RUSSIAN FEDERATION
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
PRESIDENCY
Can't stand the rain?
President Yel'tsin's vacations are infamous. In the early years of his presidency, we wondered at the timing of his retreats, as in September 1991 when he squandered the momentum of his post-coup popularity with an extended respite from political engagement. In the later years of his first term and certainly the beginning of his second, the state of the president's mental and physical health dominated analyses of his vacations. The Kremlin staff frequently contributed to speculation through their own reticence and obfuscation. Certainly we recall the publication of a months-old photograph meant to portray the president's fitness during one "disappearance," or the remarkable transformation of a sore throat into "colossal fatigue," which finally developed into coronary disease requiring bypass surgery.

Nonetheless, the president and his staff may have outdone themselves this time. With rumors of an impending coup suffusing the political atmosphere, encouraged by Yel'tsin's own comments on the possibility, the president departed Moscow for Karelia (via St. Petersburg for an appearance at Tsar Nicholas' funeral service). Accompanying the president on this vacation were an unusual number of medical personnel and an "unprecedented" security detail. (Komsomol'skaya pravda, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202)

Initially, this retreat followed previous patterns, with the president neither addressing reporters, nor venturing out for photo ops. The arrival of Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko certainly disrupted the tranquility however, as the president appeared with Kirienko before the media to announce the signature of a number of decrees regarding personnel issues. Yel'tsin did not immediately make public the specifics of the decrees, preferring to leave the release of such information to his press service, but he did contribute the following comments on personnel policy:

"Sometimes, someone's dismissal is not easily understood by the press. (...) However, I am much more informed than you are, and I know who and how has been working [sic] day by day on each case, on any crime either solved or not, and believe me, I feel quite out of sorts knowing what I do." (ITAR-TASS, 25 Jul 98; NEXIS)

The press service later announced the dismissal of FSB Director Nikolai Kovalev (more under "FSB" heading). Yel'tsin's dismissal of the head of the Security Services was already stoking the flames of coup-mongering when Yel'tsin abruptly ended his Karelian vacation and returned to the capital. While presidential aides insisted that rainy weather had prompted the premature exit from Karelia, President Yel'tsin claimed that "urgent matters" involving the "complicated political and economic situation in the country" required his presence in Moscow. (ITAR-TASS, 0815 GMT, 29 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-210)

Despite reports that the President would continue his vacation elsewhere, Yel'tsin is currently at Gorki-9, where he has held meetings with the Prime Minister, foreign loan negotiator Anatoli Chubais, and the new FSB Director Vladimir Putin. GOVERNMENT
IMF slaps Russia's wrist
In what appeared to be a mild criticism of Russian efforts to begin implementation of negotiated reforms, the International Monetary Fund reduced the amount of the first installment of Russian bailout monies from $5.6 billion to $4.8 billion. Anatoli Chubais, who represented Russia in the IMF negotiations, claimed that the temporary $800 million shortfall would not have a serious impact. (ITAR-TASS, 0038 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202)

Communist deputy joins cabinet
Yuri Maslyukov, former chair of the Duma Economics Policies Committee, has been appointed Minister for Trade and Industry by presidential decree. (ITAR-TASS, 1305 GMT, 23 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-204) Maslyukov has requested that the prime minister expand the responsibilities of the ministry to include oversight of the military-industrial sector and foreign economic relations. (Ekho Moskvy, 1800 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209)

Chernomyrdin on call
A 14 July meeting between President Yel'tsin and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin prompted speculation that Chernomyrdin may soon return to the government, perhaps as a liaison between tax collectors and the energy industry directors, with whom he has long had close ties. While there has been no word on an official role for Chernomyrdin, he did make an appearance at the first Gore-Kirienko Commission meeting. According to ITAR-TASS (1645 GMT, 24 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-205), American VP Gore sought a private meeting with Chernomyrdin at the US embassy, but Kirienko suggested they include his predecessor at the commission's meeting in the Government House.

Kirienko threatens miners
Striking miners blocking the Trans-Siberian Railroad are clearly the subject of great concern within the Russian government. Sergei Kirienko has responded to the strikes by reminding the miners that the Security Council decided in May that blocking the railways is a punishable criminal offense. Claiming that the government was fulfilling its obligations to the miners according to the agreements negotiated in May, Kirienko suggested that the coal miners should not expect all their problems to be solved at once. (Interfax, 1404 GMT, 18 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-199)

The workers' protests are also the focus of a significant portion of the coup scenario analyses. There is, however, little agreement as to who or what group may be inciting the strikers' demonstrations. Two recent articles from the Russian press suggest the diversity of opinion on the cause of the strikes:

From Moskovskiy komsomolets (16 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209): "The president's staff is now almost 100 percent certain that the miners' weeks-long picketing of the House of Government was financed with Berezovsky's money."

Literaturnaya gazeta (15 Jul 98, pp. 1-2; FBIS-SOV-98-209) has a radically different take: "Today, [Communist Deputy Viktor] Ilyukhin represents a link uniting the "people's" rebels with potential putschists from among the special services personnel."

The current pressing concern is less a matter of which flank may launch an attack, but rather that the political and economic climate is in enough turmoil to make an attack seem likely.

FSB
Kovalev replaced with Putin
President Yel'tsin's above-referenced remarks notwithstanding, the dismissal of Kovalev, and perhaps more importantly his replacement by Vladimir Putin, may have long been in the works. Kovalev, often associated with "Chernomyrdin's team," was first threatened with dismissal during the May 1997 reorganization of the Security Services and Putin was believed the likely successor then.

Putin, who was recently appointed to head up the president's Main Control Department and has close contacts within the president's staff, is also part of the St. Petersburg "clan" that followed Anatoli Chubais into Moscow federal government service. Putin's qualifications are more than political however, as he has many years of KGB service (first directorate -- intelligence) on his resume as well. (NTV, 1500 GMT, 26 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-207)

Kovalev's dismissal decree noted his transfer to other work, and Prime Minister Kirienko made an effort to dampen speculation that Kovalev's performance had incited the firing by adding his assurance that Kovalev "will continue to be used to the Motherland's benefit." (ITAR-TASS, 0816 GMT, 27 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-208)

Despite the calming remarks, it still seems an odd presidential vacation that requires interruption for the sacking of the head of the Security Services and an unplanned and hurried return to the capital.

by Susan J. Cavan

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Russia denies supplying weapons to Afghan fighters...
The Russian foreign ministry on 28 July denied that Russia is supporting one of Afghanistan's warring parties.

The ministry's Information and Press Department stated that, "Russia strictly adheres to its position of noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs," in response to a New York Times article published the previous day. The New York Times asserted that Russia was supplying weapons, training and logistical support to the northern alliance group that is fighting against the Taliban for control of northern Afghanistan. The article claimed that Russia was assisting the rebel group led by Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, as well as Russian and Uzbeki assistance to the rebel group led by 'Abdol Rashid Dostum (both forces side with the northern alliance).

Although a high-ranking source in Moscow admitted that the anti-Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan are viewed sympathetically in Moscow, the Russian government claims non-intervention, on the premise that more weapons ultimately lead to more fighting which is strongly against Russian interests. (Interfax, 1113 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209)

...But opposes Afghan arms embargo
The Russian government opposes any arms embargo on Afghanistan, and has stated that any embargo would only be beneficial for one of the conflicting sides. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release on 28 July, the same day Russian denials of arms deliveries to the northern alliance were issued, stated that, "despite the attractiveness of the idea of an international embargo on such supplies proposed by a number of countries, the Russian Foreign Ministry believes that it could hardly be implemented given that efficient control over the Afghan- Pakistani border is impossible."

While reasserting Russia's "non-intervention" position in the war, the foreign ministry statement simultaneously implied that Afghanistan's neighboring countries are supplying arms to the warring factions in Afghanistan. The statement did not directly accuse any neighboring country of supplying weapons but stated that peace can only be achieved in Afghanistan when " the country's neighbors and countries interested in peace in Afghanistan prevent their territory from being used for arms supply." (Interfax, 1113 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209)

Although Russia repeatedly asserts that peace in Afghanistan is in the best interest of Russia as well as all the states of the CIS, full Taliban control of the country could serve to destabilize further the situation in Tajikistan. Additionally, Taliban control of Afghanistan could ultimately result in a Turkmen-sponsored pipeline through Afghanistan that would avoid the Russian pipeline network.

Primakov identifies source of extremism in Kosovo
Using a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a forum to discuss the Kosovo conflict, Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov reiterated his "three nos" as Russia's official policy in the troubled Serbian province. First, Russia opposes the status quo whereby Kosovo does not have considerable autonomy rights. Second, Russia is saying no to separatism. Third, Russia objects to the possible use of outside force on Yugoslav territory. Reinforcing his third no, Primakov was quoted as saying "such actions without a corresponding request from Yugoslavia would be unjustified and would create a serious precedent." He also stated that the threat of intervention has resulted in "extremism from the side of Kosovo Albanians," and places the main responsibility for peaceful negotiations to determine the fate of the Serbian province on the Kosovo Albanians. (Interfax, 1735 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209, and Interfax, 0951 GMT, 24 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-205)

Primakov's position is that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is keeping his promise to start talks with the Kosovo Albanians and that it is the ethnic Albanians who are preventing the talks from starting. With the recent advances of the Serbian forces against Albanian separatists in Kosovo, Milosevic does not appear ready to announce any cease-fire that might translate to the start of negotiations on the future of Kosovo.

A week earlier in Moscow, a foreign ministry spokesman stressed many of these same points as he announced that Moscow is not against political representation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in any talks that may be held. Although this statement appeared to represent an easing of Russia's position concerning the status of the KLA, the Russian foreign ministry reiterated Moscow's opposition to any direct representation of the KLA, stressing that it must be a political party that represents the KLA interests. (Interfax, 1622 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202)

Russia: SFOR detentions beyond mandate
Citing the recent mistaken detention of two Bosnian Serbs, Moscow denounced the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) policy of detaining and extraditing suspected war criminals. A Russian foreign ministry statement on 28 July reinforced Moscow's position that detention and extradition of suspected war criminals is "the exclusive prerogative of the Serb Republic, and Bosnia and Herzegovina." The spokesmen referred to the SFOR incident as a demonstration of the dangers associated with putting SFOR forces "in a dubious position," stressing that such operations are not implied in the SFOR mandate. The Russian contingent of SFOR does not engage in the detention of suspected war criminals to be extradited to the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. (Interfax, 1648 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209)

Russia welcomes Iran's adherence to non-proliferation regime...
Russia and Iran confirmed their commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament and supported the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, a Russian press release stated on 18 July. Russia and Iran urged all concerned countries to consider practical measures aimed at realizing the idea of a nuclear-free zone and called for a speedy accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of all countries which have not joined it yet. As a warning to any attempt to interfere by force in the ongoing nuclear projects in Iran, both sides stressed that an attack or a threat of attack on "peaceful nuclear facilities" would pose a threat to nuclear security and could trigger a corresponding international response as provided for in the UN Charter. The official Russian press release following the high-level meetings on 15 and 16 July stated that Russia welcomed Iran's adherence to the non-proliferation regime and its lack of intention to get access to nuclear weapons. (ITAR-TASS, 1409 GMT, 18 Jul 98; FBIS-TAC-98-199)

...While Russia acknowledges Iran's attempts to acquire technologies
Shortly before his ouster, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Kovalev disclosed that, over the past two years, the FSB uncovered several attempts by Iranian elements to obtain missile and nuclear technology and substances from Russian sources. In a statement issued by the Russian Embassy in Tel Aviv, the FSB chief acknowledged that an Iranian embassy official and a member of the Iranian military delegation in Russia attempted to acquire materials that could be used to produce unconventional weapons. The statement was issued at the conclusion of Kovalev's official visit to Israel on 19 July. Kovalev cited other FSB successes in thwarting the spread of technology that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction.

A statement summing up his visit issued through the Russian embassy in Tel Aviv notes that, per President Boris Yel'tsin's instructions, the FSB will make every possible effort to thwart resolutely any attempt to export substances and technologies for the production of weapons of mass destruction and launchers. Kovalev disclosed that an Iranian Embassy employee who tried to purchase documents dealing with missile engines from a Russian citizen was arrested in Moscow in November 1997 and that a member of the Iranian military delegation who tried to obtain documents dealing with aviation technology from a Russian citizen was deported from Moscow in June 1997. (Ma'ariv, 20 Jul 98; FBIS-TAC-98-201)

In search of new friends
Noting Latin America's fast development and active integration into the world community, Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov stated that the region is becoming very important to the world's developing mechanisms of multipolarity. While speaking at a foreign ministry meeting on Russia's policy in Latin America, Primakov set out a range of top priority practical tasks for future work in that region. A press release from the government's main information news agency stressed that the new approach was based on a detailed analysis of the current state of Russian-Latin American relations. Primakov stressed the role of political dialogue, above all at summit level, referring to the recent Russian-Argentinian summit in Moscow. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1634 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-203)

In pursuit of its multipolar world, the Russian foreign ministry has stepped up its efforts to forge strong ties with countries in Africa and Latin America. The ministry has actively pursued new contacts in these regions as well as strengthened ties with former Soviet allies such as Angola and Cuba.

Seleznev sees OSCE, not NATO, as key to European security
Nearly parroting the words of Foreign Minister Primakov, State Duma Chairman Gennadi Seleznev spoke out against any further NATO expansion east. Seleznev stated that further NATO expansion could result in "the artificial alienation of Russia from the fundamentals of the European security," negatively affecting the vital interests of all states on the continent. Addressing the plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Seleznev spoke out against any inclusion of the Baltic countries in a new round of NATO expansion. He called the creation of a system of security in Europe on the basis of the OSCE one of the most important directions of Russian foreign policy. (ITAR-TASS, 1052 GMT, 10 Jul 98; FBIS-UMA-98-191)

Primakov has long advocated the strengthening of the OSCE in favor of any further NATO expansion. The Seleznev statement concerning Baltic inclusion in NATO is the often-repeated Primakov line. Primakov has also repeatedly proposed that NATO fall under OSCE, which would reduce NATO to a security structure answerable to a higher international organization.

by John McDonough

* * * * *

Some progress made during Kirienko's visit to Japan
Russia and Japan continue to move toward signing a peace treaty by 2000 along the guidelines established in a November 1997 meeting between Russian President Yel'tsin and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto. Although Hashimoto resigned during a 14 July visit by newly appointed Russian Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko, a joint communique indicated that progress was indeed made on a number of issues. Kirienko's visit to Japan was the first made by a Russian prime minister.

As expected, the two countries agreed to cooperate further on establishing economic ties. Japan will continue to support Russia's progress toward integration with the world economic community, which includes further financial support in the economic crisis, support for accelerated membership in the World Trade Organization, and future trade relationships. Some of the more serious issues of contention, such as the Kurile island dispute, received little attention during Kirienko's brief two-day visit. Future meetings will continue as scheduled despite the interruption in Japanese leadership. Some of the more important future issues which will be ironed out in upcoming months will be the establishment of a joint Russian-Japanese investment organization and agreements on cooperation in space exploration.

Expulsion of diplomats-part II
The recent row in Russian-South Korean relations over accusations of espionage demonstrates a lack of mutual maturity and understanding which divides the two. On 6 July, Russia indiscreetly expelled a South Korean diplomat on charges of spying. What remains unanswered is why Russia felt the need to act in such an abrupt manner without consultation beforehand. In any case, South Korea retaliated by expelling a Russian diplomat. Almost comically, both sides announced that the conflict was over even though no serious discussion had taken place. (Interfax, 1756 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202) When the row first began, it seemed likely that it would simply remain a matter between intelligence agencies. However, lack of communication between the two sides pushed the matter to the highest levels and threatened all diplomatic relations.

South Korean officials were taken aback at the ASEAN regional forum in Manila when Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov refused to shake hands with his counterpart Park Chung-Soo and only provided English language translators for the meeting. The two did get together for a protracted meeting but failed to put an end to the dispute. The dispute has resulted in a significant loss in South Korea's ability to conduct spying activities on North Korea as Russia insisted on the removal of five intelligence officers from the Moscow embassy. South Korea had kept eight intelligence officers in Moscow since 1990.

Primakov, Kirienko visit China, prepare for September summit
Primakov made an official visit to China on 22 July. His primary objective was to prepare for the informal "no-jackets" meeting between Russian President Boris Yel'tsin and Jiang Zemin in Moscow scheduled for September. Primakov met with Jiang Zemin, Premier of the State Council Zhu Rongji and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan. A joint statement was issued on the India-Pakistan nuclear weapons escalation reflecting the desire on both sides to build consensus on security issues in Asia. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0143 GMT, 24 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-205) Earlier in the month, Prime Minister Kirienko paid a brief visit to China and met with Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji for similar purposes. (ITAR-TASS, 1355 GMT, 16 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-197)

by Ray Gaul

DOMESTIC ISSUES & LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY
Duma focuses on procedure for transfer of presidential power
With a 316 to 1 vote, the Duma passed a bill outlining the mechanism with which presidential power would be transferred due to resignation, inability to fulfill his duties due to health, impeachment, or death. The bill allows either house of the Federal Assembly to request the Supreme Court to determine presidential competence. Under the bill, the court would appoint a medical commission nominated by the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences. Foreign specialists may act as consultants of the commission. The commission would have 14 days to report on its findings.

Once the findings are known, the Supreme Court would legally establish the president's inability to perform his duties and make this ruling public the next day. Upon the ruling, the Federation Council would decide whether the president should be removed and the prime minister made acting president. (Interfax, 0912 GMT, 3 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-184)

However, several days after the Duma passage of the bill, the Federation Council rejected it by claiming that it violated Russia's Fundamental Law and Civil Code. The bill would have spelled out the presently vague procedure of impeachment and conviction, as well as the process of finding the president unfit to carry out his duties due to reasons of health. Presumably a new draft will be forthcoming shortly. (ITAR-TASS, 1526 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190)

Duma passes bill on small business tax
Under the proposed law, small enterprises such as small retail outlets, restaurants, and gasoline stations must pay their federal income taxes in advance. The reason for the focus on small businesses is that they are known tax dodgers; their small size allows them to "escape into the shadows" and hide from federal tax agencies.

The interesting part of the bill concerns the mechanism for collecting the taxes. The bill envisages moving the responsibility for collecting the small business tax from the federal level to the regions, where each region will be required to pass the appropriate legislation. The reason for the shift, according to the bill's proponents, is that the regions are closer and thus better positioned to know the affairs of small businesses. Under the law, 50 percent of the income tax collected will go to the federal budget and 50 percent will go to the regions.

By using the regions as federal tax collectors, the central government is admitting that it cannot collect the taxes owed to it. It is clear that even if the Federation Council agrees to the law, the relationship between the regions and the federal center created by the law will be a difficult one. (ITAR-TASS, 1200 GMT, 15 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-196)

Duma commission discusses Yel'tsin impeachment
According to those who initiated the procedure, the first impeachable crime committed by the president was his participation in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Agreement which dissolved the Soviet Union. Anatoli Lukyanov, a commission member and one of the leaders of the failed August 1991 coup, said the commission is ready to provide documents, one of which is the referendum supporting retention of the union, as proof of Yel'tsin's villainies.

Any attempt to remove a democratically elected head of state should be taken seriously, however, the Duma's present attempt should be understood as a face-saving move in light of its recent loss to Yel'tsin during the Kirienko appointment process. It does not seem likely that the process of impeachment will amount to much, especially when one of the principle presidential transgressions cited is an act that occurred outside of the present constitution under which the impeachment procedure is being conducted. (Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 0900 GMT, 20 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-201)

REGIONS
Sobyanin describes provincial power brokers
In an interesting interview, Federation Council member Sergei Sobyanin explained who in fact holds power in the regions. Contrary to most accounts, the president and the supposed economic "oligarchs" are not as powerful as are other institutions. For instance, 79 out of 89 regions receive subsidies from Moscow, and therefore the finance ministry is quite influential.

Other sources of regional influence are the "force structures" (the prosecutor's office, the interior ministry, the Federal Security Service, etc.) which, according to Sobyanin, are engaged in collecting bags of compromising materials on regional leaders. Most of the information remains within the "force structures" for their own use, however, some manages to end up on the Russian president's desk.

Sobyanin also warns against "super-regions" or inter-regional associations such as the Siberian Agreement, the Greater Volga, the Greater Urals, etc. The possibility exists that they may wish to secede given that their large size makes them economically, and perhaps militarily, viable.

Clearly the Russian bureaucracy is no Weberian ideal of modern, rationalized state administration, and this bodes ill for attempts to strengthen the Russian rule of law through legislation alone. Attention must also be paid to how the laws are enforced and interpreted. Instead of relying on the regions for tax collection, as the previous Digest entry discussed, perhaps the Federal Assembly and the executive branch of government should address the administration of laws, edicts, or regulations. (Argumenty i fakty, No. 30, Jul 98 (Signed to press 21 July 98), p. 4; FBIS-SOV-98-203)

by Michael Thurman

by Kate Martin