Russian Federation Executive Branch Susan J. Cavan Foreign Relations John McDonough Domestic Issues & Legislative Branch Michael Thurman Armed Forces LtCol Dwyer Dennis CDR Curtis Stevens

Newly Independent States Western Region Tracy Gerstle Caucasus Miriam Lanskoy Central Asia Monika Shepherd

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

EXECUTIVE BRANCH PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT
Special Report on Government Dismissal: A Chronology by Susan J. Cavan
March 20	Yel'tsin, having spent last two weeks recuperating at Gorki-9, pays "surprise" visit to Kremlin, works there for three hours, reportedly catches Yastrzhembsky and Yumashev off guard. Yel'tsin has phone conversation with Chubais re: wage arrears.
21	Yel'tsin meets with Chernomyrdin at Gorki-9, also meets with Yumashev.
22	Yumashev calls Kirienko in the evening and tells him to report to Kremlin at 8 a.m.
23	Yel'tsin sacks government, appoints himself acting prime minister; two hours later (after market drop of 10 percent?), names Kirienko acting PM. Praises Chernomyrdin, awards him medal (2nd class). Targets of dismissals: Chernomyrdin, Chubais and Kulikov.
24	Yel'tsin praises Sergeev and Primakov. Yastrzhembsky denies Berezovsky, Yumashev or Livshits had any influence. Yuksi and ELF Aquitaine (FR) announce 5 percent deal.
25	Yel'tsin warns staff that failure to implement decrees "means death." Nash Dom Rossiya holds meeting. Prosecutor files embezzlement charges against former State Property Committee (GKI) deputy Ivanenko and associate. Berezovsky claims role in government dismissal.
26	Yel'tsin meets Chirac and Kohl--gets confused. Kirienko chairs cabinet meeting.
27	Yel'tsin nominates Kirienko and threatens Duma with dissolution (something he later denies doing) and again praises Chernomyrdin. Seleznev says he's disappointed, but won't give president grounds for dissolution.
28	Chernomyrdin announces candidacy for presidency; Kremlin "surprised." Decree on Security Council reorganization.
29	Kirienko says Chubais won't chair Unified Energy System (UES) board. Klimentev wins mayor's seat in Nizhni Novgorod.
30	Stepashin appointed MVD chief. Yel'tsin again denies he'll seek third term.
31	Yel'tsin confirms Primakov and Zadornov (Finance) will be in new government (corrects aides who refer to them as "acting"). Duma leaders request roundtable. Kirienko reaffirms Rosneft shares/price.
April 01	Duma's Communists, Nationalists and Agrarians request withdrawal of Kirienko nomination. Rossiyskiye vesti editor announces it will no longer be an official organ of the administration. Nizhni election commission annuls mayoral results. Deputy Chief of Staff Savostyanov dispatched to Nizhni to investigate.
02	Yel'tsin renominates Kirienko and agrees to roundtable. Duma vote postponed. Novye izvestiya (Berezovsky-owned) accuses Kirienko of unethical financial dealings. Klimentev arrested.
03	Duma requests Kirienko citizenship information (question over possible Israeli citizenship). Duma votes to investigate Nizhni election. Yel'tsin postpones Japan trip.
04	Yel'tsin sacks his representative in Nizhni, Yuri Lebedev. Kirienko promises to pay wage arrears before workers protest. Chubais elected to board of UES.
05	Stepashin suggests new law to prevent bandits from running for office.
06	Constitutional Court decides Yel'tsin must sign trophy art law. Berezovsky backs Kirienko. Mixed signals from Kremlin on Yel'tsin compliance with Constitutional Court (CC) ruling. Eventual decision: Yel'tsin will sign law, but challenge it over voting procedures. Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov says Iran nuclear reactor deal to proceed.
07	Roundtable meeting. Yel'tsin warns parliament against destabilizing the country with hesitancy over Kirienko nomination. Clear Zyuganov/Seleznev split over Kirienko candidacy. Yel'tsin lists other candidates considered for PM job before decision--Luzhkov, Stroev among them. Kirienko holds cabinet meeting--claims 700 million rubles had been sent to regions. Approximately 3,000 defense industry workers protest at government headquarters. Berezovsky urges business to back Chernomyrdin for president.
08	Kotenkov (president's Duma representative) says Kirienko unlikely to win in first round.
09	Workers' Protest (called by Communists/FITUR) attracts hundreds of thousands across several Russian cities. (~789,000 protesters?).
10	Duma rejects Kirienko candidacy (secret ballot voting: 186-143). Yel'tsin immediately renominates Kirienko. Aleksandr Putilov, chair of the board of Rosneft, complains that asking price for share is too high.
12	Former Border Guard chief Nikolaev elected to State Duma in a special by-election in southern Moscow. Yel'tsin, meeting with his new Border Guard chief, warns him not to follow divisive path of his predecessor.
13	Yel'tsin dismisses calls for constitutional change to succession clause--and to any constitutional change. Yel'tsin instructs Borodin to assist Duma deputies with housing and other "perk" appeals if they show a "constructive approach" towards Kirienko nomination. Yel'tsin submits more documents to Duma for consideration of Start II.
14	Seleznev meets with Yel'tsin, says president willing to cooperate with Duma. He also calls for backing of Kirienko in upcoming ballot. Zyuganov and his Duma allies from Nationalist, Agrarian parties reiterate their opposition to Kirienko candidacy. Duma votes to conduct open balloting for next round, which should serve to keep party members closer in line with leadership. Sergei Shakhrai supports possible constitutional change to allow Federation Council chief to succeed if Yel'tsin should be incapacitated and the prime minister remain unconfirmed. Nemtsov states there will be no changes to Rosneft auction pricing, despite pressure.
15	Duma asks Constitutional Court to rule on legality of renomination of same candidate for prime minister. CC Chair Marat Baglai says court won't decide soon and wouldn't apply ruling retroactively. Shakhrai warns that Yel'tsin would dissolve Duma if Kirienko is not confirmed and may act to change electoral law by scrapping party list system. Yel'tsin signs trophy art law, but appeals on content to Constitutional Court. Yastrzhembsky denies reports that Yel'tsin has been taken to hospital. Yel'tsin is reported to have threatened Berezovsky with deportation over his meddling in government affairs. Viktor Ilyukhin announces support for Zyuganov's call to oppose Kirienko. Duma votes to override veto of law on state ownership of UES. According to Duma law, the state would retain at least 51 percent ownership and foreign participation would be limited to not more than 25 percent.
16	Yel'tsin claims he is healthy, but admits to going to clinic for dental work. Berezovsky denies any split with Yel'tsin, claims Kirienko is too inexperienced to run country if Yel'tsin were to become incapacitated (again suggesting Rybkin as alternative), and confirms support for Lebed's Krasnoyarsk race. CC Chair Baglai states Yel'tsin cannot unilaterally change electoral law. Troops ambushed in North Ossetia, three reported killed. Decree stipulates state-owned companies must pay dividends to the state. Duma approves new tax code.
17	Duma again rejects Kirienko nomination (115-271 in open ballot). Vote may be more relevant to power struggle within the Communist faction than to any conclusions regarding Kirienko's candidacy. Yel'tsin renominates Kirienko. Zyuganov again questions constitutionality of renomination. Kirienko states he will not allow cabinet positions to be used as bargaining chips in the current struggle.
18	Yel'tsin in Japan for "casual" meetings with Hashimoto. Seleznev calls for support of Kirienko on third ballot claiming, "Russia will not forgive us if we sacrifice the State Duma over a nomination for Prime Minister." Yabloko leader Yavlinsky still not willing to support Kirienko.
19	Yel'tsin and Hashimoto discuss disputed islands and set up a Joint Commission on Drafting a Peace Treaty, as well as a Joint Investment Fund. Zyuganov reiterates his opposition to Kirienko. Former Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Agriculture, Zaveryukha, wins Duma seat in a by-election in Kamchatka Oblast.
20	Yel'tsin praises Sergeev on occasion of his 60th birthday. Kirienko meets with Strobe Talbott in Moscow. Vladimir Potanin announces support for Kirienko and intention to bid on Rosneft, despite high price. Ekho Moskvy reports onset of a campaign by friend of Chubais to win him the UES chair.
21	Yel'tsin submits a draft law banning criminal candidates to the Duma. Chernomyrdin announces opposition to Chubais as head of UES. Yastrzhembsky touring Kurile Islands on "fact-finding" mission. Trophy art law goes into effect. Skuratov re-opens Aum Shinrikyo case. Luzhkov in Krasnoyarsk campaigning for incumbent Governor Zubov and against Lebed. Zyuganov also in Krasnoyarsk campaigning for Petr Romanov.
22	Duma passes revised Land Code (with Yel'tsin's changes). Federation Council also overrides Yel'tsin's veto of UES law (See 4/15). A helicopter accompanying Sergei Stepashin is shot at along Dagestani-Chechen border. Central Electoral Commission head Ivanchenko claims new parliamentary elections would require new electoral rules to be drafted by Yel'tsin. Seleznev announces opposition to Chubais chairing UES board.
23	Yel'tsin meets with Seleznev, Stroev in Kremlin and phones heads of various Duma factions, including Zyuganov. Yel'tsin also meets with heads of coal-mining regions and promises increased attention; he directs Kirienko to work on coal sector problems. NDR, LDPR and Russia's Regions announce support for Kirienko. Agrarians and People's Power claim split in ranks over confirmation. Communists, led by Zyuganov, still oppose. Yavlinsky claims Yabloko will vote against en masse, if the ballot is open. If ballot is secret, Yabloko members will not vote. Ekho Moskvy reports that Yel'tsin has approved Chubais for UES chair. Kremlin press service issues speedy denial. Zyuganov also claims that Yel'tsin told him personally that he had not approved Chubais for the job. US air force plane removes uranium from Georgian facility. In Krasnoyarsk, Zubov confiscates 850,000 newspapers allegedly printed by Lebed, which contains an unflattering article about the Zubov campaign. Svyazinvest sets preliminary terms for next shares auction in May.
24	In a secret ballot, Kirienko wins confirmation in the Duma (251-25). Many deputies either abstained from voting or ruined their ballots. Kirienko, in comments to Duma, promises not to break up natural monopolies and announces that the Extraordinary Tax Commission (VchK) will meet in May. Yel'tsin schedules an address to the nation in the evening. Rosvooruzheniye announces plans to expand regional offices into every Russian region (currently there are 10 branch offices). The Council of Foreign and Defense Policies publishes its report on privatization, which claims that the privatization process was "saddled" with criminal capitalization. The Krasnoyarsk Krai electoral commission warns Lebed that his campaign material is not meeting standards. The commission also claims that four other candidates, including Zubov and Romanov, have exceeded fundraising limits.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Russia continues to participate in efforts to settle Kosovo crisis
Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov continued Moscow's efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis by political means. He arrived in Belgrade on 2 April. His efforts were focused on relaying Russia's position on the crisis to Serbian President Milan Milutinovic. Their discussions focused on Russia's position on the UN Security Council 31 March resolution on embargo of weapons supplies to Yugoslavia. Ivanov said "Russia will not consider the resolution as anti-Yugoslav which has been adopted in order to punish someone."

Ivanov stressed that the resolution gives a "clear signal both to Belgrade and the Kosovo community" to convince them to start talks. Russia welcomes Serbia's initiative to begin negotiations on 7 April and hopes for Kosovo's constructive response, the Russian minister said. He also confirmed Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov's position that the OSCE mediatory mission should not be considered as an attempt to internationalize the Kosovo problem. The OSCE will try to help localize the problem, but not interfere into internal affairs, Ivanov said. (ITAR-TASS, 1634 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092)

Primakov reaffirms adherence to nuclear nonproliferation
During talks with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Moscow on 30 March, Primakov reiterated Russia's adherence to nuclear nonproliferation measures. He stated that Russia strongly opposes several countries approaching "the threshold of possessing nuclear weapons," and regretted that "a few countries (outside the designated five states) possess nuclear weapons and have become unofficial members of the nuclear club." However, he stated that "peaceful use of nuclear energy is another aspect" of nuclear security," and said Russia "is ready to participate in the world-wide efforts aimed at enhancing security at nuclear power plants." (Interfax, 1308 GMT, 30 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-089)

Russia criticizes US effort in Mideast and is ready to revitalize process
The Russian foreign ministry regrets that "judging from incoming reports" the mission of US special coordinator for the Middle East peace process Dennis Ross has not helped to coordinate the positions of Israelis and Palestinians, ministry spokesman Gennadi Tarasov told a 31 March briefing. As a co-sponsor of the Middle East peace process, Russia is ready for direct and multilateral interaction with regional participants in the Madrid process, the United States, European Union countries and the entire international community in order to revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace talks, he said. (Interfax, 1449 GMT, 31 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-090)

During a private visit to Moscow on 2 April, former Israeli Prime Minister Shim'on Peres and Foreign Minister Primakov discussed various aspects of the Middle East peace process and ways to overcome the current crisis. Discussions did not only focus on the peace process, however, as Primakov and Peres said they supported developing political dialogue between Russia and Israel on regional and international issues of interest for both countries. (Interfax 1051 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092)

Primakov stresses importance of START II
Yevgeni Primakov told a press conference in Moscow on 2 April that the START II treaty is in the interests of Russia but stressed that Russia will continue to maintain enough arms to ensure a "stable defense of our interests." He also indicated that the Duma was close to signing the treaty now that some modifications had been made to the existing proposal. (ITAR-TASS, 1243 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-TAC-98-092)

Primakov remains in office; foreign policy remains on course
Primakov stressed that, in spite of the government changes, Russia's foreign policy remains consistent and invariable. "President Boris Yeltsin himself stressed, and instructed me to stress, the invariability of Russia's foreign policy, which would not be affected by changes in the government," the Russian foreign minister said 24 March. Primakov also used this announcement in Germany to stress that the "development of multilateral and partnership relations with the United States continues to remain one of the priorities in Russia's foreign policy." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 2105 GMT, 24 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-083)

Troika not anti-American, but against one-polar world
"Nothing anti-American" stands behind the upcoming summit between the Russian, French and German leaders in Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Afanasevsky told Interfax on 23 March 1998. He said that the trilateral summit talks will deal with trilateral projects and programs whose implementation is "an imperative of our time." Among these projects, he said, is the construction of a high-speed highway linking Moscow, Warsaw and Berlin, the joint production of a military transportation plane and the creation of the so-called Euronet--an alternative to the global computer system Internet.

However, in the same interview Afanasevsky stated that "Everyone recognizes the weight and role of the United States, but no one will accept its efforts to play the leading role. The European Union, Japan, China and ASEAN also represent centers of force."
"One should look for decisions that would help combine possibilities of influencing the European situation by all forces, including the United States, Western Europe and Russia," he said. Afanasevsky stated further that ample opportunity exists for the US to play a role in Europe as long as " no one makes attempts to attain unilateral domination." (Interfax, 0954 GMT, 23 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-082)


Russia welcomes the democratization of Cuba
Primakov highlighted the Russian government's determination to increase its relations with Cuba and advance bilateral ties during Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina's official visit to Moscow on 24 March 1998. Robaina met with Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov during the official two-day visit which was highlighted with the signing of an updated consular agreement. (Details of the agreement were not published.) The Ministers reiterated the willingness to promote economic-commercial ties and cooperation. (Tele Rebelde and Cubavision Networks, 0100 GMT, 24 Mar 98; FBIS-LAT-98-082)

During the same visit Primakov stressed that Moscow regards as "wrong and counterproductive the economic measures being applied against Havana," and that Moscow "would want to promote the process of normalizing relations between Cuba and the USA." However, he gave some indication that Cuba must assume a positive role in achieving normalized relations with the US, stating that Russia welcomed "any movement in the direction of democratization" on the island. Further emphasizing that change is desirable, Primakov stated "it would be wrong to think that our relations are directed toward the past." (Interfax, 1407 GMT, 23 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-082)

by John McDonough

DOMESTIC ISSUES AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY
Draft laws enabling administrative move of penal system approved
The government approved the draft of the federal law "on introducing amendments to Russian legislation in connection with reform of the penal system." This bill creates the necessary legal basis for transferring the penal system from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice. The move was occasioned by Russia's membership in the Council of Europe which required the shift.

The bill contains two sets of changes to 18 existing laws. The first set enables the transfer itself and lays the rules for its operation in the future. The second set replicates within the Ministry of Justice the laws presently found within the Ministry of Internal Affairs that provide employment benefits for those working in the penal system.

Shifting the administration of the penal system from Interior to Justice brings Russia into line with the rest of Europe. It is too soon to know if the changes will bring about a fairer and perhaps more efficient prison system in Russia, but who administers the penal system is clearly less important than how it is administered. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1001 GMT, 12 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-071)

POLITICAL PARTIES
Zhirinovsky courts the gay vote in St. Petersburg
Lurching from the insane to the bizarre, Liberal Democrat leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky has somehow come up with the idea that "sexual minorities" could provide a main [sic] source of support for his party. In order to illustrate this curious idea, Zhirinovsky went off to St. Petersburg's biggest gay club.

It seems that the club's patrons were pleased to see the LDPR leader--and especially liked his attitude toward the "relationships of sexual minorities." It is not entirely clear what his attitude is, but Zhirinovsky mentioned something about homosexuals being no threat to society because both a man and a woman are needed to have children. Whatever logic is contained in this statement can be known only by its author. It seems Zhirinovsky enjoyed himself so much that he extended his meeting with the "sexual minorities" by two hours before moving off to Pskov. (NTV, 1600 GMT, 26 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-085)

MEDIA
Luzhkov resurrects a national newspaper
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has announced the re-establishment of the news daily "Russia" which first appeared in 1898. The new editor-in-chief, Tatiana Tsyba, says the revival was timed to the centennial of the paper's founding. The daily will be backed by the Moscow City government and will have eight pages with an initial circulation of 100,000 copies.

The establishment of another national newspaper based in Moscow and ultimately subject to the editorial pressures of the city is in keeping with Luzhkov's consolidation of his political power base. It is no secret that the mayor has presidential aspirations, or at least interest in landing a powerful governmental position in the post-Yel'tsin era. This is a wise move for the mayor for two reasons: It allows him free and direct access to the citizens of Russia were he to run for office, and guarantees that he will remain a powerbroker if he decides not to run. (ITAR-TASS, 0314 GMT, 27 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-086)

REGIONS
Contracts between the center and the regions continue to be signed
It has been four years since the first "treaty" delimiting the respective responsibilities and duties of the federal and regional governments was signed between the federal authorities and Tatarstan. Since then, 40 other regions/components of the federation have signed similar treaties, thereby bringing 52 percent of the population under such agreements while covering 75 percent of the territory of the federation.

When asked about the benefits of this emerging federalism, Vasili Likhachev, chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan and deputy chairman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, claimed that most if not all of the economic and social success in his region was directly attributable to the benefits of the treaty. While this claim may be somewhat if not entirely exaggerated, federalism, and the piecemeal method of implementation, are valuable for other reasons.

First, treaties, or perhaps more accurately, memoranda of understanding (the definition of regional sovereignty and thus the standing of the regions to treat remains unresolved) acknowledge the gap in administration caused by the collapse of Soviet centralism. The treaties in effect recognize the budding decentralization of authority. Second, the piecemeal approach is an extremely effective method of implementing federalism under the nose of its many opponents in the Duma and elsewhere. Third, the always tricky paradox is avoided of where sovereignty ultimately resides in a federal system. If the issue were to be addressed on the collective level, say through some form of Convention of the Regions, the issue of the legal standing of both contracting parties would have to be resolved. And if the histories of other federal systems are any guide, no one answer is obvious and solutions that do exist are the result of decades or centuries of protracted struggle between centers and regions. However, once all 89 regions have signed treaties with the federal authorities, it would become much easier to unify the treaties into one common memorandum of understanding, which then might become part of the constitution.

Incidentally, federalism is one of James Madison's constitutional mechanisms (1787-1788) for ameliorating the deleterious effects of faction in a free society. Could a Russian federation, in deed as in word, finally provide for its citizens the political and social freedoms so long enjoyed by other societies? President Yel'tsin is, unwittingly or not, constructing a federal check on his almost-limitless presidential power. Future Russian presidents, finding themselves stymied by intransigence in the regions, may wish that Yel'tsin had at least kept up an appearance of centralism so that any possible power-grab on their part would appear to be only unseemly, not illegal. (Interfaks-AiF, 2-8 Mar 98, p. 18; FBIS-SOV-98-078)

Luzhkov's power base continues to grow
Taking advantage of the political turmoil of recent days, and perhaps the inexperience of acting Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko, Moscow mayor and presidential hopeful Yuri Luzhkov met privately with the acting prime minister and handed him a "set of fundamental proposals on economic matters" which "concern [not] only the city but are important for the whole country." It is not clear if the acting prime minister asked for Luzhkov's opinion on matters of national importance. But by offering his advice, and undoubtedly his service, Luzhkov is in fact establishing a sympathetic voice at the other end of the telephone should the mayor be in need Kirienko's assistance. Conversely, Kirienko would be well advised to remain friendly with the mayor considering the Kremlin's ultimate dependence on city services, Luzhkov's national popularity and influence in the Federation Council. (Interfax, 1903 GMT, 25 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-084)

However, Luzhkov's influence in the halls of the Federal Assembly is not limited to the upper house. The mayor has given his support to the former director of the Federal Border Service, General Andrei Nikolaev, in his bid to win a Duma seat in the Moscow voting district 197, Orekhovo-Borisovo. [ISCIP Note: Please see Editorial Digest, Volume III, Number 5 (March 26, 1998), Domestic Issues and Legislative Branch; Federal Assembly, for a full description of this interesting race.]

Nikolaev said he and Luzhkov became acquainted when both were working on a program to provide humanitarian aid to border guards in Tajikistan. Predictably, Nikolaev agrees with Luzhkov on most issues and, although Nikolaev denies that the mayor's support will help his candidacy, he does admit that Luzhkov is his most important ally. Luzhkov, on the other hand, would certainly appreciate another friend in the Duma whose seat is partly the result of Luzhkov's kind offices. (Interfax, 1336 GMT, 26 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-085).

Nizhni Novgorod mayoral election scandal discussed
Andrei Klimentev, the mayor-elect of Nizhni Novgorod, presently sits behind bars charged with campaign violations. The violations have caused the Central Election Commission to invalidate the election and new elections are to be scheduled.

Klimentev and his supporters have not accepted the developments quietly. On 2 April, his supporters demonstrated outside of the regional court building where Klimentev was being tried. In the process, someone struck the court's chairman, Vladimir Vorobyov, across the face. During the morning's events, Klimentev was arrested because he has repeatedly left town despite his pledge to the police not to do so. (Interfax, 1534 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092)

A commission of the State Duma arrived on 5 April to find out whether the results of the recent elections were annulled lawfully. The commission includes deputies from the communist, liberal-democratic and Yabloko factions, as well as Vladimir Semago--a representative for the Public Defense of Klimentiev--a legal defense fund recently established. They will inform the State Duma of the investigation results next week.

Meanwhile, another rally in support of Klimentiev was held. More than 6,000 signatures have also been collected in support of the mayor-elect. (ITAR-TASS, 1353 GMT, 5 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-095)


Central Election Commission wants campaign laws changed
In response to the problems in Nizhni Novgorod, the commission's chair, Aleksandr Ivanchenko, believes that candidates should be required to provide information on any criminal record, dual citizenship, and wealth. Unfortunately, the State Duma "does not support" the commission's proposals.

Candidates with criminal records were nominated in the Kaliningrad region, Primorsk territory, Altay autonomous republic and to the Moscow city legislature, he said. (Interfax, 0951 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092)


Yel'tsin punishes Nizhni Novgorod officials
President Yel'tsin has fired Yuri Lebedev as presidential representative in Nizhni Novgorod region and reprimanded Serge Samoilov, chief of presidential staff in Nizhni Novgorod, and Viktoria Mitina, the Kremlin officer to whom the Nizhni Novgorod staff members are accountable. The three officials were punished for "the unsatisfactory organization of work to carry out tasks entrusted to the territorial mission of the president of the Russian Federation and under Article 14 of the federal law 'On the Fundamentals of State Service of the Russian Federation,'" (Interfax, 1253 GMT, 4 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-094)

by Michael Thurman

by CDR Curtis R. Stevens

*****

S-300 antiaircraft missile system back in the news
As the posturing continues on the delivery of S-300 missile systems to Cyprus, the Russian foreign ministry has issued a statement to the effect that the need for the missile system might vanish if a demilitarization agreement for Cyprus is reached. Primakov took the opportunity to stress that "our [Russian] arms deliveries are frequently linked to our active policy of settling the conflict." In a Rossiyskaya gazeta interview with Russia's ambassador to Cyprus, Georgi Muradov, Muradov defended Cyprus' selection of the S-300 based on affordability and effectiveness as well as the country's right to conclude contracts with Russia or any other partner. He also confirmed that Russia has begun steps to fulfill its contractual obligation. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 19 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-079)

Meanwhile, Russia is entering the East Asian market with new goods, namely a proposed sale of the S-300 to South Korea, historically an all-American arms market. NTV recently broadcast a program highlighting South Korean interest in the antiaircraft system. Comparisons were made with the US Patriot missile system, claiming over a 90 percent kill rate and effective coverage area three times that of the Patriot. (NTV, 1600 GMT, 27 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-087)

While successful Russian ventures into previously US-monopolized arms markets are not new, Malaysia being only one example, it is an interesting scenario when considering that US troops are actually hosted by South Korea. Of primary concern is what message such prospective sales may reveal concerning Russia's attitudes or support for the "other side," in this case North Korea.

Russia and Greece continue to strengthen relationship
Efforts to increase cooperation between Russia and Greece have continued steadily since the intergovernmental Russo-Greek commission for military-technical cooperation met in Athens last fall. ITAR-TASS reported that Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, who led the Russian delegation at that meeting, has indicated that Greek Defense Minister Tsokhatzopoulos' visit to Moscow 31 March-2 April is very important. Ivashov said "it is hoped ... we can set an example of Russia's versatile cooperation with a NATO country. This interaction will not harm anyone ..."(ITAR-TASS, 1456 GMT, 20 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-079). Duma Chairman Seleznev reportedly told Tsokhatzopoulos during his Moscow visit that Russian-Greek military-technical cooperation has "brilliant prospects." According to an Interfax report, Seleznev stated that the two countries have similar positions on diplomacy and defense with which the Greek defense minister concurred. Tsokhatzopoulos offered further that historically, the two had been on the same side in conflicts that have occurred in the past 100 years. In addition to military-technical cooperation, NATO enlargement was also discussed. Seleznev reportedly confirmed that all Russian authority opposes the enlargement. (Interfax, 0906 GMT, 1 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-091) Tsokhatzopoulos said that Greece plans to buy antiaircraft systems (S-300), speed boats, inflatable cushions and electronic systems from Russia and that purchases are to be on a tender basis. The Greek government has already designated four trillion drachmae for arms purchase over the next four years. (Interfax, 1042 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092)

Such rhetoric makes one fundamentally question both Greece's long-term intentions and its past commitment to the NATO alliance. If Russia and Greece have indeed been on the same side relative to conflicts over the past 100 years, is Greece saying it supported Soviet aggression in places like Hungary and Czechoslovakia? Perhaps NATO should further demonstrate its resolve to have an alliance based on mutual interest by offering Greece the opportunity, bluntly, to "take a walk." Could such fracturing, however, be in line with Russia's security objectives? If this cooperation is indeed to demonstrate Russia's ability to interact with NATO members individually and on a non-threatening basis, then it remains illogical to fear NATO expansion if such access and cooperation can exist.

France acquires Russian battlefield laser
In another display of cooperation between Russia and a NATO member, France has acquired a Russian laser which can be used on the battlefield. ITAR-TASS reported that Professor Chuburkin, managing director of the Granat design bureau, announced that all design and demonstration work had been accomplished by Granat specialists during a three-year defense ministry project. All the research and development costs were paid by the French. Future joint laser development efforts are under negotiations. (ITAR-TASS, 1053 GMT, 14 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-104)

Additionally, after two years of joint development, Nikolai Makarovets, director of the Splav enterprise, announced in a ITAR-TASS interview, that Splav and the French firm Selerg are ready to mass produce a modernized rocket for the jet-propelled salvo-fire Grad system. The Grad is currently used by over 50 countries according to Makarovets. Since this effort was made on a commercial basis, the firms are now seeking financial partners to start production. This project is just one of more than 20 examples of joint military and technical cooperative efforts between Russia and France since 1994. (ITAR-TASS, 0726 GMT, 14 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-104)

Not that doing things for money is purifying, the French-Russian cooperation appears to be more in keeping with the idea behind NATO members' cooperative efforts with Russia and other NIS republics. The United States has supported numerous commercial efforts between Russian and US companies primarily in an effort to help the Russian economy to stabilize and thus not require the continued influx of direct aid into the never-never land of the Russian bureaucracy. These initiatives of France, Britain, Germany, and others seem to be a far cry from the courting that exists in the Greek-Russian arrangements.


by LtCol Dwyer Dennis

MOLDOVA
No solid coalitions as of yet
Moldova's new parliamentarians continue to discuss possible coalitions. President Petru Lucinschi reported that two options were being discussed in which the For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova Bloc (PMDP) would align itself with the Communists or the Democratic Convention (CDM) and Democratic Forces (PFD). Lucinschi refused to comment on which of the two he would prefer, only stating that he was "ready to cooperate with all of them equally." (Interfax, 1518 GMT, 30 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-089)
However, the four parties have yet to work out their differences and seem headed for deadlock. Vladimir Solonari, head of the PMDP, predicted that Moldova faced an unprecedented crisis. He sees the path to forming a productive coalition difficult or even impossible, since the winning parties will have to try all sorts of combinations of office sharing to reach a consensus. (Basapress, 1900 GMT, 28 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-089)

The new parliament is scheduled to meet for the first time on 21 April. (Basapress, 2040 GMT, 24 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-083)

by Tracy Gerstle

AZERBAIJAN
Aliev protests planned export of S-300 missile systems to Armenia
In a letter to Russian President Boris Yel'tsin, Azeri President Gaidar Aliev reiterated his concern over Russia's clandestine deliveries of over $1 billion in weapons and military supplies to Armenia and protested the planned transfer of S-300 antiaircraft missile systems to Armenia. In January and February of this year, Baku had received reports of secret negotiations between Russia and Armenia concerning plans for new transfers of Russian weapons to Armenia, including the S-300 systems. (Interfax, 16 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-075) That system parallels the US Patriot missile system and, while it is a primarily a defensive weapon, the missile technology can have offensive applications.

by Miriam Lanskoy

TAJIKISTAN
Human rights watch asks for presidential pardon
The international agency Human Rights Watch has sent a letter of appeal to President Rahmonov, asking that he commute the death sentences of Abduhofiz Abdullojonov and the five other National Revival Bloc members who were sentenced to death for conspiring to assassinate Tajikistan's president in April 1997. The letter also stated that the arrest and sentencing of Abdullojonov and his fellows appears to be motivated primarily by political reasons, rather than by the desire for justice, and that Abdullojonov (who is terminally ill with cancer) is not receiving any medical attention in prison. Copies of the letter were sent to the offices of Tajikistan's National Reconciliation Commission, the International Red Cross Committee, and the OSCE mission (ITAR-TASS, 1122 GMT, 2 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-092).

Comment:
The arrest and subsequent conviction of Abduhofiz Abdullojonov and the other 20 members (5 received death sentences, 15 others received prison sentences of varying lengths) of the National Revival Bloc (NRC) who have been accused of conspiring to assassinate President Rahmonov in Khujand last April does indeed seem politically motivated. Few details of the arrest and trial are available, which implies that the men most likely received less than the "due process" to which they were entitled under international law. The main motivations for their arrest may well be linked to the National Revival Bloc's opposition to President Rahmonov and his administration. Khujand has been the site of fairly vociferous opposition to President Rahmonov's policies since at least the Spring of 1996. With the prospect of parliamentary elections looming in the Fall, President Rahmonov may be trying to garner support for himself and his followers any way he can. He recently traveled to Khujand in order to appeal for the backing of regional leaders there. No declarations of support were forthcoming from Abdumalik Abdullojonov, the chairman of the NRC (and Abduhofiz Abdullojonov's brother). Perhaps the president hopes to acquire this support in return for pardoning at least those members of the National Revival Bloc who received death sentences.