| The ISCIP Analyst Volume XII Number 2 (16 February 2006) |
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RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
As the
government teeters
Vladimir Putin's presidency has differed in many ways from
Yel'tsin's regime; one of the most notable absences had been the constant flux
in government and Kremlin personnel.
This year, however, Putin seems to be tilting toward a shake-up in the
government. Or is it possible that
he has discovered that Yel'tsin's trademark volatility in personnel decisions
actually served several important aims in bureaucratic management? It helped balance factions, playing
them off against each other in a constant low-grade struggle. Also, uncertainty
in office was a check on most (!) officials since the
threat of ouster and replacement dampens long-term corruption schemes (it is
notable that some apparatchiki take what they can get while in office, but here the
threat of a possible audit by the new regime was wielded on one or two
occasions). Finally of course, reshuffles permit
the shifting of responsibility for intractable problems away from the Kremlin.
The creation of the Public Chamber, and the tasking of the
Chamber to deal with "National Priority Projects," also seemed to
represent another step into a familiar pattern of duplication of authorities
between the Government and the Kremlin.
At President Putin's recent press conference, a Rossiyskaya gazeta correspondent addressed the issue
of duplication directly:
"Why has such a strange mechanism been created to work on these
(national priority) projects when we already have a functioning parliament and
government?" (1) Putin's
answer could scarcely comfort the Prime Minister: "The Prime Minister heads the government of the Russian
Federation and is responsible for overseeing everything that happens…. However,
there were justified reasons, in my view, for creating an additional
mechanism…. These reasons are namely that we want to avoid the kinds of
mistakes that have already been talked about here, the misappropriation of the
funds allocated for these projects—and this is a huge amount…." (2)
Is that a not-so-polite way of saying that Fradkov is in
charge, but he and his ministerial friends are so corrupt and inept that they
can't be counted on to implement the business of the
country?
In addition to the public backhand at the press
conference, Prime Minister Fradkov had another rude surprise when Putin invited
his one-time rival and resurgent foreign policy rudder, Yevgeni Primakov, to
comment on the work of the government.
At a meeting ostensibly slated to discuss the work of the Primakov-led
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Putin was informed about the Chamber's
excellent work in fostering cooperation with Arab states" "We are
cooperating with all Arab world countries," Primakov beamed. (3) He also enthused that the Chamber was working "effectively"
and "properly" across all of Russian territory. (4)
When asked by the president about his experience working
with the Prime Minister, specifically on the issue of food distribution for the
military, Primakov let loose:
"The progress is poor." (…) "Russia has 173 territorial
chambers of commerce and industry today.
They all may [sic] control the food of the army. But this business plan has stalled
because of Fradkov's government." (5)
Primakov's remarks appear not to have startled the
president. Perhaps Primakov (and
possibly Putin) decided to wade into the current dispute between the Defense/First
Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, and the Prime Minister. (Please see
"RF Armed Forces: Internal Affairs" below for more on this
dispute.) Perhaps it is another
signal to Fradkov that his government's days are numbered.
Stoking the rumor mill's flames is the question of
Fradkov's health. The Prime
Minister reportedly missed two weeks of work (and one meeting, which was
chaired in his absence by Dmitri Medvedev) for either a cold or diabetes-related
problems. (6) While some analyses tie the possible dismissal of
the government to the search for a successor to Putin, it seems far more likely
that the issue of a successor falls further down Putin's list of priorities (if
not the lists of his friends and deputies), and that the move is contemplated
to deal with possible crises, such as the possibility of another terrorist
attack, or a mid-term issue as mundane as a potential decrease in oil
revenues. It is interesting,
however, that criticism of the government seems to be focusing on military issues
and regional questions. The topics
suggest the source of the complaints and may point to perceptions about "heirs
apparent."
In his own words: Putin and free speech
In his January press conference, President Putin was asked
about a stain on a community perpetrated by a newspaper report. "A word is not a sparrow,"
the questioner cautioned.
President Putin's response, meant, no doubt, to comfort the correspondent,
riffed on the sparrow metaphor: "As to the saying a word is not a sparrow,
Zoshchenko said that a word is not a sparrow—once it flies out you cannot
catch it. But in Russia, we chase
them, catch up with them and put them in prison." (7)
Putin had more blunt, if not more threatening, comments
for those who questioned Russia's status, particularly in foreign affairs. Interestingly, the questioner asked
what foreign press Putin read, but Putin responded with a sweeping denunciation
of his foreign critics, "die-hard Sovietologists…who do not understand
what is happening in our country and do not understand the changing
world." "There is not
even any sense in entering into discussion with them…. They really deserve no more than a ’Bah!
Be off with you,’ and that's that." (8) I guess that would be a "no"
to a subscription to The ISCIP Analyst?
2005 Roundup: Putin decrees FSB personnel restructuring
President Putin has made official adjustments to his
decree on the structure of the Federal Security Services. The Director of the FSB will now have
two first deputies, one of whom will have specific oversight of the Border
Guard Troops. (For more on the Border Guards, please see "Security
Services" below.) The
Director also will have three deputies and a state secretary. The previous structure of the FSB upper
echelons would have been set by a decree of the president, following the
proposals of the Kozak administrative reforms, which specifically abolished
the positions of first deputies throughout the
government. (9)
Source
Notes:
(1)
Transcript of the Press Conference of the Russian and Foreign Media, 31 Jan 06
via www.kremlin.ru.
(2) Ibid.
(3)
"Primakov tells Putin about CCI work with foreign partners,"
Itar-Tass, 6 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(4) Ibid.
(5)
"Putin asks to accelerate administrative reform," SKRIN Market &
Corporate News, 8 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(6)
"A False Start for the Prime Minister's Dismissal," Izvestiya, 15 Feb
06; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis.
(7)
Transcript, Ibid.
(8)
Transcript, Ibid.
(9)
Interfax, 2 Dec 05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.
By Susan
J. Cavan (sjcavan@bu.edu)
~~~~~
SECURITY
SERVICES
Border Guard Troops
Last fall,
Russian Border Guards transferred control of the Tajikistan/Afghanistan border
to Tajik control, representing a reduction in the presence of Russian Border
Guards outside of Russia’s borders.
The Border Guard Service, organized under the Federal Security Service
(FSB), is charged to protect Russia’s borders and administer the ports of
entry, but those boundaries changed substantially after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, eventually drawing most border troops back to the new Russian
borders. While border troops
clearly remain active in certain CIS countries, including some that do not
share borders with Russia, the extent of their activity remains largely
unknown. Meanwhile, the number of
Border Guard troops continues to increase and Russia substantially increased
their funding for 2006.
Border
Guard activity outside of Russia
Following
the Tajikistan civil war, Russia and Tajik authorities agreed to transfer
control of the Tajik border from Russian to Tajik border troops. The original agreement projected the
complete withdrawal of Russian troops by early 2005, later postponed to begin
in August, perhaps extending into 2006. (1) Unlike planned military withdrawals in several other CIS
states, which were often substantially delayed, Russia formally transferred
control of the Tajikistan/Afghanistan border to Tajik border troops on October
19, 2005, largely adhering to the original timeline. At Tajikistan’s request, Russia will maintain only a small
contingent of senior Border Guard advisors in Tajikistan. (2)
Russia
continues to emphasize security coordination and information sharing with
neighbor states, including Russian leadership of the formal Council of the
Leaders of CIS Security Organs and Special Services (SORB). While the footprint of Russian Border
Guard troops on foreign soil has diminished over the years (the mission to
patrol and protect Russia’s borders would not seem to require any border troops
outside of Russia), they have gone beyond the framework of coordination and
cooperation to maintain a presence in several countries. For example, officials in Armenia’s
National Security Service claim they are grateful for the assistance of Russian
Border Guards who patrol over 400 km of Armenia’s border with Iran and Turkey.
(3) In a recent interview, FSB
Director, Nikolai Patrushev stated “In our cooperation with Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan we take into account Russian border
guards' presence on the territory of these states.” (4) He did not elaborate on what they are
doing in those states, three of which do not share a border with Russia.
Moscow
funds plan to improve borders
While
Russia has drawn border troops back from several CIS states, someone has a plan
for them; they have grown from an estimated 140,000 troops three years ago to
their current size of an estimated 160,000 and received a substantial budget
increase. (5) A September 2005
report announced that the Duma would approve a 30% increase to the Border Guard
Service budget to a total of over R45 billion. (6) While one certainly can expect Russia to spend a large
amount of money protecting its borders (the country has the longest borders in
the world), the size of the increase indicates a definite plan to improve the
financing of the Border Guard Service at a pace substantially greater than the
other security services or the military.
A
consistent message from senior Russian officials emphasizes their efforts to
improve border fortifications, particularly in the North Caucasus. Last May, Army-General Vladimir
Pronichev, head of the Border Guard Service, outlined a future development
program for which R15 billion, allocated over two years, is earmarked to
improve border fortifications, primarily along the Russian-Georgian
border. The program includes
building 1,341 facilities to support three areas of development: improving
border guards’ living conditions, installing space communications systems to
enable transmission of a real-time “picture” to the FSB headquarters in Moscow,
and installing video and radar surveillance systems. (7)
The
September budget announcements indicated support for the program. Lt-Gen Viktor Trufanov, deputy head of
the Border Guard Service, stated that the 2006 budget included R6.2 billion for
border protection and fortification, a four-fold increase from 2005. He confirmed the money was part of the
five-year Russia State Border program to build over 1,300 installations
throughout the North Caucasus and along the Russian-Kazakh border. (8) A later budget announcement stated that
R1.6 billion from the 2006 budget increase would be spent on switching to a
contract system of recruitment. (9)
It appears that these two areas of improvement, contract soldiers and
border installations, account for nearly all of the 30% funding increase; the
remainder of the budget increase accounts for a mere six percent.
More recent
announcements indicate that officials intend to follow through with the
plan. In a January interview,
Colonel General Mansur Valiyev, Senior Deputy Director of the Border Guard
Service, acknowledged the five-year plan to construct border facilities including
modern visual and technical controls.
He also highlighted the fact that over 250 of 600 border guard vessels
(ships, boats and tenders) are beyond modernization and must be replaced.
(10) President Putin, during a
recent speech to the board of the FSB, commended the border troops for their
work implementing the “Russia’s State Border” program, particularly in the
North Caucasus. (11)
Will
plans survive military reorganization?
Reports of
efforts to reform Russia’s military agencies are proliferating once again. The aggregate strength of armed forces
within the Interior Ministry (MVD), the Emergencies Ministry, and the FSB
(primarily border troops) is comparable to the Armed Forces in the Ministry of
Defense. The parallel structures
often result in duplication of resources, manpower, and loss of
efficiency. President Putin
recently attacked the current establishment for its redundancy and inefficient
spending. Once again, proposals
are surfacing to unite the various armed forces within the security ministries.
(12) A less comprehensive proposal
to use the Armed Forces increasingly in security and law enforcement roles,
would transfer some border guard troops (as well as MVD) to the Armed
Forces. So far, the Border Guard
Service appears to have developed a longer-term and a short-range strategic
plan for improvement. If the
reorganization rumors come to pass, the new bureaucracy created, along with its
new priorities, could jeopardize the vision established for the Border Guard
Service.
Russia has
been trying to reorganize its military establishment since shortly after the
breakup of the Soviet Union, but the security structure remains essentially the
same. Although some reorganization
may occur within each of the security apparatuses, there are too many
influential stakeholders among the power ministries to make major reform
likely. Additionally, reducing the
flow of terrorists in the North Caucasus will remain a priority. Therefore, fueled by the increase in
petrol dollars, the Border Guard Service will likely follow through on efforts
to build more border fortifications and improve border security.
In our last
issue, an incident in Blagoveshchenks, in the Republic of Bashkortostan was
misidentified as occurring in Blagoveshchensk in the Far Eastern District.
Source Notes:
(1) The ISCIP Analyst
(formerly the NIS Observed: An Analytical Review), Vol IX, Number 12, 15 Jul
04.
(2) “Tajik President
Hails Russia’s Role in Maintaining Regional Security,” BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 21
Oct 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(3) “Armenia Commander
on Cooperation with Russia Border Guards,” ITAR-TASS, 4 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(4) “Partnership for
Security. FSB Strengthening Ties With Foreign Counterparts” FSB Director
Patrushev Interview by Timofey Borisov, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 Jan 06, OSC Translated Text
via WNC.
(5) The Military
Balance 2005-2006,
International Institute for Statistical Studies (Routledge, Taylor, and Francis
Group, London, UK), Oct 05.
(6) “The Budget of the
Border Guard Service Will Increase,” Krasnaya zveszda, 22 Sep 05; What the Papers Say
via ISI Emerging Markets.
(7) “Russia Border
Guard Chief Outlines Future Development Plans,” ITAR-TASS, 27 May 05, FBIS Translated Text
via WNC.
(8) “Russia to Increase
Border Financing Fourfold in 2006,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 Sep 05; via Lexis-Nexis.
(9) Ibid, Krasnaya
zveszda.
(10) “Border Service
Switches to Contracts” by Boris Dmitriyev, Voyenno-promyshlenny kurier, No 49, 28 Dec 05 – 10 Jan
06; WPS via Lexis-Nexis.
(11) Speech at a
Meeting of the Board of the FSB, Kremlin.ru, 7 Feb 06 via JRL 2006 #37.
(12) “The End of
Collective Armies” by Alexi Alexandrov, Rossiiskie vesti, No. 39, 3 Nov 05; WPS via
Lexis-Nexis.
By
John H. Kafer (kaferj@bu.edu)
~~~~~
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Russia’s rendezvous with rogue regimes.
Since President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000,
Russia has sought to create diplomatic influence with so-called rogue states
around the world. Lately, Russia has established itself successfully as a key
player in the controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While Russia
officially has strayed little from the common IAEA line, including agreements
to allow the IAEA to report Iran’s recalcitrance to the United Nations Security
Council, Russia’s insistence on waiting until March for any action actually has
provided Iran with precious time to continue on its path to acquire nuclear
weapons – an outcome that IAEA was set up to avoid. Now, Russia is hoping
to become a decisive force by becoming a conduit through which the United
States and Europe can communicate with the newly-elected Hamas leadership in
the Palestinian territories.
As one-fourth of the Middle East Quartet, which also
includes the United States, the European Union and the United Nations, Russia
officially has established itself as one of the major powers that seeks to
influence policy in that region. Since 2003, Russia has aligned itself with the
policies of the Middle East Quartet’s “Road Map,” which calls for a peaceful
two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. Sergei Lavrov continued to
promulgate the official Quartet line in a February 7 statement, stating that
Russia “is hoping for the formation of a viable Palestinian government which
will reaffirm Israel’s right to exist.” (1) On the same day, President Vladimir
Putin stated, during a press conference in Spain, that although Hamas is viewed
as a terrorist organization by the other nations and institutions in the
Quartet, it would be a mistake to impose sanctions on the Palestinian Authority.
He continued, “I have certain ideas about what we can do and how we can go
about [establishing a peaceful Middle East].” (2)
Two days later, Putin’s “certain ideas” were revealed to
the chagrin of the remaining members of the Quartet. On February 9, Russian
officials extended an open invitation to Hamas leaders asking them to come to
Moscow for diplomatic talks. Aleksandr Kalugin, Russia’s special envoy to the
Middle East, was quoted by Russia’s Interfax news agency, “What we want is for
[Hamas] to respect previous agreements and that there should be no terrorist
acts…And, of course, they must move towards the recognition of Israel’s right
to exist.” (3) Israeli cabinet member Meir Sheetrit explained his country’s
perceived betrayal by accusing Putin of “stabbing Israel in the back,” adding,
“I wonder what Putin would say if we invited the Chechens here and talked to
them.” (4)
Only a few weeks earlier, Russia had been a cosignatory of
the quartet demand that dealing with Hamas be contingent on that organization
renouncing terrorism, disbanding its armed network + recognizing Israel’s right
to exist–demands that Hamas has rejected explicitly since the Palestinian
elections. While it is possible that Russian officials may believe they can
convince Hamas to accept the existence of Israel and become partners in the
peace process, it is more plausible that Russia is using its leverage to assert
itself, once again, as a viable world player. A researcher at the Carnegie
Endowment’s Moscow office, Aleksei Arbatov, voiced the latter view: “Russia
wants to win global clout by acting as a mediator amid growing tensions between
the West and the Islamic world.” (5) Arbatov pointed out that many researchers
are beginning to see parallels between Russian policy in the Middle East now
and former Soviet Middle East policy: “The Soviet Union was engaged in Mideast
games for decades and got nothing in return. It’s useless to get involved in
that again. It may bring some tactical benefits, but incur big strategic
damage.” (6)
Russia is performing a dangerous balancing act on a shaky
wire. Russia is using its leverage with Iran and the Palestinian Authority to
ensure their status on the world scene, and not necessarily for altruistic
motives. Putin fancies himself as the link between East and West, but, in
reality his policies could make him a vulnerable target from all sides. His
policy toward Iran has given the Iranians precious time to pursue a nuclear
arsenal; his recent arms deal with Iran to provide that country with a fleet of
missiles, has given the country the capabilities needed to defend a nuclear
weapons cache (7); and, his goal to engage Hamas has startled and may alienate
many of the very countries Russia hopes to impress.
Russian reasoning behind their actions regarding Iran and
Hamas is perplexing. It seems unlikely that Russia does not realize it is
allowing and even helping Iran acquire nuclear weapons. Questions abound: Why
would Russia want these weapons to sit just on the other side of Georgia
– a country over which Russia would like to hold the only real influence?
Why would Russia risk alienating itself from the leading powers of the world to
legitimize an organization that has been declared a terrorist institution by
much of the world? (? especially in light of one
of Putin’s latest statements on terrorism: “No civilized nation can allow
itself the luxury of negotiating with terrorists because negotiations with
terrorist only weaken the state and strengthen the terrorists.”)
(8)
Hamas has expressed a desire to establish relations with
“Islamic,” “Arab,” and “communist” countries, but has not specifically answered
whether those categories include Russia. (9). Either way, Russia is not likely
to possess any real negotiating power regarding the policies Hamas chooses to
pursue, especially as long as Russia aligns itself with the Quartet.
Likewise, Russia does not seem to be
asserting any real power over Iranian nuclear ambitions. Russia
offers enrichment deals and trying
to bargain, but leaves it up to the Iranians whether
they wish to accept the terms. If they do not perceive the
Russian deals as beneficial to their nuclear programs, there is no
real incentive held out for
Iran to accept a deal. Konstantin Kosachev, a member of the lower parliament
who is said to be “Kremlin-connected” stresses Russia’s
supposed weakness toward Iran, claiming that
Russia has “practically no levers to put pressure on Iran.” (10)
Iranian officials confirmed Russia’s supposed
lack of influence in the region by indefinitely postponing talks that were
supposed to occur on February 16. (11)
Muhammad cartoon conspiracy?
In the wake of the “spy rock” scandal that accused four
British diplomats of spying by means of a computer-equipped mock rock in a
park, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has surfaced once again
in the news regarding a new, even more ridiculous conspiracy. However, this
time, instead of the FSB accusing British diplomats, a former FSB lieutenant
colonel, who now lives in London, has accused his former FSB colleagues of
planting in a Danish newspaper the infamous Muhammad cartoons, which have
sparked extremist violence around the globe.
Ekho Moskvy reported that Aleksandr Litvinenko revealed that a
culture editor, Fleming Rose, of the Danish paper that ran the cartoons was
working in conjunction with the FSB: “I have data that this individual [Rose]
has direct links to Russian special services, the FSB. He is married to a
Russia woman. His wife’s father is a KGB general. This man was the first
or among the first to have written in Denmark that Akhmed Sakayev killed a
priest, father Filip, who subsequently turned out to be alive. When I looked at
these materials, I put two and two together and was left in no doubt at all
that it is Russian special services which are behind this whole provocation.”
(12)
Rose denied any involvement with the FSB or KGB and has
apologized to the Muslim community for his involvement in publishing the
cartoons. (13)
At the time of press, Russia had not addressed
Litvinenko’s accusations, but Russian President Vladimir Putin did condemn the
publication of the cartoons while addressing journalists in a February
7 press conference during his state visit to Spain. While he
strongly criticized the creation and publication of the cartoons (he compared
them to child pornography and devoted some five sentences to that
condemnation), he only devoted one sentence to criticism of the extremist
violent reactions: “[E]xtremist manifestations are very dangerous from any
quarters and we very much hope that Muslim religious leaders and the leaders of
the Muslim world will be able to bring this situation under control.” (14)
While not at all corroborating Litvinenko’s conspiracy
theory, which seems to say more about the shady
connections between the Soviet-era KGB and today’s FSB than anything else,
Putin’s clearly light chiding of the extremist
reactions versus his sharp condemnation of the publication of the cartoons does
illuminate Russia’s current policy line regarding the Middle East: Putin is trying
to appease the East and the West. The real question is: how long before that
policy –
and not a silly conspiracy – leads to a volatile eruption?
Source Notes:
(1)
“Russia’s
Lavrov hopes Palestinians will accept Israel’s right to exist,” BBC Monitoring,
7 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(2)
Transcript
of “Interview to the Spanish Media,” 7 Feb 06 via president.kremlin.ru.
(3)
“Russia-Hamas
talks anger Israel,” BBC News, 9 Feb 06, via
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4701312.stm.
(4)
Ibid.
(5)
“Russia
seeks to expand its global clout by reaching out to rogue regimes,” 10 Feb 06,
AP Worldstream via Lexis-Nexis.
(6)
Ibid.
(7)
“Foreign
Relations,” 8 Dec 05, ISCIP Analyst via
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol11/ed1104.html#foreign.
(8)
Transcript
of “Interview to the Spanish Media,” 7 Feb 06 via president.kremlin.ru.
(9)
“Russia-Hamas
talks anger Israel,” 9 Feb 06, BBC News via
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4701312.stm.
(10)
“Russia
walking fine line in Iran nuclear standoff,” 8 Feb 06, Prime-Tass via Lexis-Nexis.
(11)“Iran Moves Forward on Atomic
Production,” 13 Feb 06, New York Times via nytimes.com.
(12)
“Former
FSB man says Russian secret service behind cartoon row,” 7 Feb 06, BBC
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.
(13)
Ibid.
(14)
Transcript
of “Interview to the Spanish Media,” 7 Feb 06 via president.kremlin.ru.
By Marissa Payne
By
Marissa Payne (mpayne@bu.edu)
~~~~~
DOMESTIC ISSUES AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Spy rocks and NGO scandals – Vindication?
In a fiasco that could have significant impact on Russian
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive foreign funding, the Russian
secret services (FSB) have accused members of the British embassy of espionage.
The scandal centers around what has become known as the “spy rock,” a
transmitting device disguised as a rock that supposedly received and dispatched
intelligence information from its repository in a park in central Moscow. Of
the four British embassy employees “implicated” in the scandal, one of them,
Marc Doe, had substantial ties to Russian NGOs. Doe is the second secretary of
the British embassy in Moscow and overseer of the Global Opportunities Fund, a
section of Britain’s foreign office which dispenses money to NGOs.
The espionage story broke on 22 January when Rossiya, the
state-owned television channel, broadcast a show entitled “Spies.” The program
centered on the “discovery” of the spy rock by the FSB and the alleged
involvement of the British embassy. The second half of the show switched the
focus to Britain’s ties with Russian NGOs, proportedly showing documents signed
by embassy personnel and recording the receipt of money by NGOs. Among those
implicated were the prominent human rights organization Moscow Helsinki Group
and the Eurasia Foundation.
The story follows closely on the heels of the passage of
an unpopular law mandating stricter oversight of NGOs by the state. The law was
protested by many Western governments, including the United Kingdom. The law
was widely interpreted as the Kremlin’s attempt to squelch the development of a
Russian “Color Revolution,” such as those that occurred in Georgia and Ukraine.
The “disclosure” that a spying British embassy employee played a key role in
the disbursement of Western funds to Russian NGOs constitutes an attempt to
justify the harsher NGO legislation.
Pressing its advantage, the state has announced its appeal
to the Moscow Basmanny District Court to close the Russian Human Rights
Research Center on the grounds that it has not reregistered since 1999.
(1) The Center is the umbrella
organization for 12 NGOs, including the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Union of
Soldiers’ Mothers Committees. The two organizations have proved a thorn in the
side of the Kremlin administration and its military apparatus on numerous
occasions, most notably over the situation in Chechnya. In response, the Moscow
Helsinki Group has announced its intention to sue state-owned Rossiya and Channel One as well as
Gazprom-owned NTV over their broadcasts of the allegations that it is funded by
the British secret services. Predictably, the group does not expect a favorable
response. Its leader, Lyudmila Alekseyeva, said it was prepared to take its
case to the European Court of Arbitration in the likely event of an unfavorable
hearing in the Moscow Arbitration Court. (2)
The Public Chamber, which met for the first time on 22
January, is also getting in on the action. It has asked Putin not use the
“British Scandal” as an excuse for curbing civil society, but also has proposed
special regulations for NGOs receiving state funding along the lines proposed
by Putin in July 2005. (3)
The irony of the situation is that, spy rocks aside, the
British funding of NGOs was done in a completely legal and transparent manner.
Unfortunately, now NGOs have been linked to foreign spies because of the broad
media coverage. It will be difficult to recover the lost ground and the
legitimacy needed to counter authoritarian controls over NGOs and civil society
generally in light of the events of the last few weeks.
Hazing, Soldiers’ mothers and Private Sychev
The recent disclosure of the case of Private Andrei Sychev
has brought increasing attention to the well-known but intractable problem of
hazing in the Russian military. Private Sychev was subjected to beating and
torture by other servicemen, then left without medical treatment for three days
while his condition worsened. His legs and genitals had to be amputated once he
finally did receive medical care. Unfortunately, Sychev’s case is by no means
unusual, although the response of military authorities is telling. Sergei
Ivanov, Minister of Defense, shunted questions about the case when he first
learned of it from journalists, saying that if it had been a serious incident,
he would have heard about it. (4)
The official response changed soon after authorities realized that it
was, indeed, a serious incident and as well as a public relations disaster.
Putin promised money to cover Sychev’s hospital expenses and discussed the
possible implementation of an earlier scheme to create a military police force.
Hazing often goes unreported in the media or to upper
military officials. Many of the cases that do come to light do so through the
offices of the Union of Soldiers’ Mothers Committees, which have been
campaigning against hazing in first the Soviet and then the successor Russian
army since the latter portion of the Soviet Afghan War. This organization
offers a valuable service in helping conscripts and their families deal with
issues such as hazing, deferments, and even collection of state allotments for
conscripts’ families if the soldier dies in action. The group is led by
Valentina Melnikova. Neither of Melnikova’s two sons served in the army because
she got involved with a group of soldiers’ mothers when her oldest son was up
for the Soviet draft in 1989. She has been involved ever since. The soldiers’
mothers have proven remarkably effective in helping conscripts and their
families negotiate interactions with the military. It has proven one of the
relatively few Russian organizations to develop solid popular support. This
effectiveness in challenging the state and in holding it accountable for its
military actions are the driving factors behind the state’s attempts to shut
the Union down by closing its umbrella organization, the Russian Human Rights
Research Center.
The Sychev incident has encouraged other people to press
charges against the military for various abuses including the renting of
conscripts for slave labor in order to supplement the income of certain
officers. (5)
Still trying to define its mission, role, and actual
ability to influence policy, the Public Chamber has become involved in the
hazing fracas. Chamber members Anatoly Kucherena and Nikolai Svanidze traveled
to Chelyabinsk to investigate the Sychev matter personally. The Public Chamber’s commission for
monitoring law enforcement and security organs has established a working group
that will draft proposals on how to address the issue of hazing in the armed
forces. The commission will include Valentina Melnikova and Ella Pamfilova,
Secretary of the President’s Council for Developing Civil Society.
Source
Notes:
(1)
“Russian Authorities Aim to Close Human Rights Research Center,” 27 Jan 06,
Mayak Radio; FBIS transcribed text via World News Connection (WNC).
(2) “Moscow
Helsinki Group to sue Russian TV channels,” 31 Jan 06, Prime-Tass English-language
Business Newswire via Lexis-Nexis.
(3) “Public
Chamber focuses on funding NGOs from the budget,” 8 Feb 06, Kommersant;
Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis.
(4) “Russian Non-state TV Highlights Pressure on
Defence Minister over Bullying Case,” 1 Feb 06, BBC Monitoring International
Reports via Lexis-Nexis.
(5) “Russian Officer Hired Out Troops for Slave
Labour,” 3 Feb 06, The Guardian via Lexis-Nexis.
By Robyn
Angley (hearthhobbit@hotmail.com)
~~~~~
ARMED
FORCES (INTERNAL)
Internal battles stifling defense industry
Bureaucratic infighting and diffusion of institutional
authority continue to hamper the effectiveness of Russia’s defense
industry. Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov and newly-appointed Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov waged one of
the most recent battles. Ivanov
(the Defense Minister) added the title of Deputy Prime Minister in part to
increase his ability to control defense industry as well as the Ministry of
Defense. Indeed, a week after his
promotion in mid-November, Ivanov embarked on a tour of military enterprises
across Russia with clear aspirations for assuming a leading role in the
military industrial complex. (1)
Along the tour Ivanov speculated that he would likely chair Russia’s
military-industrial commission which he stated is “one of the two main
mechanisms for managing the defense sector.” (2) Ivanov added, “I don't rule out the possibility that I might
chair this commission, and I am well aware of the burden of responsibility that
would rest on my shoulders, which are none too broad.” (3)
However, Fradkov had other ideas, as he resisted yielding
chairmanship of the commission and eventually won the right to maintain his
symbolic position. After a
two-week delay, Fradkov signed the document detailing the distribution of power
among the deputy prime ministers with the understanding that he would retain
chairmanship of the military industrial commission. (4) In addition, Fradkov announced his
intention to retain control over distribution of funds in the defense
industry. Ivanov was given the
role of deputy chair for the military-industrial committee and given a
“coordinating responsibility” for the defense industry. This was clearly not his first
preference. More importantly, this
type of bureaucratic maneuver significantly diminishes hope for any improvement
in the splintered distribution of authority for managing the defense industry.
Fradkov also made clear his intention to preclude Ivanov
and the defense ministry from establishing a new agency for managing the
defense industry. There is
widespread speculation that a ministry for the defense industry will soon be
re-created with presidential envoy Ilya Klebanov mentioned as the director,
given his previous experience in a similar post. (5) It also is expected that the new organization would be
embedded in the ministry of defense.
However, Fradkov downplayed this speculation on his own personal tour of
the defense establishment:
"As yet, there is no need to establish a separate agency; better
coordination is a more immediate need." (6) Fradkov instead suggested that time was needed to evaluate
the current arrangement: “a deputy prime minister (also the defense minister)
working with the prime minister who chairs the military-industrial complex
commission." (7) Hence, the
battle lines already are drawn opposing a badly needed central authority for
managing the defense industry.
Beyond individual maneuvering, institutional pathologies
also are hampering the likelihood of improving management of the defense
industry. Even within the defense
ministry, competition between personalities and offices creates turmoil
especially since there is no single leader to keep the various factions in
line. For example, plans to institute
a single authority to manage defense contracts continues to suffer from a
pitched battle between General Aleksei Moskovsky, Deputy Defense Minister for
Armament, and Andrei Belyaninov, Director of the Federal Defense Order Service,
which was created by Presidential Decree a year ago. (8) Moskovsky’s and Belyaninov’s empires
control nearly $35 billion annually, and there are also other fiefdoms within
the MoD which wield substantial influence over defense industry funds. (9) Other MoD oligarchs include Sergei
Chemezov, director of Rosoboronexport, which handles approximately $7 billion
per year primarily in Russia’s expanding export market as well as General
Vladimir Isakov, deputy defense minister and chief of the Armed Forces Rear
Services, who is in charge of billions of dollars in purchases made by the
state's security-related agencies. (10)
It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Russia to improve
its defense efficiency without breaking down the artificial divisions of
resources, and centralized planning, and instituting more accountability.
Fradkov appears to have achieved his near-term goal of
maintaining the chairmanship of the military-industrial commission, but storm
clouds are on the horizon. First,
rumors of Fradkov’s departure are increasing in intensity, and his recent one
week absence due to illness only serves to increase speculation that he will
soon be replaced. (11) Second,
past reforms continue to fail and production has not improved. As Belyaninov admitted, military
spending has increased 30% in recent years with no discernable increase in
production output. (12) Finally,
while Ivanov may not have the seat at the head of the table, he has direct
access to Putin, which is far more valuable. The best that Fradkov can hope for is to keep some semblance
of relevancy by creating additional commissions; Ivanov’s connections give him
far greater potential to effect real change…if Russia ever gets serious about
improving defense industry performance.
The harsh truth for Russia’s defense industry is that the military
industrial complex is not a driving issue in the 2008 election and its leaders
are not serious about implementing needed changes.
Export market continues to boom
All the news for the defense industry is not bad, as
military exports continue to rise.
Mikhail Dmitriyev, the head of the Federal Service for Military and
Technical Cooperation, announced that Russia achieved a post-Soviet arms sales
record of $6.1 billion in 2005. (13)
Moreover, Dmitriyev is also optimistic about the future as Russia has
$23 billion in new weapons contracts already on the books: “These orders will
be fulfilled starting in 2007, and our annual sales will exceed $7 billion
starting in 2007." (14) India and China are the primary recipients
of Russian hardware. Vyacheslav
Dzirkaln, deputy head of the Federal Military-Technical Cooperation Service
stated, "More than $7 billion worth of weapons and military hardware were
sold to India in the last five years.
We are working on nearly $10 billion worth of new contracts with India
nowadays." (15) Russian
military exports to China continue to be strong particularly in the wake of
last year’s Peace Mission 2005 joint military exercises.
Russia also is beginning to diversify its customer base to
maintain strong growth in the arms export business. Indonesia and Malaysia have made large purchases and Vietnam
has agreed to a billion dollar deal for Russian naval ships, missiles, and
aircraft. (16) In the Middle East,
Russia plans to continue a billion dollar deal to sell twenty-nine Tor-M1 and
Pechora-A2 air defense systems to Iran, despite international concern over
Iran’s nuclear program. Russia
also continues to cultivate business in Syria. (17) In Latin
America, demand for Russian arms continues to grow particularly in countries
such Venezuela that have adversarial relationships with the US. Venezuela recently purchased 100,000
Kalashnikov rifles from Russia and is considering buying more AK-47s and
perhaps even MiG fighters, much to the chagrin of the US. (18) Russia is undeterred by the prospect of
US disapproval on arms sales in Latin America. As Dmitriyev states, “If Venezuela wants to get MiGs, we are
ready to cooperate.” (19)
In Africa, Russia is poised to consummate the single
largest post Soviet defense export deal with a $4 billion package of arms to
Algeria. The basic agreement has
already been hammered out and is awaiting a planned visit by Putin in February
or March. The list of weapons
includes Mig-29 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, S-300 air defense systems, and T-90
battle tanks along with additional maintenance and support contracts. (20) If this sale proceeds as planned,
Algeria could account for as much as 20 percent of Russia’s military exports in
the near-future. (21)
Furthermore, Russia is innovating to improve maintenance
and servicing of its arms exports.
In the post-Soviet era, Russia’s indifference or inability to provide
logistics and maintenance support to clients has been a significant liability,
in contrast to Western arms dealers.
Russia appears to have re-discovered that much of the profit in arms
deals is in long-term support and is now planning to increase and upgrade its
customer service operation.
Dmitriyev said that new or expanded weapons service centers are being
considered worldwide and specifically mentioned Vietnam, China, Ethiopia,
Jordan, Algeria, and Venezuela as possible sites. (22)
Source Notes:
(1) “Sergei Ivanov Tours His
New Job By Tank,” Kommersant, 23 Nov
05, WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) “Mikhail Fradkov Distributed
The State Defense Order,” Kommersant, 1
Dec 05, WPS What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets.
(5) “There May Be Variants,” Vremya novostei, 28 Nov 05, RusData Dialine -
Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis.
(6) “Mikhail Fradkov Denies Sergei Ivanov An Agency,” Kommersant, 30 Nov 05, WPS Defense and
Security via Lexis-Nexis.
(7) Ibid.
(8) “Options Are Possible,” Vremya novostei, 28 Nov 05, WPS Defense and
Security via Lexis-Nexis.
(9) “Oligarchy In Epaulettes,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Nov 05, RusData Dialine -
Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis.
(10) Ibid
(11) “A Technical Successor--Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov May Be Soon Be Replaced By The Next President Of Russia,” Novye izvestia, 9 Feb 06, WPS What the Papers
Say via Lexis-Nexis.
(12) “No Increase In Russian Military Production Despite
Better Funding,” Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 4 Dec 05,
BBC Monitoring International Reports via Lexis-Nexis.
(13) “Russia's Arms Sales Last Year Totaled US$6.1
Billion, Setting New Post-Soviet Record,” Associated Press Worldstream, 9 Feb
06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(14) Ibid.
(15) “Russia Will Flood India With Military Hardware;
Unless The United States Does It First,” Kommersant, 3 Feb 06, WPS Defense and
Security via Lexis-Nexis.
(16) “Russia To Supply Super
Modern Armament To Vietnam,” Vedomosti, 17 Jan 06, WPS Russian Business Monitor via
Lexis-Nexis.
(17) “Rosoboroneksport Is Doubling Sales,” Nezavisimaya
gazeta, 10 Feb
06, WPS What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis.
(18) “Russia's Arms Sales Last Year Totaled US$6.1
Billion, Setting New Post-Soviet Record,” Associated Press Worldstream, 9 Feb
06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(19) Ibid.
(20) “Russia, Algeria to Strike $4 Billion Arms Sale Deal,”
Moscow Times, 26 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(21) Ibid.
(22) “Russia's Arms Sales Last Year Totaled US$6.1
Billion, Setting New Post-Soviet Record,” Associated Press Worldstream, 9 Feb
06 via Lexis-Nexis.
By Jeffrey Butler (butler88@bu.edu)
~~~~~
ARMED FORCES (EXTERNAL)
Georgia and Russia: Approaching the boiling point
Givi Targamadze, head of Georgia’s parliamentary Defense
and Security Committee, had unusually strong words for Russia on 6 February
when he threatened that Georgia would use force to expedite the removal of
Russian “peacekeepers” from his country. (1) Targamadze’s statements typified the rhetoric of what has
been a particularly busy year for leaders in Georgia and Russia looking to
affect the outcome of the conflicts in separatist Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. As Georgia’s parliament
formally prepares to debate the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the
republics, Georgia has turned up its rhetoric on the issue. Once again,
while politicians on both sides of the debate stoke the fires, Russian and
Georgian troops find themselves in a simmering cauldron that threatens to boil
over into armed conflict.
Political rhetoric in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Last October, the Georgian parliament may have planted the
seeds for the current war of words when legislators set February 2006 and July
2006 deadlines to complete their evaluation of the effectiveness of Russian
“peacekeepers” stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (2) Although it
seems pre-determined that these evaluations would find Russian “peacekeepers”
ineffective, tensions between Georgia and Russia have escalated as the
politicians’ deadlines approached.
Much of the rhetoric centers on South Ossetia. On 10
January, officials from South Ossetia accused Georgia of deploying troops to
the region in violation of existing agreements. (3) Moreover, Russian
Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Force in
the conflict zone, charged Georgian politicians with “aggressive” statements
that make the demilitarization of the region and disarmament of illegally armed
groups there impossible. (4) These charges seem to offer Russia more
excuse to claim that its peacekeepers cannot be asked to leave the
area.
In response to accusations leveled by Russia and South
Ossetia, the Georgian Foreign Ministry has reiterated its long-held position
that Russia illegally provides armament to South Ossetian forces. (5) This
claim dovetails with Georgia’s more fundamental complaint that Russian
“peacekeepers” do not fulfill their mandate of disbanding illegal armed
formations, disarming “self-defense forces,” and preventing the concentration
of heavy weaponry in the conflict zone. (6) Georgian Foreign Minister
Gela Bezhuashvili furthered his government’s position in a plea for support he
made 25 January to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.
In his statements, Bezhuashvili argued that Russia is the chief impediment to a
solution in the region. (7) Although the EU likely will be slow to act on
Bezhuashvili’s plea, Georgia appears to be building its case for any future
steps it might take in South Ossetia.
Matters are not much different in Abkhazia. The day
following Bezhuashvili’s remarks about Russia and the conflict in South
Ossetia, Russia seemed to take a step back in its stated commitment to solving
the conflict in Abkhazia. Specifically, during a 26 January meeting of
the United Nations Security Council, Russia made clear it no longer supports
the “Boden Paper” as a basis for negotiations on Abkhazia’s status within
Georgia. Although Abkhaz officials never before had accepted the
document, crafted by German diplomat Dieter Boden, this was the first time
Russian officials explicitly denied the document’s viability. Furthermore,
at the same meeting, Security Council members voted to extend the United
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) by only two months, far short of
the six-month extension that heretofore had been the norm. (8) Ending the
UNOMIG early could prove convenient for parties that do not want international
observers present in a conflict zone.
Georgia’s Armed Forces
The questioning of Georgia’s military status looms large
in the issues at hand. Russian officials, along with those of Abkhaz and
South Ossetian secessionists, have questioned Georgia’s recent military
build-up. Perhaps they are alluding to the fact that Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili, on 5 January, signed into law plans to expand Georgia’s armed
forces from 21,550 personnel to 31,878 personnel, an increase of nearly 50%.
(9) Moreover, additional plans for changes in Georgia’s military seem
consistent with Georgia’s intent to join NATO. On 3 February, Georgian
President Saakashvili confirmed Georgia’s desires for military accession to
NATO in a speech he made at the annual Munich international security
conference, just one day after he signed a decree to end Georgia’s
participation in the CIS Defense Council. (10) Georgia’s three-pronged
approach of increasing the size of its military, disengaging from CIS
structures, setting Georgia on a course for NATO membership likely will produce
a series of repercussions, including the intensification of tension between its
troops and those from Russia or the breakaway republics.
Georgian forces increasingly seem positioned for
confrontation with Russian troops. In a 3 February announcement, Georgian
authorities voiced their suspicions that a Russian-made “Igla” surface-to-air
missile discovered near South Ossetia was intended for use by South Ossetian
terrorists who planned to assassinate President Saakashvili by shooting down
his helicopter. Furthermore, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili
stated that the missile could only have been “brought [to South Ossetia] from
Russia through the help of Ossetians.” (11) Givi Targamadze went further
than Okruashvili and suggested that Russian forces could have tipped-off South
Ossetian terrorists of Saakashvili’s travel plans. (12) Although the validity
of Georgia’s claims has not been ascertained, they nonetheless seem well-timed
to garner political leverage before the 15 February vote by Georgia’s
parliament on whether to call for the withdrawal of Russian “peacekeepers” from
South Ossetia.
A vote calling for the withdrawal of Russian “peacekeepers”
would not be surprising, nor would the call be unprecedented. Still, both sides
seem primed for a confrontation. On 31 January fistfights reportedly broke out
between Georgian police and Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia following
the police officers’ attempts to tow the “peacekeepers’” military vehicle after
an accident. Reportedly, the fights did not break-up until shots were fired
– into the air. (13) More serious is the insinuation made on 26
January that Georgian police abducted and killed an Ossetian man in the village
of Kekhvi. (14) These allegations, made by the Foreign Ministry of the
unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, preceded claims by South Ossetian
President Eduard Kokoity that Georgia had deployed 500 servicemen to the
republic in the hopes of provoking armed conflicts with Russian peacekeepers.
(15)
Clashes in South Ossetia continue. On 9 February Georgia
announced that its military police reportedly arrested three Russian
“peacekeepers” in South Ossetia on charges of visa violations. (16) Reportedly,
there was no violence in the arrests; nonetheless, the move undoubtedly
exacerbated the risks of future conflict. In response to the arrests, Russian
Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov claimed, “I believe this incident is yet
another gross provocation carried out, once again, by units of the Georgian
Defense Ministry. At this stage, we’ve reinforced all our checkpoints and
taken all steps so as to not allow any forceful incident to occur.” (17)
More to come…
Georgia’s parliament is scheduled to make a final decision
on the presence of Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia by 15 February. (18)
A similar decision regarding Abkhazia is scheduled for July. (19) In both
cases, it seems a given that Georgia’s lawmakers will rule against the presence
of Russian troops in the regions. The next step after such a
vote would be for Georgia’s executive branch formally to demand that Russia
withdraw all of its troops. If President Saakashvili’s government makes this oft-repeated
demand, the difference from past experiences will be the political and military
leverage Georgia and Russia have applied to each other in the months leading up
to their inevitable confrontation. (For more on the situation in Georgia,
please see the Caucasus Report, below).
Military Lagniappe*
In other Georgian military news, the head of Georgia’s
National Guard abruptly resigned on 25 January after serving in his post for
only 10 days. (20) The resignation of Lt-General Giorgi Tatukhashvili appears
to be unrelated to Georgia’s recent spats with Russia over the presence of
Russian “peacekeepers” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, it seems
likely Tatukhasvili was a casualty of an on-going political battle between
President Saakashvili, who appointed Tatukhasvili, and the president’s Defense
Minister, Irakli Okruashvili. The Defense Minister, who in the past two years
also has served as Georgia’s Prosecutor General and Interior Minister,
reportedly appointed a successor for Tatukhashvili before Saakashvili could
accept his resignation.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has reiterated his
government’s position that Russia will not withdraw its 1,500 peacekeeping
troops from Moldova’s breakaway Transdniester republic. Ivanov made this
announcement just two days after Russian President Vladimir Putin lamented what
he suggested was the unacceptable state of Russian-Moldovan relations. (22)
*Lagniappe (‘lan – yap) n. something given or obtained
gratuitously, something extra.
Source Notes:
(1) “Georgian Parliament Gears Up for Debate on Russian
Peacekeepers,” LF, 7 Feb 06, RFE/RL Volume 10, Number 23, Part I.
(2) “Moscow Kills Boden Paper, Threatens to Terminate
UNOMIG in Georgia,” Socor, Vladimir, 7 Feb 06, Eurasia Daily Monitor (EDM),
Volume 3, Issue 26.
(3) “Georgian Officer Defends Rotation of Peacekeepers in
South Ossetia,” LF, 11 Jan 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 5, Part I.
(4) Ibid.
(5) “South Ossetia Denies it Receives Weaponry from
Russia,” LF, 23 Jan 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 12, Part I.
(6) “Georgian Parliament Gears Up for Debate on Russian
Peacekeepers,” Ibid.
(7) “Georgia: Foreign Minister Pushes for EU Backing in
Standoffs with Russia,” Lobjakas, Ahto, 25 Jan 06, RFE/RL via www.rferl.org.
(8) “Moscow Kills Boden Paper, Threatens to Terminate
UNOMIG in Georgia,” Ibid.
(9) “Georgian president sanctions military build-up,”
RIA Novosti, 5
Jan 06, via http://en.rian.ru/world/20060105/42864390.
(10) “President Appeals for Georgia to be Admitted to
NATO,” LF, 6 Feb 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 22, Part I.
(11) “Tbilisi Claims to have Thwarted Attempt on
Saakashvili’s Life,” Anjaparidze, Zaal, 9 Feb 06, EDM Vol. 3, Issue 28.
(12) Ibid.
(13) “Russians, Georgians Come to Blows in South Ossetia,”
AP, Caucasus Press, 1 Feb 06, RFE/RL via www.rferl.org.
(14) “South Ossetia Blames Killing on Georgians,” LF, 1
Feb 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 19, Part I.
(15) Ibid.
(16) “Georgia: Foreign Minister Pushes for EU Backing in
Standoffs with Russia,” Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) “Moscow Kills Boden Paper, Threatens to Terminate
UNOMIG in Georgia,” Ibid.
(20) “Head of Georgia’s National Guard Resigns after 10
Days,” Anjaparidze, Zaal, 1 Feb 06, EDM Vol. 3, Issue 22.
(21) Ibid.
(22) “Russian Defense Minister Says Troops will Stay in
Transdniester,” LF, 6 Feb 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 22, Part II.
By J. Marcel LeBlanc (jleblanc@bu.edu)
~~~~~
CAUCASUS
GEORGIA
What will Tbilisi do?
For months now, officials from Georgia, the breakaway
region of South Ossetia and Russia have been ratcheting up the rhetoric. And tensions have been increasing, to
such an extent that few would have been surprised had armed conflict
begun. Indeed, war almost began
last week between “peacekeeping” regiments.
This week, the Georgian parliament is scheduled to discuss
issuing a demand that Russian “peacekeepers” leave South Ossetia, based on the
belief that the Joint Control Commission (JCC), a quadripartite group
consisting of Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia and North Ossetia, has not managed
to resolve the issue of South Ossetian demands for independence. But how much weight would such a
declaration have? None, according
to Russian and South Ossetian officials. “Peacekeepers will continue fulfilling their task anyway
because the Georgian parliament’s decision means nothing for peacekeepers. Firstly, we are subordinated to the
control commission for settling the conflict. Secondly, the decision to deploy peacekeepers was made by
the Russian and Georgian presidents in 1992,” claimed Marat Kulakhmetov,
commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. He warned in a decidedly
non-peacekeeping tone that “Georgian military or police units sent to the
conflict zone will turn into cannon fodder.” (1)
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and his ministers
have been laying the groundwork for increased hostilities and/or a change of
peacekeeping authority in the conflict region. Saakashvili has sought an alternative framework to the
conflict resolution, arguing that the JCC is ineffective and obstructionist.
(2) And Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli continues to carry that banner,
charging Russia with “the stalling of the peace process.” (3)
Recent actions are beginning to speak almost as loud as
the words. Reportedly in
response to a traffic accident in Abkhazia involving a vehicle driven by a
Georgian citizen and a Russian army vehicle, hundreds of Georgian troops were
brought in. The Russian Foreign
Ministry protested that latest “provocative” action by Georgia. (4) The Georgian Foreign Ministry, in response, claimed the
Russians had sent armored vehicles to the scene, and that “the Georgian
peacekeeping battalion, which arrived at the scene of the car accident, acted
absolutely legally.” (5) Three
officers sent from Moscow to settle the conflict were detained by Georgian
police because they did not have visas to enter the country. (6) They were sent home with an OSCE escort. Regardless of who was provoking whom,
however, the more important thing to keep in mind is that tensions among the
peacekeepers themselves – armed military troops – are
escalating. Meanwhile, Georgian
air space was closed to Russian military transport planes for some time in
January – “a purely economic decision” according to a source in the
Georgian Civil Aviation Department.
(7)
It has been clear that the Georgians hoped Western
peacekeepers would either dilute, or replace, Russian troops, by stressing the
Russians were not trustworthy.
Earlier statements that the “peacekeepers” clearly do not suffice (8)
have segued into charges that Russia is now on the attack, holding Georgia
hostage by withholding energy supplies.
Sometimes, the connection is clear, such as when Russia actually raised
the price of energy (9); other charges that Moscow was behind a series of
pipeline explosions (10) are less certain.
While continuing its diatribes against the “evil empire,”
Georgia has been steadily increasing military capacity. Last month, the government called for
an additional 1,000 conscripts for the army. (11) According to defense ministry officials, the number of
troops in the Georgian military is expected to reach 31,878. (12)
It’s not just the “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia, either,
who are targets for Georgian moves.
The Georgians want all Russians out, now. After all, Russia has set – and then pushed forward
into the future – repeated dates for evacuating its military personnel.
About 25 Georgian military police tried to seize the Russian facilities of the
12th military base in Batumi on 20 January, according to
Major-General Andrei Popov, the commander of the Russian Group of Forces in the
Transcaucasus. Intervention by the
Russian military commanders and ambassador to Georgia and discussions with
Georgian military and political leaders ended the confrontation. (13) According
to the Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Yui Baluyevsky,
there is a timeline by which troops will be withdrawn – “before the end
of 2008.” (14) The military
hardware from the Alkhalkalaki base in Georgia is due to be taken to the 102nd
military base in 2006-07, Army General Aleksandr Baranov, the commander of the
North Caucasian Military District, announced after a visit to the Armenian base
by Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov. (15)
But Tbilisi received the very clear signal last week that,
while continuing to support the concept of Georgian territorial sovereignty,
the West (read: the United States) does not want military conflict in the
region. However, in that signal
may have continued another – Georgia may be moving in the right
direction, just too quickly.
US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Julie Finley, said she and the OSCE recognize
that the existing framework for resolving the conflict is ineffective. She added, however, that “a request for the peacekeepers to leave without anything in
their place may be destabilizing. In this regard, we call on Georgia to
contribute its full complement of forces to maintain the proper balance within
the JPKF.” (16) Hmmmm. That sounds
less like a death knell to Georgian aspirations of unifying the country than
South Ossetia, and Russia, may have anticipated; indeed, it implies that
sufficient Georgian troop strength in the conflict zone could keep the
peace. Still Finley’s statement
also included the hope that the next JCC meeting will be more productive than
the last had been – an acknowledgement of ineffectiveness coupled with
the expectation that the JCC forum would continue to be used. This is a setback for Georgian hopes to
work outside the Commission. The
next meeting is scheduled for February 20 and 21.
Russia has reiterated that it has no choice
but to “protect” South Ossetians, many of whom have been turned –
following a widespread Russian campaign – into Russian citizens.
(17)
NKAO
Still no agreement
The removal of “peacekeepers” elsewhere in the
Caucasus was under discussion in Paris over the weekend, but the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan could not reach any conclusive agreement on what was to
be done with the Nagorno-Karabakh exclave. (18) According
to Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov, only two of the nine issues
under discussion – “the return of refugees and forced migrants and the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan” – were sticking points. (19) Unfortunately, of course, those are the
key points to the conflict.
Negotiations are scheduled to continue in
March, but there is little political will evident to resolve the crisis
conclusively and peacefully.
Indeed, prior to the meeting, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev
assured the population that no concessions would be made. “It is our land. Historically, it belongs to Azerbaijan,
and we should liberate it by any means necessary. In order to do that, we have to become stronger, our army
must be strengthened,” he said.
(20)
Never hesitant to insert itself into regional
conflicts, Russia offered armed forces as “peacekeepers.” But such a peace would be costly, since
the Russians, according to Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov, “are ready to arm both Armenia and Azerbaijan, though taking into
account the balance of forces and our own national security.” (21) Given that Azerbaijan already has
increased its defense spending, and the Russian-Armenian alliance is
well-documented, one must assume that such a statement means… arming Armenia,
at below-market prices.
AZERBAIJAN
Trust me, it’s good for you
Just in case anyone in the Baku government was
feeling comfortable enough to start decorating offices, here comes a cautionary
tale. The administration has, for
the past three months, been a virtual revolving door for hirings and firings
and reassignments.
The latest batch of administrative shuffles
occurred early in February. Aliyev
relieved Kamaladdin Heydarov of his position as chairman of the State Customs
Committee, appointing him instead to head the newly-formed Ministry of
Emergencies (a combination of Civil Defense, Fire Protection and the State
Committee for Reserves). Heydarov
will be replaced at the State Customs Committee by the first deputy chairman of
the committee, Aydin Aliyev. (22)
Within two days, businessman Fizuli Alekperov
was named Labor and Social Security Minister (replacing the dismissed Minister
Ali Nagiyev), and businessman Azad Ragimov was appointed Youth and Sports
Minister. The reshufflings
are intended to streamline government and improve Azerbaijan’s image abroad,
according to MP Ziyad Samedzade, who heads (at least for now) the parliamentary
commission on economic policy.
(23)
But the reshuffling has been going on a bit
longer, since the October pre-election purge of ministers and high-ranking
businessmen suspected of plotting a coup against the president. Early personnel changes occurred
shortly after last November’s parliamentary election, and originally centered
on the energy sector. Most
notably, on 9 December, Aliyev named Natiq Aliyev, the Director of the
Azerbaijan State Petroleum Company (GNKAR), as Minister of Industry and Energy.
Replacing Natiq Aliyev at GNKAR was Rovnaq Abdullayev. Both men reportedly had connections
with the president going back over 10 years; Ilham Aliyev was once Natiq
Aliyev’s first deputy at GNKAR, while the president and Abdullayev have
purportedly known each other since their college days in Moscow. (24)
Source Notes:
(1)
Defense and Security, 10 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(2)
ITAR-TASS, 28 Dec 05; OSC Transcribed Text via WNC.
(3)
Rustavi-2 Television, 26 Jan 06; OSC Translated Excerpt via WNC.
(4)
RIA-Novosti, 1 Feb 06; OSC Translated Text via WNC.
(5)
Interfax, 1 Feb 06; OSC Transcribed Text via WNC.
(6)
Interfax, 8 Feb 06; OSC Translated Text via WNC.
(7)
Interfax, 30 Jan 06; OSC Transcribed Text via WNC.
(8)
Vremya Novostei, 28 Nov 05; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis.
(9)
Rustavi-2 Television, 19 Jan 06; OSC Translated Text via WNC.
(10)
Interfax, 22 & 23 Jan 06; OSC Transcribed Text via WNC.
(11)
Rustavi-2 Television, 25 Jan 06; OSC Translated Text via WNC.
(12)
Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 30 Jan 06; OSC Transcribed Text via WNC.
(13)
RIA-Novosti, 21 Jan 06; OSC Translated Text via WNC.
(14)
Interfax, 25 Jan 06; OSC Transcribed Text via WNC.
(15)
ITAR-TASS, 26 Jan 06; OSC Translated Text via WNC.
(16) US Department of State, States News Service, 9 Feb 06 via
Lexis-Nexis.
(17) Interfax, 7 Feb 06; OSC Transcribed Text via WNC.
(18) TASS, 11 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(19) Arminfo, 13 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(20) Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 26 Jan 06; OSC Transcribed
Text via WNC.
(21) RIA-Novosti, 24 Jan
06; OSC Translated Text via WNC.
(22) Turan, 6 Feb 06; OSC
Translated Text via WNC.
(23) Interfax, 8 Feb 06;
OSC Transcribed Text via WNC.
(24) Turan, 9 Dec 05; FBIS
Translated Text, and Nezavisimaya gazeta,
18 Dec 05; OSC Translated Text via WNC.
By Kate Martin (kmmartin@bu.edu)
~~~~~
CENTRAL
ASIA
UZBEKISTAN
Government crackdown continues
In September 2005, the trial of 15 "Islamic
militants" accused of instigating the Andijan rebellion took place in
Tashkent. Two months later, the court delivered its verdict, sentencing each of
the defendants to prison terms ranging from 14 to 20 years. (1)
Some time before the trial began, the Uzbek government
launched a massive campaign against the country's opposition forces, human
rights activists and organizations (whether Uzbek or foreign), and
international media outlets. The Uzbek government's actions were 'justified'
retroactively by the Prosecutor's allegations that Western media organizations,
specifically the BBC and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, had provided
substantial funding to the 'militants.' (2)
The Uzbek government's campaign, unsurprisingly, has been
successful. First, on 26 October, the BBC World Service announced that all of
its correspondents would be withdrawn from the country, while its offices would
close for the foreseeable future. A BBC statement claimed that its announcement
was the direct result of a campaign of "harassment and intimidation"
by the government. Several Uzbek employees of the BBC reportedly have been
granted political asylum in the United Kingdom. (3) During the weeks either
side of the BBC's departure, several other prominent organizations, including
Internews, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and the Open
Society Institute also closed their offices and withdrew their correspondents,
citing impossible working conditions. (4)
On 12 December, the government refused to renew Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty's accreditation, forcing the closure of its Tashkent
bureau. In a report published a day after the government's decision, RFE/RL
claimed that a number of its reporters and their families had received direct
telephone threats from the National Security Service, while others, their recording
equipment seized, had been detained and beaten by authorities. (5)
Last month, the Uzbek Justice Ministry issued an
injunction against Freedom House, the US-sponsored NGO. Although the term was
not used directly by the Ministry, the charges against the organization
amounted to subversion. Specifically, the Ministry alleged that Freedom House
had violated national laws on non-governmental organizations by providing gratis internet access to Uzbek
citizens, and by hosting "unregistered organizations…human rights
defenders and political parties." (6) On February 6, a civil court in
Tashkent took less than 7 minutes to reject an appeal to reverse the
organization's six month suspension.
Freedom House has announced that no local employees will
be removed from its payroll, in the hopes that operations can re-commence once
the organization's suspension is served. (7) The press release on the court's
decision contains one extremely disturbing piece of information—namely
that some 200 foreign and domestic organizations have been forced to shut down
since the events in Andijan in May 2005. (8) At this point in time, seems
unlikely that the Uzbek government will relent in its activities. This is a
conclusion supported by the ongoing of the leadership personalities of a major
national opposition group.
On 22 October, the National Security Service arrested
Sanjar Umarov, leader of Uzbekistan's opposition Sunshine Coalition. Prior to his detention, Umarov had
issued repeated calls for President Islam Karimov to dissolve the government
and appoint "progressive officials." (9) Umarov's fate probably was
sealed further by his fundraising trip to the United States last year, as well
his statement that, should the Sunshine Coalition "win the people's
trust," he would run against Karimov in next year's presidential
elections. (10)
Two months after Umarov's arrest, the Sunshine
Coalition was
targeted again. Nodira Khidoyatova, a "coordinator" for the
opposition group, was arrested by the NSS on returning from a trip to Moscow.
According to the Russian press, Khidoyatova was virulently critical of
President Karimov's leadership, and specifically of his handling of the Andijan
crackdown, during her stay. (11) She faces charges of a financial nature
(including tax-evasion and money laundering), similar to those leveled against
Umarov.
The two trials began respectively on 25 and 30 January.
Umarov's case was immediately adjourned until February 3 to allow defense
attorneys more time to prepare their case. (12) A verdict was expected by 30
January in Khidoyatova's case. (13) As yet, no verdict has been announced in
the latter's case, while Umarov's trial reopened—albeit closed to the
press—as scheduled on 3 February. (14)
A spokeswoman for the Uzbek Prosecutor's office has been
at pains to stress that "Sanjar Umarov and his criminal group," (a
phrase clearly designed to include Khidoyatova) are being tried for activities
which have "nothing to do with politics," but are purely
"economic crimes." (15) Given Umarov's activities as described above,
and his direct “election challenge” against Karimov, this statement clearly
cannot be taken at face value. It
seems likely that Umarov and Khidoyatova face forced exile at best, and lengthy
(potentially life-long) custodial sentences at worst.
While Karimov consolidates move into Russian camp.
President Karimov's actions vis-á-vis the opposition,
media and NGOs have not been carried out in isolation. The President
concurrently has conducted a “diplomatic offensive,” designed to remove Uzbekistan
from the "Western camp," placing it firmly in alliance with President
Vladimir Putin's Russia.
Late in November 2005, the United States government,
responding to demands issued by Tashkent in July, removed the last of its
forces from the K2 airbase near Tashkent. Eight days before the last US troops
left, Uzbekistan signed a significant mutual defense treaty with Russia. Then,
in late December, Karimov signed a formal declaration, removing Uzbekistan from
the US-supported, GUUAM alliance. (16)
In the last few weeks, President Karimov has taken three
further steps to re-position Uzbekistan. First, he traveled to St. Petersburg,
where he took part in an open meeting of the Interstate Council of Heads of
State of the Eurasian Economic Organization (EEO), during which Uzbekistan
officially was admitted to the organization. The EEO's stated goals are the
creation of a "free trade zone," a joint customs organization, and
eventually, a common market. (17) Karimov and Putin used the occasion to sign a
number of agreements providing for Russian involvement in Uzbekistan, including
a $1.5 billion deal with Gazprom for an oil and gas extraction project. (18)
Secondly, on 7 February, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) General
Secretary Nikolai Bordiuzha met with Karimov in Tashkent in order to discuss
"urgent international and regional" issues, including terrorism and
narcotics trafficking. (19) Although no mention of such a discussion was made
by President Karimov's Press Service, a number of sources confirmed prior to
the meeting that Uzbekistan's future accession to the CSTO would be on the
agenda. (20) Finally, a report in Germany's Der Spiegel indicated that the German
government has been notified that it may be asked to close the Bundeswehr base
at Termez. (21) According to the Uzbek foreign ministry, Berlin violated the
basing agreement in that Termez was used to ferry some 400 third party
nationals from Afghanistan back to their home countries.
As a condition for the base remaining open, Tashkent
apparently has demanded that the German government increase its local
"assistance," including building a local hotel and hospital to the
tune of 20 million Euros (22), above and beyond the infrastructure agreements
reached in December. (23) German officials are due to travel to Uzbekistan in
February to negotiate the issue, but should Tashkent hold firm, and should
German troops be forced to leave, Tashkent's ties to the 'West' will be fully
severed.
KYRGYSTAN
Presidential-Parliamentary battle brewing?
During the last week, there have been indications that a
serious power struggle between the Parliament and President Kurmanbek Bakiev
may be on the horizon. On 3 February, Bakiev made a surprise appearance at
Parliament in order to address deputies. Bakiev complained that Parliament had
refused to confirm one out of every five bills sent for debate. (24) Bakiev's
attack continued, with the President alleging that the Jogorku Kenesh
(Parliament) had been "sabotaging" the privatization program and had
tried to "assume the role of head of state." Bakiev's speech, which
also contained admonishments that deputies were abusing their positions for
personal gain brought a strong reaction. Jogorku Kenesh Speaker Omurbek
Tekebaev claimed that Parliament had never exceeded its remit, while other MP's
likened Bakiev's speech to "a Communist Party meeting on a Soviet-era
collective farm." (25)
In the week since Bakiev's remarks, the war of words has
escalated. On 9 February, Tekebaev addressed deputies, claiming that Bakiev's
errors were "grave enough to make the man hang himself." (26)
Immediately when making this speech, Tekebaev was forced to leave a meeting of
the Security Council, after President Bakiev stated that he would not
participate if Tekebaev remained in the room. (27)
The same day, the Kyrgyz Prosecutor General, Kambaraly
Kongantiyev claimed that Tekebaev could face charges of defaming the
Presidency, and that Bakiev could choose to dissolve Parliament as a result of
the Speaker's words. (28) Tekebaev tendered his resignation on 10 February,
(29) but his departure may not signal the end of this matter: Azimbek
Beknazarov, a former Bakiev ally who served as interim Prosecutor General last
year, has labeled Kongantiyev's remarks as "attacks on the Jogorku
Kenesh," (30) adding that the issue would be debated in Parliament. As
yet, no news of a debate or further action by the Prosecutor General has
emerged. Given the already tenuous situation in Kyrgyzstan, it is to be hoped
that a major confrontation between the executive and legislature can be
avoided.
Source Notes:
(1) See
ISCIP Analyst, Volume XI, Number 4 (08 Dec 05).
(2) See
ISCIP Analyst, Volume XI, Number 2 (03 Nov 05).
(3)
"Uzbekistan: RFE/RL Forced To Close Tashkent
Bureau After Government Denies Accreditation," RFE/RL Features Article, 13
Dec 05 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/91956278-7ab3-4e13-883e-2d279827a8e6.html .
(4) Ibid.
(5) "Closure of Radio Free Europe Signals Endgame For Free
Media," Reporters Without Borders, 14 Dec 05 via www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15916 .
(6) "Uzbekistan: Freedom House Becomes Latest NGO
Casualty," RFE/RL Features Article, 10 Feb 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/2/E9A6FBBE-DAFA-4E63-801B-112F0D7B6ABE.html .
(7)
"Uzbek Court Denies Freedom House's Appeal to Continue Human Rights
Program in Uzbekistan," Freedom House Press Release, 9th Feb 05
via www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=327 .
(8) Ibid.
(9) See
ISCIP Analyst, Volume XI Number 2 (03 Nov 05).
(10)
Ibid.
(11)
"Uzbekistan: Activists Concerned As Opposition Trials Proceed,"
RFE/RL Features Article, 26 Jan 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/01/f38cb433-a424-48cf-9861-0b6a1dcacf7b.html
.
(12)"Uzbek
Opposition Leader's Trial Opens, Quickly Adjourns," RFE/RL Features
Article, 30 Jan 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/1/623758F0-FAA7-4562-8614-714B20FA38A0.html .
(13)
"Uzbekistan: Activists Concerned As Opposition Trials Proceed,"
RFE/RL Features Article, 26 Jan 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/01/f38cb433-a424-48cf-9861-0b6a1dcacf7b.html .
(14)
"Umarov's Trial is Open, But At the Same Time, Journalists are not
Permitted to Attend it," Ferghana.ru, 6th Feb 05 via Sunshine
Coalition Uzbekistan website, www.sunshineuzbekistan.org/wordpress/archives/330 .
(15)
"Uzbek Opposition Leader's Trial Opens, Quickly Adjourns," RFE/RL
Features Article, 30 Jan 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/1/623758F0-FAA7-4562-8614-714B20FA38A0.html
.
(16) See
ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 1 (27 Jan 06).
(17)
"Important Step Towards Common Goal," Press Service of the President
of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 26 Jan 06 via www.press-service.uz/en/content.scm?contentId=17319 .
(18)
Ibid.
(19)
"Discussing Security Issues," Press Service of the President of the
Republic of Uzbekistan, 07 Feb 06 via www.press-service.uz/en/mcontent.scm?sectionId=4489&contentId=5630
(20)
Interfax, 6 Feb 06, OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(21)
Uzbekistan Daily Digest, 02 Feb 05 via www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/hypermail/news/0000.shtml
.
(22)
Ibid.
(23) See
ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 1 (27 Jan 06).
(24)
"Kyrgyz President Takes on Parliament," 07 Feb 06, Institute for War
& Peace Reporting, via www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=259428&apc_state=henprca .
(25)
Ibid.
(26)
ITAR-TASS, 9 Feb 06, OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(27)
AKIpress, 9 Feb 06, OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(28)
ITAR-TASS, 9 Feb 06, OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(29)
Ibid.
(30)
AKIpress, 9 Feb 06, OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
By Fabian
Adami (fabs_adami@hotmail.com)
~~~~~
WESTERN REGIONS
UKRAINE
On 16 September 2000, Ukrainian journalist Heorhiy
Gongadze disappeared. Two months
later, his decapitated body was discovered in a forest not far from Kyiv. Just one month after that, Socialist
Party leader Oleksandr Moroz released recordings on which then President Leonid
Kuchma reportedly was heard ordering the journalist’s abduction. The ensuing attempt by Ukraine’s
authorities to deny their involvement in his death and the lack of any credible
investigation of the case provided Ukraine’s political opposition with an
anthem. It sparked the country’s
largest demonstrations since 1991 and pointed Ukraine on a path toward
revolution.
On 1 March 2005, after years of protests in Gongadze’s
name and an orange revolution that embraced his cause, new President Viktor
Yushchenko proudly announced that “the murder of Gongadze has been solved. …
The former regime protected the assassins.” Now, he said, the country must
“find out who ordered and organized” the killing. (1) But today, over 5 years after Gongadze’s death, and almost
one year after Yushchenko’s triumphant announcement, the organizers of the
crime remain free, the trial of “the assassins” drags on with numerous
postponements, and his family still waits for justice.
There has been some progress. In August 2005, three former police colonels were arrested
and charged with abducting and killing Gongadze. Another suspect and the reported leader of the men, General
Oleksiy Pukach, fled the country.
Trail proceedings began against the three colonels on 19
December. At that time, during a
preliminary hearing, a Kyiv court decreed that substantive arguments would
begin on 9 January “in public.” (2)
On 9 January, however, the tenor of events changed. “The journalists of the Ukrainian
mass media who were going to cover the hearing on the murder of Heorhiy
Gongadze … are demanding that a criminal case should be opened over the
situation in which they were prevented from carrying out their professional
duties,” reported Ukrainian television 5 Kanal. “The guards who accompanied the suspects rudely pushed the
journalists out of the courtroom, and several policemen resorted to rubber
batons.” (3)
The trial then was quickly adjourned for two weeks after
one of the defendants complained of “elevated blood pressure.”
Not long after, in response to complaints from the
defendants, the court altered its earlier ruling and said that all trial
testimony would be closed to the public and media. “Providing media with access to court sessions may produce
negative consequences, [and] impede a comprehensive, full and unbiased investigation
of the case,” presiding Judge Iryna Hryhoryeva announced. (4) The State Prosecutor’s Office supported the ruling, suddenly
suggesting that certain evidence dealt with state secrets. “There are certain secret documents and
individuals who cannot be questioned in public,” Prosecutor General Oleksandr
Medvedko said. (5)
However, representatives of the family disputed this
statement, saying that they had clearly been informed by the prosecutor when
examining the case file that it did not contain anything categorized as a state
secret.
The court’s newfound hesitance to allow media access to
the trial developed on what would have been the first day of testimony; before
the trial opened, Gongadze’s widow Myroslava and a representative of his mother
Lesya gave strong statements demanding that not only the direct murderers, but
also the organizers of the crime be put on trial.
They also declared publicly
their intention to make full use of a provision in Ukrainian law that allows
family members of victims to request that the presiding judge call witnesses
– witnesses who may or may not be called by the prosecutor.
“I don’t think this [trial] is enough,” Myroslava Gongadze
said, “because these people had no personal motives for killing Heorhiy. They were carrying out a criminal
order.” While the defendants, she
said, must answer for their crimes, since they did not refuse to carry out
their order, “the next step will
be when the organizers of this crime are brought to justice. Their identities are known and they
must be punished,” she said, referring to the “Gongadze tapes” released by
Moroz in 2000. (6)
On these tapes, which have been authenticated by several
laboratories around the world (including the FBI), a voice said to be Kuchma’s
repeatedly asks for an update on “what to do” about Gongadze, and several times
urges that he be kidnapped and “thrown to the Chechens.” Former Interior Minister Yuriy
Kravchenko responds that his “team” will “do everything you want.” (Not incidentally, Kravchenko was reported
by authorities to have committed suicide by shooting himself twice in the head
the day after Yushchenko’s announcement that the case was solved.) (7)
However, in spite of this evidence, there has been little
attempt to question Kuchma about this crime. Myroslava Gongadze suggests that perhaps the resolve to
bring the organizers to justice does not exist. “It looks like there is still no political will to hold
responsible those who ordered the killing,” she said. (8)
The European Court of Human Rights, in an 8 November 2005
decision on the case of Myroslava Gongadze vs. Ukraine, seemed to support this
statement. The decision found
that, until December 2004, the authorities had violated the European Convention
of Human Rights by failing to investigate the case adequately,
causing undue suffering and denying effective remedy for the crime.
However, the European Court also took
note of the lack of response in 2005 to a detailed Ukrainian parliamentary
investigation on the case “which concluded that the kidnap and murder of Mr
Gongadze had been organised by former President Kuchma and Mr Kravchenko and
that the current speaker of Parliament, Mr V. Lytvyn, and a member of
parliament, Mr L. Derkach, were involved in the crimes.” The report notes that the parliamentary
report was transferred to the Prosecutor General’s Office in September 2005,
but no action was taken by that office.
The conduct of the trial would seem to support these
concerns, as prosecutors appear to use every tool to limit the scope of the
inquiry only to the three men.
Since 9 January, no substantive testimony has been given. At least three times the hearing has
been adjourned because of an expressed “illness” of a defendant, and
adjournments have generally lasted at least one week.
This has led Myroslava Gongadze to suggest that an attempt
is perhaps being made to postpone testimony until after the 26 March
parliamentary election in order to protect those whom she and Lesya Gongadze
will call as witnesses.
“We intend to invite many witnesses who will be able to
shed a lot of light on this case,” she said on 9 January. (9) Later, she emphasized that “a number of the witnesses are members
of election lists.” Therefore,
after 26 March, most of these individuals will have either extended or received
new parliamentary immunity. (10)
Clearly, the murder itself and the ensuing five year
“cover-up” has touched a number of major Ukrainian politicians in some way.
Lesya Gongadze has already officially requested that
Kuchma, Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn (heard on the tape encouraging
Kuchma to have Kravchenko “handle” Gongadze), former Security Service Head
Leonid Derkach, Supreme Court Chief Justice Vasyl Malyarenko and President
Viktor Yushchenko testify.
(11) Although her attorney
makes it clear that he in no way believes Yushchenko is involved in the
Gongadze case itself, it is likely that Andriy Fedur would like to ask
Yushchenko about a reported agreement on immunity with Kuchma regarding this
crime.
Judge Iryna Hryhoryeva has so far refused Lesya Gongadze’s
requests for witnesses, but promised to reconsider them later. Myroslava Gongadze, meanwhile, believes
that the judge will have to allow at least some of the witnesses.
On 25 January, two of the three defendants pled guilty to
all charges against them. There is little concern, based on the evidence seen
by the family, that these confessions were forced. Under Ukrainian law, the trial will continue in
order to determine appropriate sentences and to determine the guilt or
innocence of the third defendant (who pled guilty to several lesser charges).
But although three out of four of the direct killers of
Heorhiy Gongadze now will likely spend the rest of their lives in prison, is
this the justice that Ukrainians have fought for since 2000?
The EU”s Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE), which has been one of the most vocal international organizations on the
issue throughout the years, doesn’t think so. PACE’s questioning of the investigation in October –
after its initial welcoming of President Yushchenko’s rhetoric – must
have been a painful point for a government courting Europe. “Five
years after the disappearance and murder of the journalist Gongadze,” PACE
wrote in its 5 October resolution, “the Assembly is dissatisfied that after the
indictment in March 2005 of the alleged direct perpetrators of the murder, the
investigation of the case has been stalled, in particular as regards the
prosecution of those who ordered and organised this crime.” The resolution notes prosecutorial
action which “is seen as a step towards excluding from the prosecution the
masterminds and organizers.” (12)
If PACE’s representatives hoped that
their resolution would alter the course of the investigation, they are no doubt
disappointed, as are many Ukrainians who stood on Independence Square in
November of 2004.
Throughout the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians loudly
demanded – “Bandits to jail”
and “Murderers to jail” – and it’s clear they weren’t talking about three
police colonels. But in February of 2006, despite increased press freedom, and
despite greater government transparency, the Gongadze case is, in many ways,
where it was in 2004.
The organizers of the murder are technically unknown, yet
the names are discussed by everyone involved in the case. Those who directly committed the crime
will go to prison, but likely without being made to shed any light on their
actions. The organizers of
the crime continue enjoying their lives, seemingly secure in their
freedom. The president of
the country repeatedly speaks of justice, but does little to ensure that it
will occur in this particular case.
And the family of Gongadze is left isolated, wondering why, after five
years and a revolution, they still cannot find justice for Heorhiy.
MOLDOVA
Over the last several years, Moldova President Vladimir
Voronin has won international praise for his attempts to steer his country’s
foreign policy toward Western international structures. Moldova has entered the
WTO, expressed its desire to join the EU, adjusted many of its customs and
tariff laws in the direction of European standards, refused to further integrate
into the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independence States, welcomed an EU
border-monitoring mission, and invited EU and U.S. representatives to
participate in the stalled talks over the status of the Transnistria region.
At the same time, however, President Voronin’s domestic
policies have resulted, at a
minimum, in a continuation of Soviet-style
political practices, and at worst, a rolling-back of some of the gains made in
the 1990s. The press is stifled,
political competition is limited and civic oversight of political decisions is
almost non-existent. There is no
better example of these tendencies than the plight of already-imprisoned former
Defense Minister Valeriu Pasat.
The former minister and current external relations advisor to Russia’s
Unified Energy Systems (UES), has worked consistently in opposition to
President Voronin while maintaining a close relationship to UES head Anatoly
Chubais. Pasat now appears to be
paying the price.
On 7 February, Moldovan prosecutors accused Pasat of
attempting to overthrow the government and plotting to kill Iurie Rosca, leader
of the pseudo-opposition Popular Christian Democratic Party.
In a convoluted indictment, authorities suggest that Pasat
approached Rosca a year ago with an offer of assistance for his party in the
run-up to the 6 March 2005 parliamentary election, and offered to support a
violent overthrow of the government in the event that his party did not win the
election. This assistance reportedly
would be both financial and logistical.
Rosca, in a statement to the media, vigorously supported
the charges. “Pasat told me he was
looking to remove Vladimir Voronin from power,” he said, and “proposed to
finance the electoral campaign of the PPCD.” Additionally, “If the Communist Party [headed by Voronin]
won, it was planned to organize large-scale street rallies to dispute the
results of the election and to stage a so-called orange revolution in imitation
of the events in Tbilisi and Kyiv.
The PPCD was given the role of organizer of the rallies.” (13)
Prosecutors and Rosca also suggested that, if these
scenarios failed to remove Voronin, the PPCD leader was to be killed and,
according to Rosca, “it should have led to turmoil for which President Vladimir
Voronin was to be blamed.” (14)
Despite, or perhaps partly because of, Rosca’s statements,
numerous questions surround these charges. This is particularly true when examined in light of previous
charges against Pasat and within the context of Moldova’s oppressive political
environment.
Pasat was first arrested in March 2005 on charges of
abusing his position while defense minister by selling 21 MiG 29 fighter jets
to the United States for $40 million.
Authorities accused Pasat of selling the fighters too cheaply,
“inflicting great damage” to the country.
The arrest came less than two weeks after the aforementioned
parliamentary elections – during which Pasat reportedly worked closely
with the opposition Democratic Moldova Bloc. This Bloc ran separately from the PPCD.
Less than one month ago, in a trial widely condemned by
international human rights groups, a Moldovan court convicted Pasat for this
“crime” and sentenced him to 10 years in prison.
During the trial, former Moldovan President Petru
Lucinschi testified on Pasat’s behalf, noting that he, not his defense
minister, had given final approval of the price paid by the U.S. for the
MiGs. Additionally, E. Wayne
Merry, former U.S. Defense Department regional director for Eurasia, and one of
the chief negotiators for the deal, submitted a deposition on Pasat’s
behalf.
In a letter to the Financial Times, Merry called Pasat “a
stubborn and difficult interlocutor, who prolonged the bargaining for months to
gain more compensation for his country.”
He further called the deal “an entirely fair one for both sides,” and
dismissed the so-called additional $55 million that Moldovan officials claim
Pasat could have earned from an unnamed third party as “phantom money.” “In fact,” he said, “many within the
U.S. government believed we overpaid for the aging aircraft.” (15)
Speaking during a briefing for Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Merry said that his deposition and willingness to give further
information were ignored. He
suggested that former U.S. Ambassador John Todd Stewart’s deposition in support
of Pasat’s position also was not taken into consideration. (16)
This may not be the case in the European Court of Human
Rights, where Pasat has said he will take his case. As pointed out by Merry, “Mr. Pasat may find justice from
the European Court of Human Rights, which would at least consider the publicly
available evidence.” (17)
Pasat has denied the new claims as vigorously as the
previous charges. “Rosca is
desperate and he is going to great lengths in a bid to doctor his political
image, which was greatly harmed … when his party voted for the re-election of
President Vladimir Voronin.” (18)
In private, U.S. officials who have worked with both Pasat
and Rosca express strong misgivings about the current claims, and suggest that
this may be intended as “insurance” for the Moldovan government given the
likelihood of Pasat’s success in the European Court of Human Rights. While Moldova could ignore any European
Court ruling, its EU aspirations and need for support against Russia’s pressure
would make that a difficult position.
Officials may hope that these new charges provide a better
pretext for removing Pasat from the political scene – or even more, for
providing an example to future politicians who choose to work either against
Voronin or with Russian interests.
What they may find, however, is that these charges have simply
underscored the growing concerns about Moldova’s deteriorating domestic
policies at a time when Moldova desperately needs Western support.
Source Notes:
(1) Agence France Presse, 1713 GMT, 1 Mar 05; via
Lexis-Nexis.
(2) Interfax-Ukraine, 1534 GMT, 19 Dec 05; BBC Monitoring,
via ProQuest.
(3) TV 5 Kanal, 1300 CET, 9 Jan 06; via ProQuest.
(4) ICTV, 1645 CET, 23 Jan 06; via ProQuest.
(5) UNIAN News Agency, 1201 CET, 31 Jan 06; via ProQuest.
(6) Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Ukrainian Service
and Newsroom, 9 Jan 06.
(7) See www.rferl.org and search for “Gongadze tapes” to
read transcripts of Kuchma’s conversations.
(8) Agence France Presse, 1348 GMT, 9 Sept 05; via
Lexis-Nexis.
(9) Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Op. Cit.
(10) 13 Feb 06
(11) ICTV, 1645 CET, 23 Jan 06; BBC Monitoring, via
ProQuest.
(12) PACE Resolution 1466, 28th Sitting, 5 Oct
05.
(13) Infotag
News Agency, 1400 GMT, 6 Feb 06; via Lexis-Nexis.
(14) Ibid.
(15) “EU
should press for basic Moldovan civil rights after former minister’s trial,” E.
Wayne Merry, Financial Times, Letters-to-the-Editor, 4 Feb 06; via Lexis-Nexis.
(16) “MiG-29
fighter jets and Moldovan politics: Revelations of a former U.S. official,”
Moldova.org, 31 Jan 06.
(17) Financial Times, Op. Cit.
(18) ITAR-TASS, 1935 CET, 8 Feb 06.
By Tammy
Lynch (tammyinboston@yahoo.com)
~~~~~
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