According to the edict (No. 960, signed 11 Aug 03; Financial Times Information, 15 Aug 03; Global Newswire via Lexis-Nexis), the FSB "is entitled to have two first deputy directors …; [one of whom] is head of the Border Services; a secretary of state who is deputy director of [the FSB]; another deputy director [whose duties are not spelled out] ; six deputy directors who are heads of departments [within the FSB]; and a deputy director who is chief of the [FSB] Inspectorate; and to form a Collegium of 19 members."

As is often the case, the nature of the individuals who fill the stipulated posts likely will determine the relative influence of the position. A much longer presidential decree has spelled out, in great detail, the responsibilities of the FSB and will be covered in an upcoming N.I.S. Observed.

The first few years of Putin's ascendancy in Moscow, observers and analysts catalogued the travails of the satellite apparatchiki who glided through Kremlin intrigues with the dour Judo whiz, finally landing with dazzling success at the pinnacle of Russian power. Even through the first two years of his Presidency, Putin-watchers worried over the number of St. Petersburgers who followed their mentor from the frozen North to the gilded halls. Insulating himself from the clannish Yel'tsin staffers with his own personnel, Putin would ferret out the bureaucratic corruption and punish those who prospered from Russia's weak state in the 1990's. Or so we could be excused for thinking….

Perhaps the Petersburgers would grow too powerful along their march to glory and, in the euphoria of Kremlin intrigues, overstep their authority -- endangering society with their lawless loyalty to Putin. As their devotion clashed with the ideals of democratic, market transformation, the seasoned 'reformers' of the Yel'tsin era warned of a 'cult of personality' and unchecked ambition.

If these scenarios sound vaguely familiar, it's because they were, all too often, tales spun for journalists by a deep Kremlin insider, who, no matter how many times he teases with a new conspiracy tale, seems to have an uncanny inside track on the apparat.

Yes, it's Gleb Pavlovsky. And yes, he has gone flying off the tracks on occasion: the hysteria about a "Hasidic-paramasonic" conspiracy back in 2000 (The Moscow Times, 5 Oct 00 via Lexis-Nexis) when Berezovsky and Gusinsky were targets du jour of the regime; and the leak of the "Version-1" mutinous drafts [for which he spent four days in Lefortovo, courtesy of Sergei Stepashin (Moscow News, No. 48, 28 Nov 01 via Lexis-Nexis)] back when he thought Kremlin powerhouse Korzhakov buttered his bread. All in all however, he has either been tuned directly in to the "under-the-rug" apparat infighting, or propagandizing for one Kremlin strongman or t'other directing the analysts' focus from enemy to prey with remarkable agility.

These days however, he seems surprisingly reliable. And these days, he wants us to understand that the real danger is the current battle between the former security officers (siloviki) and the oligarchs. Once again, what we really seem to be facing is a conflict between old and new money -- with old being defined as "90s" -- perhaps money is too constricting a category, but it seems to lie at the heart of the matter. The former KGB/FSB guys (among them, more than a few St. Petersburgers) want access to the trappings of wealth, which often translates directly to political power (or simply buys political perks). Given the enthusiastic patronage of Putin, it may seem counterintuitive that security service officers would need greater access to political power. The key may now be found less in their need to increase their own access than in their desire to restrict the access, and therefore the power (and consequently independence) of other groups.

The siloviki seem keenly aware that money is fungible: their concern that Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos were turning their wealth into political clout and police protection almost certainly precipitated this summer's moves against the Yukos clan.

Pavlovsky, speaking now for the former 'Family' members and their wealthy patrons, warns that a "minority" within the presidential administration is on the political attack "in opposition to the course of President Putin." (OFFICIAL KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST, 2 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis)

Pavlovsky's warning are dire: "The President will be actually put under their control." (Ibid.) In this, he seems to long for the period of the Yel'tsin administration when factions were calmly played off against one another: no one group gained supremacy until Yel'tsin succumbed to illness and control in the Kremlin passed to the 'Family'. Perhaps Pavlovsky's awareness of the ability of one faction to seize opportunities to defeat the other makes him particularly sensitive to the threat posed by the powerful siloviki. Perhaps he has his own patrons to pacify or he realizes the FSB men know the skeletons in his own closet, either way, Pavlovsky's vulnerability may provide a peek under the rug at Kremlin dirt.

Pavlovsky provides us (and presumably therefore the President) with a list of names of the new mutinous conspirators: Presidential Administration Deputies Viktor Ivanov and Igor Sechin and the wealthy business men connected to them -- Sergei Pugachev, Rosneft head Sergei Bogdanchikov and Veremeyenko. (Ibid.) Some were involved earlier this year in an attack on the power of the oligarchs, which likely unleashed this backlash. The difference between tit-for-tat accusations and its colleague, the kompromat war, and a more serious threat to Russian political society lies in the response of the President. Will Putin take the bait and purge a 'disloyal opposition' or will the fur continue to fly? An answer may have to wait for election results.

President Vladimir Putin’s decree on the security services, signed on 15 August, indicates that, for the moment at least, formal restructuring of the Federal Security Service (FSB) is over. The Presidential Decree established a new command structure for the Security Service. According to the legislation, several new Deputy-Directorships will be created, and the FSB from now on will be governed by a Collegium of 19 members. [(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Aug 03; Financial Times via Lexis-Nexis) For further details see "Executive Branch" above]

Judging by recent events, however, the FSB’s mission to increase its influence over Russian society will continue unabated. Not only is the FSB rumored effectively to have taken control of both the Interior Ministry and the GRU, but also, as of 1 September, the FSB’s purview also extends into the private/economic sector: the new Vice-President of the Alrosa diamond company is FSB Colonel Yuri Ionov. There are conflicting explanations for Ionov’s appointment. The Government’s line is that Ionov has been appointed to protect the company’s economic security. His job description is, in effect, to counter industrial espionage.

An unnamed source within the company, however, is quoted by Kommersant (PRIME-TASS News Wire, 20 August 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database) as having said that the Federal Government is seeking to gain control of the firm’s cashflow, by obtaining an 8 percent stake in the company, and that Ionov is to "act on behalf of the government" in order to attain this goal.

While the FSB’s level of penetration of all levels of society is extremely disconcerting, there is some small encouragement to be gained from the fact that there have been two recent articles in the Russian press (both published by Nezavisimaya gazeta) addressing this issue. On 29 August, Nezavisimaya gazeta carried a story in which the author, Alexander Bovin, wrote that "Military and Security people in government are becoming a danger to the nation." Bovin noted that over half of the Security Council seats are occupied by former Security Service Officers, that five of seven super—governors are Generals, and that some 6,000 ex-KGB/FSB officers "hold important positions in the State Apparatus." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 29 Aug 03 via What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets Database)

At this point, Bovin halts his analysis. Rather than posing serious questions as to Putin’s motivation, Bovin prefers to assume that the President was simply misguided and perhaps naïve in placing his FSB cronies in positions of power:

"I don’t know whether Putin understood that in promoting senior officers to serve as the pillar of the State, and surrounding himself with the military, he would have to satisfy their corporate interests, at least partially, sooner or later. Perhaps he failed to understand that." (Ibid.) The previous story, an interview with Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a faculty member at the Russian Academy of Sciences, reached the same conclusion about the presence of (former) security officers.

"Not everything Putin does is to their liking; but they view him as one of their own, and hope that the President will give them a chance to run the country. That is, they hope he will permit them to ‘restore order’ as they understand it, and as they hope Putin understands it too." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Aug 20 03; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets Database)

Based on the fact that much, if not all, of the FSB’s power stems directly from the Presidential Apparatus, including Presidential decrees, which have the force of law, it is difficult to grant any credibility to Bovin and Kryshtanovskaya’s pretense of Presidential naivety. One can only conclude that the economic sector is simply the next target in the FSB’s campaign forever increasing influence.

Since the blast at the Mozdok Military hospital compound on August 1, there have been two further serious terrorist incidents in Russia. First, in Krasnodar (Southern Federal District) on August 25, three simultaneous explosions tore through the town. The blasts resulted in three deaths, and twenty persons were wounded. (RIA; Oreanda-Economic News from Regions, 25 Aug 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database)

The second, more serious, attack occurred on 3 September in the Stavropol region, where a commuter train traveling near Kislovodsk was blown up. Six people were killed in the blast. Investigators from the FSB and Interior Ministries discovered two craters along the tracks, which, they have claimed, are consistent with 5-KG charges of TNT, detonated remotely. (IZVESTIA PRESS DIGEST, 4 Sept 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database)

Blame for both acts has been placed squarely at the door of Chechen terrorists, with Nikolai Khazikov, Chief of the Caucasus Regional Prosecutor General’s Office, hinting that Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basaev were the instigators of the operation.

In the aftermath of the Mozdok bombing, it was easy to raise suspicion that some terrorist acts were being allowed to take place in order to strengthen the position of the Security Services. It is now almost impossible to avoid such a conclusion, based on Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov’s statement in the wake of the first of these most recent attacks, that domestic legislation to enhance the authority of the security services in their efforts to counter terrorism is expected in September. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 26 Aug 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database)

It would seem the Security Services might not be satisfied with anything short of full control.

Despite a pledge of good behavior signed by a little more than half (27 out of 43) of the parties involved in the upcoming parliamentary race, mud — not to mention charges of interference and chicanery — has begun to be slung.

Chief among the slingers is Gennadi Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party. Zyuganov, along with Union of Right Forces leader Boris Nemtsov, has complained that their respective parties are facing an information blockade due to the lack of independent media in the country, a blockade each plans to attack through regional appearances by party representatives. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Aug 03; Global News Wire; World News Connection via Lexis-Nexis and NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 27 Aug 03 via Lexis-Nexis)

Moreover, Zyuganov has complained, not without cause, of Kremlin-backed attempts to chip away support from the KPRF, which polls continuously at approximately the same level of support as "Putin’s party," United Russia. The latest endeavor, he says, is a move by Dmitri Rogozin, chairman of the Federation Council and Putin’s envoy on Kaliningrad-related matters, along with Sergei Glazyev, the leader of Russia’s Regions and a member of the Communist faction in the State Duma, to form an election bloc of nationalist groups — groups previously aligned with the KPRF.

One is tempted to ascribe the bloc’s founding to a confluence of forces that includes ambition and a forward-looking attitude brought in by the younger politicians, with the power of Kremlin support. Glazyev had been considered a possible modernizing force for Russian communists, a transformation Zyuganov rigorously opposes. Indeed, in a text intended for Pravda (but distributed to other media outlets), Zyuganov wrote that his party remains closer to communism’s "primordial principles" than similar parties in Europe that have taken a path unacceptable to Russians. (THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 22 Aug 03; Emerging Markets Datafile via Lexis-Nexis)

It is impossible, however, to overlook the insignificance of the parties that have joined the election bloc, as well as the haphazard manner of its formation. The bloc has no name, the rather hazy goal of uniting "all patriotic forces" to work on a program "of national interests," (RIA NEWS AGENCY, 1055 GMT, 24 Aug 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) and a fuzzy membership -- according to various reports, 15, 16 or17 parties have joined. There is also the logistical problem of the distribution of seats — with no shared platform and so many members — if (and it’s a big if) the bloc does manage to overcome the 5% minimum percentage of votes, who will have allocated the seats? If the statements made since the coalition was announced on 22 August provide any indication, the aim is to harness popular discontent and nostalgia for the "good old days" of Soviet domination. Parties that have joined the movement include the Congress of Russian Communities, Russia’s Regions, the Party of Labor, Native Fatherland Movement, For Holy Russia, Russia Traditional Party, Eurasia (not the better-known Eurasian Party), People’s and Patriotic Union of Youth, Soyuz Movement, and the Social and Democratic Organization. (KOMMERSANT, 25 Aug 03; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis) Certainly, such a collection puts into doubt that this bloc is intended as a vehicle for Glazyev to modernize anything.

Subsequent efforts by the bloc have focused on attracting big names that solidify thoughts of nostalgia, such as the former chairman of the Central Bank, Viktor Gerashchenko, the Commander-in-Chief of the Airborne Troops, Colonel General Georgi Shpak, (KOMMERSANT, 26 Aug 03; WPS via Lexis-Nexis) and former Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces General Valentin Varennikov, Rogozin’s "idol in the early 1990s," who, as a member of the rebellious State Emergency Committee, refused an amnesty for the August 1991 attempted coup. (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 27 Aug 03; WPS via Lexis-Nexis)

To be sure, Rogozin is no stranger to rhetoric harkening back to the time when Russia successfully bulldozed its neighbors, ignoring notions of territorial sovereignty, but that tactic hasn’t really worked in a while — he saw that himself in Russia’s recent attempts to force Lithuania to back down over transit regulations concerning Kaliningrad. And, indeed, it seems that the Federation Council speaker hasn’t overcome the disappointment of seeing the European Union side with Lithuania on the issue, as his statements demonstrate. "We will deal with the Kaliningrad problem until we feel that even those small restrictions which today exist for citizens’ transit travel and those restrictions which they are trying to impose on us regarding the transit of cargo... will be dully removed," Rogozin said. (RTR RUSSIA TV, 1600 GMT, 24 Aug 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis)

It is this preoccupation with the past -- a well-trodden plank in the communist platform — which makes the creation of the election bloc so suspect. Rogozin and Glazyev repeatedly have issued calls for the Communist Party to join, which Zyuganov and others (not surprisingly) have declined repeatedly. "We can’t join this coalition!.. If we join it, we would betray our voters, because we suspect that this coalition was created on the Kremlin’s orders, for the purpose of holding back the [KPRF]," explained Yuri Petrakov, a party representative. (KOMMERSANT, 25 Aug 03; WPS via Lexis-Nexis)

It is not inconceivable that the Kremlin did have a hand in the creation of the bloc, but apparently Moscow’s willingness to intervene in the election process, at least to support United Russia, is not wholehearted. In the regions, the Kremlin is seen as having schemed to keep United Russia from becoming too comfortable with its position of most-favored party. A new regional movement called New Russia has emerged in Tula, led by a provincial MP, Aleksei Berezin. The movement’s platform explicitly includes the goal of luring away at least 20 percent of United Russia’s current membership, as payback for United Russia’s refusal to support Berezin in the upcoming State Duma elections. Where does the Kremlin fit in this tale of revenge? Despite Berezin’s statements that the movement is supported by owners of small- and medium-sized businesses, rumors are rampant that the chief sponsor is a large state-owned oil company. (RUSSKY KURYER, 22 Jul 03; The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 55, No. 29 via Lexis-Nexis)

The Central Election Commission (CEC) is keeping its official eye on the election scene, though its effectiveness remains open to question. The commission certainly is devoting a substantial amount of time to media coverage; indeed, more attention seems to be spent on what is written about the process than on the process itself. To help earnest journalists navigate the tricky shoals of newly promulgated election-related legislation, the CEC is working on an informational brochure, "The Mass Media and the Elections; Questions and Answers." Touting such admirable principles as objective and accurate reporting, the publication assures the media that there is no prohibition on analyzing a candidate’s pre-election activity as they inform voters, although successfully influencing voters by "purposefully and systematically creat[ing] a positive or negative attitude... toward candidates" is unacceptable. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 21 Aug 03; Global News Wire; via World News Connection via Lexis-Nexis)

That is not the only training the CEC is offering, however. The Commission’s Russian Center for the Study of Election Technologies recently sent some reporters to a region where a gubernatorial campaign is underway, to note the success of election laws. Yet, while the laws apparently worked on the surface, a closer look revealed the continued circumvention of regulations, by such means as media manipulation, dishonest signature collections and underhanded, premature advertising. "Everything was done the way people do. Or rather, the way candidates do — people in fact are not paying nearly the close attention to what is happening that politicians would like," reporter Yekaterina Dobrynina explained. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 28 Aug 03; FBIS-2003-0828 via World News Connection)

Interestingly, all this activity is playing out against a backdrop of anticipated voter apathy. There has been a steady increase in the number of voters selecting "against all," and at least one Moscow-based newspaper warns that a potential increase in that number could "squeeze United Russia from second place." (VREMYA MN, 12 Aug 03; Global Newswire; World News Connection via Lexis-Nexis) Of course, such a scenario is unlikely, though not impossible, particularly if recent polls are to be believed. The Regional Politics Research Agency, a division of the ROMIR Monitoring agency, recently released the results of a poll of residents in 32 Russian regions. When asked who holds real power in the country, most respondents (37 percent) indicated their belief that oligarchs, not politicians, are in charge; only 4 percent responded that the Duma held the real power. (VEDOMOSTI, 27 Aug 03; WPS via Lexis-Nexis)

The Constitutional Court recently demonstrated its own brand of independence from the Kremlin, by removing a powerful tool the federal government had used to keep rebellious (and, possibly, independence-leaning) regions in line. The court ruled that the attempts by the prosecutor’s office to seek decisions from general courts on the constitutionality of regional laws were themselves unconstitutional. Only the Constitutional Court gets to decide that (which is probably why it’s called the Constitutional Court). Still, the folks in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the most visible targets of the prosecutor-general’s office in this regard, should not plan victory rallies anytime soon. The decision does not necessarily invalidate earlier general court rulings that, in the main, supported federal attempts to overhaul regional legislation which provided for any degree of autonomy. It does, however, offer those regions, and the rest of the Russian Federation, the opportunity to appeal the rulings. (KOMMERSANT, 19 Jul 03; Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press via Lexis-Nexis)

The prosecutor’s office had more success in another ruling, the conviction on charges of libel of journalist and politician German Galkin from Chelyabinsk. The ruling was most surprising in its sentence: While previously such convictions ended with a fine or, at most, a suspended sentence, Galkin faces one year of corrective labor in a prison colony. He was found guilty of libel for a series of articles which implied that Chelyabinsk Vice Governor Konstantin Bochkarev was a pedophile and that Bochkarev, as well as Vice Governor Andrei Kosilov, were guilty of professional criminal activity. "Galkin accused me and my colleague of having committed a whole range of especially serious crimes — participation in an organized crime grouping, serving the interests of the narcotics mafia, embezzlement of budget funds, paying off officials, organizing murders for hire, creating financial pyramids...," Kosilov said. (IZVESTIYA, 20 Aug 03; Global News Wire; World News Connection via Lexis-Nexis) While Glakin denies he wrote the articles, evidence indicates he was, at least, one of the persons who edited the publication.

It may be premature, however, to assume that the Galkin sentence signals a hardening of judicial attitudes towards the media, given the political nature of the publication in question as well as the types of accusations contained in the articles. Still, the severity of the sentence and the charges brought against Galkin, for articles whose authorship cannot be proved, guarantee that the media, and media analysts, will be watching the situation carefully.

Almost daily since late August, Russian officials have dropped hints about their willingness to reconsider the Iraqi issue and perhaps contribute an (as yet undefined) number of troops to the task of occupation and reconstruction. (AFP via Lexis-Nexis, 9 Sep 03; and various RFE/RL Newslines 27 Aug to 9 Sep 03) One condition mentioned consistently is the need for Russian elements to operate under a "UN mandate" – depending on the outcome of negotiations sponsored by UN. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, this may be as modest as a new UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) for "cover" or, if France and Germany supported by Russia and China can prevail over the U.S. and U.K., it may mean an entirely new political and "peacekeeping" structure. (Reuters via RFE/RL, 5 Sep 03) In fact, US Secretary of State Colin Powell will meet this weekend with Annan and the foreign ministers from the five members of the UN Security Council to discuss the issue. (AFP via Lexis-Nexis, 9 Sep 03)

Russia’s consideration of these possibilities entails evolution of the previous opposition to the war, and may mean a Russian approach separate from that of Germany and France, its earlier partners. All three still want the UN to play a major role but, Russia is hinting that it may settle for a U.S. General in charge of military forces in Iraq, as well as the U.S.-appointed administrator and Governing Council. (AFP, 9 Sep 03 via Lexis-Nexis; and RFE/RL Newsline, 5 Sep 03) The adjustment in the Russian approach was signalled during a press conference with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in Sardinia on 30 August, when President Vladimir Putin said he "sees nothing wrong if [a peacekeeping contingent] is under U.S. command." (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 Sep 03)