| The ISCIP Analyst Volume XII Number 2 (16 February 2006) |
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RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
As the
government teeters
Vladimir Putin's presidency has differed in many ways from
Yel'tsin's regime; one of the most notable absences had been the constant flux
in government and Kremlin personnel.
This year, however, Putin seems to be tilting toward a shake-up in the
government. Or is it possible that
he has discovered that Yel'tsin's trademark volatility in personnel decisions
actually served several important aims in bureaucratic management? It helped balance factions, playing
them off against each other in a constant low-grade struggle. Also, uncertainty
in office was a check on most (!) officials since the
threat of ouster and replacement dampens long-term corruption schemes (it is
notable that some apparatchiki take what they can get while in office, but here the
threat of a possible audit by the new regime was wielded on one or two
occasions). Finally of course, reshuffles permit
the shifting of responsibility for intractable problems away from the Kremlin.
The creation of the Public Chamber, and the tasking of the
Chamber to deal with "National Priority Projects," also seemed to
represent another step into a familiar pattern of duplication of authorities
between the Government and the Kremlin.
At President Putin's recent press conference, a Rossiyskaya gazeta correspondent addressed the issue
of duplication directly:
"Why has such a strange mechanism been created to work on these
(national priority) projects when we already have a functioning parliament and
government?" (1) Putin's
answer could scarcely comfort the Prime Minister: "The Prime Minister heads the government of the Russian
Federation and is responsible for overseeing everything that happens…. However,
there were justified reasons, in my view, for creating an additional
mechanism…. These reasons are namely that we want to avoid the kinds of
mistakes that have already been talked about here, the misappropriation of the
funds allocated for these projects—and this is a huge amount…." (2)
Is that a not-so-polite way of saying that Fradkov is in
charge, but he and his ministerial friends are so corrupt and inept that they
can't be counted on to implement the business of the
country?
In addition to the public backhand at the press
conference, Prime Minister Fradkov had another rude surprise when Putin invited
his one-time rival and resurgent foreign policy rudder, Yevgeni Primakov, to
comment on the work of the government.
At a meeting ostensibly slated to discuss the work of the Primakov-led
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Putin was informed about the Chamber's
excellent work in fostering cooperation with Arab states" "We are
cooperating with all Arab world countries," Primakov beamed. (3) He also enthused that the Chamber was working "effectively"
and "properly" across all of Russian territory. (4)
When asked by the president about his experience working
with the Prime Minister, specifically on the issue of food distribution for the
military, Primakov let loose:
"The progress is poor." (…) "Russia has 173 territorial
chambers of commerce and industry today.
They all may [sic] control the food of the army. But this business plan has stalled
because of Fradkov's government." (5)
Primakov's remarks appear not to have startled the
president. Perhaps Primakov (and
possibly Putin) decided to wade into the current dispute between the Defense/First
Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, and the Prime Minister. (Please see
"RF Armed Forces: Internal Affairs" below for more on this
dispute.) Perhaps it is another
signal to Fradkov that his government's days are numbered.
Stoking the rumor mill's flames is the question of
Fradkov's health. The Prime
Minister reportedly missed two weeks of work (and one meeting, which was
chaired in his absence by Dmitri Medvedev) for either a cold or diabetes-related
problems. (6) While some analyses tie the possible dismissal of
the government to the search for a successor to Putin, it seems far more likely
that the issue of a successor falls further down Putin's list of priorities (if
not the lists of his friends and deputies), and that the move is contemplated
to deal with possible crises, such as the possibility of another terrorist
attack, or a mid-term issue as mundane as a potential decrease in oil
revenues. It is interesting,
however, that criticism of the government seems to be focusing on military issues
and regional questions. The topics
suggest the source of the complaints and may point to perceptions about "heirs
apparent."
In his own words: Putin and free speech
In his January press conference, President Putin was asked
about a stain on a community perpetrated by a newspaper report. "A word is not a sparrow,"
the questioner cautioned.
President Putin's response, meant, no doubt, to comfort the correspondent,
riffed on the sparrow metaphor: "As to the saying a word is not a sparrow,
Zoshchenko said that a word is not a sparrow—once it flies out you cannot
catch it. But in Russia, we chase
them, catch up with them and put them in prison." (7)
Putin had more blunt, if not more threatening, comments
for those who questioned Russia's status, particularly in foreign affairs. Interestingly, the questioner asked
what foreign press Putin read, but Putin responded with a sweeping denunciation
of his foreign critics, "die-hard Sovietologists…who do not understand
what is happening in our country and do not understand the changing
world." "There is not
even any sense in entering into discussion with them…. They really deserve no more than a ’Bah!
Be off with you,’ and that's that." (8) I guess that would be a "no"
to a subscription to The ISCIP Analyst?
2005 Roundup: Putin decrees FSB personnel restructuring
President Putin has made official adjustments to his
decree on the structure of the Federal Security Services. The Director of the FSB will now have
two first deputies, one of whom will have specific oversight of the Border
Guard Troops. (For more on the Border Guards, please see "Security
Services" below.) The
Director also will have three deputies and a state secretary. The previous structure of the FSB upper
echelons would have been set by a decree of the president, following the
proposals of the Kozak administrative reforms, which specifically abolished
the positions of first deputies throughout the
government. (9)
Source
Notes:
(1)
Transcript of the Press Conference of the Russian and Foreign Media, 31 Jan 06
via www.kremlin.ru.
(2) Ibid.
(3)
"Primakov tells Putin about CCI work with foreign partners,"
Itar-Tass, 6 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(4) Ibid.
(5)
"Putin asks to accelerate administrative reform," SKRIN Market &
Corporate News, 8 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(6)
"A False Start for the Prime Minister's Dismissal," Izvestiya, 15 Feb
06; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis.
(7)
Transcript, Ibid.
(8)
Transcript, Ibid.
(9)
Interfax, 2 Dec 05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC.
By Susan
J. Cavan (sjcavan@bu.edu)
~~~~~
SECURITY
SERVICES
Border Guard Troops
Last fall,
Russian Border Guards transferred control of the Tajikistan/Afghanistan border
to Tajik control, representing a reduction in the presence of Russian Border
Guards outside of Russia’s borders.
The Border Guard Service, organized under the Federal Security Service
(FSB), is charged to protect Russia’s borders and administer the ports of
entry, but those boundaries changed substantially after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, eventually drawing most border troops back to the new Russian
borders. While border troops
clearly remain active in certain CIS countries, including some that do not
share borders with Russia, the extent of their activity remains largely
unknown. Meanwhile, the number of
Border Guard troops continues to increase and Russia substantially increased
their funding for 2006.
Border
Guard activity outside of Russia
Following
the Tajikistan civil war, Russia and Tajik authorities agreed to transfer
control of the Tajik border from Russian to Tajik border troops. The original agreement projected the
complete withdrawal of Russian troops by early 2005, later postponed to begin
in August, perhaps extending into 2006. (1) Unlike planned military withdrawals in several other CIS
states, which were often substantially delayed, Russia formally transferred
control of the Tajikistan/Afghanistan border to Tajik border troops on October
19, 2005, largely adhering to the original timeline. At Tajikistan’s request, Russia will maintain only a small
contingent of senior Border Guard advisors in Tajikistan. (2)
Russia
continues to emphasize security coordination and information sharing with
neighbor states, including Russian leadership of the formal Council of the
Leaders of CIS Security Organs and Special Services (SORB). While the footprint of Russian Border
Guard troops on foreign soil has diminished over the years (the mission to
patrol and protect Russia’s borders would not seem to require any border troops
outside of Russia), they have gone beyond the framework of coordination and
cooperation to maintain a presence in several countries. For example, officials in Armenia’s
National Security Service claim they are grateful for the assistance of Russian
Border Guards who patrol over 400 km of Armenia’s border with Iran and Turkey.
(3) In a recent interview, FSB
Director, Nikolai Patrushev stated “In our cooperation with Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan we take into account Russian border
guards' presence on the territory of these states.” (4) He did not elaborate on what they are
doing in those states, three of which do not share a border with Russia.
Moscow
funds plan to improve borders
While
Russia has drawn border troops back from several CIS states, someone has a plan
for them; they have grown from an estimated 140,000 troops three years ago to
their current size of an estimated 160,000 and received a substantial budget
increase. (5) A September 2005
report announced that the Duma would approve a 30% increase to the Border Guard
Service budget to a total of over R45 billion. (6) While one certainly can expect Russia to spend a large
amount of money protecting its borders (the country has the longest borders in
the world), the size of the increase indicates a definite plan to improve the
financing of the Border Guard Service at a pace substantially greater than the
other security services or the military.
A
consistent message from senior Russian officials emphasizes their efforts to
improve border fortifications, particularly in the North Caucasus. Last May, Army-General Vladimir
Pronichev, head of the Border Guard Service, outlined a future development
program for which R15 billion, allocated over two years, is earmarked to
improve border fortifications, primarily along the Russian-Georgian
border. The program includes
building 1,341 facilities to support three areas of development: improving
border guards’ living conditions, installing space communications systems to
enable transmission of a real-time “picture” to the FSB headquarters in Moscow,
and installing video and radar surveillance systems. (7)
The
September budget announcements indicated support for the program. Lt-Gen Viktor Trufanov, deputy head of
the Border Guard Service, stated that the 2006 budget included R6.2 billion for
border protection and fortification, a four-fold increase from 2005. He confirmed the money was part of the
five-year Russia State Border program to build over 1,300 installations
throughout the North Caucasus and along the Russian-Kazakh border. (8) A later budget announcement stated that
R1.6 billion from the 2006 budget increase would be spent on switching to a
contract system of recruitment. (9)
It appears that these two areas of improvement, contract soldiers and
border installations, account for nearly all of the 30% funding increase; the
remainder of the budget increase accounts for a mere six percent.
More recent
announcements indicate that officials intend to follow through with the
plan. In a January interview,
Colonel General Mansur Valiyev, Senior Deputy Director of the Border Guard
Service, acknowledged the five-year plan to construct border facilities including
modern visual and technical controls.
He also highlighted the fact that over 250 of 600 border guard vessels
(ships, boats and tenders) are beyond modernization and must be replaced.
(10) President Putin, during a
recent speech to the board of the FSB, commended the border troops for their
work implementing the “Russia’s State Border” program, particularly in the
North Caucasus. (11)
Will
plans survive military reorganization?
Reports of
efforts to reform Russia’s military agencies are proliferating once again. The aggregate strength of armed forces
within the Interior Ministry (MVD), the Emergencies Ministry, and the FSB
(primarily border troops) is comparable to the Armed Forces in the Ministry of
Defense. The parallel structures
often result in duplication of resources, manpower, and loss of
efficiency. President Putin
recently attacked the current establishment for its redundancy and inefficient
spending. Once again, proposals
are surfacing to unite the various armed forces within the security ministries.
(12) A less comprehensive proposal
to use the Armed Forces increasingly in security and law enforcement roles,
would transfer some border guard troops (as well as MVD) to the Armed
Forces. So far, the Border Guard
Service appears to have developed a longer-term and a short-range strategic
plan for improvement. If the
reorganization rumors come to pass, the new bureaucracy created, along with its
new priorities, could jeopardize the vision established for the Border Guard
Service.
Russia has
been trying to reorganize its military establishment since shortly after the
breakup of the Soviet Union, but the security structure remains essentially the
same. Although some reorganization
may occur within each of the security apparatuses, there are too many
influential stakeholders among the power ministries to make major reform
likely. Additionally, reducing the
flow of terrorists in the North Caucasus will remain a priority. Therefore, fueled by the increase in
petrol dollars, the Border Guard Service will likely follow through on efforts
to build more border fortifications and improve border security.
In our last
issue, an incident in Blagoveshchenks, in the Republic of Bashkortostan was
misidentified as occurring in Blagoveshchensk in the Far Eastern District.
Source Notes:
(1) The ISCIP Analyst
(formerly the NIS Observed: An Analytical Review), Vol IX, Number 12, 15 Jul
04.
(2) “Tajik President
Hails Russia’s Role in Maintaining Regional Security,” BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 21
Oct 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(3) “Armenia Commander
on Cooperation with Russia Border Guards,” ITAR-TASS, 4 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis.
(4) “Partnership for
Security. FSB Strengthening Ties With Foreign Counterparts” FSB Director
Patrushev Interview by Timofey Borisov, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 Jan 06, OSC Translated Text
via WNC.
(5) The Military
Balance 2005-2006,
International Institute for Statistical Studies (Routledge, Taylor, and Francis
Group, London, UK), Oct 05.
(6) “The Budget of the
Border Guard Service Will Increase,” Krasnaya zveszda, 22 Sep 05; What the Papers Say
via ISI Emerging Markets.
(7) “Russia Border
Guard Chief Outlines Future Development Plans,” ITAR-TASS, 27 May 05, FBIS Translated Text
via WNC.
(8) “Russia to Increase
Border Financing Fourfold in 2006,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 Sep 05; via Lexis-Nexis.
(9) Ibid, Krasnaya
zveszda.
(10) “Border Service
Switches to Contracts” by Boris Dmitriyev, Voyenno-promyshlenny kurier, No 49, 28 Dec 05 – 10 Jan
06; WPS via Lexis-Nexis.
(11) Speech at a
Meeting of the Board of the FSB, Kremlin.ru, 7 Feb 06 via JRL 2006 #37.
(12) “The End of
Collective Armies” by Alexi Alexandrov, Rossiiskie vesti, No. 39, 3 Nov 05; WPS via
Lexis-Nexis.
By
John H. Kafer (kaferj@bu.edu)
~~~~~
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Russia’s rendezvous with rogue regimes.
Since President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000,
Russia has sought to create diplomatic influence with so-called rogue states
around the world. Lately, Russia has established itself successfully as a key
player in the controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While Russia
officially has strayed little from the common IAEA line, including agreements
to allow the IAEA to report Iran’s recalcitrance to the United Nations Security
Council, Russia’s insistence on waiting until March for any action actually has
provided Iran with precious time to continue on its path to acquire nuclear
weapons – an outcome that IAEA was set up to avoid. Now, Russia is hoping
to become a decisive force by becoming a conduit through which the United
States and Europe can communicate with the newly-elected Hamas leadership in
the Palestinian territories.
As one-fourth of the Middle East Quartet, which also
includes the United States, the European Union and the United Nations, Russia
officially has established itself as one of the major powers that seeks to
influence policy in that region. Since 2003, Russia has aligned itself with the
policies of the Middle East Quartet’s “Road Map,” which calls for a peaceful
two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. Sergei Lavrov continued to
promulgate the official Quartet line in a February 7 statement, stating that
Russia “is hoping for the formation of a viable Palestinian government which
will reaffirm Israel’s right to exist.” (1) On the same day, President Vladimir
Putin stated, during a press conference in Spain, that although Hamas is viewed
as a terrorist organization by the other nations and institutions in the
Quartet, it would be a mistake to impose sanctions on the Palestinian Authority.
He continued, “I have certain ideas about what we can do and how we can go
about [establishing a peaceful Middle East].” (2)
Two days later, Putin’s “certain ideas” were revealed to
the chagrin of the remaining members of the Quartet. On February 9, Russian
officials extended an open invitation to Hamas leaders asking them to come to
Moscow for diplomatic talks. Aleksandr Kalugin, Russia’s special envoy to the
Middle East, was quoted by Russia’s Interfax news agency, “What we want is for
[Hamas] to respect previous agreements and that there should be no terrorist
acts…And, of course, they must move towards the recognition of Israel’s right
to exist.” (3) Israeli cabinet member Meir Sheetrit explained his country’s
perceived betrayal by accusing Putin of “stabbing Israel in the back,” adding,
“I wonder what Putin would say if we invited the Chechens here and talked to
them.” (4)
Only a few weeks earlier, Russia had been a cosignatory of
the quartet demand that dealing with Hamas be contingent on that organization
renouncing terrorism, disbanding its armed network + recognizing Israel’s right
to exist–demands that Hamas has rejected explicitly since the Palestinian
elections. While it is possible that Russian officials may believe they can
convince Hamas to accept the existence of Israel and become partners in the
peace process, it is more plausible that Russia is using its leverage to assert
itself, once again, as a viable world player. A researcher at the Carnegie
Endowment’s Moscow office, Aleksei Arbatov, voiced the latter view: “Russia
wants to win global clout by acting as a mediator amid growing tensions between
the West and the Islamic world.” (5) Arbatov pointed out that many researchers
are beginning to see parallels between Russian policy in the Middle East now
and former Soviet Middle East policy: “The Soviet Union was engaged in Mideast
games for decades and got nothing in return. It’s useless to get involved in
that again. It may bring some tactical benefits, but incur big strategic
damage.” (6)
Russia is performing a dangerous balancing act on a shaky
wire. Russia is using its leverage with Iran and the Palestinian Authority to
ensure their status on the world scene, and not necessarily for altruistic
motives. Putin fancies himself as the link between East and West, but, in
reality his policies could make him a vulnerable target from all sides. His
policy toward Iran has given the Iranians precious time to pursue a nuclear
arsenal; his recent arms deal with Iran to provide that country with a fleet of
missiles, has given the country the capabilities needed to defend a nuclear
weapons cache (7); and, his goal to engage Hamas has startled and may alienate
many of the very countries Russia hopes to impress.
Russian reasoning behind their actions regarding Iran and
Hamas is perplexing. It seems unlikely that Russia does not realize it is
allowing and even helping Iran acquire nuclear weapons. Questions abound: Why
would Russia want these weapons to sit just on the other side of Georgia
– a country over which Russia would like to hold the only real influence?
Why would Russia risk alienating itself from the leading powers of the world to
legitimize an organization that has been declared a terrorist institution by
much of the world? (? especially in light of one
of Putin’s latest statements on terrorism: “No civilized nation can allow
itself the luxury of negotiating with terrorists because negotiations with
terrorist only weaken the state and strengthen the terrorists.”)
(8)
Hamas has expressed a desire to establish relations with
“Islamic,” “Arab,” and “communist” countries, but has not specifically answered
whether those categories include Russia. (9). Either way, Russia is not likely
to possess any real negotiating power regarding the policies Hamas chooses to
pursue, especially as long as Russia aligns itself with the Quartet.
Likewise, Russia does not seem to be
asserting any real power over Iranian nuclear ambitions. Russia
offers enrichment deals and trying
to bargain, but leaves it up to the Iranians whether
they wish to accept the terms. If they do not perceive the
Russian deals as beneficial to their nuclear programs, there is no
real incentive held out for
Iran to accept a deal. Konstantin Kosachev, a member of the lower parliament
who is said to be “Kremlin-connected” stresses Russia’s
supposed weakness toward Iran, claiming that
Russia has “practically no levers to put pressure on Iran.” (10)
Iranian officials confirmed Russia’s supposed
lack of influence in the region by indefinitely postponing talks that were
supposed to occur on February 16. (11)
Muhammad cartoon conspiracy?
In the wake of the “spy rock” scandal that accused four
British diplomats of spying by means of a computer-equipped mock rock in a
park, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has surfaced once again
in the news regarding a new, even more ridiculous conspiracy. However, this
time, instead of the FSB accusing British diplomats, a former FSB lieutenant
colonel, who now lives in London, has accused his former FSB colleagues of
planting in a Danish newspaper the infamous Muhammad cartoons, which have
sparked extremist violence around the globe.
Ekho Moskvy reported that Aleksandr Litvinenko revealed that a
culture editor, Fleming Rose, of the Danish paper that ran the cartoons was
working in conjunction with the FSB: “I have data that this individual [Rose]
has direct links to Russian special services, the FSB. He is married to a
Russia woman. His wife’s father is a KGB general. This man was the first
or among the first to have written in Denmark that Akhmed Sakayev killed a
priest, father Filip, who subsequently turned out to be alive. When I looked at
these materials, I put two and two together and was left in no doubt at all
that it is Russian special services which are behind this whole provocation.”
(12)
Rose denied any involvement with the FSB or KGB and has
apologized to the Muslim community for his involvement in publishing the
cartoons. (13)
At the time of press, Russia had not addressed
Litvinenko’s accusations, but Russian President Vladimir Putin did condemn the
publication of the cartoons while addressing journalists in a February
7 press conference during his state visit to Spain. While he
strongly criticized the creation and publication of the cartoons (he compared
them to child pornography and devoted some five sentences to that
condemnation), he only devoted one sentence to criticism of the extremist
violent reactions: “[E]xtremist manifestations are very dangerous from any
quarters and we very much hope that Muslim religious leaders and the leaders of
the Muslim world will be able to bring this situation under control.” (14)
While not at all corroborating Litvinenko’s conspiracy
theory, which seems to say more about the shady
connections between the Soviet-era KGB and today’s FSB than anything else,
Putin’s clearly light chiding of the extremist
reactions versus his sharp condemnation of the publication of the cartoons does
illuminate Russia’s current policy line regarding the Middle East: Putin is trying
to appease the East and the West. The real question is: how long before that
policy –
and not a silly conspiracy – leads to a volatile eruption?
Source Notes:
(1)
“Russia’s
Lavrov hopes Palestinians will accept Israel’s right to exist,” BBC Monitoring,
7 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(2)
Transcript
of “Interview to the Spanish Media,” 7 Feb 06 via president.kremlin.ru.
(3)
“Russia-Hamas
talks anger Israel,” BBC News, 9 Feb 06, via
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4701312.stm.
(4)
Ibid.
(5)
“Russia
seeks to expand its global clout by reaching out to rogue regimes,” 10 Feb 06,
AP Worldstream via Lexis-Nexis.
(6)
Ibid.
(7)
“Foreign
Relations,” 8 Dec 05, ISCIP Analyst via
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol11/ed1104.html#foreign.
(8)
Transcript
of “Interview to the Spanish Media,” 7 Feb 06 via president.kremlin.ru.
(9)
“Russia-Hamas
talks anger Israel,” 9 Feb 06, BBC News via
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4701312.stm.
(10)
“Russia
walking fine line in Iran nuclear standoff,” 8 Feb 06, Prime-Tass via Lexis-Nexis.
(11)“Iran Moves Forward on Atomic
Production,” 13 Feb 06, New York Times via nytimes.com.
(12)
“Former
FSB man says Russian secret service behind cartoon row,” 7 Feb 06, BBC
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.
(13)
Ibid.
(14)
Transcript
of “Interview to the Spanish Media,” 7 Feb 06 via president.kremlin.ru.
By Marissa Payne
By
Marissa Payne (mpayne@bu.edu)
~~~~~
DOMESTIC ISSUES AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Spy rocks and NGO scandals – Vindication?
In a fiasco that could have significant impact on Russian
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive foreign funding, the Russian
secret services (FSB) have accused members of the British embassy of espionage.
The scandal centers around what has become known as the “spy rock,” a
transmitting device disguised as a rock that supposedly received and dispatched
intelligence information from its repository in a park in central Moscow. Of
the four British embassy employees “implicated” in the scandal, one of them,
Marc Doe, had substantial ties to Russian NGOs. Doe is the second secretary of
the British embassy in Moscow and overseer of the Global Opportunities Fund, a
section of Britain’s foreign office which dispenses money to NGOs.
The espionage story broke on 22 January when Rossiya, the
state-owned television channel, broadcast a show entitled “Spies.” The program
centered on the “discovery” of the spy rock by the FSB and the alleged
involvement of the British embassy. The second half of the show switched the
focus to Britain’s ties with Russian NGOs, proportedly showing documents signed
by embassy personnel and recording the receipt of money by NGOs. Among those
implicated were the prominent human rights organization Moscow Helsinki Group
and the Eurasia Foundation.
The story follows closely on the heels of the passage of
an unpopular law mandating stricter oversight of NGOs by the state. The law was
protested by many Western governments, including the United Kingdom. The law
was widely interpreted as the Kremlin’s attempt to squelch the development of a
Russian “Color Revolution,” such as those that occurred in Georgia and Ukraine.
The “disclosure” that a spying British embassy employee played a key role in
the disbursement of Western funds to Russian NGOs constitutes an attempt to
justify the harsher NGO legislation.
Pressing its advantage, the state has announced its appeal
to the Moscow Basmanny District Court to close the Russian Human Rights
Research Center on the grounds that it has not reregistered since 1999.
(1) The Center is the umbrella
organization for 12 NGOs, including the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Union of
Soldiers’ Mothers Committees. The two organizations have proved a thorn in the
side of the Kremlin administration and its military apparatus on numerous
occasions, most notably over the situation in Chechnya. In response, the Moscow
Helsinki Group has announced its intention to sue state-owned Rossiya and Channel One as well as
Gazprom-owned NTV over their broadcasts of the allegations that it is funded by
the British secret services. Predictably, the group does not expect a favorable
response. Its leader, Lyudmila Alekseyeva, said it was prepared to take its
case to the European Court of Arbitration in the likely event of an unfavorable
hearing in the Moscow Arbitration Court. (2)
The Public Chamber, which met for the first time on 22
January, is also getting in on the action. It has asked Putin not use the
“British Scandal” as an excuse for curbing civil society, but also has proposed
special regulations for NGOs receiving state funding along the lines proposed
by Putin in July 2005. (3)
The irony of the situation is that, spy rocks aside, the
British funding of NGOs was done in a completely legal and transparent manner.
Unfortunately, now NGOs have been linked to foreign spies because of the broad
media coverage. It will be difficult to recover the lost ground and the
legitimacy needed to counter authoritarian controls over NGOs and civil society
generally in light of the events of the last few weeks.
Hazing, Soldiers’ mothers and Private Sychev
The recent disclosure of the case of Private Andrei Sychev
has brought increasing attention to the well-known but intractable problem of
hazing in the Russian military. Private Sychev was subjected to beating and
torture by other servicemen, then left without medical treatment for three days
while his condition worsened. His legs and genitals had to be amputated once he
finally did receive medical care. Unfortunately, Sychev’s case is by no means
unusual, although the response of military authorities is telling. Sergei
Ivanov, Minister of Defense, shunted questions about the case when he first
learned of it from journalists, saying that if it had been a serious incident,
he would have heard about it. (4)
The official response changed soon after authorities realized that it
was, indeed, a serious incident and as well as a public relations disaster.
Putin promised money to cover Sychev’s hospital expenses and discussed the
possible implementation of an earlier scheme to create a military police force.
Hazing often goes unreported in the media or to upper
military officials. Many of the cases that do come to light do so through the
offices of the Union of Soldiers’ Mothers Committees, which have been
campaigning against hazing in first the Soviet and then the successor Russian
army since the latter portion of the Soviet Afghan War. This organization
offers a valuable service in helping conscripts and their families deal with
issues such as hazing, deferments, and even collection of state allotments for
conscripts’ families if the soldier dies in action. The group is led by
Valentina Melnikova. Neither of Melnikova’s two sons served in the army because
she got involved with a group of soldiers’ mothers when her oldest son was up
for the Soviet draft in 1989. She has been involved ever since. The soldiers’
mothers have proven remarkably effective in helping conscripts and their
families negotiate interactions with the military. It has proven one of the
relatively few Russian organizations to develop solid popular support. This
effectiveness in challenging the state and in holding it accountable for its
military actions are the driving factors behind the state’s attempts to shut
the Union down by closing its umbrella organization, the Russian Human Rights
Research Center.
The Sychev incident has encouraged other people to press
charges against the military for various abuses including the renting of
conscripts for slave labor in order to supplement the income of certain
officers. (5)
Still trying to define its mission, role, and actual
ability to influence policy, the Public Chamber has become involved in the
hazing fracas. Chamber members Anatoly Kucherena and Nikolai Svanidze traveled
to Chelyabinsk to investigate the Sychev matter personally. The Public Chamber’s commission for
monitoring law enforcement and security organs has established a working group
that will draft proposals on how to address the issue of hazing in the armed
forces. The commission will include Valentina Melnikova and Ella Pamfilova,
Secretary of the President’s Council for Developing Civil Society.
Source
Notes:
(1)
“Russian Authorities Aim to Close Human Rights Research Center,” 27 Jan 06,
Mayak Radio; FBIS transcribed text via World News Connection (WNC).
(2) “Moscow
Helsinki Group to sue Russian TV channels,” 31 Jan 06, Prime-Tass English-language
Business Newswire via Lexis-Nexis.
(3) “Public
Chamber focuses on funding NGOs from the budget,” 8 Feb 06, Kommersant;
Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis.
(4) “Russian Non-state TV Highlights Pressure on
Defence Minister over Bullying Case,” 1 Feb 06, BBC Monitoring International
Reports via Lexis-Nexis.
(5) “Russian Officer Hired Out Troops for Slave
Labour,” 3 Feb 06, The Guardian via Lexis-Nexis.
By Robyn
Angley (hearthhobbit@hotmail.com)
~~~~~
ARMED
FORCES (INTERNAL)
Internal battles stifling defense industry
Bureaucratic infighting and diffusion of institutional
authority continue to hamper the effectiveness of Russia’s defense
industry. Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov and newly-appointed Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov waged one of
the most recent battles. Ivanov
(the Defense Minister) added the title of Deputy Prime Minister in part to
increase his ability to control defense industry as well as the Ministry of
Defense. Indeed, a week after his
promotion in mid-November, Ivanov embarked on a tour of military enterprises
across Russia with clear aspirations for assuming a leading role in the
military industrial complex. (1)
Along the tour Ivanov speculated that he would likely chair Russia’s
military-industrial commission which he stated is “one of the two main
mechanisms for managing the defense sector.” (2) Ivanov added, “I don't rule out the possibility that I might
chair this commission, and I am well aware of the burden of responsibility that
would rest on my shoulders, which are none too broad.” (3)
However, Fradkov had other ideas, as he resisted yielding
chairmanship of the commission and eventually won the right to maintain his
symbolic position. After a
two-week delay, Fradkov signed the document detailing the distribution of power
among the deputy prime ministers with the understanding that he would retain
chairmanship of the military industrial commission. (4) In addition, Fradkov announced his
intention to retain control over distribution of funds in the defense
industry. Ivanov was given the
role of deputy chair for the military-industrial committee and given a
“coordinating responsibility” for the defense industry. This was clearly not his first
preference. More importantly, this
type of bureaucratic maneuver significantly diminishes hope for any improvement
in the splintered distribution of authority for managing the defense industry.
Fradkov also made clear his intention to preclude Ivanov
and the defense ministry from establishing a new agency for managing the
defense industry. There is
widespread speculation that a ministry for the defense industry will soon be
re-created with presidential envoy Ilya Klebanov mentioned as the director,
given his previous experience in a similar post. (5) It also is expected that the new organization would be
embedded in the ministry of defense.
However, Fradkov downplayed this speculation on his own personal tour of
the defense establishment:
"As yet, there is no need to establish a separate agency; better
coordination is a more immediate need." (6) Fradkov instead suggested that time was needed to evaluate
the current arrangement: “a deputy prime minister (also the defense minister)
working with the prime minister who chairs the military-industrial complex
commission." (7) Hence, the
battle lines already are drawn opposing a badly needed central authority for
managing the defense industry.
Beyond individual maneuvering, institutional pathologies
also are hampering the likelihood of improving management of the defense
industry. Even within the defense
ministry, competition between personalities and offices creates turmoil
especially since there is no single leader to keep the various factions in
line. For example, plans to institute
a single authority to manage defense contracts continues to suffer from a
pitched battle between General Aleksei Moskovsky, Deputy Defense Minister for
Armament, and Andrei Belyaninov, Director of the Federal Defense Order Service,
which was created by Presidential Decree a year ago. (8) Moskovsky’s and Belyaninov’s empires
control nearly $35 billion annually, and there are also other fiefdoms within
the MoD which wield substantial influence over defense industry funds. (9) Other MoD oligarchs include Sergei
Chemezov, director of Rosoboronexport, which handles approximately $7 billion
per year primarily in Russia’s expanding export market as well as General
Vladimir Isakov, deputy defense minister and chief of the Armed Forces Rear
Services, who is in charge of billions of dollars in purchases made by the
state's security-related agencies. (10)
It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Russia to improve
its defense efficiency without breaking down the artificial divisions of
resources, and centralized planning, and instituting more accountability.
Fradkov appears to have achieved his near-term goal of
maintaining the chairmanship of the military-industrial commission, but storm
clouds are on the horizon. First,
rumors of Fradkov’s departure are increasing in intensity, and his recent one
week absence due to illness only serves to increase speculation that he will
soon be replaced. (11) Second,
past reforms continue to fail and production has not improved. As Belyaninov admitted, military
spending has increased 30% in recent years with no discernable increase in
production output. (12) Finally,
while Ivanov may not have the seat at the head of the table, he has direct
access to Putin, which is far more valuable. The best that Fradkov can hope for is to keep some semblance
of relevancy by creating additional commissions; Ivanov’s connections give him
far greater potential to effect real change…if Russia ever gets serious about
improving defense industry performance.
The harsh truth for Russia’s defense industry is that the military
industrial complex is not a driving issue in the 2008 election and its leaders
are not serious about implementing needed changes.
Export market continues to boom
All the news for the defense industry is not bad, as
military exports continue to rise.
Mikhail Dmitriyev, the head of the Federal Service for Military and
Technical Cooperation, announced that Russia achieved a post-Soviet arms sales
record of $6.1 billion in 2005. (13)
Moreover, Dmitriyev is also optimistic about the future as Russia has
$23 billion in new weapons contracts already on the books: “These orders will
be fulfilled starting in 2007, and our annual sales will exceed $7 billion
starting in 2007." (14) India and China are the primary recipients
of Russian hardware. Vyacheslav
Dzirkaln, deputy head of the Federal Military-Technical Cooperation Service
stated, "More than $7 billion worth of weapons and military hardware were
sold to India in the last five years.
We are working on nearly $10 billion worth of new contracts with India
nowadays." (15) Russian
military exports to China continue to be strong particularly in the wake of
last year’s Peace Mission 2005 joint military exercises.
Russia also is beginning to diversify its customer base to
maintain strong growth in the arms export business. Indonesia and Malaysia have made large purchases and Vietnam
has agreed to a billion dollar deal for Russian naval ships, missiles, and
aircraft. (16) In the Middle East,
Russia plans to continue a billion dollar deal to sell twenty-nine Tor-M1 and
Pechora-A2 air defense systems to Iran, despite international concern over
Iran’s nuclear program. Russia
also continues to cultivate business in Syria. (17) In Latin
America, demand for Russian arms continues to grow particularly in countries
such Venezuela that have adversarial relationships with the US. Venezuela recently purchased 100,000
Kalashnikov rifles from Russia and is considering buying more AK-47s and
perhaps even MiG fighters, much to the chagrin of the US. (18) Russia is undeterred by the prospect of
US disapproval on arms sales in Latin America. As Dmitriyev states, “If Venezuela wants to get MiGs, we are
ready to cooperate.” (19)
In Africa, Russia is poised to consummate the single
largest post Soviet defense export deal with a $4 billion package of arms to
Algeria. The basic agreement has
already been hammered out and is awaiting a planned visit by Putin in February
or March. The list of weapons
includes Mig-29 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, S-300 air defense systems, and T-90
battle tanks along with additional maintenance and support contracts. (20) If this sale proceeds as planned,
Algeria could account for as much as 20 percent of Russia’s military exports in
the near-future. (21)
Furthermore, Russia is innovating to improve maintenance
and servicing of its arms exports.
In the post-Soviet era, Russia’s indifference or inability to provide
logistics and maintenance support to clients has been a significant liability,
in contrast to Western arms dealers.
Russia appears to have re-discovered that much of the profit in arms
deals is in long-term support and is now planning to increase and upgrade its
customer service operation.
Dmitriyev said that new or expanded weapons service centers are being
considered worldwide and specifically mentioned Vietnam, China, Ethiopia,
Jordan, Algeria, and Venezuela as possible sites. (22)
Source Notes:
(1) “Sergei Ivanov Tours His
New Job By Tank,” Kommersant, 23 Nov
05, WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) “Mikhail Fradkov Distributed
The State Defense Order,” Kommersant, 1
Dec 05, WPS What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets.
(5) “There May Be Variants,” Vremya novostei, 28 Nov 05, RusData Dialine -
Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis.
(6) “Mikhail Fradkov Denies Sergei Ivanov An Agency,” Kommersant, 30 Nov 05, WPS Defense and
Security via Lexis-Nexis.
(7) Ibid.
(8) “Options Are Possible,” Vremya novostei, 28 Nov 05, WPS Defense and
Security via Lexis-Nexis.
(9) “Oligarchy In Epaulettes,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Nov 05, RusData Dialine -
Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis.
(10) Ibid
(11) “A Technical Successor--Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov May Be Soon Be Replaced By The Next President Of Russia,” Novye izvestia, 9 Feb 06, WPS What the Papers
Say via Lexis-Nexis.
(12) “No Increase In Russian Military Production Despite
Better Funding,” Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 4 Dec 05,
BBC Monitoring International Reports via Lexis-Nexis.
(13) “Russia's Arms Sales Last Year Totaled US$6.1
Billion, Setting New Post-Soviet Record,” Associated Press Worldstream, 9 Feb
06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(14) Ibid.
(15) “Russia Will Flood India With Military Hardware;
Unless The United States Does It First,” Kommersant, 3 Feb 06, WPS Defense and
Security via Lexis-Nexis.
(16) “Russia To Supply Super
Modern Armament To Vietnam,” Vedomosti, 17 Jan 06, WPS Russian Business Monitor via
Lexis-Nexis.
(17) “Rosoboroneksport Is Doubling Sales,” Nezavisimaya
gazeta, 10 Feb
06, WPS What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis.
(18) “Russia's Arms Sales Last Year Totaled US$6.1
Billion, Setting New Post-Soviet Record,” Associated Press Worldstream, 9 Feb
06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(19) Ibid.
(20) “Russia, Algeria to Strike $4 Billion Arms Sale Deal,”
Moscow Times, 26 Jan 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(21) Ibid.
(22) “Russia's Arms Sales Last Year Totaled US$6.1
Billion, Setting New Post-Soviet Record,” Associated Press Worldstream, 9 Feb
06 via Lexis-Nexis.
By Jeffrey Butler (butler88@bu.edu)
~~~~~
ARMED FORCES (EXTERNAL)
Georgia and Russia: Approaching the boiling point
Givi Targamadze, head of Georgia’s parliamentary Defense
and Security Committee, had unusually strong words for Russia on 6 February
when he threatened that Georgia would use force to expedite the removal of
Russian “peacekeepers” from his country. (1) Targamadze’s statements typified the rhetoric of what has
been a particularly busy year for leaders in Georgia and Russia looking to
affect the outcome of the conflicts in separatist Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. As Georgia’s parliament
formally prepares to debate the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the
republics, Georgia has turned up its rhetoric on the issue. Once again,
while politicians on both sides of the debate stoke the fires, Russian and
Georgian troops find themselves in a simmering cauldron that threatens to boil
over into armed conflict.
Political rhetoric in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Last October, the Georgian parliament may have planted the
seeds for the current war of words when legislators set February 2006 and July
2006 deadlines to complete their evaluation of the effectiveness of Russian
“peacekeepers” stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (2) Although it
seems pre-determined that these evaluations would find Russian “peacekeepers”
ineffective, tensions between Georgia and Russia have escalated as the
politicians’ deadlines approached.
Much of the rhetoric centers on South Ossetia. On 10
January, officials from South Ossetia accused Georgia of deploying troops to
the region in violation of existing agreements. (3) Moreover, Russian
Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Force in
the conflict zone, charged Georgian politicians with “aggressive” statements
that make the demilitarization of the region and disarmament of illegally armed
groups there impossible. (4) These charges seem to offer Russia more
excuse to claim that its peacekeepers cannot be asked to leave the
area.
In response to accusations leveled by Russia and South
Ossetia, the Georgian Foreign Ministry has reiterated its long-held position
that Russia illegally provides armament to South Ossetian forces. (5) This
claim dovetails with Georgia’s more fundamental complaint that Russian
“peacekeepers” do not fulfill their mandate of disbanding illegal armed
formations, disarming “self-defense forces,” and preventing the concentration
of heavy weaponry in the conflict zone. (6) Georgian Foreign Minister
Gela Bezhuashvili furthered his government’s position in a plea for support he
made 25 January to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.
In his statements, Bezhuashvili argued that Russia is the chief impediment to a
solution in the region. (7) Although the EU likely will be slow to act on
Bezhuashvili’s plea, Georgia appears to be building its case for any future
steps it might take in South Ossetia.
Matters are not much different in Abkhazia. The day
following Bezhuashvili’s remarks about Russia and the conflict in South
Ossetia, Russia seemed to take a step back in its stated commitment to solving
the conflict in Abkhazia. Specifically, during a 26 January meeting of
the United Nations Security Council, Russia made clear it no longer supports
the “Boden Paper” as a basis for negotiations on Abkhazia’s status within
Georgia. Although Abkhaz officials never before had accepted the
document, crafted by German diplomat Dieter Boden, this was the first time
Russian officials explicitly denied the document’s viability. Furthermore,
at the same meeting, Security Council members voted to extend the United
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) by only two months, far short of
the six-month extension that heretofore had been the norm. (8) Ending the
UNOMIG early could prove convenient for parties that do not want international
observers present in a conflict zone.
Georgia’s Armed Forces
The questioning of Georgia’s military status looms large
in the issues at hand. Russian officials, along with those of Abkhaz and
South Ossetian secessionists, have questioned Georgia’s recent military
build-up. Perhaps they are alluding to the fact that Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili, on 5 January, signed into law plans to expand Georgia’s armed
forces from 21,550 personnel to 31,878 personnel, an increase of nearly 50%.
(9) Moreover, additional plans for changes in Georgia’s military seem
consistent with Georgia’s intent to join NATO. On 3 February, Georgian
President Saakashvili confirmed Georgia’s desires for military accession to
NATO in a speech he made at the annual Munich international security
conference, just one day after he signed a decree to end Georgia’s
participation in the CIS Defense Council. (10) Georgia’s three-pronged
approach of increasing the size of its military, disengaging from CIS
structures, setting Georgia on a course for NATO membership likely will produce
a series of repercussions, including the intensification of tension between its
troops and those from Russia or the breakaway republics.
Georgian forces increasingly seem positioned for
confrontation with Russian troops. In a 3 February announcement, Georgian
authorities voiced their suspicions that a Russian-made “Igla” surface-to-air
missile discovered near South Ossetia was intended for use by South Ossetian
terrorists who planned to assassinate President Saakashvili by shooting down
his helicopter. Furthermore, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili
stated that the missile could only have been “brought [to South Ossetia] from
Russia through the help of Ossetians.” (11) Givi Targamadze went further
than Okruashvili and suggested that Russian forces could have tipped-off South
Ossetian terrorists of Saakashvili’s travel plans. (12) Although the validity
of Georgia’s claims has not been ascertained, they nonetheless seem well-timed
to garner political leverage before the 15 February vote by Georgia’s
parliament on whether to call for the withdrawal of Russian “peacekeepers” from
South Ossetia.
A vote calling for the withdrawal of Russian “peacekeepers”
would not be surprising, nor would the call be unprecedented. Still, both sides
seem primed for a confrontation. On 31 January fistfights reportedly broke out
between Georgian police and Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia following
the police officers’ attempts to tow the “peacekeepers’” military vehicle after
an accident. Reportedly, the fights did not break-up until shots were fired
– into the air. (13) More serious is the insinuation made on 26
January that Georgian police abducted and killed an Ossetian man in the village
of Kekhvi. (14) These allegations, made by the Foreign Ministry of the
unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, preceded claims by South Ossetian
President Eduard Kokoity that Georgia had deployed 500 servicemen to the
republic in the hopes of provoking armed conflicts with Russian peacekeepers.
(15)
Clashes in South Ossetia continue. On 9 February Georgia
announced that its military police reportedly arrested three Russian
“peacekeepers” in South Ossetia on charges of visa violations. (16) Reportedly,
there was no violence in the arrests; nonetheless, the move undoubtedly
exacerbated the risks of future conflict. In response to the arrests, Russian
Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov claimed, “I believe this incident is yet
another gross provocation carried out, once again, by units of the Georgian
Defense Ministry. At this stage, we’ve reinforced all our checkpoints and
taken all steps so as to not allow any forceful incident to occur.” (17)
More to come…
Georgia’s parliament is scheduled to make a final decision
on the presence of Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia by 15 February. (18)
A similar decision regarding Abkhazia is scheduled for July. (19) In both
cases, it seems a given that Georgia’s lawmakers will rule against the presence
of Russian troops in the regions. The next step after such a
vote would be for Georgia’s executive branch formally to demand that Russia
withdraw all of its troops. If President Saakashvili’s government makes this oft-repeated
demand, the difference from past experiences will be the political and military
leverage Georgia and Russia have applied to each other in the months leading up
to their inevitable confrontation. (For more on the situation in Georgia,
please see the Caucasus Report, below).
Military Lagniappe*
In other Georgian military news, the head of Georgia’s
National Guard abruptly resigned on 25 January after serving in his post for
only 10 days. (20) The resignation of Lt-General Giorgi Tatukhashvili appears
to be unrelated to Georgia’s recent spats with Russia over the presence of
Russian “peacekeepers” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, it seems
likely Tatukhasvili was a casualty of an on-going political battle between
President Saakashvili, who appointed Tatukhasvili, and the president’s Defense
Minister, Irakli Okruashvili. The Defense Minister, who in the past two years
also has served as Georgia’s Prosecutor General and Interior Minister,
reportedly appointed a successor for Tatukhashvili before Saakashvili could
accept his resignation.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has reiterated his
government’s position that Russia will not withdraw its 1,500 peacekeeping
troops from Moldova’s breakaway Transdniester republic. Ivanov made this
announcement just two days after Russian President Vladimir Putin lamented what
he suggested was the unacceptable state of Russian-Moldovan relations. (22)
*Lagniappe (‘lan – yap) n. something given or obtained
gratuitously, something extra.
Source Notes:
(1) “Georgian Parliament Gears Up for Debate on Russian
Peacekeepers,” LF, 7 Feb 06, RFE/RL Volume 10, Number 23, Part I.
(2) “Moscow Kills Boden Paper, Threatens to Terminate
UNOMIG in Georgia,” Socor, Vladimir, 7 Feb 06, Eurasia Daily Monitor (EDM),
Volume 3, Issue 26.
(3) “Georgian Officer Defends Rotation of Peacekeepers in
South Ossetia,” LF, 11 Jan 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 5, Part I.
(4) Ibid.
(5) “South Ossetia Denies it Receives Weaponry from
Russia,” LF, 23 Jan 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 12, Part I.
(6) “Georgian Parliament Gears Up for Debate on Russian
Peacekeepers,” Ibid.
(7) “Georgia: Foreign Minister Pushes for EU Backing in
Standoffs with Russia,” Lobjakas, Ahto, 25 Jan 06, RFE/RL via www.rferl.org.
(8) “Moscow Kills Boden Paper, Threatens to Terminate
UNOMIG in Georgia,” Ibid.
(9) “Georgian president sanctions military build-up,”
RIA Novosti, 5
Jan 06, via http://en.rian.ru/world/20060105/42864390.
(10) “President Appeals for Georgia to be Admitted to
NATO,” LF, 6 Feb 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 22, Part I.
(11) “Tbilisi Claims to have Thwarted Attempt on
Saakashvili’s Life,” Anjaparidze, Zaal, 9 Feb 06, EDM Vol. 3, Issue 28.
(12) Ibid.
(13) “Russians, Georgians Come to Blows in South Ossetia,”
AP, Caucasus Press, 1 Feb 06, RFE/RL via www.rferl.org.
(14) “South Ossetia Blames Killing on Georgians,” LF, 1
Feb 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 19, Part I.
(15) Ibid.
(16) “Georgia: Foreign Minister Pushes for EU Backing in
Standoffs with Russia,” Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) “Moscow Kills Boden Paper, Threatens to Terminate
UNOMIG in Georgia,” Ibid.
(20) “Head of Georgia’s National Guard Resigns after 10
Days,” Anjaparidze, Zaal, 1 Feb 06, EDM Vol. 3, Issue 22.
(21) Ibid.
(22) “Russian Defense Minister Says Troops will Stay in
Transdniester,” LF, 6 Feb 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 22, Part II.
By J. Marcel LeBlanc (jleblanc@bu.edu)
~~~~~
CAUCASUS
GEORGIA
What will Tbilisi do?
For months now, officials from Georgia, the breakaway
region of South Ossetia and Russia have been ratcheting up the rhetoric. And tensions have been increasing, to
such an extent that few would have been surprised had armed conflict
begun. Indeed, war almost began
last week between “peacekeeping” regiments.
This week, the Georgian parliament is scheduled to discuss
issuing a demand that Russian “peacekeepers” leave South Ossetia, based on the
belief that the Joint Control Commission (JCC), a quadripartite group
consisting of Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia and North Ossetia, has not managed
to resolve the issue of South Ossetian demands for independence. But how much weight would such a
declaration have? None, according
to Russian and South Ossetian officials. “Peacekeepers will continue fulfilling their task anyway
because the Georgian parliament’s decision means nothing for peacekeepers. Firstly, we are subordinated to the
control commission for settling the conflict. Secondly, the decision to deploy peacekeepers was made by
the Russian and Georgian presidents in 1992,” claimed Marat Kulakhmetov,
commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. He warned in a decidedly
non-peacekeeping tone that “Georgian military or police units sent to the
conflict zone will turn into cannon fodder.” (1)
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and his ministers
have been laying the groundwork for increased hostilities and/or a change of
peacekeeping authority in the conflict region. Saakashvili has sought an alternative framework to the
conflict resolution, arguing that the JCC is ineffective and obstructionist.
(2) And Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli continues to carry that banner,
charging Russia with “the stalling of the peace process.” (3)
Recent actions are beginning to speak almost as loud as the words. Reportedly in response to a traffic accident in Abkhazia involving a vehicle driven by a Georgian citizen and a Russian army vehicle, hundreds of Georgian troops were brought in.