute issue of choosing between alignment with Russia and the West is associated with the choice between two models of social development.” (26)

Indeed, Russia's democratic deformities lead its rulers to espouse policies that exploit and perpetuate the pathologies common to Central Asian regimes in order to turn them to the benefit of the Russian state or its component elites. (27)  In turn, Central Asian rulers, and not just Karimov, look to Russia for support against pressures for reform. (28) Certainly Karimov has turned increasingly to Moscow and Beijing, not least because of Western pressures to reform. (29) In return, China also opposes reform in Central Asia lest it energize Xinjiang’s  opposition at home and works with Uzbekistan to gain influence there in return for greater persecution of Uighurs in Uzbekistan. (30)

Thus, the great game in the CIS is becoming not just a political contest but an ideological one as well; not only will there be a political and even ideological struggle with Russia during President Bush’s term, there will also be one with Central Asian governments who will enjoy the overt and covert support of Russia and China insofar as democratization issues appear on the agenda.  For these reasons, we need to start asking ourselves just what does it mean for the future of U.S. relations with local governments and Russia, if democracy becomes their enemy and our banner?  Will the hysteria now being expressed and institutionalized throughout the post-Soviet space make it easier for us, or for those governments, to achieve peace, security and democracy, not to mention a functioning alliance against terrorism?  The fact that this remains an open question suggests just how explosive Central Asia may soon become.

Source Notes:
(1)Malcolm Beith, “Central Asia: Orange Fever,”  Newsweek International Atlantic Edition, Jan 31 05.
(2) M.K. Bhadrakumar, "The Bar of Democracy for Central Asia,"  Asia Times Online, Dec 10 04, (www.atimes.com),  "Uzbek Leader Blames Ukrainian Authorities for Crisis," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline, Dec 9 04, "Three Central  Asian Presidents Congratulate Ukrainian PM Yanukovych on His Election,"  BBC Monitoring, in English, Nov 25 04 illustrate the genuine attitude of Central Asian leaders to the Ukrainian crisis.
(3) Daniel Kimmage, “Fear of Orange,” Eurasia Insight, Feb 4 05.
(4) Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline, Jan 31, 05.
(5) Vyacheslav Nikonov, “Putin’s Strategy,”  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dec 22 04, Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Sergey Kolmakov, “The Ukrainian Elections -- Views From Russia  Access PBN,  I, No. 23, Jan 25 05.
(6) Current Digest of the Post-Soviet press (Henceforth CDPP), LVI, No. 48, Dec 29, 04,  p. 10.
(7) Kimmage.
(8) Ibid., Stephen Blank, “Kyrgyzstan Teeters on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jan 19 05.
(9) Beith, “Kyrgyzstan Doesn’t Want “Interference” in Elections,”  Times of Central Asia, Jan31 05, (www.times.kg/news/print/0064958), Olga Dzyubenko, “Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Vow to Resist upheaval, “  The Moscow Times.com, Jan 31 05,  Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline, Jan 31 05, Mykola Debyola, “Belarusian President Vows Tight Control over Security Agencies; Rights Groups Warn of Crackdowns,”  Associated press, Jan 25 05; Oleg Shchedrov, “Kyrgyz Leader Sees Threat of Revolution,”  Reuters, Jan 28 05, “Kyrgyzstan not to Brook Any Interference in Elections,” ITAR-TASS, Jan 31 05, “Uzbek Leader Warns He Will Stop Ukraine-Style Revolt,”  Reuters, Jan 28 05, (www.yahoo.com), “Putin Speaks Out Against “Exporting Capitalist Democracy,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, Apr 11 03, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; for an example from Turkmenistan see Gennady Sysoev, "Saparmyrat Niyazov Seeks Protection,"  Moscow,  Kommersant, in Russian, Apr 11 03,  Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia (Henceforth FBIS SOV), Apr 11 03.
(10) Beith, Debyola,  Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline,  Jan 19 05, “Kyrgyz Election Update,”  institute for War and peace Reporting, Jan 31 05, (www.iwpr.net/index.pl? archive/rca2/rca2_344_3eng.txt), “Growing Threats to Tajikistan’s independent Press in Approach to Legislative Elections,” Feb 1 05 (www.payvand.com/news/05/feb1005.html).
(11) “Uzbek leader Warns He Will Stop Ukraine-Style Revolt,” Kimmage.
(12) Shchedrov, Dzyubenko, Beith, Sergei Blagov, “Kyrgyzstan Fears Blossoming Tulips,”  Asia Times Online, (www.atimes.com), Jan 25 05, Stephen Blank, ”Kyrgyzstan Teeters on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jan 19 05.
(13) Ibidem., “Kyrgyz Leader Sees Threat of Revolution,” Times of Central Asia, Jan 31 05, (www.times.kg), “Colorful Revolution in Kyrgyzstan May Bring to Civil War,” Times of Central Asia, Jan 28 05, (www.times.kg),  Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline, Feb 1 05.
(14) Blank.
(15) Brian Gill, “Aiding the Rule of Law Abroad: The Kyrgyz Republic as a Case Study,”  Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, XXIX: No. 1, Winter, 2005, pp. 133-157.
(16) Blank.
(17) This is based on accounts from recent travelers to Central Asia who met with elites and officials in Uzbekistan and neighboring governments.   But see also, Marat Yermukanov, "Kazakstan Faces Potent Mix of Extremism, Nationalism and Terrorism,"  Eurasia Daily Monitor, Nov 18 04, Igor Rotar, "Demographics, Borders, Complicate Anti-Terrorism Efforts in Central Asia,"  Eurasia Daily Monitor, Nov 18 04, "Paper Warns Russia May Face "Terrorist" Threat From Uzbekistan,"  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, Moscow, Aug 1 04, Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Kadyr Toktogulov, "Kyrgyzstan Straddles Role on Terror Issue," Associated Press, Mar 6 04; Marat Yermukanov, "Kazakhstan Faces Potent Mix of Extremism, Nationalism, and Terrorism,"Eurasia Daily Monitor, Nov 18 04, pp. 2-4; Igor Rotar, "Demographics, Borders Complicate Anti-Terrorism Efforts in Central Asia," Eurasia Daily Monitor, Nov 18 04, pp. 4-6; Bruce Pannier, "Central Asia: Is Uzbekistan The Source of Regional Extremism,?"  Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Apr 27 04, "Will US Policy Backfire in Central Asia," RCA No. 273 Mar 30 04, (www.iwpr.net), particularly Fiona Hill's remarks,  Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty newsline, Nov 12 04.
(18) Ahmed Rashid, "Karimov Contributing to his Own Demise in Uzbekistan," Eurasia Insight, Dec 20 04 are just a few of a host of articles and reports attesting to this continuing repression and the attitude towards Ukraine's revolution.
(19) Rashid, Marat Yermukanov, Igor Rotar, "Paper Warns Russia May Face "Terrorist" Threat From Uzbekistan,"; Kadyr Toktogulov, "Kyrgyzstan Straddles Role on Terror Issue," Associated Press, Mar 6 04;  Bruce Pannier, "Will US Policy Backfire in Central Asia," Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Newsline, Nov 12 04.
(20) C.J. Chivers, “How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation’s Path,” New York Times, Jan 17 05.
(21) Blank.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Blagov, “Kyrgyzstan Fears Blossoming Tulips,” Tbilisi , 24 Saati, in Georgian, Oct 6 03,  Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia (Henceforth  FBIS SOV), Oct 6 03.
(25) Tesmur Basilia, “Eurasian Commentary,” Jan H, Kalicki and Eugene K. Lawson, Eds.,  Russian-Eurasian Renaissance?: U.S. Trade and Investment in Russia and Eurasia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 166.
(26) Ibid., p. 163.
(27) Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, Janusz Bugajski, Back to the Front: Russian Interests in the New Eastern Europe, Donald Treadgold Papers, No. 41, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004; Steven Lee Myers, "Putin Uses Soft Power to Restore the Russian Empire,"  New York Times, Nov 14 04, (www.nytimes.com); Preston Mendenhall, “Russian Crime Creeps Into Kremlin,”  MSNBC.com, Aug 31, 03, (www.msnbc.com/id/3071652), Bugajski; Bruce Pannier, "Russia comes on Strong in Central Asia," Asia Times Online, Nov 18 04, (www.times.com).
(28) Gennadiy Sysoev, "Saparmyrat Karimov Nyyazov Seeks Protection," Moscow, Kommersant, in Russian, Apr 11 03, FBIS SOV, Apr 11 03, Ibragim Rustambek, "The Events in Ukraine Can Jeopardize the Whole of the CIS: do the Kyrgyz People Need Revolution?"  Argumenty i Fakty, Bishkek, in Russian, Dec 1 04, BBC Monitoring Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
(29) Leila Kazemi, "Domestic Sources of Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy,"  Journal of International Affairs, LVI, No. 2, Spring, 2003, pp. 205-216, "Terrorists Outpacing Antiterror Coalition, Uzbek Leader Tells Putin,"  Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, BBC Monitoring,  Apr 18 04, available on the website of the International Institute for Caspian Studies (www.caspianstudies.com); Esmer Islamov, Sergei Blagov, "Uzbek Events Could Prompt Geopolitical Shift,"  Eurasia Insight, Apr 2 04, "Uzbekistan To Seek New Ways to Strengthen Ties with Russia," Xinhua, Aug 27 04, Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis, Yuriy Yegorov, "Washington Pushes Karimov closer to Moscow,"  Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jul 22 04; "A Billion Dollars for Islam Karimov,"  Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, (Henceforth CDPP), LVI, No. 24, Jul 14 04, p. 14,  "Russia Said to Be Overlooking Uzbekistan's Human Rights Record," Nezavisimaya Gazeta Website, Jun 21 04, Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
(30) Ibidem.

_________________________________

Copyright ISCIP 2005
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal have been commissioned especially
for Perspective.

	About Us	Staff	Contact	Home