Volume XV Number 2 (February-March 2005)
By Tammy Lynch
The cliff note version of the Orange Revolution is well known: At the end of 2004, Ukrainians peacefully and joyfully rose up against a discredited regime following a discredited presidential election purportedly won by a discredited candidate. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians descended on Ukraine¹s capital city of Kyiv to reject the claim that the government-backed candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, had won the presidential election run-off. Ukrainians gathered en masse to insist that Viktor Yushchenko, the internationally recognized winner of the poll, be allowed to fulfill his mandate. Kyiv turned orange, as everyone from shopkeepers to taxi drivers to bank presidents adopted Yushchenko¹s campaign color as their own. After 17 days of loud but orderly protest, the newly emboldened Supreme Court ordered a repeat of the presidential run-off. Less than two weeks later, Yushchenko celebrated his victory in that poll. In one month, the Ukrainian people had reset their country¹s political and geographical orientation and had demonstrated their support for freedom, democracy and truth. The ³power of the people² had triumphed – a point clear to anyone who had visited Kyiv during the previous weeks.
On November 27, six days after the start of the revolution, Tom Warner of the Financial Times attempted to describe the atmosphere created by the thousands of people flooding into downtown Kyiv. ³The growing crowds have taken on a dynamic of their own,² he wrote. ³Whatever one names it, the movement Mr. Yushchenko began has become an awesome demonstration of popular power.² (1)
³Popular power² it most certainly was – of a kind rarely seen in one lifetime. But did Viktor Yushchenko really begin this ³movement²? And when did it truly originate? Upon examination, and when placed within the context of Ukraine¹s major political battles of the last four years, the Orange Revolution can be viewed as the spectacular culmination of a movement that found its roots in the year 2000.
There is no doubt that Viktor Yushchenko¹s stolen election victory was the rallying cry for the thousands who occupied Kyiv¹s Independence Square. Clearly, he is the man Ukrainians have charged with leading them as they move toward Europe. He is by far the most trusted political leader in the country and the man seen as Ukraine¹s best hope for the future. Also clearly, opposition leader and now Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko spurred the crowds on with her spirited speeches and with her reputation as Ukraine¹s most unwavering opposition leader. But, as they look back on their victory, Ukrainians have someone else equally important to thank for their success (albeit unintentionally) – former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.
The Orange Revolution was a largely spontaneous outpouring of anger and hope on the part of the people; for the country¹s political leaders, however, it was the culmination of years of preparation by opposition forces, and even more important, the almost direct result of miscalculations by the Kuchma regime. Without the actions of Leonid Kuchma and his entourage, Viktor Yushchenko and many of his allies might not have chosen the route of revolution. But Kuchma gave Yushchenko little choice – despite Yushchenko¹s repeated and sometimes plaintive requests for a way out.
As 1999 gave way to the year 2000, Kuchma began moving down a brash, bumbling and often thuggish path designed to neutralize his opponents. Disagreement and debate were no longer tolerated. All power would be consolidated in his hands and in the hands of his allies. The tactic, also being pursued in an almost identical fashion in neighboring Russia, had quick, superficial success. But, the resilience of his opponents –most particularly Tymoshenko – was unexpected, and the long-term effect of his attacks was not predicted.
Kuchma¹s attempts to neutralize the opposition began in earnest in mid-2000 with an attack on the Communists and Socialists, but he gradually worked to undermine, in some way, all forces opposing him.
The path to revolution was paved by Kuchma and/or his allies when they undermined the Communist and Socialist Parties in parliament, ceaselessly harassed and arrested opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko, became implicated in the death of Georgiy Gongadze, rigged the parliamentary elections of 2002, undertook a demonizing campaign against Viktor Yushchenko, and finally staged the fraudulent elections of 2004, complete with a brazen poisoning of Yushchenko. For the duration of most of Kuchma¹s attack, Yushchenko rebuffed the more radical methods of the declared opposition. He repeatedly reached out to Kuchma and his parliamentary allies, attempting to change the direction of the government from within. However, every one of his overtures was met with an attack. Finally, faced with no other alternative, Viktor Yushchenko was left to ally with a waiting opposition, and take up a position of direct conflict with the authorities.
The shadows of this ³waiting opposition² began to form around Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz as early as 1998, but truly began to consolidate in 2000. Its development is complicated, yet clear.
Prior to 2000, Ukraine¹s parliament was controlled by a majority coalition made up of the Communist and Socialist Parties, as well as numerous smaller leftist groupings, and was sometimes tacitly supported by the presidential administration. From 1994-1998, Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz served as the speaker of parliament. His reign ended as speaker in mid-1998 when President Kuchma successfully organized a bloc of deputies who agreed not to vote in his favor. Although Kuchma and Moroz had never been particularly friendly, the move cemented Moroz¹s opposition to the president and allowed him more freedom in criticizing the president – something that would soon be essential to opposition politics in Ukraine.
In late 1999, with Ukraine¹s economy floundering, and a former prime minister under international investigation for embezzlement, (2) President Kuchma and his allies–including newly confirmed Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko–removed any backing they may have given to the leftist coalition. They began working toward a ³reformist² parliamentary majority, led by a ³reformist² speaker. In February of 2000, this goal was achieved when Oleksandr Tkachenko was replaced by the pro-presidential Ivan Pluysch.
The change in the composition of the parliamentary majority was hailed by the Ukrainian government, international financiers and investors. Ukraine had finally moved out from under the shadow of the Communist Party. It was unquestionably a positive step for Ukraine; for the first time the government was able to enact truly reform-oriented legislation. Additionally, in the long-term, the move had unexpected consequences–it led to the creation of the first true opposition force in Ukraine.
In response to the loss of their majority, leftist deputies announced numerous protests, and suggested that they would fight vigorously for their positions in the future. In that moment, Ukraine not only began moving forward on necessary reforms, but also saw the Communist and Socialist Parties transformed, at least temporarily, into a true opposition force led by individuals who no longer had any stake in the government. This fact became vital just a few months later when the headless body of journalist Georgiy Gongadze was discovered.
Without question, the murder of investigative journalist Georgiy Gongadze was a watershed moment for Ukraine. Gongadze was one of the founders of the opposition-oriented Ukrayinska Pravda website, and regularly examined and criticized the influence of business interests, or ³oligarchic clans,² on the functioning of the government.
Gongadze disappeared on September 16, 2000. Three weeks later, a decapitated body identified as Gongadze¹s by his family and colleagues was discovered in a village outside Kyiv. Immediately, calls for the government to investigate the case actively came from political opposition and media circles. Very little was done.
Then, on November 28, 2000, Oleksandr Moroz called a press conference to play secretly recorded conversations of President Kuchma – conversations which included discussions of how to ³shut up² Gongadze. The conversations reportedly were held shortly before the journalist¹s disappearance. Moroz stated, ³The President was worried by Gongadze¹s activities, gave instructions and controlled their execution.² (3)
Kuchma immediately denied the accusation, labeled the tapes as fake, and threatened to sue Moroz for slander. (4) Moroz responded that he had done nothing wrong, and called for an official parliamentary probe into the situation. ³Then,² he said, ³we could get the grounds for launching an impeachment case against Kuchma.² (5) It was the first time a major political figure suggested such a scenario.
Authentication of both the tapes and the body began immediately, and months passed as Moroz and Kuchma traded threats and demands. Throughout these months, protest actions built. The appearance of the tapes provided the opposition with a ³cause,² and also provided an outlet for Ukrainians who had watched their economy and living standards plummet under Kuchma.
On the 15th of December, 500 protestors announced a ³sit-in² at Independence Square in Kyiv. In a scenario almost identical to that which began the Orange Revolution, the protestors rallied and pitched tents, to form a camp where they threatened to stay until the president was impeached. (6)
On December 19, more than 5,000 protestors descended on Independence Square. The demonstrators were joined by a number of parliamentary deputies, including Moroz and the leaders of both the Communist Party and the extreme nationalist Ukrainian People¹s Association (UNA-UNSO). (7) At the same time, over 1,000 people gathered outside the parliament building shouting one of the slogans later adopted by the Orange Revolution, ³Kuchma, Het,² or Kuchma, Out. (8)
Also on December 19, 2000, a few brave political leaders found the will to unite. Leaders of the Communist and Socialist Parties were joined publicly in opposition to Kuchma by the leaders of several smaller parties–the radical UNA-UNSO, the rightist People¹s Rukh, and the centrist Yabloko and Sobor parties. They named their new alliance ³Ukraine Without Kuchma.² UNA-UNSO member Ruslan Zaitsenko said, ³Kuchma has to go. That will sort things out. Then, our first choice [for president] will be Prime Minister Yushchenko.² (9)
However, as of mid-December, Yushchenko had made no public comment about the Gongadze issue. Instead, he responded to protestor¹s demands by arranging a meeting with the president for the leaders of the action. At the meeting, according to then-Socialist representative and current Minister of the Interior Yuri Lutsenko, Kuchma agreed to dismiss three officials implicated in the Gongadze tapes. Lutsenko told reporters that Interior Minister Yuri Kravchenko, Ukrainian Security Service Director Leonid Derkach and Customs Head Yuri Solovkov would be replaced. If Kuchma had fulfilled his promise, it is likely that the protest action would have lost much of its impetus. However, he quickly backtracked; his spokeswoman suggested that at Yushchenko¹s request the president had only agreed to consider replacing the officials. (10) The president had lost an opportunity to placate his opponents, while the resolve of the protest leaders hardened.
Moroz, who reportedly had been pleased with the progress of negotiations, responded angrily to Kuchma¹s shift. He promised additional, larger demonstrations. ³We will not tolerate the situation when the president tells protestors¹ representatives one thing, and his press secretary later denies what the president said,² he told journalists. (11)
The plan to expand the protests was cut short, however, as a Kyiv court responded to a government request by immediately banning all protest actions around government buildings ³for the holiday period.² The measure unexpectedly went into effect on December 22, the day after the meeting with Kuchma. The court announced that the ban would lift on January 29.
Kuchma used the court-ordered cessation of protests to what he undoubtedly believed would be good advantage. On January 19, President Kuchma fired Yulia Tymoshenko, then the Deputy Prime Minister for Fuel and Energy, who had been charged with embezzlement and tax evasion conveniently just days earlier.
The president¹s actions came after almost a year of wrangling between Kuchma and Tymoshenko, as he attempted to control her energy sector reforms and she attempted to end the ³schemes² used by energy companies – often connected to him and his friends–to avoid taxation. The actions also came after Tymoshenko announced her belief that Kuchma¹s involvement in Gongadze¹s death was ³an established fact,² and after she encouraged other security personnel to publicize illegal actions by officials. (12)
Tymoshenko came to the cabinet fresh from leading the multi-billion dollar energy conglomerate Unified Energy Systems of Ukraine (UES). Opposition to her work was to be expected. Almost immediately after joining Viktor Yushchenko¹s cabinet (she had also worked in the same position for Pavlo Lazarenko), Tymoshenko released a scathing statement calling on all political forces to ³decisively repulse the destructive affairs of the oligarchs.² (13) It got plenty of attention. Oligarchs were said to have complained mightily to Kuchma; the president then tried in vain to force Yushchenko to dismiss Tymoshenko. She vowed repeatedly never to give in to the president¹s pressure to resign.
Before taking her on, the prosecutor-general ordered the arrest of Tymoshenko¹s husband and several other colleagues with whom she had worked at UES. Mykhailo Obikhod claimed that Oleksandr Tymoshenko had embezzled state funds while sitting on the board of directors at UES. (14)
Tymoshenko lashed out at the arrests, saying that the only guilt of those arrested ³was that they were close to me.² (15) Months later, as her husband remained in prison, Tymoshenko continued to cling stubbornly to her position, underscoring her nickname as the ³Iron Lady.² At the same time, rumors began to surface that she was helping to finance anti-Kuchma demonstrations. (16)
By the time of her dismissal on January 19, 2001, Tymoshenko had been hardened into a staunch oppositionist. She loudly participated in the renewal of ³Ukraine Without Kuchma² protests and hailed the creation of a new tent city in Independence Square. In addition, with Oleksandr Moroz, Tymoshenko announced an alliance of 15 parties from the left, right and center called the National Salvation Forum. The Forum¹s stated goal was to carry out ³a new velvet revolution² by focusing Kyiv¹s somewhat chaotic and uncoordinated protests on specific goals. (17)
It would appear that this alliance touched a governmental nerve. Four days after the announcement of the new pact, Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested. And, on the same day she was taken into custody, a letter attacking the opposition appeared throughout the Ukrainian press–signed by President Leonid Kuchma Š and Viktor Yushchenko.
Together with Parliament Speaker Lytvyn, they wrote, ³The disappearance of journalist Georgiy Gongadze and the so-called tape scandal have been used as a reason for social disruption.² The three leaders then apologized for ³unprofessional conduct² in the investigation of the Gongadze case, but assured the public that it would be solved.
Most disturbingly, Kuchma, Yushchenko and Lytvyn wrote, ³Recently, a National Salvation Forum has appeared, based on unknown foundations, and has been widely publicized. The leaders of this many-colored conglomerate, resentful of their own political losses and fiascos, are indeed looking for salvation – not for the state and the nation, but for themselves – from political bankruptcy and disappearance and – some of them – from criminal responsibility.² (18) The letter, timed with Tymoshenko¹s arrest, focused national and international attention on the efforts of the government¹s political opponents. But, more seriously, the signature of Ukraine¹s most trusted politician on the letter alongside the president undermined the Ukraine Without Kuchma protest movement and was a significant setback for opposition attempts to mobilize citizens. Clearly, a deal was struck – most likely involving a promise from Kuchma not to dismiss Yushchenko. In the following weeks, as Tymoshenko sat in prison, participation in protests fell, and momentum that had been gathering in parliament to vote no confidence in the prosecutor stalled.
Heorhiy Omelchenko, co-chairman of the NSF, admitted on February 27 that their movement was not having the effect they desired. ³To oust Kuchma,² he said, ³it is necessary one day to have as many people in the streets as there are during the Dynamo Kyiv-Barcelona Soccer game. That is 100,000.² But the protest movement ³lacks a leader equal to Kuchma,² ITAR-TASS wrote at the time. The news agency noted that Moroz¹s Socialist Party ³is not a mighty force,² while ³Yulia Tymoshenko could have played the role of a Ukrainian Joan of Arc. But her arrest Š beheaded the opposition.² (19) Unfortunately for Kuchma, his unwillingness to live up to his deal with Yushchenko, willingness to use force against tent city demonstrators, and the unexpected, fortuitous release of Tymoshenko, eventually would provide the opposition with the leadership it needed.
On March 28, 2001, Yulia Tymoshenko was suddenly released from prison, after a brave Kyiv court ruled that the government did not have probable cause for her arrest. Two days later, she published a statement announcing that a unified opposition program of action would be undertaken ³soon,² and that her primary goal remained the removal of ³the regime preventing Ukraine¹s normal development.² (20)
Yushchenko hailed Tymoshenko¹s release, saying it would have ³a positive impact.² (21) He also pledged to begin negotiations with his former deputy to end the ³political crisis² in the country. Just four days later, however, Tymoshenko was re-arrested in the hospital and all access to her was cut-off. In response, Yushchenko made his first clear statements against Kuchma. He termed the re-arrest a ³demonstration of force counterproductive for overcoming the crisis and establishing a normal political dialogue.² Further, he pointed out that the action would put an end to the possibility of a negotiated settlement. ³It¹s hard to hold talks if any of the negotiating parties are behind bars,² he said. (22)
Just over three weeks later, Viktor Yushchenko was removed as the Prime Minister of Ukraine.
The next year saw a shift in opposition tactics; Yushchenko¹s natural aversion to civil protest and confrontation left him and his allies in a sort of limbo – unable to commit to what he saw as the ³radical² opposition, but at the same time not wanting to support the pro-presidential team. He worked to cobble together a new political grouping made up of what he saw as the more moderate members of the pro-governmental forces with the most moderate oppositionists.
In late July 2001, in preparation for the parliamentary elections of March 2002, Yushchenko announced the creation of the Our Ukraine Bloc. It was as ³centrist² a grouping as Ukraine had ever seen. Pointedly, Yushchenko expressed no interest in working with either the National Salvation Forum or the Socialist Party. In response, the National Salvation Forum was renamed the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, and Tymoshenko, who had fought attempts to return her to prison since April, repeatedly called on Yushchenko to join a unified opposition force. When she received no response, she announced that her Bloc would concentrate on creating a regional network of opposition offices. Soon after, Russian authorities announced that they had sent evidence to Ukraine implicating Tymoshenko in embezzlement, and urged the authorities to investigate the case. She responded, ³Russia is insisting on the destruction of Ukraine¹s opposition,² and vowed to fight harder. (23)
By September 2001, with severe restrictions placed on her movements, and having survived a suspicious car accident on her way to a court appearance, Tymoshenko¹s requests to Yushchenko began turning into demands. She accused Yushchenko of ³a drift to the president² because of his Bloc¹s negotiations with the deeply pro-presidential Regions of Ukraine party (the future party of Viktor Yanukovich), and demanded that he give a ³specific answer² as to whether he would work with her, and if not, she asked that he explain why. He responded that he objected to the amount of time she spent calling for the removal of the president. ³Ukraine has a president,² he said, ³a symbol of its statehood. I, being a citizen, have to respect this symbol. If somebody expects something different from me, it¹s their problem.² Moreover, Yushchenko stressed that he would continue to ³consult him [the president] as long as I think is needed.² (24)
In March 2002, Our Ukraine, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYT) and the Socialist Party entered the parliamentary elections separately – although Tymoshenko and Moroz continued to work together.
Despite significant charges of election rigging by the authorities, Our Ukraine, BYT and the Socialists all passed the 4% threshold to enter parliament. Our Ukraine, in particular, passed all expectations – placing first in the party list vote with over 23 percent. The Communists earned over 20 percent, while pro-presidential parties earned approximately 20 percent. The Tymoshenko Bloc gained approximately 7.5 percent, and the Socialists squeaked into parliament with 5 percent. Given the pressure on the two radical opposition parties – Tymoshenko¹s Bloc was not even listed on counting forms throughout portions of the country – both Tymoshenko and Moroz expressed pleasure. Our Ukraine totaled 112 parliamentary seats, the Communists 65, BYT and the Socialists 22 each. However, because 50 percent of the parliament was made up of single-mandate districts, where pro-presidential candidates prevail more easily, pro-Kuchma parties received 148 parliamentary seats.
Soon after, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko announced an alliance of their parties, together with the Socialists and the Communists to support their own can didate for parliamentary speaker. The three more radical parties, however, put severe restrictions on the personnel they would support. Meanwhile, Kuchma¹s allies offered Yushchenko a deal – if Our Ukraine would join with the pro-presidential parties to support United Ukraine¹s Volodymyr Lytvyn as speaker, they would support Yushchenko¹s reinstatement as prime minister. Negotiations on this point, as well as committee chairs, continued for a week and were held separately from the opposition parties, which refused to negotiate. Tymoshenko said, ³The agreement to appoint Viktor Yushchenko as prime minister was brilliant bait. (. . .) Through the unrealizable dream of becoming prime minister, Mr. Yushchenko simply refused to lead his own majority of 231 in parliament, which had existed for three weeks. While the businessmen of United Ukraine made a show of discussing details of the agreement with Yushchenko, the authorities were actively pulling away people¹s deputies from the opposition majority.² (25)
By the conclusion of the negotiations, Our Ukraine¹s faction had either formally or theoretically been deserted by nine of its deputies. When the so-called agreement was reached, United Ukraine refused to support it formally, and then, by virtue of the shrinking size of Our Ukraine, was able to vote in Lytvyn as speaker without the assistance of the opposition parties. The majority had been lost by Yushchenko and nothing had been gained. Later, Tymoshenko explained, ³Yushchenko is a good, gentle man. An honest man. He trusts. This is ³not always the best thing² in political life.² (26)
Yushchenko¹s trust was eroding, however, and his anger over the long series of broken agreements with Kuchma and his allies finally resulted in his joining with the opposition. On September 17, 2002, Tymoshenko, Moroz and Communist Leader Petro Symonenko initiated a new campaign called ³Rise Up, Ukraine!² Over 100,000 people descended on Independence Square, while organizers claimed that a million people demonstrated throughout the country. The protestors came not just to participate in the rally, but to support Tymoshenko¹s call that Yushchenko be elected Ukraine¹s new president. She called for early elections following a ³velvet revolution,² and said, ³The ideas of this revolution are pure. Therefore they will triumph.² (27) Yushchenko¹s appearance on the stage with all other opposition leaders energized the crowd. It was an indication of things to come.
Nevertheless, even after this demonstration, and perhaps hoping that the protest would have made its point, Yushchenko suggested negotiations with Kuchma. They never happened. Instead, faced with dwindling support in parliament, Yushchenko lashed out angrily at the president for using ³criminal and political pressure² to convince members of Yushchenko¹s bloc to desert him. He suggested that the coming months would be a ³question of whether to live free or be a slave.² (28) At the same time, his allies began to sense a change in the air. Yushchenko¹s campaign manager and now Deputy Premier for Administrative Reform Roman Bezsmertnyy announced on December 12 that Our Ukraine would lead the second stage of the ³Rise Up, Ukraine² protests. The bloc, he said, ³should be the leader of the protests rather than follow Tymoshenko or anyone else.² (29)
Just days later, Yushchenko announced, ³Despite provocation from the presidential administration, we proposed dialogue for eight months in parliament. We were rebuffed, but we did not fall into ambitions Š . We will be able to say with a light heart: that¹s it, the end. We¹ve done everything we could. They don¹t understand our language. We are moving to another, multi-million language.² (30) Viktor Yushchenko had finally had enough.
From that point on, Yushchenko¹s position hardened more each month. As he received death threats – in spite of attempting to negotiate with Kuchma, as his family was sent into hiding, as he was painted a Nazi – even though his father survived Auschwitz, and as he survived a horrific poisoning, he turned more each day to the ³radicals² he had pushed away for so long. And when the time came, they welcomed him.
Viktor Yushchenko¹s victory was cemented by the hundreds of thousands of people who cheered, stomped, blew horns and chanted at Independence Square at the end of 2004, and by his own strength during a painful, confusing and chaotic presidential campaign. But, the possibility of his victory was created by those around him – the authorities who unbelievably rebuffed his repeated attempts at compromise, and the opposition leaders who, at their own risk, prepared society for the day when Viktor Yushchenko would be ready to lead them.
(1) Tom Warner, ³Orange Revolution crowds take on a dynamic of their own,² Financial Times, 27 Nov 04, p. 7.
(2) Former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko was detained on December 4, 1998 in Switzerland on suspicion of money laundering and released pending trial. He was then arrested in the United States on February 20, 1999 for similar charges. In June of 2004, he was found guilty of money laundering, wire fraud and extortion in connection to 60 million dollars questionably transferred to the United States from Ukraine. He is currently under house arrest in California awaiting the outcome of an appeal.
(3) Moroz Claims Kuchma Involved in Gongadze Appearance, Eastern Economist Daily, 29 Nov 00 via Lexis-Nexis.
(4) Ironically, one of the first calls for Moroz to be charged in court came from Oleksandr Zinchenko, then the leader of the ³party of power,² the Social Democratic Party United. In mid-2004, after a falling-out with Kuchma, Zinchenko became Viktor Yushchenko¹s campaign manager.
(5) Kuchma Accused of Plotting Journalist¹s Demise, The Moscow Times, 30 Nov 00 via Lexis-Nexis.
(6) 500 Protest Handling of Gongadze Case, Eastern Economist Daily, 18 Dec 00 via Lexis-Nexis.
(7) 5,000 March in Kiev to Protest Journalist¹s Disappearance, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 16:15 CET, 19 Dec 00 via Lexis-Nexis.
(8) Olga Kryzhanovska, Ukrainians Tell Kuchma to Step Down, The Moscow Times, 22 Dec 00.
(11) UNIAN News Agency, 21 Dec 02.
(12) Ukraine Police Storm Anti-President Sit-in, Agence France Presse, 12 Jan 01; via Lexis-Nexis.
(13) UNIAN news agency, 1410 GMT, 18 Jan 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts via Lexis-Nexis.
(14) Unified Energy System¹s Falkovych and Tymoshenko Arrested, Eastern Economist Daily, 22 Aug 00 via Lexis-Nexis.
(15) UNIAN news agency, 1521 GMT, 22 Aug 00.
(16) Falling Apart, The Economist, 17 Feb 01.
(17) Newly Created National Salvation Forum Has Goal of Impeaching Ukrainian President, Interfax News Agency, 9 Feb 01.
(18) President, Premier and Speaker Address Nation in Joint Statement, UT-1, 1600 GMT, 13 Feb 01; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts via Lexis-Nexis.
(19) Ukrainian Protests Subside, ITAR-TASS News Agency, 27 Feb 01 via Lexis-Nexis.
(20) Ukraine Business Report, Interfax News Agency, 30 Mar 04.
(21) UNIAN news agency, 1701 GMT, 27 Mar 01
(22) Interfax News Agency, 01 Apr 01.
(23) Russia Adds Fuel to Fire in Ukraine, The Moscow Times, 09 Aug 01.
(24) Ukraine: International Country Risk Guide, The PRS Group, 01 Dec 01 via Lexis-Nexis.
(25) Ukrainian Former Deputy PM Claims Role of Opposition Leader, Segodnya, 17 Jun 02, p. 4 via Lexis-Nexis.
(26) Meeting with author, Office of Yulia Tymoshenko, 24 Dec 04. The author is grateful for the assistance of Freedom House Senior Scholar Adrian Karatnycky.
(27) United As Never Before, Opposition Parties, Led by Timoshenko, Organize Mass Rallies, Izvestia, 17 Sep 02, p. 1-2; Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press via Lexis-Nexis.
(28) Peter Byrne, ³Power Play Pro-Kuchma Forces Grab Control of Rada,² Kyiv Post, 12 Dec 02.
(29) Ukrainian Opposition Fails to Unite, Ukrainskaya Pravda, 12 Dec 02.
(30) Opposition May Take to the Streets, Zerkalo Nedeli, 21 Dec 02.
Copyright ISCIP 2005
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal have been commissioned especially